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MAPPING STUDY

The Role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Security Sector Governance and Reform

FINAL REPORT

Geneva, 20 December 2013

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About This Report

This report summarizes the key findings of a project entitled “The Role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Security Sector Governance and Reform”, mandated by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs with the support of the OSCE Secretary General. It consists of a mapping and comprehensive review of the OSCE’s role in supporting security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) at both normative and operational levels, and uses desk-based research complemented by interviews with over 170 interlocutors, including representatives of the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and field operations, national counterparts and members of the international community in four selected field contexts: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Tajikistan.

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ACRONYMS

ATU	Action against Terrorism Unit
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMSC	Border Management Staff College
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
CSCE	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DD	Democratization Department
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic acid
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HRD	Human Rights Department
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MC	Ministerial Council
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSP	National Security Policy
OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSG	Office of the Secretary General
OSR/CTHB (SRC/THB)	Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
P2P	Peer to Peer
PA	Parliamentary Assembly
PC	Permanent Council
PESU	Programming and Evaluation Support Unit
POLIS	OSCE's Online Information System on Law Enforcement Activities within the OSCE Area
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSG/R	Security Sector Governance and Reform

SSR	Security Sector Reform
TND	Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department
TNT	Transnational Threats Department
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VERLT	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism

PART I: INTRODUCTION

Security sector governance (SSG) and security sector reform (SSR)¹ are increasingly recognized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its participating States as playing an essential role in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, early warning and crisis management.² It has been noted that the OSCE’s comprehensive and multidimensional approach to security can add value to efforts in the area of SSG.³ At the normative level, security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) concerns are reflected in many of the principles and concepts developed by the OSCE.⁴ At the operational level, the OSCE is actively engaged in supporting SSG/R activities through its Secretariat, institutions and field operations. The 2007 OSCE Spanish Chairmanship’s perception paper on this subject notes that the OSCE has over 30 years of “extensive practical involvement in security sector reform/governance, in particular in relation to activities such as democratic control of armed forces, confidence- and security-building measures, border security and management, counter-terrorism, combating trafficking, police training and reform, anti-corruption, electoral legislation and judiciary reform and the rule of law”.⁵ Moreover, in terms of its operational support, it has been noted that “the OSCE’s added value to international operations is its work in the areas of security sector reform and its role in the stabilisation and democratic processes in transition countries”.⁶

While the OSCE has a wealth of experience in this domain, activities are not implemented as part of a common and coordinated approach to SSG/R. Concerns have been raised that the lack of a coherent approach has limited the effectiveness of its assistance “in both scope and impact”.⁷ Strong calls have emerged from the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and field levels to develop such an approach. For example, the annual reports of the Secretary General on police-related activities have twice called for coherence in the OSCE approach to SSG/R, notably to “link together the operational elements of the Organization in order to guide the formulation of OSCE mission mandates, present a clear statement of purpose in association with existing ones and distinguish between the activities of the OSCE and its international

¹ The concepts of SSG and SSR are defined in Part II of this report.

² OSCE-MC, “Chairmanship’s Perception Paper on OSCE Basic Norms and Principles in the Field of Security Sector Governance/Reform”, OSCE Ministerial Council, Madrid, 30 November 2007, MC.GAL/9/07, www.osce.org/mc/29386.

³ See for example OSCE-MC, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Petras Vaitiekūnas, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, at the 14th OSCE Ministerial Council”, OSCE, Brussels, 4–5 December 2006.

⁴ For example, among others: CSCE-FSC, “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security”, 3 December 1994, DOC.FSC/1/95; CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, 29 June 1990, www.osce.org/odhr/elections/14304; OSCE-MC, “Border Security and Management Concept”, 6 December 2005, MC.DOC/2/05.

⁵ OSCE-MC, note 2 above.

⁶ OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, “Police Reform in Serbia. Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service”, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro Law Enforcement Department, Belgrade, January 2004, p. 35, www.osce.org/serbia/18310.

⁷ Victor-Yves Ghebali, “The OSCE’s SSG/R Operational Activities: A Piecemeal Approach with Limited Results”, in David M. Law (ed.), *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform* (Geneva and Münster: DCAF/LIT Verlag, 2007, p. 133).

counterparts in the future”.⁸ In 2006 the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) underlined the “need for a holistic approach” to SSG/R.⁹ Several field operations have also recognized the value of developing an approach to SSG/R, as reflected by increasing attempts in the field to engage with the concept in their projects and programmes.¹⁰ Finally, several participating States have raised the importance of taking stock of the OSCE’s role in supporting SSG/R.¹¹ Against this background, in 2007 the Spanish Chairmanship sought a Ministerial Council (MC) decision on SSR. Although no MC decision was adopted, the initiative resulted in the release of a Chairmanship’s perception paper on SSR.¹² Since then, discussions on the topic appear to have been rather sporadic until it was raised again in July 2012 at the first annual discussion on the implementation of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.¹³

In preparation for its upcoming Chairmanship in 2014, Switzerland has mandated the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) to conduct a study on the role of the OSCE in supporting SSG/R. The objectives of this study are threefold: (i) to achieve an enhanced understanding of the extensive engagement of the OSCE in SSG/R at both normative and operational levels; (ii) to identify its comparative advantages in SSG/R; and (iii) to reflect on how to enhance the coherence of OSCE activities in this field. The OSCE Secretary General expressed his support to this project in a letter addressed to the head of the Swiss delegation to the OSCE in July 2012, suggesting a phased approach. Accordingly, phase I of the project, completed in 2012, comprised a desk-based mapping that drew on the OSCE’s various annual reports, declarations, outcome documents and press releases, enriched by an initial series of interviews conducted at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna. Phase II was undertaken in 2013 and consisted of a comprehensive review of the OSCE’s role in supporting SSG/R based on systematic interviews with representatives of the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and selected field operations.

The methodology of the study has three strands: desk research, semi-structured interviews and case studies (for more information on methods see Part II). Between 1 October 2012 and 30 September 2013 over 170 people were interviewed for this study (for the list of interviewees see Annex 3), including representatives of the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and field operations, national authorities and civil society, and the international community in four of the 15 current field operations, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Tajikistan – representing two case studies from each of the major regions in which the OSCE is engaged through field operations support.

The study is not an evaluation of the OSCE’s support to SSG/R, but a review based on empirical findings aimed at identifying lessons to be learned and, on this basis, developing

⁸ OSCE, “Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2004”, 29 June 2005, SEC.DOC/2/05, www.osce.org/secretariat/15861; OSCE, “Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2005”, 2 November 2006, SEC.DOC/2/06, www.osce.org/secretariat/22448.

⁹ OSCE-PA, “Brussels Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Fifteenth Annual Session”, OSCE-PA, Brussels, 3–7 July 2006, www.osce.org/pa/19799.

¹⁰ See Part IV of this report.

¹¹ See for example OSCE-MC, “Address by H.E. Jan Kubis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, at the 14th OSCE Ministerial Council”, OSCE, Brussels, 4–5 December 2006.

¹² According to representatives of the OSCE Secretariat, an MC decision was not adopted because there was a lack of consensus among participating states on a strategic framework for SSG/R.

¹³ Theodor H. Winkler, “The Concept and Relevance of Security Sector Governance in an OSCE Context”, keynote speech, Annual Discussion on Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Vienna, 11 July 2012, FSC.DEL/87/12.

policy/practical recommendations for further discussion. In particular, it seeks to feed into the discussions on how the OSCE can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its support, and to contribute to greater coherence in the provision and impact of this support.

This report represents the principal output of the mapping study on the OSCE's role in SSG/R. Following this introduction, Part II provides conceptual and methodological clarifications. Part III consists of a mapping of the OSCE's normative and operational roles in SSG/R, including structures for support and activities supported. It is based mainly on desk research complemented by some interviews, and includes an overview of all 15 field operations. Part IV comprises the comprehensive review of the role of the OSCE. In particular, it examines the OSCE's *de facto* approach to SSG/R, and lessons learned from this approach. It draws primarily on interviews conducted in the Secretariat, institutions and four selected field operations.

In sum, ten key lessons were identified in this study. Accordingly, the OSCE should:

- develop an overarching framework to SSG/R support
- adopt a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support
- identify and build on the OSCE's comparative advantages
- enhance a sustainable approach to SSG/R support
- increase cross-dimensional engagement with civil society
- delineate roles and responsibilities in SSG/R support
- enhance effective coordination in SSG/R support
- adapt SSG/R support to available human resources
- adapt SSG/R support to available financial resources
- strengthen monitoring and evaluation of SSG/R support.

In Part V the study concludes with a set of general and specific recommendations on how to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the OSCE's support to SSG/R. While the general recommendations are highly relevant to SSG/R, they are also relevant to the organization as a whole. The specific recommendations on SSG/R are at both strategic and operational levels – based on the understanding that in combining political discussion with practical steps, it is possible to enhance the OSCE's support to SSG/R.

PART II: CONCEPTS AND METHODS

The conceptual framework for the project is underpinned by the terms “security sector governance” and “security sector reform”. International actors (e.g. the United Nations and the European Union) have begun developing their own concepts of SSG/R that set out normative and operational principles for their work. This has given more focus to their activities and enhanced the coherence of their approaches. The OSCE, however, has not developed a common approach to SSG/R, although SSR is mentioned in several official OSCE documents. For example, one of the first references is found in the Secretary General’s annual report on police activities of 2004, which noted that the OSCE would benefit from developing “a doctrine of Security Sector Reform (SSR)”.¹⁴ In 2006 the Parliamentary Assembly underlined the “need for a holistic approach” to SSR.¹⁵ In a background paper released by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 2012, the link between SSR and human rights was emphasized.¹⁶ Finally, in response to MC Decision No. 3 adopted in Vilnius in 2011,¹⁷ a report by the OSCE Secretary General on its implementation was released which notes that SSR is an “important element of post-conflict rehabilitation”.¹⁸

A common theme is that these OSCE documents recognize the importance of SSR, highlight the need to develop a holistic approach and call for the elaboration of a doctrine on SSR. While no common OSCE definition has been established, a perception paper of 2007 outlines a definition proposed by the then Spanish OSCE Chairmanship.¹⁹ It notes that the aim of SSR is to achieve “a security sector capable of delivering effective and legitimate security and justice functions fully consistent with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law”.²⁰ This definition is very similar to those elaborated by other regional and international organizations, which also point to the need for security sector accountability and oversight within a framework of rule of law. Sources of inspiration include the Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform,²¹ the UN Secretary-General’s report on SSR²² and the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s handbook on security system reform.²³

¹⁴ OSCE (2005), note 8 above.

¹⁵ OSCE-PA, note 9 above.

¹⁶ OSCE-ODIHR, “Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges in the OSCE Region: The Human Dimension”, background paper, OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, 26–28 June 2012, www.osce.org/cio/91751.

¹⁷ OSCE-MC, “Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-conflict Rehabilitation”, Vilnius, 2004, MC.DEC/3/11, www.osce.org/mc/86621.

¹⁸ OSCE, “Secretary General’s Report on the Implementation of MC.DEC/3/11”, 16 July 2012, SEC.GAL/137/12. [Quote to be verified].

¹⁹ OSCE-MC, note 2 above.

²⁰ Ibid., section 2.1.1.

²¹ CEC, “Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform”, communication from Commission to Council and European Parliament, Brussels, 25 June 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0253en01.pdf.

²² United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on SSR”, 2008, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Resources/OfficialUNDocuments/tabid/198/SMID/498/ItemId/22/Default.aspx>.

²³ OECD, “OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice”, 2007, www.oecd.org/development/conflictandfragility/38406485.pdf.

Given the lack of official OSCE definitions, this study uses working definitions by drawing on the various understandings of international organizations where OSCE participating States have played a major role.

Security Sector

The term “security sector” is widely used by international actors, but different understandings abound. There are narrow views that cover the security apparatus and the civilian bodies supporting its management and oversight. Broader understandings include elements of the judicial sector due to the recognized linkages between security and justice. The most inclusive views also cover non-state actors involved in delivering security – from private security suppliers to customary justice providers. The OSCE Chairmanship’s perception paper of 2007, for example, posits a very broad understanding and divides the security sector into five categories: core security actors entitled to use force; civil management and oversight bodies; justice and law enforcement institutions; non-statutory security forces; and non-statutory civil society groups and organizations.

In general, international actors are increasingly taking a broader understanding of the security sector as part of the shift from a limited focus on the state towards a more inclusive understanding of the dynamics that affect the security of the state and its citizens. From the UN perspective, for example, as enshrined in the UN Secretary-General’s report on “Securing Peace and Development”,²⁴ the security sector can be divided into four main categories.

- a. Defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies.
- b. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force.
- c. Actors that manage and oversee the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups.
- d. Other non-state actors, such as customary or informal authorities and private security services.

