THE CONCEPT OF ASYMMETRICAL POLICING

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the intelligence process and the strategies of problem-oriented policing, community policing, broken windows theory and Compstat. Each of these strategies requires more than just information. They require collection and dissemination of intelligence products and adjustments to meet the needs of different department and agencies. The research suggests that there is a lack of understanding by many police officers in the United States of the intelligence process and the value of analytical products to policing. There is a recognized need for training of police in the U.S. to achieve identification and understanding of crime, the trends and threats, and the nature and extent of the law enforcement response by employing critical thinking, or what is termed the intelligence process and intelligence-led policing. The paper introduces a new concept, asymmetrical policing, which is a response to the asymmetrical threats encountered by modern policing and the application of a variety of evolving strategies to modern policing.

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INTRODUCTION

Unlike major law enforcement organizations the average police department in the United States has fewer than fifty officers (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002). Seventy-five percent have less than twenty-five sworn officers. These small departments comprised the majority of police departments in the U.S. In states such as Mississippi, not unlike many other rural states, these departments may have little exposure to the intelligence process as opposed to the considerable assets of a city such as New York. However, these small departments have the capacity to develop and disseminate valuable information ranging from national security to crime trends and organized crime. As early as 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals strongly recommended that all law enforcement agencies established and maintain the ability to develop and disseminate intelligence. The recommendations included establishing a central deposit and dissemination system in each state, and that agencies with seventy-five or more employees have an intelligence unit within its organization.

These agencies may also develop and apply strategies normally seen in large departments such as New York City or Los Angeles. The strategies include problem oriented policing (Goldstein, 1990), community policing (Allendar, 2004), broken windows theory that is attributed to James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (1982), Compstat, developed by the New York City Police Department, and intelligence-led policing/intelligence-driven policing introduced by Great Britain in the 1990's. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, but can be employed together to better address law enforcement issues and challenges. However, the intelligence process plays a role in each of these strategies and it is critical that both large and small law enforcement entities have an understanding and are involved in the intelligence process. The first objective of this paper is to examine the nexus of intelligence-led policing to the concepts of community and problem oriented policing, broken windows theory, and Compstat. The second

objective of the paper is to introduce asymmetrical policing as a term that best describes the direction of modern policing that is necessary to meet the challenges of the dynamic threats that present significant challenges to law enforcement. The paper will list and define the concept of asymmetric threats, and discuss why they require asymmetrical policing. Due to the enormous differences in organizations and their capabilities, a level of achievement in the intelligence process should be described that is possible for law enforcement at any level, regardless of size or geographic location.

THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING PLAN

In March 2002, the International Association of Chiefs of Policing (IACP) and the U.S. Government organized a summit of experts in criminal intelligence who developed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. The objective of this plan which was revised in June 2005 is to develop solutions and approaches for a cohesive plan to develop and share intelligence. As a result of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was formed to further develop and oversee the national plan. The GIWG recognized the importance of the smaller local agencies to develop, gather, access, receive, and share intelligence information that is critical to public safety and national security. The plan outlines the responsibility of agencies, how they can be involved, and how to improve the intelligence process. The vision of the GIWG included a mechanism to promote and develop intelligence- led policing. The primary purpose of the recommendations of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan is to provide public safety decision makers with the information needed to protect the lives of citizens. The plan contained twenty-eight specific recommendations to achieve this purpose. Additionally, the plan called for a national model for intelligence training and a model for intelligence process principles and policing. Training standards are now being established in almost every state. Other major concerns and recommendations of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan involved interoperability of existing systems and the protection of individual privacy and constitutional rights. The plan calls for the development of sound, professional intelligence analytical products which support intelligence-led policing. The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) was established as suggested by the IACP to advise the U.S. Congress,

the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security on intelligence use, and works under the Global Advisory Committee until it is operational. The CICC has representatives from state, local, tribal, and federal agencies. These entities partner with other public and private sectors to provide intelligence.

Under the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan agencies involved in the intelligence process are to adopt the standards of the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies Federal Regulation (28 CFR Part 23) and use the International Association of Chiefs of Police criminal intelligence model policy when implementing the intelligence function. Other recommendations include minimum standards for intelligence analyst including training standards. Background investigations on sworn and non sworn personnel are to be conducted initially and every three years.