Although a security sector may be understood in different ways, there appears to be a convergence around a rather broad view which incorporates both military *and* non-military security forces, includes both security-providing (and justice-providing) institutions *and* management and oversight bodies, and comprises both state institutions *and* – to some extent – non-state actors.

Security Sector Governance

Security sector governance has not been defined in official OSCE documents. In fact, while several OSCE norms outline the need to uphold certain elements of SSG, there is no one document that provides a common thread for the definition of governance.²⁵ Nonetheless, SSG is understood to refer to formal and informal structures and processes of security provision, management and oversight within a country. Understood in normative terms, it implies that the security sector is subject to the same standards of good governance as the

²⁴ United Nations, “Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform”, Report of the Secretary-General (A/62/659 – S/2008/39), 2008, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/904B9EE812B7591FC12573F400322816/\\$file/Joint+Seminar_A-62-659_S-2008-39.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/904B9EE812B7591FC12573F400322816/$file/Joint+Seminar_A-62-659_S-2008-39.pdf).

²⁵ Victor-Yves Ghebali, “The OSCE Norms and Activities Related to the Security Sector Reform: An Incomplete Puzzle”, *Security and Human Rights*, 4, 2008, p. 275.

public service. The aim is to ensure that the sector is able to provide security in an effective, efficient and accountable manner. SSG is therefore the normative end state, while SSR is the related policy process.²⁶

Security Sector Reform

In this study, all activities that aim at improving SSG are considered SSR, even if not named as such. For instance, the UN Secretary-General’s report defines SSR as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, and that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law”.²⁷ The conceptual framework proposed in this study is based on five areas of SSR components and related activities – as visualized in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. SSR and related activities pertinent to the OSCE

1 The strategic framework (e.g. security sector reviews, needs assessments, development of SSR strategies and national security policies)		
2 Security and justice provision	3 Civilian management and democratic oversight	4 Related activities in post-conflict contexts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defence reform • Intelligence reform • Border security reform²⁸ • Police reform • Justice reform • Prison reform • Other activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive management and control • Parliamentary oversight • Judicial review • Oversight by independent bodies • Civil society oversight 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DDR • SALW control • Mine action • Transitional justice • Other activities
5 Cross-cutting issues (e.g. gender equality, human rights, combating trafficking, etc.)		

The first category refers to support that is provided to the strategic framework, for instance through the development of national security policies or strategies. The second refers to those activities that support enhanced security and justice provision. The third is activities that promote the civilian management and democratic oversight of the security sector. The fourth is SSR-related activities that while not belonging to SSR *per se* are closely related, such as small arms and light weapons (SALW), disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), etc.²⁹ Finally, the last category is cross-cutting issues. It addresses core elements of SSG/R, such as human rights and gender equality, which must be mainstreamed across all areas of security sector reform. This category also includes those activities that although not strictly SSR require reforming parts of the sector in order to reach their aims. This covers much of the OSCE’s cross-cutting work in the area of countering transnational threats, such as anti-trafficking and counterterrorism.

²⁶ Winkler, note 13 above.

²⁷ United Nations, note 24 above.

²⁸ There are different terms in use, such as border security reform, border management reform and border security and management reform. These are often used interchangeably. In this report and related documents, the term “border security management” is used because of its broad nature.

²⁹ For the purpose of this study, category 4 – activities that are only related to SSR but which are not part of the conventional understanding of SSR (e.g. DDR, SALW control etc.) – are not considered. The OSCE, however, has extensive experience in supporting activities in these SSR-related areas, such as SALW control efforts. If requested, SSR-related activities could be examined in Phase II of the project.

In sum, SSR seeks to enhance SSG within a country. Thus it includes all those efforts to reform or reshape the sector which ensure effective and efficient provision of security within a framework of democratic governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Methodological Approach

The methodology for the study comprised desk research, semi-structured interviews and four case studies.

The desk research consisted of examining primary and secondary sources, including the OSCE's various annual reports, declarations, outcome documents and press releases. One technique used was quantitative content analysis. It would have been preferable to conduct such analysis of the annual reports of the Secretary-General or of each institution; however, the empirical foundations are scarce as these reports do not exist for all entities and are not comparable. Therefore, content analysis was carried out for the only accessible source covering all OSCE entities, which are press releases. This involved examining each press release available and published between 1 January 2008 and 31 October 2013 on the OSCE's homepage.³⁰ The filter function was used to examine the press releases included under each relevant actor (e.g. Secretariat/SPMU, ODIHR, OSCE field operation in Serbia).³¹ Only those press releases that related to SSG/R activities as described in the previous section on conceptual clarifications were examined. Moreover, only those activities that were directly implemented by the actor or in cooperation with the actor were included.³² The press releases were then analysed and reflected in a table under the categories of activity type,³³ purpose of activity³⁴ and topic.³⁵ On the basis of this table, charts were developed for each entity to highlight some broad trends.³⁶ Naturally, there are several constraints with this approach. First, not all activities are comparable (e.g. supporting curriculum development may incur significantly more time than planning a workshop), and many are not covered, as press releases are not always produced for each activity.³⁷ Also, most likely only successful projects will result in a press release, while unsuccessful processes would probably not be reported, or at least not to the same extent.³⁸ Moreover, some actors may have over 100 relevant press releases while others have only a few. Thus the quantitative analysis is intended only to be

³⁰ See www.osce.org/press-releases.

³¹ Unlike the Secretariat, where a filter exists for each department, ODIHR did not have a filter per department.

³² That is to say, press releases highlighting that a department had dispatched a speaker/participant to an event were not included. Furthermore, a press release may be listed more than once if more than one actor was actively involved in implementing the project.

³³ Activity type consisted of the main activity identified in the press release, for instance holding a discussion or roundtable meeting, delivery of training, development of a guidebook or organizing a study visit.

³⁴ The category of purpose of activity was used to clarify that there are differences within the activity types – for instance, a roundtable event may sometimes be used for the purpose of raising awareness while other times it may have a concrete aim like reviewing a law. This information is reflected in the section on programmatic approach to provide some insights into the type of activities supported.

³⁵ The category on topic is intended to provide more depth to the type of thematic support being provided. Thus, for instance, under the theme of police reform, topics may include addressing war crimes, community policing or other. The topic reflects the main theme in the press release. If two themes are repeatedly mentioned, then the same press release is reflected under the two topics.

³⁶ For example, with regard to the thematic approach, if a total of 60 press releases were issued by a field operation, and among those 25 were related to policing, then 40 per cent of all activities by the field operation were considered to relate to policing.

³⁷ For instance, more delicate topics, such as defence reform efforts, might not be made public, at least not in the form of a press release.

³⁸ Moreover, the general data available were *de facto* preselected by the responsible press officers and thus “polluted” by their publicity focus.

illustrative, not representative. The approach taken is not satisfying from a methodological perspective, but for the purpose of illustration it is nonetheless helpful. The analysis of the press releases combined with the numerous interviews provides a fairly good indication of OSCE engagement in SSG/R.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with over 170 interlocutors between 1 October 2012 and 30 September 2013. They consisted of representatives of the OSCE Secretariat, including from the Office of the Secretary General, in particular the executive management, External Co-operation Section and Gender Issues team; representatives from the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), including its Policy Support Service, Operations Service, Forum for Security Co-operation Support Section and Programming and Evaluation Support Unit; representatives from the Transnational Threats Department (TNT), including from the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) and Borders Unit; and representatives from the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). Personnel of the relevant institutions, and in particular from ODIHR's Democratization Department, Human Rights Department, and Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department, were also interviewed.³⁹

Regarding the case studies, interviews were conducted in four out of the 15 current field operations, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Tajikistan, thus representing two case studies from each of the two major regions in which the OSCE is engaged through its field operations. These four case studies were selected in consultation with the OSCE Secretary General and the Ukrainian Chairmanship on the basis of a set of criteria, including region; scope of SSG/R activities, in both breadth and depth; structural diversity in SSG/R support; and size of the operation in terms of budget and staff.⁴⁰ The field research consisted of interviews with representatives of the OSCE field operation, national authorities and civil society, and the international community. The interviews with non-OSCE officials were conducted to provide greater insight into the perceptions of the strengths, weaknesses and comparative advantages of the OSCE in supporting SSG/R.

³⁹ An interview has been requested with a representative of the High Commissioner on National Minorities to complete the findings.

⁴⁰ Had more funding been available, it would have been beneficial to expand the sample of case studies to include smaller field operations, such as project coordinators' offices.

PART III: MAPPING OVERVIEW

Part III provides an overview of the mapping related to the role of the OSCE in supporting SSG/R. It first outlines the normative role of the OSCE in SSG/R, with a particular focus on the elaboration of SSG/R principles and standards through the development of relevant commitments and a policy framework. It then examines the operational roles of the OSCE, with a focus on the Secretariat, institutions and field operations.

Normative Roles of the OSCE in SSG/R

The OSCE has developed a rich policy framework for engaging in support in SSG/R-related areas which cuts across all three dimensions of security – politico-military, economic/environmental and human. The norms relate to security and justice providers (in particular, police reform, border security reform and judicial reform), democratic oversight and management of the security sector, and SSG/R in the context of cross-cutting issues (e.g. anti-terrorism, combating trafficking and gender mainstreaming in the security sector).

Among the documents relevant to SSG/R, a key one is the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994). Others include the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), the Border Security and Management Concept (2005) and the OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities (2012), to name a few. While the normative framework does not provide a common and coherent approach that covers all widely accepted principles of SSG/R, it does give a broad set of norms to guide support in this area. The various norms within the OSCE framework that are relevant to SSG/R include the following.

Democratic and civilian control over the security sector. Effective democratic and civilian control of the military, paramilitary, police, intelligence and other security actors is promoted in several documents in the context of ensuring respect for human rights and national and international law, and preventing excessive use of force. This is called for in the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, and the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991). Moreover, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security recognizes that democratic control of the security sector is an “indispensable element of stability and security”.

Accountability. The theme of accountability is addressed for both the defence sector (e.g. Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 2011; Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security) and the police (e.g. Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE; Charter for European Security, 1999).

Transparency. The transparency of military expenditure and planning is crucial for security. This is underlined in the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

Good governance. The need for effective and efficient police human resources management systems is mentioned in several OSCE documents (e.g. Charter for European Security; OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities, 2012). The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security also outlines principles of good governance in relation to the military and other security forces. The Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (2012) stresses the importance of good governance. Furthermore, MC Decision No. 11/04 on Combating Corruption (2004) describes corruption as undermining security and stability.

Rule of law. The importance of security providers upholding the rule of law is often mentioned, with regard to all actors (e.g. Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE; MC Decision No. 7/08 on Further Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Area, 2008) and specific entities, like the judiciary (MC Decision No. 5/06 on Organized Crime, 2006) or the police (PC Decision No. 1049 on OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities). Respecting the rule of law has also been called for in the context of fighting terrorism (MC Decision No. 10/08 on Further Promoting the OSCE's Action in Countering Terrorism, 2008).

Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and humanitarian law. Respect by the security forces for human rights, fundamental freedoms and humanitarian law is promoted in a large number of documents (e.g. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE; Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE; Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security; OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities). The Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area (2003) raises the question of respect for human rights by police and border officers specifically with regards to national minorities, and other documents note the importance of upholding human rights in the context of the fight against terrorism (e.g. Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century, 2003; OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, 2012) and trafficking (e.g. Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 2003).

Preventing discrimination. The need to prevent discrimination is addressed mainly in the context of policing. In particular, it is noted that the OSCE must seek to ensure the police do not discriminate on the basis of religious and ethnic identity or gender (e.g. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security; Charter for European Security; MC Decision No. 13/06 on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, 2006).

Independence of the judiciary. The Charter for European Security and the MC Decision on Organized Crime promote the independence of the judiciary.

Comprehensive approach to security. A comprehensive approach to the security sector has been advocated, in particular strengthening the complementarity of law enforcement and criminal justice systems (e.g. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security; Bishkek Programme of Action, 2001; MC Decision No. 14/06 on Enhancing Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Including for Labour Exploitation, Through a Comprehensive and Proactive Approach, 2006; MC Decision No. 5/06 on Organized Crime; OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities).

Building trust and confidence. Several documents, mainly in relation to the police, highlight the importance of building the trust and confidence of the population towards the security sector (e.g. Charter for European Security; Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area; MC Decision on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding).

Democratic policing. Special emphasis is put on democratic policing, which is considered “the foundation of the OSCE’s police-related activities” (OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities), and is also promoted in the context of fighting transnational threats such as terrorism (Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, 2001).

Gender mainstreaming. The OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality (2004) notes that “the empowerment of women in the politico-military dimension is also essential to comprehensive security”. MC Decision No. 7/09 on Women’s Participation in Political and Public Life calls on participating states to “Consider taking measures to create equal opportunities within the security services, including the armed forces, where relevant, to allow for balanced recruitment, retention and promotion of men and women.” Furthermore, the MC Decision on Further Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OSCE Area urges states to make the necessary amendments to criminalize, investigate and prosecute gender-based violence, and provide assistance to victims.

In sum, the most comprehensive normative document is the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, in that it sets out the fundamental norm on democratic control of the armed forces.⁴¹ However, several other OSCE documents also provide a basis for SSG/R, such as the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Charter for European Security and various MC decisions. The framework thus comprises a host of norms in areas such as enhancing transparency, upholding the rule of law, promoting human rights and strengthening trust and confidence.

While norms are prominent in the areas of armed forces, police, border management and the role of the security sector in anti-terrorism efforts, there is a relative scarcity of normative documents available for others, such as corrections reform or private security oversight. Moreover, there is a need to link the various norms together in a coherent framework, because the current approach allows picking and choosing elements of the normative framework with which to engage. It has been noted, for instance, in relation to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security that its broad nature can damage the focus on democratic governance of the armed forces.⁴² This is because in the framework of reporting on or implementing the Code, it is possible to focus more on aspects related to counterterrorism, for instance, than on the governance dimension. There is thus a need to promote the understanding that the various elements of SSG/R addressed in OSCE norms are linked together and can benefit from building on mutual synergies.

Finally, while the most comprehensive normative document in the area of SSG/R is the Code, the concept of SSG/R has evolved beyond the principles outlined therein.⁴³ For instance, the normative concept of democratic control of armed forces has been expanded to cover the whole security sector, including for example non-state actors and penal institutions. The concept also takes a broader approach to oversight by incorporating judicial and civil society

⁴¹ This should also include its predecessors, the Copenhagen and Moscow documents.

⁴² Interview with OSCE official, 21 November 2012.

⁴³ Winkler, note 13 above.

oversight.⁴⁴ Thus, as noted in the Chairmanship’s perception paper of 2007, while SSG/R “builds on the fundamentals of the Code and complements it”, the Code is “less holistic” than SSG/R.⁴⁵

The normative framework also provides guidance on how the OSCE should support its SSG/R goals at the operational level. The majority of calls for support are in the areas of capacity and institution building, training and the development of best practices and codes of conduct.

It is the area of *policing* that contains the most operational guidance on the role of the OSCE in SSR. One of the main documents is the Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities, but there are numerous other documents and decisions addressing the OSCE’s role. These relate in particular to capacity and institution building, training, needs assessments, monitoring and evaluation, the development and sharing of best practices, guidance development, technical advice and assistance, the promotion of the concept of community policing and the rapid deployment of civilian expertise.

In the area of *border security*, the Border Security and Management Concept calls specifically for a host of measures, such as supporting political dialogue on border issues, promoting the exchange of information and best practices, supporting interaction with international and regional organizations, providing technical assistance in the development and harmonization of legislation, assisting in the development of national action plans and the provision of specialized assistance with issues such as the detection of false documents and combating organized crime and terrorism.

In the area of *criminal justice*, roles for the OSCE are foreseen in the domains of capacity building, training and the dissemination of best practices. The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism also calls for strengthening the capacity of the judiciary and supporting prison reform.

In the area of *strengthening democratic oversight of the security sector*, the Bucharest action plan calls for improving the capacity of parliamentary structures, ombudsman institutions and civil society. For civil society oversight, calls are made to strengthen civil society as well as conducting outreach programmes to improve relations between police and the public. While the Code of Conduct is the main normative document in the area of democratic oversight of the security sector, it is weaker on the operational level as it is intended to provide normative guidance to participating States rather than operational guidance to the organization.

At the operational level, the policy framework thus provides very clear roles for the OSCE in the areas of policing, border security and management, and criminal justice. The role the OSCE should play in areas such as supporting intelligence reform, corrections reform and private security oversight is less clear. Moreover, in terms of the support the organization should provide, significant emphasis is placed on capacity building, the development and sharing of best practices, and outreach. Less emphasis is placed on its roles in supporting the monitoring and evaluation of reform efforts, or promoting a strategic approach based on coordination among different actors in the security sector.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ OSCE-MC, note 2 above.

⁴⁶ With the exception to some extent of law enforcement and criminal justice reform, where there have recently been increasing calls for promoting synergies in this area. See, for example, the OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities.

In sum, this section highlights that the policy framework pertinent to SSG/R cuts across the three dimensions of security, with a particular emphasis on the first and third dimensions. There is a strong emphasis on politico-military aspects because of the important role played by the Code of Conduct. The human dimension is also reflected at the normative level due to the emphasis, for instance, on human rights and rule of law.

Key Findings

- The OSCE's normative role in SSG/R is very rich, with its normative framework providing both normative and operational guidance to the OSCE.
- There are strong norms on, for example, enhancing the democratic control of the security sector, promoting transparency, respecting human rights, etc.
- The areas with the strongest guidance on the operational roles of the OSCE are police, border management, criminal justice, and strengthening the democratic governance of the security sector. The operational roles in the area of SSG/R are in many cases related to cross-cutting issues such as anti-corruption, anti-trafficking and counter-terrorism).
- There are several gaps in the policy framework. These are thematic (e.g. corrections, private security oversight) and operational (e.g. clarifying the synergies between the various areas of SSG/R support, supporting the monitoring and evaluation of SSG/R).
- The policy framework for SSG/R primarily falls in the first and third dimensions of security, and to a lesser extent in the second dimension.

Operational Roles of the OSCE in SSG/R

The OSCE's primary role is to support participating States. The Secretariat and institutions have an additional role in terms of the provision of support and expertise to field operations. Finally, the field operations provide targeted support to the host country. This section outlines the operational roles of the organization in the area of SSG/R, based on an examination of the structures for support and the type of activities supported. It highlights that the Secretariat, the institutions and the field operations all provide support to SSG/R. There are also other structures within the OSCE which have engaged with the SSG/R concept. In particular, the PA has, for instance, supported awareness-raising on the parliamentary oversight of armed forces, police and security forces. However, this structure is not addressed in this study because its role is not operational in comparison to the Secretariat, institutions and field operations. Its main mandate is to support inter-parliamentary dialogue. While this is recognized to be an important component of enhancing democratic governance, it is not an operational role and therefore is not covered.

Secretariat

The following is an overview of the structures in the OSCE Secretariat that are engaged in the provision of support to SSG/R, as well as the activities they conduct. It highlights that their involvement in this area can be distinguished by support to participating States, OSCE Partners for Co-operation and field operations, and covers a variety of activities ranging from sharing expertise to organizing regional capacity-building events.

Structures

A wide range of entities within the OSCE Secretariat are engaged in providing support to SSG/R (see Table 1.1 in Annex 1). Within the Secretariat, all the four thematic entities – the Conflict Prevention Centre, Transnational Threats Department, Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and the Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities – work on supporting SSG/R activities. CPC provides most of its operational support in this area through the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) Support Section, which works on promoting and implementing the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.⁴⁷ TNT provides support through the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), the Borders Team and the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU). The OSR/CTHB takes a holistic approach to SSG/R by assisting border institutions, the police, prosecutors and judges in the area of combating trafficking. While the OCEEA's mandate mainly relates to security aspects of economic and environmental cooperation, it touches upon SSG/R issues through its work on corruption and good governance, which focuses on the security sector among other issues. While it cooperates heavily with other relevant departments of the Secretariat, it does not play a lead role in supporting SSG/R issues if there is no strong economic/environmental dimension. Finally, the Office of the Secretary General's Gender Section supports the mainstreaming of gender through the various activities of the organization, including in the area of SSG/R.

Out of the 341 staff members employed by the Secretariat, over 40 have a clearly delineated SSG/R-related portfolio, including administrative staff.⁴⁸

Activities

The support provided by the Secretariat can be grouped into three main categories: support to participating States, support to partners for cooperation and support to the field.

Support to participating States is often provided through expertise, norms promotion and policy advice. It also takes the form of regional awareness-raising, experience-sharing and capacity-building initiatives through conferences, seminars and workshops. Another significant area is the provision of guidance on SSG/R-related topics to participating States through the publication of toolkits or other guideline documents outlining best practices, giving recommendations and establishing standards. ATU is currently working in cooperation with SMPU on a guidebook entitled *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach*. SPMU has also recently developed a new *Guidebook on Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform*. Finally, a significant amount of SSG/R support is provided in the context of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. This ranges from holding awareness-raising and outreach events on the principles and commitments contained in the Code to seminars for parliamentarians on how to use the Code as an entry point for

⁴⁷ The CPC also assists the OSCE executive structures in establishing monitoring and self-evaluation of systems for their programmes via its Programming and Evaluation Support Unit (PESU). It also may provide policy support through its Planning and Analysis Team.

⁴⁸ The SSG/R-related portfolio refers to working on issues which are related to SSG/R (i.e. police reform, anti-terrorism). The 42 staff are one gender adviser responsible for first-dimension issues in the Office of the Secretary General, one FSC support officer dedicated to the code of conduct within the CPC, 30 people in TNT and ten in the OSR/CTHB. This includes three administrative and public information staff. TNT has a coordination cell (five), SPMU (nine, including one administrative assistant), ATU (ten) and Borders Team (six, including one administrative assistant)

better overseeing the security sector. In addition, annual discussions and overviews on its implementation by participating States are provided.

Support to OSCE Partners for Co-operation is another important area, and is divided between Mediterranean and Asian partners. The provision of support to Mediterranean partners has received important impetus since the “Arab Spring”, resulting in an MC decision that calls for “the OSCE executive structures, in accordance with their mandates and established procedures, to engage in action oriented co-operation with the Partner countries in all three dimensions”.⁴⁹ Similarly, the OSCE PA released the Belgrade Declaration, which “[e]ncourages the OSCE to increase upon request the sharing of its values and experience beyond the OSCE area, particularly to OSCE Partners for Co-operation [...] and other relevant international and regional organizations”.⁵⁰ Against this background, numerous outreach meetings have been organized with Mediterranean partners. In the area of SSG/R, a Secretariat’s assessment mission that took place in Algeria at the request of the host country is of particular relevance. An expert-level team of representatives from TNT (ATU, SPMU and the Borders Team), as well as a representative of the Section for External Co-operation, held meetings with Algerian public security and anti-terrorist officials, and it is expected that the mission should result in further sharing of expertise.⁵¹ The Secretariat is also producing an Arabic translation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security as a basis for enabling the sharing of best practices in the area of democratic governance of the security sector with the League of Arab States and other States of the Mediterranean and North African region.⁵² A list of project proposals for cooperation with Mediterranean partners has been established, several of which address SSG/R.⁵³

Support to Asian partners has seen a significant focus on Afghanistan. The MC decisions of Madrid (2007) on OSCE engagement with Afghanistan⁵⁴ and Vilnius (2011) on strengthening OSCE engagement with Afghanistan⁵⁵ both called for enhanced efforts in supporting the country. In line with the 2007 MC decision, the OSCE Secretary General has been tasked with assisting in the SSG/R area, notably by “intensifying the involvement of Afghan counterparts in OSCE activities, such as those related to the fields of border security and management, policing and the fight against drug trafficking”.⁵⁶ A number of projects have been identified that can support Afghanistan through training border officials, training in leadership in the security sector, etc. However, there are certain constraints to this support, linked to the fact that the OSCE cannot provide training on the ground in Afghanistan, and cannot measure the success of its efforts in the country, because Afghanistan is not a participating State. Nonetheless, the OSCE assists these efforts by building bridges with neighbouring countries and inviting representatives of the Afghan security sector to training in these countries.⁵⁷ It has also promoted “partner to partner support”: for instance, it aided Thailand in organizing a

⁴⁹ OSCE-MC, “Partners for Co-operation”, Vilnius, 2011, MC.DEC/5/11, www.osce.org/mc/86081.

⁵⁰ OSCE-PA, “Belgrade Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Adopted at the Twentieth Annual Session”, Belgrade, July 2001, p. 2, www.oscepa.org/publications/all-documents/doc_download/675-belgrade-declaration-english.

⁵¹ Interview with OSCE official, November 2012.

⁵² Interview with OSCE official, November 2012.

⁵³ Interview with OSCE official, November 2012.

⁵⁴ OSCE-MC, “OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan”, Madrid, 2007, MC.DEC/4/07/Corr.1, www.osce.org/mc/29470.

⁵⁵ OSCE-MC, “Strengthening OSCE Engagement with Afghanistan”, MC.DEC/4/11, Vilnius, 2011, www.osce.org/mc/86080.

⁵⁶ OSCE-MC, note 55 above.