Inadequacies of the law enforcement intelligence process were contributing factors in not preventing the 9-11 events. The events of September 11 demolished the sense of invulnerability to a foreign hostile action and paralyzed New York financial markets which impacted the economy of the United States. The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan is designed to support the concept of Intelligence led policing and is now a priority of law enforcement by the United States Government. Intelligence must be a function that all law enforcement can use, regardless of size or location. Four levels of intelligence function can be part of a national plan. These include the highest level, producing tactical and strategic intelligence products for the benefit of any law enforcement agency, to the lowest level of assigning a person to intelligence operations, enhancing the department's knowledge of intelligence and using analytic products (The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 2005).

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING -A DEFINITION

Intelligence-led policing also known as intelligence-driven policing originated in the United Kingdom or Great Britain in the early 1990's. Due to an increase in property crime, the Kent constabulary began prioritizing calls for service and referring the less serious calls to other entities. This concept allowed the police to focus their resources on groups or individuals who where responsible for the majority of the property crime. The concept resulted in a dramatic reduction in

crime and better use of police resources. The emphasis was shifted from crimes to criminals. The intelligence developed on targeted criminals resulted in arrest of those responsible for the majority of crimes and produced a more efficient and effective law enforcement effort. Known as the Kent Policing Model, the concept or strategy led to the policing with intelligence report in 1997 (HMIC, 1997).

Ratcliffe (2003) defined intelligence-led policing as the application of criminal intelligence analysis to decision making to facilitate a reduction in crime, prevent crime through effective strategies, and create partnerships that assist in this effort. The purposes of Intelligence-led policing are:

- Targeting repeat or active offenders;

- Identify and address hot spots;

- Linking crimes and incidents.

- Application of measures to prevent crime and disorder (NCIS 2000).

Intelligence is a value-added product produced by a process involving a continuous cycle of planning and direction, collection, processing, collation, analysis, dissemination, and revaluation. The cycle is never ending and like the Deming Cycle of Plan, Do, Study, and ACT, it results in continuous improvement. The Deming Cycle was originally known as the Shewhart Cycle named from its founder Walter Shewhart. Many of the concepts discussed in this paper may well have had their beginning in the idea presented in the quality movement introduced by gurus such as W. Edward Deming, J.M. Juran, and Philip B. Crosby.[1] It is interesting to note that this process of the Deming Cycle is very similar to the SARA problem solving process (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment), an acronym first proposed by John Eck and Bill Spelman (1987) and then presented by Goldstein (1990) in his book *Problem-Oriented Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officers*. More recently, the British Home Office described the SARA process as consisting of intelligence, intervention,

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[1] For a discussion of Total Quality Management (TQM) see Dean's and Evan's book, *Total Quality-Management Organization and Strategy* published in 1994 and *The Deming Management Method* by Mary Walton published in 1990.

implementation, involvement, and impact and process evaluation (the 5 I's) which resembles the essential elements of intelligence-led policing.

The IACP summit participants, who developed the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (2005), identified five major impediments to the intelligence process:

- lack of intelligence policies, standards, and procedures;

- lack of analytical support and trained analysis including compatible software and equipment;

- a system that does not foster sharing information;

- lack of sharing, trust, and communication;

- lack of a working technology infrastructure.

Intelligence-led policing bases police strategies and tactics on sound, accurate, and timely intelligence products. Solutions to problems require prioritizing a specific criminal activity, and identifying the most efficient and effective response. However, responses are not necessarily law enforcement. Responses may include community involvement, external agencies involvement, education, environmental, and partnerships that may well extend to the international community.[2]

THE INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING AND CRIME REDUCTION PROCESS

The strategy for intelligence-led policing involves a model which demonstrates how the concept is effective and efficient resulting in crime reduction process. Ratcliffe (2003) presented the model below as the process of intelligence-led policing.

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[2] A thorough discussion of criminal analysis strategies can be found in the text by Thomas E. Baker (2005), *Introductory Criminal Analysis, Crime Prevention and Intervention Strategies*.

Figure 1

Ratcliffe (2003) explained the model (figure 1) as having a positive impact on the criminal environment that is dynamic and fluid but will continue to exist. Three steps or stages include: interpreting (stage 1) the criminal environment by intelligence unit; influencing (stage 2) decision-makers who have the ability to impact the criminal environment; the final stage, (stage 3), results in an impact (reduction of crime) by decision-makers on the criminal environment. In states such as Mississippi, which is considered a rural policing environment, the strategies of intelligence-led policing will be different than the strategies for an urban setting. However, the model will still result in crime reduction if effective police strategies are created by skilled and enthusiastic decision makers who are influenced by effective intelligence products.

The Relationship of Intelligence-led Policing to Other Major Strategies

Broken windows theory suggests policing incivilities and maintaining order to reduce major crime. The strategy focuses on identifying deteriorating neighborhoods and addressing small offenses that may lead to major criminal acts, cleaning up the environment, and policing small offenses which reduce major crime (Goldstein, 1990). However, all small offenses do not always result in the development of major offenses. Intelligence and crime analysts determine which minor offenses and offenders led to major criminal activity. Addressing small offenses does not always reduce serious crime; controlling graffiti on disorder problems may not reduce such crimes as robbery or assault. Intelligence-led policing which focuses on accurate information to guide police operations can result in better application of the broken windows theory or strategy.

Problem-oriented policing (POP) using the SARA model addresses the process of specific solutions after analysis of the underlying causes of each problem. This concept is very similar to Deming's discussion of "root causes" to problems under the total quality management philosophy. Intelligence-led policing involves the process of SARA and the PDSA cycle to produce intelligence that has application to policing and solving problems. The response of analysis and assessment is the outcome of intelligence-led policing. Both POP and SARA can be, and are often incorporated into intelligence-led policing. POP uses more statistical and incident based analysis (criminal analysis) than strategic intelligence. While crime analyst data are used for investigative purposes, intelligence analysis develops models of major problems or criminal organizations creating data that are used as guidance for decision makers. Crime analysis and intelligence analysis both fall under the broad concept of criminal analysis.[3] Broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) offers only the broad concept or solution of policing incivilities and maintaining order. POP develops specific solutions to specific problems for long term reduction of crime. The POP philosophy is that prevention is more effective than enforcement. POP is also an important part of the community policing model which is a much broader philosophy than POP.[4]

Community policing (COP) or community oriented policing (Allendar, 2004) focuses more on partnerships and relations than POP or broken windows theory. This philosophy strives to increase public confidence. COP includes problem solving, crime prevention and partnerships. Community policing officers have relationships with citizens who can provide information that is essential to the intelligence process. Citizens and partners of COP are important in developing intelligence sharing plans and can provide information that may well prevent another 9-11. Both COP and POP are not at odds with the intelligence-led strategy and all can merge to form a more effective strategy.

Compstat is still another strategy that requires sound, accurate, and timely intelligence. Both POP and Compstat share similarities by focusing on crime problems that are specific; Compstat focuses on geographic hot spots and POP on

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[3] For a more through discussion of criminal analysis see *Applications in Criminal Analysis, A Source book* by Marilyn B. Peterson (1998).

[4] For a complete discussion of the POP process see *Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps* by Ronald Clarke and John Eck (2005). This work includes a discussion of the problem analysis triangle.

recurring crime problems in a larger geographic area. By using crime mapping techniques and ensuring command accountability, the Compstat strategy suggests that eliminating hot spots reduces overall crime. Again, the Compstat strategy has four principles that are similar to the SARA and PDSA models. These principles include accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid deployment of personnel and resources, and relentless follow-up and assessment. Compstat focuses on controlling serious crime for public safety. Collecting, analyzing and mapping crime data and measuring police performance to hold police leaders accountable are the strategies of Compstat. Like COP, POP, and broken windows theory, this strategy is not in opposition to intelligence-led policies and can blend with the strategy of intelligence-led policing. Compstat is now widely employed in major cities in the U.K and the U.S. and is credited with police-oriented crime reduction. Other countries, including Australia, have adopted many of the principles of Compstat and have also equally recognized the value of intelligence-led policing.[5]

From the research it is evident that the four approaches or strategies mentioned above can and do work with the strategy of intelligence-led policing. The core elements and the processes of each of these strategies can and do mutually augment the effectiveness of the other strategies. The merging or incorporating these strategies might be termed a type or concept of "Asymmetrical Policing". The challenges of policing are asymmetrical and require a variety of strategies to address the diverse and complex problems of public safety.