⁵⁷ Interview with OSCE official, November 2012.

course for Afghan officials on Thai experience of the transformation of the Golden Triangle through tackling drugs and corruption.⁵⁸

Although field operations do not report directly to the Secretariat, its organs as well as the OSCE institutions often provide expertise to, or collaborate jointly with, field operations in supplying operational support. Collaboration is facilitated when thematic focal points exist, as is often the case in the areas of gender, terrorism, border issues and early warning. The Borders Team, for example, has initiated a project, implemented by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, for Kyrgyz and Afghan customs to mentor the development and delivery of training curricula for these services. ODIHR, ATU and SPMU have supported field missions in the organization of workshops and training on respecting human rights in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities, for instance in Turkmenistan⁵⁹ and Kyrgyzstan.⁶⁰ SPMU has delivered since 2007 eight counternarcotics courses for Afghan law enforcement officers in the training institutions of a number of participating States.⁶¹

The analysis highlights that several OSCE Secretariat entities provide support in SSG/R. A majority of entities have assisted in the areas of police, border security and judicial reform. Activities are often supported in joint cooperation to build on the comparative advantages of the various entities. The main entity involved in supporting defence reform is the FSC Support Section. Only OCEEA has worked on intelligence reform, by supporting the establishment and strengthening of financial intelligence units. The PA is the main entity engaged in supporting awareness-raising on parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Finally, for cross-cutting issues the thematic entities within the Secretariat are in the lead (e.g. ATU, OSR/CTHB, Gender Section).

Key Findings

- The main structures engaged in SSG/R in the OSCE Secretariat are the FSC Support Section within CPC, the units of TNT, the OSR/CTHB and the Gender Section.
- The Secretariat's support to SSG/R can be divided into work with participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation and advice to field operations.

Institutions

Structures

OSCE institutions are also heavily engaged in promoting SSG/R issues.⁶² The various departments of ODIHR support SSG/R with a special focus on the human dimension, in

⁵⁸ OSCE Secretariat, "OSCE Highlights", 21 January 2010, p. 2, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/41215>

⁵⁹ OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE Trains Turkmenistan Police Students on Human Rights Protection in Countering Terrorism", press release, Ashgabat, 22 November 2010, www.osce.org/odihr/74192; OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, "Capacity-building for Law Enforcement Officials on Fighting Terrorism and Safeguarding Fundamental Rights", course, OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, 12–14 November 2007.

⁶⁰ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "OSCE Hosts Meeting for Kyrgyz Civil Society to Discuss Counter-terrorism and Human Rights", press release, 7 December 2009, www.osce.org/bishkek/51705.

⁶¹ See for instance OSCE-SPMU, "Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2010", SEC.DOC/3/11, Vienna, May 2011, p. 107, www.osce.org/spmu/81657.

⁶² An interview has been requested with a representative of the High Commissioner on National Minorities to complement the desk research. An interview will also be requested with an official from the Representative of the Freedom of the Media.

particular gender and human rights. The Democratization Department and its Rule of Law, Democratic Governance and Gender, and Legislative Support Units engage in work with all three branches of power, as well as with civil society. The Human Rights Department cooperates extensively with security actors through its specialized programmes on human rights education, human rights and anti-terrorism, human rights and anti-trafficking, and human rights, gender and security. The Human Rights, Gender and Security Unit's mandate is interlinked to SSG/R as it is based on a holistic approach to SSG/R support, albeit mainly through the lens of cross-cutting issues. Based on UNSC Resolution 1325 and OSCE MC Decision 14/05, both on women and security, it promotes the integration of gender-sensitive perspectives in various security providers. The gender work of the Human Rights, Gender and Security Programme has included awareness-raising events, advice on 1325 national action plans and hands-on training for police, border guards, armed forces personnel, parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Part of the unit's work seeks to mainstream human rights concerns by reminding defence actors of the human rights commitments included in the 1994 Code of Conduct.⁶³ This has included capacity building for activities implemented by NGOs on human rights and SSR in the OSCE region. Finally, the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department (TND) engages with the whole spectrum of the security sector on one specific issue – hate crimes.

A different institution which has played an important role in supporting police reform is the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), which has a particular focus on non-discrimination and multiethnic policing.

It is difficult to quantify the number of personnel working on SSG/R as staff in the various departments and units within the institutions may at times work on SSG/R issues in an *ad hoc* manner, but not as part of their main portfolio. For instance, the legal department within ODIHR may be called upon to comment on a law related to the security sector but this is not the main focus of its work. As an estimate, out of the 128 staff at ODIHR, approximately ten are working specifically on SSG/R and related issues.⁶⁴ Within HCNM there are 31 staff members, but currently none have a portfolio that is specifically dedicated to SSG/R, although at times their work has included support in the area of police reform.⁶⁵

Activities

ODIHR's activities can be divided into the same three categories as that of the Secretariat. First, ODIHR provides significant support to participating States. For instance, at the request of participating States, ODIHR reviews legislation on a number of issues related to the security sector, such as domestic violence, trafficking in human beings, anti-terrorism and criminal legislation. It also provides significant support through training. TND, for instance,

⁶³ OSCE/ODIHR, "Democracy and Human Rights Assistance, Human Rights, Gender and Security Programme", www.osce.org/odihr/44257.

⁶⁴ These are staff in the Rule of Law Unit within the Democratization Department (five people), four human rights officers within the Human Rights Department (three from the Gender, Human Rights and Security Unit, and one human rights education adviser who works with different audiences but whose last project focused on human rights education for law enforcement) and one hate-crime officer in the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. Other people may also work on SSR-related areas in an *ad hoc* manner, in particular in the Legislative Support Unit, the Democratic Governance Unit and the Human Rights and Tolerance and Anti-Discrimination Departments, but it is not their main portfolio.

⁶⁵ While HCNM has strongly been engaged in policing in the past in the context of its anti-discrimination and ethnic minorities work, it is currently not very active in this area. Email exchange with HCNM official, October 2013.

has run numerous training events in the area of hate crimes for police and prosecutors in Poland, Croatia and Bulgaria. The Human Rights, Gender and Security Unit supplies training for the police on gender and has among others supported the adoption of a gender action plan in Georgia. It has also developed together with DCAF a Handbook on Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel,⁶⁶ which has been translated in a number of languages and introduced to several countries of the region as well as used during reviews of the Code of Conduct. Since 2010 it has also conducted some 20 training events based on its Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit.⁶⁷ ODIHR's Rule of Law Unit, Human Rights Department and Democratization Department support participating States in the area of monitoring trials, which on the one hand contributes to security by building trust and confidence in institutions, and on the other hand forms a tool/entry point for reforms as it assesses how the judiciary functions (e.g. in Belarus and Georgia). ODIHR's trial monitoring capacity-building work therefore supports civil society to take a more proactive role as external agents of oversight of the security sector.

ODIHR has provided support to partners for cooperation. For instance, the Legislative Support Unit of the Democratization Department reviewed four Tunisian laws on rule of law, independence of the judiciary, human rights and gender participation, and might replicate the exercise in Morocco and Jordan. At the request of the Tunisian government, ODIHR reviewed the 1969 Law on Public Meetings, Marches, Rallies, Demonstrations and Assemblies, the 1967 Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, the High Judicial Council and the Status of Judges, the 2011 Decree Law on the Organization of Political Parties and the Draft Law on Establishing an Independent Election Management Body of the Republic of Tunisia, and provided an overview of international standards and good practices from the OSCE region regarding legislation on domestic violence in 2012. The Rule of Law Unit also presented the OSCE Kyiv recommendations on judicial independence⁶⁸ to Tunisia.

Most ODIHR programmes work closely with field operations, in particular supporting the implementation of the tools they have developed. For instance, the guidelines on human rights education for law enforcement produced in 2012 by the Human Rights Education Unit in collaboration with SPMU are now translated by field operations for use on the ground. Similarly, the training programmes on hate crimes for police and prosecutors developed by ODIHR's TND are used by field operations. ODIHR's reference manual for practitioners on trial monitoring⁶⁹ and gender and SSR toolkit developed in cooperation with DCAF and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women⁷⁰ are other tools that have been developed to support field operations. With regard to the Legislative Support Unit, it is very often the field operations that request the unit's expertise at drafting stage on the compliance of new laws with international standards.

⁶⁶ OSCE-ODIHR, DCAF, "Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel", Warsaw, 2008. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/31393>

⁶⁷ OSCE-ODIHR, DCAF, UN-INSTRAW, "Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit", Geneva, 2008, www.osce.org/odihr/70294.

⁶⁸ OSCE, "Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia", June 2010, www.osce.org/odihr/KyivRec?download=true.

⁶⁹ OSCE-ODIHR, "Trial Monitoring. A Reference Manual for Practitioners", Warsaw, 2012, www.osce.org/odihr/94216.

⁷⁰ OSCE-ODIHR, DCAF, UN-INSTRAW, "Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit", Geneva, 2008, www.osce.org/odihr/70294.

HCNM's mandate is to provide early warning and appropriate early action regarding possible tensions involving national minority issues.⁷¹ Its main area of support in the area of SSG/R relates to multiethnic policing. In particular, it has developed in cooperation with SPMU a set of recommendations on policing in multiethnic societies which is intended to assist states in developing mechanisms to improve the interaction between police and minorities. Its work in policing is complemented by joint activities in cooperation with SPMU and OSCE field presences to support trust and confidence building between the police and ethnic communities.⁷² It has also implemented a few specific projects in this field, such as a project on policing in multiethnic Kazakhstan upon request from the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan,⁷³ and has organized conferences promoting confidence building between the police and minorities.⁷⁴

The analysis shows that ODIHR is heavily engaged in SSG/R from a third-dimension perspective. It has a strong focus on cross-cutting issues such as human rights, non-discrimination and gender equality, and a strong legal focus. HCNM has also significantly contributed to OSCE work in SSG/R through its contribution to multiethnic policing.

Key Findings

- The main OSCE institutions involved in SSG/R are ODIHR and HCNM. The main structures within ODIHR are: the Democratization Department, Human Rights Department, and Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. HCNM does not have dedicated SSG/R capacity although it has provided support in the area of multi-ethnic policing.
- Support is often provided in the areas of the development of guidelines and standard setting, the organization of awareness-raising, outreach and regional capacity-building events, and the sharing of expertise.

Field Operations

This section provides an overview of OSCE field operations' support to SSG/R. It examines the 15 field operations that are currently deployed; these vary significantly in size and focus as well as lifespan. The largest OSCE missions are generally situated in Southeastern Europe, and average from around 45 staff members (Montenegro) to about 700 (Kosovo). The largest field operations are the Missions in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Skopje. Other operations in the region are the OSCE Presence in Albania and the Mission to Montenegro. In Eastern Europe the OSCE maintains the Mission to Moldova and a project coordinator in the Ukraine – while smaller in size they are both long-lasting operations, having opened in 1993 and 1994 respectively. There are two OSCE field operations in the South Caucasus: the Office in Baku (Azerbaijan) and the Office in Yerevan (Armenia). Finally, the OSCE has five field operations in Central Asia: the small Centres in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) and Astana (Kazakhstan), the larger Centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), the Office in Tajikistan and a project coordinator in Uzbekistan. The largest Central Asian

⁷¹ CSCE, "Helsinki Document 1992. The Challenges of Change", Helsinki, July 1992, <http://www.osce.org/mc/39530?download=true>.

⁷² OSCE-HCNM, "Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies", The Hague, February 2006, www.osce.org/hcnm/32227?download=true.

⁷³ OSCE-HCNM, "OSCE High Commissioner launches multi-ethnic policing project in Kazakhstan", press release, 26 June 2012, www.osce.org/hcnm/91689.

⁷⁴ See for instance the conference organized in 2008 in Ukraine, www.osce.org/hcnm/57718.

operation is the Office in Tajikistan, which numbers approximately 160 national and international staff. In this study, the term “field operations” is used to denote all centres, coordinators, offices, missions and presences that the OSCE leads in the field.

Structures

Within field operations, structures supporting SSG/R activities vary greatly. In the four operations examined, only two (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) have exclusive departments assigned to each dimension (first, second and third). In Kyrgyzstan there are two additional departments in the area of policing (Police Reform Department and Community Security Initiative) which do not fall under the first dimension. In the case of Tajikistan there are individual departments for all three dimensions, as well as an extra-budgetary initiative in the form of the Border Management Staff College. In Bosnia the departments do not always strictly follow dimensions: the mission has a department for security cooperation and another for the human dimension. The Human Dimension Department represents the whole third dimension. The Department for Security Cooperation is not referred to as the politico-military department; although, among other things, it has a strong focus on first-dimension issues. In the case of Serbia, none of the departments uses dimension in its name. There is the Democratization Department (which in practice essentially links the first and third dimensions), the Law Enforcement Department, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Department (which is also responsible for all financial crime matters that are usually considered second dimensional) and the Media Department.