THE ASYMMETRICAL POLICING CONCEPT

The law enforcement process in the United States has evolved since its inception and during that evolution legal based or both state and federal constitutional restrictions have been applied, by what is often termed as case law, impacting law enforcement operations that resulted in a US system that is unique. Unlike a system in which the rule of law or the national government permits unlimited or slightly restricted police powers (Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, etc), the law enforcement effort as seen in the United States is restricted in its operations. This restriction is one element that creates an imbalance between law enforcement and

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[5] For a complete discussion of Compstat see articles by Jon Shane in the *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, April, May, and June issues, 2004.

the criminal element. As law enforcement is restricted by rules related to search and seizure, arrest, etc, the criminal element operates outside those restrictions which present an asymmetrical threat. Law enforcement must find ways to counter-balance those restrictions while still ensuring that the law enforcement effort operates clearly within the rule of law.

Before explaining the term Asymmetrical Policing, an explanation of the asymmetric threats is required. Asymmetric threat is a term used to describe attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent's strengths. The asymmetric attack alters the "battlespace" within which conflict occurs. By exploiting a weaknesses and using methods that differ significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operation, the superiority of the foe is overcome (La Carte, 2002). The modern asymmetric threats include terrorism (domestic and international), transnational organized crime, information warfare and cyber crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical, and radiological products), emerging criminal groups such as MS-13, natural disasters, numerous emerging criminal markets, expanding illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration and human trafficking. Many of the threats consist of perpetrators that are highly specialized who employ techniques and technology with a high level of sophistication that seek to exploit asymmetries in legal, administrative, and economic areas of governments. The globalization of crime and the nature or source of these threats presents an increasing problem in areas of jurisdiction, responsibility, and information sharing because these threats operate across national borders or outside the sovereign domain of a nation. The erosion of borders, advances in technology, unpredictability of criminal activity, and the ability of criminal organization to travel anywhere, anytime, and deliver any product or service demanded does indeed change the battlespace.

Asymmetrical Policing best describes the new and diverse methods that address today's laws enforcement challenges. The essence of Asymmetrical Policing is that law enforcement has become even more than ever the inferior force in terms of the traditional resources of money, manpower, equipment, and time. Law enforcement is truly a "thin blue line" given the diverse, complex, dangerous, and numerous threats and challenges it now faces. In addition to the concepts of Compstat, COP, POP, intelligence-led policing, and broken windows theory, the

most common responses in the U.S. to these asymmetric threats have included the establishment of task forces to address specific problems or criminal groups: the joint terrorism task forces, Russian organized crime task forces, MS-13 task force, establishing departments of homeland security (state and federal), cyber crime units (local, state, and federal), and natural disaster task forces, i.e. hurricane Katrina. Other responses have included the assignment of officers or agents by major departments or agencies to work in nations and governments where the criminal group is based. Law enforcement of any one nation or law enforcement alone cannot effectively address the numerous asymmetric threats and must be involved as partners in corporate and financial operations or investigations worldwide. Asymmetrical Policing requires partnerships with businesses, military, and a number of diverse international entities to improve in areas such collection of human intelligence. Law enforcement must anticipate criminal activity, the trends and patterns to remain on the cutting edge of concepts that can successfully address modern challenges. Law enforcement must not only employ responses at different times and geographic locations, but employ new and innovative approaches to deal with evolving complex crime and natural disasters in addition to new approaches to traditional crimes. The creation of a new "battlespace" is created in part by law enforcement by establishing alliances with other entities such as the military and the corporate world while diminishing inter-agency and international barriers. Most of these responses will depend upon intelligence or the concept of intelligence-led policing and continuous problem solving through critical thinking. Just because a response or strategy is working today does not mean it will continue to be effective. For law enforcement in the United States, which has been traditionally burdened by jurisdictional, budgetary, leadership, and political and resource limitations, the ability to respond to crime and the criminal element is seriously challenged. The criminal element may have the technological advantage which has redefined crime and criminal capabilities. From the law enforcement position, tactical success of asymmetric policing is virtually identical to the factors that define success in asymmetric warfare. Law enforcement must now respond to traditional crimes as well as emerging crimes and threats with essentially the same resources. Asymmetrical policing employs a constantly evolving and changing response to both traditional crime and non-traditional crime. Asymmetrical crime does now more than ever require

Asymmetrical Policing. This concept will mandate that both small law enforcement departments and corrections become sources of intelligence and more involved in the intelligence process.

CURRENT STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Since the events of 9-11, there has been a significant proliferation of intelligence based sharing systems. The concept of "fusion centers" has been established in more than thirty-five states in the U.S. with more in the planning stage. These centers were created as clearing houses for domestic generated data including strategic and operational or tactical intelligence. These centers operate 24/7 and provide information and intelligence products to a range of users including patrol officers, investigators, and decision makers or management. The information provided by these centers includes criminal activities of individuals or groups and analysis of crime trends or patterns. Funded by both federal and state sources, the approach most recommended by intelligence unit personnel is to include all criminal activity including terrorism in the data banks and intelligence products generated by the centers. The "all crimes" approach was well received by intelligence personnel in Mississippi, who were contacted by the author to obtain their comments and suggestions regarding the intelligence function in Mississippi.

RESEARCH IN MISSISSIPPI

The author contacted twelve analysts from a variety of centers in Mississippi that either have an intelligence function or are planning to establish a unit. The Jackson Police Department (JPD) currently operates under a Compstat program. They employ six analysts who are crime analysts that support Compstat. The department is currently planning to establish an intelligence unit that will complement the department's mission. The analysts contacted emphasized the need for training of officers who had little understanding of the intelligence function and were not aware of the difference between crime analyst and intelligence analyst functions and products.

The research found that there were very few departments or agencies in Mississippi that employed intelligence analysts or crime analysts. Gulfport, Mississippi has 203 officers, but only one intelligence officer who also functions

as a crime analyst to support a Compstat program. There are no large departments in Mississippi; JPD is the largest currently with 435 sworn officers. In rural states such as Mississippi, law enforcement depends on state or regional systems for criminal intelligence on crime analyst products. Mississippi has the Criminal Information Center that is the central depository of criminal court depositions and the automated finger print information system. Both the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation (MBI) and the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics (MBN) have intelligence functions that are mostly in-house systems for agent support.

An improved information system has been developed on the Mississippi Gulf Coast under the guidance of the Harrison County Sheriff's office in Mississippi. This automated system project has improved the "Triple I" query to include misdemeanors, arrest, and pending case information on individuals from all participating departments. The system is endorsed by its users, but funding which is currently by a federal grant expires in 2008. The cost to users is uncertain after this date, but is now being planned to ensure the program's continual existence. The concept may well be expanded state wide and into other states that have expressed an interest.

The Department of Public Safety which includes MBI, MBN and The Department of Homeland Security is planning to create a fusion center for the state of Mississippi modeled after fusion centers in the states of Maryland, Illinois, and Iowa. The question remains what data bases the center will search and how the center will serve and generate intelligence products. Other questions are how interoperability with the numerous systems will be obtained. Will the "all crimes" approach be employed in Mississippi? The creation of still another system without regard to existing systems in Mississippi, federal systems, and systems in other states is problematic. The patrol officer and investigator needs timely, complete, accurate and "one-stop shopping" information to be more effective.