Human resources vary significantly between field operations and between departments. Sometimes there is a whole department dedicated to a specific topic (e.g. the Law Enforcement Department in Serbia, with 27 staff), while at other times only one or two people work on a specific topic (i.e. for border management or anti-terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, or democratic oversight of the security sector in BiH).

Mandates

This section provides an overview of the mandates for SSG/R and the activities generally supported. It highlights that while all the field operations are engaged in supporting SSG/R, only a few have an explicit mandate in this area (see Table 1.2 in Annex 1).

The context-specific mandates are negotiated with host countries and decided by consensus among all participating States. The mandates are further defined through the unified budget process as well as in consultation with host countries. Several mandates use the same broad language, such as support to “the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments”.⁷⁵ This language presents an entry point for the OSCE to provide support upon request in certain areas of SSG/R based on the organization’s normative framework. For instance, the commitments made by participating States in the context of the 1994 Code of Conduct have been used as an entry point for engaging in SSG/R. This is the case, for example, in the area of defence reform and police training in BiH, parliamentary oversight in Montenegro and human rights training for armed forces in Armenia.

While the various mandates do not refer to the need to support “SSG/R” efforts, a few call for supporting its component areas. Currently five field operations are mandated specifically to

⁷⁵ OSCE-PC, “Establishment of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro”, 29 June 2006, PC.DEC/732, www.osce.org/pc/19691.

engage in SSG/R activities, in the areas of police (four), defence (one), border management (two) and oversight and management (three). Additionally, three operations (of which two are included in the five mandated in component areas) are instructed to engage in cross-cutting areas of SSG/R (combating trafficking in human beings, and preventing and combating terrorism).

In sum, broad mandates allow flexibility in terms of activities conducted by field operations. As a result, all field operations are engaged in one or more areas of SSG/R, both where these are explicitly mentioned in the mandates and where these are implicitly covered by broad mandates and commitments.

Activities

All 15 OSCE field operations are engaged in one way or another in direct or indirect support in the area of SSG/R (see Table 1.3 in Annex 1). All dimensions of SSG/R are covered to varying degrees, although only one operation covers all aspects – the Mission to Serbia, which is engaged in all 14 SSG/R domains (defence reform, police reform, border security reform, judicial reform, intelligence reform, parliamentary, civil society and independent oversight of the security sector, management, and SSR) through all five cross-cutting issues (gender and SSR, anti-corruption, combating trafficking in human beings, anti-drug trafficking and anti-terrorism). Most field operations on average engage in six to ten SSG/R activities. The majority are involved in police, border security and judicial reform, as well as SSG/R in the context of combating trafficking and anti-corruption and anti-terrorism efforts.

OSCE field operations support the reform of all security and justice providers covered in the tables of Annex 1. In the area of police reform, support is provided by all operations, mostly through training, but also strengthening police oversight and the creation of a police school in Kosovo.⁷⁶ All field operations are also active in judicial reform. Their activities consist mainly of trial monitoring and training in ethics and good practices. They have also conducted assessments, as in BiH on the independence of the judiciary, and commented on draft criminal law. Border management has been tackled by almost all operations through the provision of training and logistical support, or the elaboration of national and regional strategies. One major achievement in this area is the Border Management Staff College established in Tajikistan. The remaining security sector providers have received much less attention. Just two operations⁷⁷ have worked on oversight of the intelligence services, and three on defence reform, only one of which (BiH) worked in an extensive manner.⁷⁸

With regard to management and oversight of the security sector, six operations are promoting oversight by parliament through drafting legislation, organizing workshops and conferences for the exchange of best practices in the region, and assessment of existing mechanisms.⁷⁹ Seven operations provide training to civil society on oversight, mostly within the third dimension in relation to fair trials and detention conditions. Nine have supported the creation,

⁷⁶ For example, the creation of the Police Inspectorate in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, “Public Safety”, www.osce.org/kosovo/43396. See also Perrin de Brichambaut and Marc Perrin, “Briefing Notes: Police Inspectorate of Kosovo Implementation Project”, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 24 July 2007, www.docstoc.com/docs/40952252/Police-Inspectorate-of-Kosovo-Implementation-Project-OSCE-Mission-in.

⁷⁷ Albania and BiH.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Bilandzic, “OSCE Role in Security Sector Reform – The Region of South Eastern Europe”, OSCE/DCAF/medienhilfe Schweiz/CCMR, Belgrade, 14–15 November 2003, p. 14.

⁷⁹ For example, for the private security sector in Armenia.

capacities and outreach of ombudsman institutions, and seven provided training on police management.

Finally, the field operations have all contributed to reforming different aspects of the security sector through their actions in cross-cutting issues such as combating trafficking in human beings (e.g. training for police, border officers and judges), terrorism (e.g. workshops on investigation methods, travel security and regional cooperation), gender (e.g. studies, conferences and training mainly on gender-sensitive recruitment of police personnel), corruption (e.g. assessments, prevention mechanisms and training on integrity and accountability of police, border officers and prosecutors) and drug trafficking (training and seminars for police and border guards). Support to SSG/R through these cross-cutting issues is thus extensive and encompasses engaging with the police, border officials, prosecutors, etc.

In sum, all field operations are engaged in one or several aspects of SSG/R. In some cases their action in relation to SSG/R is more comprehensive than that of the Secretariat and institutions, in the sense that jointly they address all its aspects. While most field operations do not work in terms of supporting a holistic approach to SSG/R, some references to this concept have appeared. Four seminars have been held specifically on this topic, twice in relation to gender and non-discrimination,⁸⁰ once in relation to democratic oversight⁸¹ and once in relation to civil society.⁸² Only two cases were found within the limits of this study where a field operation has a project or programme specifically focused on SSR. The first is the Mission to Serbia, where a programme is located under the democratic governance section of the mission. The SSR programme seeks to enhance democratic civilian control of the security sector, strengthen good governance and the role of civil society, and advance academic education and research in the field of security.⁸³ The second relates to the Mission to Bosnia, where a project on national security policies has recently evolved to include SSR. Cross-cutting issues such as the fight against terrorism and human trafficking have often been at the centre of many SSR efforts; for example, in police reform the focus of training has often been in this area.

Key Findings

- Only five field operations have an explicit mandate for SSG/R related support activities, but all current field operations are engaged in one way or another in supporting SSG/R activities in a direct or indirect manner.
- Most SSG/R efforts have been focused on supporting reform of the police, border security institutions and judicial systems. Some support has been provided in the area of democratic oversight of the security sector, however, this has not been systematic.
- Many of the reform efforts are part of the fight against transnational threats.

⁸⁰ OSCE Mission to Moldova, “OSCE Mission to Moldova and ODIHR Promote Women’s Inclusion in the Security Sector”, photo gallery, Chisinau, 8 December 2011, www.osce.org/moldova/86013; OSCE Mission to Serbia, “Round Table: Presentation of the Research ‘LGBT Population and Security Sector Reform in Serbia’”, OSCE Public Policy Research Centre, Belgrade, 8 December 2011, www.osce.org/serbia/85515.

⁸¹ OSCE Centre in Astana, “OSCE Centre in Astana Conducts Regional Seminar on Democratic Oversight of Security Sector in Central Asia”, press release, 3 October 2012, www.osce.org/astana/94629.

⁸² OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, “The Role of Civil Society in Security Sector Reform”, seminar, Kanjiza, 18 February 2005, www.osce.org/serbia/41855.

⁸³ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “Democratization Department”, www.osce.org/serbia/43348.

PART IV: COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW

The fourth part of the study consists of a comprehensive review of the OSCE's support to SSG/R. It draws mainly on the interviews conducted with over 170 counterparts regarding the organization's engagement in this area. It first reviews the OSCE's *de facto* approach to SSG/R support, examining in particular how this has taken place at the strategic, thematic and programmatic levels. Drawing from the review, it then identifies ten key lessons on how the organization can enhance the coherence of its support to SSG/R.

While it was possible to make a clear distinction between the structures and activities of the Secretariat and institutions in the mapping (Part III), it is not feasible to maintain this distinction in the comprehensive review, given that there are significant commonalities in the support provided to participating States. While it is recognized that the Secretariat and institutions have clearly distinct mandates and operational roles, their *de facto* approach to SSG/R is nonetheless complementary and would entail repetition if addressed separately.

The OSCE's *de Facto* Approach to SSG/R Support

As the mapping overview shows, the OSCE is heavily engaged in supporting SSG/R-related activities, even if this is not done under the heading of SSG/R and not necessarily in full compliance with the concept. In practice, however, it is possible to identify elements of a *de facto* approach to SSG/R support pursued by the OSCE, unintended or not, as reflected across three levels: strategic, thematic and programmatic.

Strategic Level

The organizational approach to SSG/R at the strategic level refers to the existence of overarching goals for support and clarity on the means of achieving them. It often depends on the development of a strategic vision for support which provides clear direction on where the organization is going. The OSCE's *de facto* approach to SSG/R support at the strategic level is heavily influenced by its planning culture. Strategic planning is a challenge for the OSCE, and expands beyond the area of SSG/R. The short-term budget cycles of one-year periods are often cited as an impediment to long-term planning. In the words of one ODIHR official: "In one year, we have to plan, implement, and evaluate programmes. So, we focus on our internal business and don't have time to coordinate with others."⁸⁴ Short-term planning has also been called one of the "biggest weaknesses of the organization".⁸⁵ This challenge is compounded by the fact that planning frequently lacks strategic direction. Projects are often *ad hoc*, based on requests from participating States and immediately available expertise, and shaped by the priorities of individual states which contribute extra-budgetary funding and seconded personnel. Consequently, projects are often not inserted within a "chain" of activities that aim to achieve a broad goal – thereby considerably reducing their impact. They are also too rarely based on thorough assessments of local needs in light of the objective as well as perceived threats to security, strengths and weaknesses of the sector, and activities of other actors.

⁸⁴ Interview with ODIHR official, April 2013.

⁸⁵ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2012.

The results of this overall strategic approach are particularly detrimental in the area of SSG/R, which requires planning for long-term change that cannot be observed within short to medium timeframes. Moreover, SSG/R requires meticulous strategic planning to identify synergies between different component areas and ensure that programming finds entry points not just to enhance effectiveness but also to strengthen the accountability of the security sector, which is the more challenging and long-term need. Such support requires a careful strategic approach based on a number of core principles for SSG/R. These include, for instance, the need for reforms to address at the same time effectiveness and accountability concerns;⁸⁶ the need to engage with both state and non-state actors, in particular civil society; and the need to adopt an integrated approach which moves away from partial reforms in component areas.

Secretariat and Institutions

The secretariat and institutions do not have a strategic approach to SSG/R, in the sense that they do not frame their support in the context of SSG/R. There are two exceptions. First, SPMU has called for an approach to SSG/R in the reports of the OSCE Secretary General in order to enhance linkages between police reform and criminal justice reform.⁸⁷ To respond to this demand the guidelines on policing in criminal justice have been developed to take an “SSR approach” to police reform. The other exception is ODIHR’s work in the area of human rights, gender and security issues – it has, for instance, developed a toolkit on gender and SSR.

While there is no overall strategic approach to SSG/R, a number of OSCE commitments are directly related to it (see description in Part I of the study). These commitments provide the fundamentals of a broad strategic vision in the individual component areas and, in particular, highlight what the roles of the OSCE should be in these areas. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is the document which comes closest to providing a strategic vision for SSG/R, given its strong focus on democratic control of the security sector. It is widely considered as the normative cornerstone for the democratic control of armed forces – providing the basis for many of the cardinal principles of SSG/R, such as the need to ensure an accountable, effective, efficient and transparent sector through its democratic control. However, it does not provide operational guidance for the organization on how it should deliver its support in this area. Other documents provide a vision of this operational work, such as the Border Security and Management Concept, which states that the organization’s support can take the form of technical assistance in the development and implementation of national strategies and action plans, technical assistance in development, adaptation and harmonization of relevant legislation, facilitation of political dialogue between states on border-related issues, etc.⁸⁸ In the area of police, the Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities also provides OSCE bodies with concrete advice on how to deliver assistance to participating States at their request in police development and reform.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Reforms solely aimed at modernizing and/or professionalizing the security sector without strengthening its democratic oversight and accountability are not consistent with the popular notion of SSG/R.

⁸⁷ E.g. OSCE (2005), note 8 above. As a result, SPMU published a new guidebook in 2013 which seeks to unpack the linkages between police reform and criminal justice reform.

⁸⁸ OSCE, “Border Security and Management Concept”, 6 December 2005, MC/DOC/2/05.