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA) has a system known as "Safety Net" that is connects forty-three state HIDTA programs for target, events, and other data. Pointer systems are popular with most systems and are probably the likely choice for a fusion center in Mississippi that would include, state, federal, and local queries. According to the director of HIDTA in the Jackson, MS area, there is much duplication in reporting of seizures such as

clandestine labs, drug seizures and currency seizures. There is a need for more accurate reporting of events and seizures to better understand patterns and trends. Still another problem is the lack of uniform or standard reporting forms for data that will be entered into a state wide clearing house of information. If data cannot be entered accurately, then the analysis of this data will be misleading for users of the intelligence products generated.

Other concerns of the analysts contacted by the author were the apparent lack of funding, support, and resources for the intelligence and crime analyst functions. Lack of technology, training, and personnel were problem areas according to respondents contacted by the author. The choice of software was a major problem due to the large number of companies offering products that may or may not work for the department. Many of these products are very expensive and some are very complicated with continuous maintenance needed. The most common solution offered by the analysts was to network existing systems that have worked well for an extended period of time for similar states, agencies, or departments. In other words, we do not have to reinvent the wheel when it comes to software and systems for crime and intelligence analysis.

OTHER INITIATIVES AND RESEARCH THAT SUPPORTS INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

In 2003 in response to the mandate to share strategic and tactical intelligence by federal, state, or local law enforcement, the FBI created field intelligence groups in 56 field offices. These groups are comprised of special agents, analysts, and others. The objective of these units/ groups is to provide intelligence products to help guide investigations and policy decisions by the law enforcement community. These groups also form liaisons with key community leaders, businesses and service agencies to collect and relay critical information. This sharing beyond law enforcement may well add to a safer community and reduction in crime (Spiller, 2006).

New Jersey State police created a Statewide Intelligence Management Systems (SIMS) to consolidate law enforcement intelligence and enforcement resources to become more proactive by connecting all law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in the State of New Jersey. The system addresses local crime, organized

crime, and terrorist activity. Menex, Inc. was the provider of the management and analyst solution used by The New Jersey Department of Law and Public Service. The state also provides training free to qualified agencies.

Research by Cope (2004) concluded that policing does rely on intelligence to target and prioritize operations. However, the research found a training need for both officers and analysts and a need for improving quality of information on which intelligence products are based. Cope concluded that there is a gap between theory and practice of the concept of intelligence-led policing. The author's limited research in Mississippi tends to support Cope's conclusions. Mississippi analysts suggested that many officers and decision-makers do not understand the concept, value, and application of criminal analysis which includes intelligence and crime analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

Intelligence-led policing can be successfully blended with the strategies of Compstat, broken windows theory, problem-oriented policing, and community oriented policing. In fact, these strategies depend upon complete, timely and accurate intelligence. Strategies based on intelligence ensure effective problem solving by critical thinking and professional analysis. Although there has been considerable progress since the events of 9-11, a need remains for all law enforcement, including smaller and rural departments, to be involved in intelligence-led policing and information sharing as called for by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan that includes four levels of agency capability or involvement.

The research finds a critical need remains for many states and for a national clearing house for intelligence information and data. However, there are a number of training and technology issues that remain an obstacle to establishing an effective concept of intelligence-led policing. Funding and support are additional areas of concern for establishing this concept.

Intelligence operations or units can be applied to both terrorist/organized crime threats and local community crimes. Gang and organized crime activity are both becoming more transnational and present a significant challenge to law enforcement. Perhaps the concept of "Asymmetrical Policing" addresses this

diverse nature and challenges of modern policing. To become a more effective, criminal justice systems must, balance the needs of local community and major threats such as computer crimes, organized crime and terrorism. Under the broad responses of law enforcement this may be termed the age of "Asymmetrical Policing" which like other strategies involves intelligence or intelligence-led policing. Despite numerous successes by law enforcement there remain significant criminal and other challenges for the future of the global community. Asymmetrical Policing can create the new battlespace and combined strategies needed for modern policing. Deming's concept of total quality management, new ideas and strategies are continuously evolving and emerging. It appears from the research that there is yet work to be done to implement the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and intelligence-led policing in the U.S., Law enforcement should continue to move toward a global sharing plan with other nations to meet modern challenges presented by emerging and dynamic asymmetric threats that terrorism, transnational organized crime, cyber crime, and natural disasters present.

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