⁸⁹ The operational roles it promotes include among others supporting cooperation in and exchange of best practices between and among the police training institutions of participating states; supporting, where appropriate, efforts to create multiethnic police services; and developing guideline documents in specific areas of police reform, such as systems and concepts of police education, police training, strategic planning, human resource management and police accountability.

The commitments thus provide the broad strategic vision in component areas. However, staff in both the Secretariat and the institutions point to a missing link between these commitments and programming. That is to say, the middle layer which translates the broad commitments into strategic direction for programming is missing. For instance, it was noted that in many cases entities do not have a clear understanding of what their priorities should be for the next five years in order to support the implementation of the commitments; and it was highlighted by the field that the role the OSCE should play in supporting the implementation of the 1994 Code of Conduct is sometimes unclear. Aside from exchange of information on the Code, much support in this area has consisted of holding awareness-raising seminars, though there have been calls from numerous staff members to rethink how and where such seminars are held.⁹⁰ It was considered by staff to be a lost opportunity to run seminars in places or regions where much awareness-raising has already taken place on the Code, while elsewhere there is a persisting lack of knowledge on the subject both within field operations and among national counterparts. It was therefore felt that it may be more valuable for Secretariat support to the Code to involve developing a short module which field operations can then adapt themselves to the context, rather than reinventing the wheel: this would include clarity on what participating States should be trying to achieve; supporting sensitization among Secretariat, institutions and field operations staff on what the Code is and how it can be used as an entry point in their support;⁹¹ and, when seminars on the Code are supported, ensuring that they are not just awareness-raising events with no substantial output, but rather serve to brainstorm on identifying gaps in implementing the commitment and facilitating a discussion on how to move forward in achieving implementation and planning for follow-up to present results.⁹² Ultimately, the Code of Conduct provides the foundations for SSG/R, but due to a lack of a strategic vision it is not being used adequately as an entry point to supporting holistic reforms.

Finally, while there are individual commitments in different areas related to SSG/R, there is no clear strategic vision for SSG/R. This means that there is no clarity on what constitutes a coherent approach. For instance, there is sometimes confusion about whether or not the provision of equipment is part of SSG/R, and few activities actually address the governance dimension which is fundamental for the concept. Furthermore, the linkages between the different component areas are often missing, as exemplified by the lack of vision regarding where synergies within support can lie. There is, for instance, a lack of coordination between police and criminal justice support which has been widely acknowledged – to the extent that SPMU has recently developed guidelines on addressing this linkage.⁹³ However, the potential synergies in SSG/R that go beyond this nexus have not been identified; for example, a clear strategic approach would ensure that the efforts of TNT in the area of counterterrorism are not only focused on engagement with the security forces, but also more closely and systematically with judges and prosecutors. It was highlighted, however, that this is challenging, as it may attract resistance from other entities within the Secretariat and institutions which consider such issues to be part of their own roles and responsibilities.⁹⁴ Clarity on roles and responsibilities ought to provide an opportunity to build on synergies between different departments, rather than to strengthen the stovepiped approach. Developing common goals in

⁹⁰ Interviews with representatives of field operations, 2013.

⁹¹ This could take the form of a brief tool with practical examples.

⁹² Interviews with representatives of field operations, 2013.

⁹³ TNT/SPMU, “Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice”, <http://polis.osce.org/library/f/4070/3786/OSCE-AUT-SPM-4070-EN-3786>.

⁹⁴ Interview with senior official of the OSCE Secretariat.

the area of SSG/R through a strategic approach would enable planning around achieving them and help identify areas where different parts of the OSCE can plug in their support.

Field Operations

In the context of field operations, lack of strategic vision is also a significant challenge. There was only one example out of the four field operations examined where very clear strategic priorities had been elaborated at the initiative of the head of mission and shared with all department staff. This was the case in Kyrgyzstan, where the mission has established “strategic hubs” (or objectives) which are intended to enhance cross-dimensional planning. Several of these hubs are directly linked to SSG/R, such as promoting good governance, rule of law and transnational threats. The management ensure that departments contribute to this strategic vision by prioritizing support in these areas and reporting on their activities towards these objectives. The absence of clarity on strategic priorities in other field operations has often impacted on public perception of the operation as well as on its ability to effect change.

While there is no mission-wide vision for SSG/R, some departments or programmes within the missions are increasingly engaging in strategic thinking on it. For instance, within the Mission to Serbia’s Democratization Department a programme on SSR has been established with the objective of improving oversight of the security sector, supporting inter-institutional coordination and civil society participation in the sector, and strengthening education and expertise within the sector. Thus much work is geared at strengthening oversight mechanisms of parliament and civil society, and corresponds to a strategic vision for SSG/R. This is only a three-person operation, and it was recognized that there are limits to what a small department can achieve in this area. Consequently, it was felt that maybe the team was overstretching its resources by trying to engage in so many SSG/R issues without going into sufficient depth. On the other hand, national counterparts acknowledged a clear added value in taking this approach, as both national and international actors recognized that if it were not for the OSCE’s approach to work in this area, many important SSR issues related to “software” and not “hardware” would not have been identified and supported. This includes strengthening oversight mechanisms and supporting work concerning the status of (and issues related to) homosexuals in the security sector as well as strengthening local municipalities’ coordination responses to sexual and gender-based violence in predominantly Muslim communities.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the past year the Security Cooperation Department has tried to engage with a more strategic approach to SSG/R. In this case, a project entitled Security Sector Reform and Security Policy Development and Implementation evolved from a project focusing only on national security policy (NSP) development and implementation. It was recognized that taking an SSR perspective would enable the field operation to put more emphasis on the need for inter-agency cooperation as well as advancing implementation in the SSR issues listed in the NSP which were not moving forward. Similarly, in the case of the field operation in Tajikistan, the Politico-Military Department is considering evolving a project on countering security threats into a broader dialogue on SSR in 2014: it recognizes the need for a more coherent approach to its overall reform efforts in the security sector to overcome its current compartmentalized approach and engage with a wider variety of actors.⁹⁵

In sum, there have been increasing efforts to pursue a more strategic approach to SSG/R at the field level. The large majority of people interviewed in the field operations highlighted that it

⁹⁵ Interview with OSCE official, Dushanbe, September 2013.

would be very beneficial for their work if the OSCE were to develop such an approach. It was recognized that this would be important in order to identify how the different departments can contribute to a broader goal, and two missions also pointed out that the development of an internal OSCE SSG/R framework would enhance credibility *vis-à-vis* the government when the operation is trying to advocate an approach that links different entities and domains of the security sector.⁹⁶ Currently, it was suggested, the OSCE is not credible in SSR support because it does not have its own internal approach, and in practice OSCE operations often mirror the stovepiping found among government entities.⁹⁷

Key findings

- The Secretariat and institutions are not yet actively engaging with the concept of SSG/R in form of a strategic approach to support. However, the field is starting to recognise its value.
- The value added of developing a strategic approach to SSG/R is generally raised by staff as:
 - Emphasising the need for a long-term approach to SSG/R based on a strategic vision of what the organisation is trying to achieve in each context. This would enable greater coherence among reform efforts, so that a long-term goal can be identified which different entities work towards. This would also strengthen prioritisation of activities, particularly in the field where assessments are often lacking and a wide range of issues are covered where it is not always possible to have an impact.
 - Bringing together the numerous commitments at the strategic level and establishing the linkage between the strategic and programming levels. There were strong calls from both the Secretariat and field to develop this missing link, and it was noted that SSG/R would be a fitting framework for enhancing coherence within the organisation.
 - Encouraging cross-dimensional coordination and cooperation.
 - Enabling the field operation to engage with the host country with the necessary legitimacy.

Thematic Level

The OSCE Secretariat, institutions and field operations provide support to security and justice providers, civilian management and democratic oversight of the security sector, and cross-cutting issues related to SSR. Examining the depth of the thematic approach aims to determine where the main focus of SSG/R-related support lies – that is to say, whether support is mainly provided on specific themes related to security and justice providers (e.g. strengthening skills in community policing, processing war crimes); themes related to the civilian management and democratic oversight of the security sector (e.g. strengthening parliamentary oversight, reforming human resources management systems); or cross-cutting themes such as gender or human rights mainstreaming within the security sector, or counterterrorism. It helps to identify where there may be gaps in support due to either a lack of expertise or technical capacity, or a lack of awareness of the importance of supporting certain topics.

Attempting to measure the thematic approach of the Secretariat, institutions and four examined field operations is a challenging task. However, a quantitative content analysis of press releases, combined with numerous interviews and desk research, provides a broad

⁹⁶ This was staff in the field operations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

⁹⁷ OSCE Centre officials at an informal roundtable on SSR, Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

picture of the type of themes within OSCE SSG/R support (see methodological considerations in Part II).

Secretariat and Institutions

The following provides an overview of the thematic focus of the work of the Secretariat and institutions.⁹⁸

The Strategic Police Matters Unit engages mainly with police matters.⁹⁹ Within this topic, its work has a strong thematic focus on countering narcotics trafficking,¹⁰⁰ organized crime (for instance, raising awareness on software piracy)¹⁰¹ and human trafficking. The focus on trafficking is often on methods to identify victims¹⁰² or target illicit proceedings of human trafficking specifically.¹⁰³ Other areas addressed by SPMU include cybercrime, community policing, money laundering and criminal justice. Support in the area of anti-discrimination has taken place, for instance in regard to addressing issues with Roma and Sinti communities.¹⁰⁴ Governance and oversight issues have been addressed primarily under democratic policing. This mainly relates to SPMU's development of a guidebook on the topic, which places a strong emphasis on accountability and control through internal and external oversight.¹⁰⁵ SPMU has also recently developed a guidebook on policing in criminal justice which aims at looking at synergies between police and criminal justice.

In the area of border security reform, the Borders Section (now embedded in TNT, previously within CPC) has played a strong role in providing support in line with the OSCE's Border Security and Management Concept. The concept sets out that the OSCE's support in the area of border management may include topics such as:

- (i) Strengthening of international exchange networks and information-sharing on the above-mentioned threats and challenges to security;
- (ii) Crime-specific training for border services and competent national structures;
- (iii) Identification of sources for crime-specific equipment and supplies and, if possible, mobilization of available

⁹⁸ As the objective of this section is to quantify thematic engagement based on press releases and complemented with information from interviews and desk research – recognizing the caveats outlined in part II on methodological considerations – only those entities which had more than six press releases are considered here; two entities which have a thematic connection to SSG/R were thus left out. Only two press releases of the OSR/CTHB were identified which directly address SSG/R issues. The office has a clear thematic focus on human trafficking: the press releases addressed protection of trafficking victims' rights in criminal proceedings (www.osce.org/cthb/75345) and combating human trafficking and migrant smuggling in Central Asia (www.osce.org/spmu/49701). Furthermore, there was only one press release directly related to SSG/R identified for HCNM, publicizing the launch of a multiethnic policing project in Kazakhstan (www.osce.org/hcnm/91689).

⁹⁹ Those relevant press releases adopted when SPMU was previously housed under CPC are also included.

¹⁰⁰ OSCE-SPMU, "Fighting Illicit Drug Supply to Young People Focus of OSCE Conference in Vienna", press release, 18 October 2012, www.osce.org/spmu/96514.

¹⁰¹ OSCE-SPMU, "OSCE, Private Companies to Support Discussion on Illegal Cigarette Trade, Internet Software Piracy in South-Eastern Europe", press release, 20 June 2012, www.osce.org/spmu/91458.

¹⁰² OSCE-SPMU, "Methods to Identify Trafficking Victims Focus of OSCE-Organized Expert Discussion in Vienna", press release, 19 November 2010, www.osce.org/spmu/74168.

¹⁰³ OSCE-SPMU, "OSCE Trains Police in Targeting Illicit Proceeds of Human Trafficking", press release, 20 July 2012, www.osce.org/spmu/92314.

¹⁰⁴ OSCE-SPMU, "OSCE Book on Police and Roma and Sinti to Be Launched on Margins of Annual Police Experts Meeting", press release, 19 May 2012, www.osce.org/spmu/69294.

¹⁰⁵ OSCE, "Guidebook on Democratic Policing by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General", Vienna, May 2008, paras 80–94, www.osce.org/spmu/23804; OSCE-SPMU, "OSCE Holds Workshop in Minsk to Promote Democratic Policing", press release, 16 September 2009, www.osce.org/spmu/51312.

resources; (iv) Technical and non-technical means of detection of illegal or false documents aiming at improving the security of travel documents and visas; (v) Encouragement for the conclusion and implementation of agreements on cross-border co-operation; (vi) Promotion of the implementation and development of multilateral international norms and practices, in conformity with international legal frameworks, regarding extradition and other forms of legal co-operation on criminal matters related to terrorism and other serious crimes, on aspects related to border security and management; (vii) Enhancement of co-operation aimed at preventing and countering the threat of illicit trafficking in drugs.

Activities in its press releases correspond to these thematic priorities, for instance relating to strengthening participating States capacity in the issue of detecting forged documents, and supporting dialogue or training in border management more broadly.¹⁰⁶

In the area of counterterrorism, the Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) offers a wide range of assistance. Specific emphasis in programmatic work is placed on strategic areas outlined in the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism. This has included raising awareness or providing training on detecting forged documents and securing travel documents, and addressing violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT)¹⁰⁷ – for instance, providing expertise on issues such as policing VERLT¹⁰⁸ and women’s role in countering VERLT.¹⁰⁹ Another thematic focus is engaging different stakeholders against terrorism through support to public-private partnerships. Within this area, ATU brings together business communities and states to enhance their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, as for instance a workshop on partnerships to enhance tourism security.¹¹⁰ TNT’s Coordination Cell has also supported participating States in their endeavours to develop confidence-building measures regarding cyber/ICT security in line with PC.DEC/1039 on Development of Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risk of Conflict Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies. TNT further promotes OSCE efforts in this area at international expert meetings and liaises with internal and external partners, including international and regional organizations, the private sector and academia.

The Conflict Prevention Centre (in its current form, not including work formally addressed by the Border Unit or SPMU which is now covered under TNT) has mainly engaged in SSG/R-related topics through raising awareness of two key documents: the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. The Code of Conduct has been used by CPC to stimulate discussions on governmental security providers and their role in a democratic society. Besides regional

¹⁰⁶ A significant amount of the Border Unit’s work is supporting field operations’ efforts in this area. Much of its comprehensive support is therefore not captured in the few press releases available.

¹⁰⁷ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Facilitates Discussion on Preventing Terrorist Radicalization in Kyrgyzstan”, press release, 29 November 2012, www.osce.org/atu/97621; OSCE-ATU, “Strong Rule of Law Best Way to Prevent Terrorism, Say Participants at OSCE Conference”, 12 November 2012, www.osce.org/atu/97125.

¹⁰⁸ OSCE Centre in Astana, “OSCE Discusses Role of Community Policing in Countering Terrorism”, press release, 12 October 2012, www.osce.org/astana/95203.

¹⁰⁹ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Organizes Expert Meeting on Preventing the Terrorist Radicalization of Women”, press release, 12 December 2011, www.osce.org/atu/86102; OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Highlights Need to Involve Women in Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism, Terrorist Radicalization”, press release, 12 March, 2012, www.osce.org/atu/88880.

¹¹⁰ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Organizes Workshop on Public-Private Partnerships to Enhance Tourism Security”, press release, 8 September 2011, www.osce.org/atu/82281.

seminars in Minsk¹¹¹ and Riga,¹¹² CPC recently organized a comprehensive conference on the Code of Conduct in Malta, where it discussed the role of armed forces in democratic societies with high-ranking armed forces officials and representatives from the League of Arab States, academia and parliaments of more than 20 states.¹¹³ SSR and parliamentary oversight were specific topics discussed by participants in the context of this event.

The Gender Issues Section of the Office of the Secretary General mainstreams gender aspects within the OSCE and its participating States. While not focusing specifically on SSG/R *per se*, the section has engaged in some relevant work; for instance, it has published a good practice guide to combat violence against women,¹¹⁴ with a strong focus on the judiciary sector and police.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the section has raised awareness on violence against women in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and co-organized with ATU an expert meeting on preventing terrorist radicalization of women with a comprehensive audience of academia, civil society, media and participating states.¹¹⁶

The Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities is also involved in work relevant to the security sector. Of these related activities, several fall into the thematic area of borders, where OCEEA is mainly concerned with good governance and anti-corruption in the context of border management. For example, it co-organized a seminar to fight corruption in the border services in Central Asia and South Caucasus,¹¹⁷ and organized a forum on good governance to promote transparency and enhance coordination between customs and other border agencies.¹¹⁸ A significant amount of support has also been provided in the area of money laundering, combined with efforts in human trafficking, anti-terrorism and anti-corruption. These include, for example, the joint organization of a meeting with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to raise awareness and discuss money laundering and human trafficking in the Mediterranean region,¹¹⁹ and facilitation of a meeting to discuss money laundering in relation to the financing of terrorism.¹²⁰ OCEEA often coordinates with TNT's Borders Unit.

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights addresses a number of SSG/R-related activities, the majority of which link to efforts in the judicial sector. First and foremost, ODIHR engages with the topic of war crimes and humanitarian law. Most such activities are focused on the provision of training to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary

¹¹¹ OSCE-FSC, "Regional Seminar in Minsk Highlights Role of OSCE Code of Conduct", press release, 22 September (year missing), www.osce.org/fsc/72309.

¹¹² OSCE-FSC, "High-Level Officials Discuss OSCE Politico-Military Code of Conduct at Seminar in Latvia", press release, 18 June 2012, www.osce.org/fsc/91368.

¹¹³ OSCE-CPC, "The Role of Armed Forces in Democratic Societies in Mediterranean Discussed at OSCE Malta Conference", press release, 11 September 2013, www.osce.org/cpc/104792.

¹¹⁴ OSCE Gender Section, "OSCE Launches Good Practices Guide to Combating Violence against Women", press release, 8 June 2009, www.osce.org/gender/51014.

¹¹⁵ OSCE "Bringing Security Home: Combating Violence against Women in the OSCE Region. A Compilation of Good Practices", Vienna, June 2009, chs 5 and 6, www.osce.org/gender/37438.

¹¹⁶ OSCE-ATU (2011), note 107 above.

¹¹⁷ OSCE-OCEEA, "OSCE Seminar Focuses on Fight against Corruption in Border Services in Central Asia and South Caucasus", press release, 13 July 2010, www.osce.org/eea/72074.

¹¹⁸ OSCE-OCEEA, "OSCE Forum Discusses Rail and Road Transport, Good Governance at Border Crossings", press release, 1 February 2010, www.osce.org/eea/51861.

¹¹⁹ OSCE-OCEEA, "Joint UN-OSCE Meeting Aims to Intensify Fight against Money Laundering and Human Trafficking in the Mediterranean Region", press release, 18 September 2008, www.osce.org/eea/50088.

¹²⁰ OSCE-OCEEA, "OSCE Meeting on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism in Vienna", press release, 6 February 2012, www.osce.org/cio/87669.

sector in prosecuting and processing war crimes. Support in the area of hate crimes is also a focus, such as supporting reporting on hate crimes¹²¹ and providing recommendations on the legal framework.¹²² Aside from engagement in the judiciary, ODIHR's main thematic focus with regard to the security sector is gender mainstreaming and promotion and monitoring of human rights, where projects have been supported involving the armed forces, border officials and counterterrorism efforts. ODIHR's Human Rights Department in particular has played a strong role in supporting the integration of a human rights and gender perspective in security sector processes and institutions. Policing has also been addressed in the context of Roma and Sinti. While one of the key priorities of ODIHR is to support democratic governance, and in particular institutional accountability and responsiveness, in the area of SSG/R few examples of such engagement were identified in either press releases or interviews. This is likely because the "framework" that informs ODIHR's democratic governance work focuses mainly on areas other than SSG/R, such as the electoral cycle or political pluralism. There are some exceptions, however, related to its work on gender equality and human rights. For instance, a pilot training event on gender equality was conducted in July 2013 for MPs and staff of different committees of the Montenegrin parliament (including the committee on security and defence issues); this focused on the role of parliamentarians in adopting and monitoring legislation to prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence, and emphasized the importance of gender sensitivity in the parliament's work on security and defence policy and legislation.

Overall, the different institutions and entities of the Secretariat show considerable involvement in SSG/R-related activities from a thematic perspective. A commonality in the thematic approach is a high focus on issues related to transnational threats – this holds true in particular for the work of the Secretariat. This may reflect that it is a key concern shared by all participating States and is therefore high on the OSCE's agenda. Moreover, the decision to create the Transnational Threats Department was intended to give more focus to work in this area, but some concerns have been raised that it may run counter to other efforts. Some interviewees felt that terrorism was a symptom, and what should rather be tackled are the corrupt and non-functioning institutions which are the root causes of the problem.¹²³ Civil society representatives were also afraid that this focus on transnational threats would be to the detriment of a focus on governance issues.¹²⁴ ODIHR presented a background paper to the annual security review conference urging participants not to forget human rights and other human-dimension issues in the fight against terrorism.¹²⁵

Moreover, it is noteworthy that democratic oversight and management, despite forming a core element of the typically understood notion of SSG/R, are rarely addressed. The few occasions where they have been supported are when strategic guidance has been developed by the OSCE on this topic (e.g. in the area of democratic policing by SPMU or of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the armed forces by ODIHR) or it has been discussed under the auspices of the Code of Conduct. Perhaps this is a reflection that there is no department specialized principally in the provision of this support (other than the FSC Support Section in

¹²¹ OSCE-ODIHR, "Despite National Efforts, Hate Crimes Remain Serious Problem in OSCE Region, ODIHR Report Says", press release, 16 November 2012, www.osce.org/odihr/97298.

¹²² OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE/ODIHR Launches Guidelines on Hate Crime Laws", press release, 19 March 2009, www.osce.org/odihr/50732.

¹²³ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

¹²⁴ Interview with representatives of civil society, Belgrade, September 2013.

¹²⁵ OSCE-ODIHR, "Background Paper on Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges in the OSCE Region: The Human Dimension", OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, 26–28 June 2012, www.osce.org/odihr/91694.

relation to its role in promoting the code).¹²⁶ Support in this area could have further originated from structures engaging with the security providers themselves. Support to civil society engagement has also not been a strong focus of capacity development activities. However, in different instances civil society was included in forums, conferences and meetings; for example, ATU organized an expert workshop promoting cooperation between public actors and the media in combating terrorism,¹²⁷ OCEEA included civil society representatives at a meeting on countering money laundering and terrorism,¹²⁸ and ODIHR provided advice for civil society in the form of guidelines on hate-crime laws.¹²⁹

Field Operations

While it is clear that each field operation has its own thematic focus and pursues its own activities based on the needs of its host country, there are nonetheless some common thematic priorities in SSG/R support. Overall, the priorities clearly lie with police, borders and judiciary: work conducted in those three thematic domains comprises almost two-thirds of all recorded activities. Other domains include penitentiary, followed by anti-trafficking, anti-terrorism and defence. With regard to borders, there is a clear regional focus on Central Asia, which corresponds to the overall OSCE priorities and regional developments, especially in view of Afghanistan post-2014. Thus Tajikistan conducts more than half its recorded SSG/R-related activities in the border sector and this is the third-largest sector in Kyrgyzstan, although it is weak in Serbia and Bosnia. The judiciary receives much attention in Bosnia and Serbia, while it ranks in the middle in Kyrgyzstan and is virtually non-existent in Tajikistan.

In the area of police reform, field operations focused thematic support on community policing. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, community policing activities comprise issues such as supporting voluntary citizen patrols,¹³⁰ prevention of extremism and radicalization,¹³¹ juvenile delinquency,¹³² etc. The second most common subtopic is police reform, which consists for instance of support to parliamentary hearings¹³³ and public forums,¹³⁴ or discussion with civil society on the subject.¹³⁵ Strengthening police education systems is another important topic addressed, and covers among other things work on how to enhance management and delivery of police training.¹³⁶ Other topics addressed include human rights (e.g. in counterterrorism

¹²⁶ The Parliamentary Assembly, however, has been involved in the organization of awareness-raising events and agreements on parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

¹²⁷ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Expert Workshop Promotes Voluntary Co-operation between Public Actors, Media in the Fight against Terrorism”, press release, 19 October 2009, www.osce.org/atu/51464.

¹²⁸ OSCE-OCCEA, note 118 above.

¹²⁹ OSCE-ODIHR, note 120 above.

¹³⁰ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre Supports Public Order Training for Voluntary Citizen Patrols in Kyrgyzstan”, press release, 20 September 2010, www.osce.org/bishkek/72296.

¹³¹ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Contributes to Kyrgyzstan’s Efforts in Preventing Extremism and Radicalization through Community Policing”, press release, 4 October 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/83353.

¹³² OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre in Bishkek Fosters Local Police Dialogue with Young People to Tackle Juvenile Delinquency”, press release, 7 September 2010, www.osce.org/bishkek/72231.

¹³³ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre in Bishkek Supports Parliament Hearing on Police Reform”, press release, 27 June 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/79013.

¹³⁴ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre Supports Public Discussion on Police Reform Concept”, press release, 15 June 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/78665.

¹³⁵ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “OSCE Mission to Serbia to Launch Project on Engaging Civil Society in Police Reform”, press release, 15 December 2008, www.osce.org/serbia/50504.

¹³⁶ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “OSCE Mission to Serbia Hosts First e-Learning Conference for Serbian Police”, press release, 23 March 2010, www.osce.org/serbia/69081.

efforts), gender (e.g. with regard to domestic violence¹³⁷) and narcotics (e.g. precursor identification and backtracking investigations¹³⁸). With regard to forensics, training on DNA has been provided for investigators, for instance.¹³⁹ In the area of strengthening management within the institution, it is noteworthy that two workshops on strategic planning and change management were conducted in Tajikistan, which aimed among other things at supporting skills in the development of strategic policing plans.¹⁴⁰

In the area of judicial reform, a significant focus of support is enhancing capacity to tackle war crimes, particularly in BiH and Serbia.¹⁴¹ Other thematic issues include addressing the independence of the judiciary¹⁴² and reforming juvenile justice.¹⁴³ Support has been provided in selection of judges, trial monitoring, witness and victim assistance, and access to justice.

In the area of border security reform, a key topic has been border management. Under border management, the press releases usually summarize a comprehensive range of issues related to the management of security, such as border control, intelligence information analysis, forged document detection, duty collection, counternarcotics search, leadership and management techniques, and human rights issues. Examples include the training of Afghan border police and customs officials in Kyrgyzstan¹⁴⁴ and Tajikistan,¹⁴⁵ and training and courses at the Border Management Staff College.¹⁴⁶ Another important topic has been enabling the detection of forged travel documents.¹⁴⁷ Customs has been an important focus, such as strengthening airport customs procedures and promoting international customs standards.¹⁴⁸ Other topics addressed include organized crime,¹⁴⁹ counternarcotics¹⁵⁰ and planning and conducting border

¹³⁷ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Office in Tajikistan Helps Train Police Officers in Supporting Victims of Domestic Violence”, press release, 16 June 2010, www.osce.org/tajikistan/69436.

¹³⁸ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Trains Tajik and Afghan Law Enforcement Officers on Precursors Identification, Backtracking Investigations”, press release, 25 October 2010, www.osce.org/tajikistan/74040.

¹³⁹ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre Supports DNA Training for Investigators and Forensic Experts in Kyrgyzstan”, press release, 7 September 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/82218.

¹⁴⁰ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Office Conducts Strategic Planning Workshop to Support Tajikistan’s Police Reform”, press release, 4 March 2011, www.osce.org/tajikistan/75919; OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Office Supports Police Reform in Tajikistan with Strategic Planning Workshop”, press release, 7 May 2010, www.osce.org/tajikistan/69256.

¹⁴¹ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “OSCE Mission Organizes Working Visit of Serbian War Crimes Judges to ICTY”, press release, 1 September 2010, www.osce.org/serbia/72197; OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Trains Police Inspectors on War Crimes Investigation”, press release, 20 October 2010, www.oscebih.org/News.aspx?newsid=58&lang=EN.

¹⁴² OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “OSCE Urges Political Representatives to Stop Undue Pressure on the Judiciary”, press release, 12 January 2010, www.oscebih.org/News.aspx?newsid=51&lang=EN.

¹⁴³ OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “OSCE Mission to BiH Concludes Roundtables Discussion Series on New Juvenile Justice Legislation in Republika Srpska”, press release, 26 November 2010, www.oscebih.org/News.aspx?newsid=65&lang=EN.

¹⁴⁴ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre in Bishkek Holds Third in a Series of Training Courses for Afghan Customs Officers”, press release, 24 January 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/75048.

¹⁴⁵ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE, UNDP Train Afghan Border Police, Customs Officials on Border Management”, press release, 5 June 2012, www.osce.org/tajikistan/91074.

¹⁴⁶ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “Senior Border Officials from 14 Countries Receive OSCE Training”, press release, 3 June 2013, www.osce.org/tajikistan/102220.

¹⁴⁷ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre in Bishkek Trains Border Officials on Travel Document Security”, press release, 11 November 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/84947.

¹⁴⁸ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “Afghan and Tajik Customs Officers Learn about Airport Customs Procedures in OSCE Training Course”, press release, 10 July 2013, www.osce.org/tajikistan/103456; OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre in Bishkek Supports International Customs Standards in Kyrgyzstan”, press release, 13 September 2010, www.osce.org/bishkek/72257.

¹⁴⁹ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Trains Tajik Border and Customs Officers on Combating Transborder Organized Crime”, press release, 21 June 2013, www.osce.org/tajikistan/102966.

surveillance.¹⁵¹ These thematic priorities often originate in the Secretariat's Borders Unit and are then shared with field operations for implementation.

Penitentiary reform was another topic that was highly engaged in Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent in Serbia and Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the thematic priorities include education of penitentiary staff on human rights¹⁵² and the prevention of radicalization.¹⁵³ Issues have included supporting income-generating activities in prisons,¹⁵⁴ raising awareness on human rights and international standards,¹⁵⁵ and monitoring places of closed detention.¹⁵⁶

Defence reform is generally not a strong focus of field operations with the exception of Bosnia, where this engagement has been overtaken by a focus on supporting national security policy (NSP) development and implementation. Numerous courses have been organized for officials on NSP. Moreover, the project on NSP has recently evolved to focus on SSR. This is reflected in press releases showing the mission has engaged thematically with "SSR", supporting for instance training on this topic in cooperation with the Armed Forces Joint Staff and the Centre for Security Studies for relevant ministries and agencies, the armed forces, media and civil society.¹⁵⁷

In the area of strategic frameworks, the only example of support to the development and implementation of an NSP was found in BiH. It was pointed out by staff of one operation in Central Asia that support to strategic frameworks might be an entry point to engage in promoting broader dialogue on the security sector. However, field operations do occasionally support strategic frameworks at the component level (e.g. police reform strategy in Tajikistan). Finally, strengthening management systems is also rarely conducted – and mostly in the area of police reform, such as in Serbia and Tajikistan.

A common finding is that the thematic focus on oversight and management is relatively weak given the range of other thematic focuses that are prioritized. Transnational threats issues, such as combating trafficking and terrorism, enjoy a much stronger focus by field operations. It was raised by interlocutors that this might not always be the most important topic to address in terms of immediate needs, but is often prioritized by international actors.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁰ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, "Afghan and Tajik Border Officials Undergo OSCE-Supported Training in Identifying Chemicals Used in Illicit Manufacture of Drugs", press release, 29 May 2013, www.osce.org/tajikistan/102070.

¹⁵¹ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, "Afghan Border Police Officers Complete OSCE Border Security Training in Tajikistan", press release, 2 August 2012, www.osce.org/tajikistan/104043.

¹⁵² OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "OSCE Centre Organizes Course on Human Rights and Safety for Kyrgyz Prison Security Units", press release, 14 August 2009, www.osce.org/bishkek/51236.

¹⁵³ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "OSCE Centre Supports Seminars for Prison Wardens to Prevent Religious Extremism and Radicalization in Kyrgyzstan's Prisons", press release, 13 September 2010, www.osce.org/bishkek/72259.

¹⁵⁴ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "OSCE, EU and UNODC Support Income-Generation Activities in Kyrgyzstan's Penitentiary System", press release, 16 May 2013, www.osce.org/bishkek/101574.

¹⁵⁵ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "OSCE Centre Provides Training to Prison Officers in Southern Kyrgyzstan", press release, 8 June 2009, www.osce.org/bishkek/51013.

¹⁵⁶ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "Monitoring of Detention Facilities Helps Prevent Torture, says Deputy Head of OSCE Centre in Bishkek", press release, 18 August 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/81728.

¹⁵⁷ OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Security Sector Reform Focus of OSCE-Supported Training in Bosnia and Herzegovina", press release, 14 March 2013, <http://www.osce.org/bih/100144>.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with international counterpart in Bishkek, July 2012.

There are some exceptions. The mission in Bosnia in particular has placed a strong focus on engaging with parliament on oversight of the security sector through the work of its Security Cooperation Department, which specifically had a position dedicated to this topic. For instance, the mission has supported the parliamentary military commissioner. Moreover, as part of its security policy course for civilian and military staff, efforts are directed towards strengthening cooperation between parliamentary bodies and state institutions, and raising awareness on the security and defence policies of the country.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the Mission to Serbia's SSR programme provides support to parliamentary oversight: it assists, for example, in capacity development for the parliamentary committees on both defence and internal affairs and control of security and intelligence services.¹⁶⁰ In Kyrgyzstan the mission has included parliamentary staff in some events, such as a national forum on police reform. However, beyond this, little focus has been placed on building their capacity for oversight. This is even more apparent in Tajikistan, where first-dimension staff note that there are currently no entry points for engaging in support to parliamentary oversight.¹⁶¹

In the case of strengthening civil society oversight, civil society has often been invited to events, but efforts to engage in building its capacity as a thematic focus have been rare, the main exception being the Mission to Serbia. In Kyrgyzstan civil society has often been included through the focus on community policing, and only very recently in discussions on police reform. In Serbia several efforts have been made to enhance media oversight of the security sector. A distinction must be made, however, between the dimensions; while the first dimension rarely engages in capacity building of civil society, the human dimension's engagement with civil society is a pillar of its work.

In the Central Asian missions the topic of parliamentary oversight of the security sector has often been raised by staff as being too sensitive or not knowing how to use an entry point. The Code of Conduct was rarely understood as a potential entry point in these contexts – indeed, not all staff were aware of its existence. In the case of strengthening civil society oversight, staff often said they do not know what the potential entry points would be.

¹⁵⁹ OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Head of OSCE Mission to BiH Stresses Importance of Co-operation between Institutions and Citizens for Maintaining Security", press release, 6 December 2010, www.oscebih.org/News.aspx?newsid=66&lang=EN.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with OSCE official, Mission to Serbia, September 2013.

¹⁶¹ Interview with OSCE officials, Dushanbe, September 2013.

Key findings

- The thematic focus between the Secretariat and the field is similar. Within each first dimension thematic area (i.e. police, border) this includes a strong focus on transnational threats (such as counter-terrorism, cybercrime). There are some areas where the field is involved while not the Secretariat or Institutions. For instance, whereas many field operations are active in improving prisons conditions or penitentiary reform, they are rarely supported by the Secretariat and Institutions.¹⁶²
- While oversight and management are key components of the notion of SSG/R, in practice, they are not systematically supported by the Secretariat, Institutions and field operations. Moreover, in the field operations, several distinctions can be made. First, the Missions to Bosnia and Serbia have engaged in strengthening parliamentary oversight of the security sector, and Serbia has been significantly engaged in strengthening civil society oversight of the security sector. Beyond these examples, parliamentary and civil oversight in the first dimension was fairly neglected and often limited to inviting representatives to meetings. Second, in the case of the operations in Central Asia, a certain resistance towards engaging thematically in governance aspects of SSG/R was perceivable, either because of not knowing the value of this, or not knowing entry points, or for fear of resistance. While it is recognized that it is sensitive and delicate to engage in these governance issues, there are nonetheless entry points and this represents an area for potential future OSCE guidance.
- There is a risk that the thematic focus is dictated by the capacities and expertise of each entity, rather than by a strategic vision of support needed.

Programmatic Level

The programmatic level refers to how the OSCE chooses to design, plan and implement its support. The broad priorities identified in OSCE commitments and MC decisions are the shaping factors in this regard. For instance, following the OSCE MC decision in Bucharest calling for enhanced engagement of the Secretariat in supporting law enforcement in tackling organized crime, including drug trafficking,¹⁶³ SPMU has supported various training for police practitioners in the OSCE region on fighting drug trafficking, and has included Afghan police officers in line with the Madrid MC decision.¹⁶⁴ In the case of field operations, support is often more influenced by mission mandates, requests from participating States and, in theory, an analysis of what other international actors are doing to identify the gaps and needs.

A common element of programmatic support is that, in line with the organization's origins, much of it is focused on "sending messages, promoting ideas, and influencing policy agendas".¹⁶⁵ As noted by the previous Secretary General, the OSCE has a unique role to play in terms of its platform for dialogue and ability to "build networks and to focus political attention on technical questions of great significance".¹⁶⁶ While there is still a significant

¹⁶² An exception being the supplementary human dimension meeting on prison reform organized by ODIHR in 2002 to discuss measures participating states can take to improve the prison systems; however, there has been no significant follow-up to this, and it was raised as a gap in interviews. See OSCE-ODIHR "Final Report", Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting Prison Reform, Vienna, 8–9 July 2002, www.osce.org/odihr/19925.

¹⁶³ OSCE-MC, "The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism", December 2001, MC(9).DEC/1.

¹⁶⁴ OSCE-MC, note 55 above. See OSCE-SPMU, "Afghan Police Officers Graduate from OSCE-Organized Counter-Narcotics Course", press release, 10 December 2008, www.osce.org/spmu/50322.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

¹⁶⁶ OSCE OCEEA, note 116 above.

focus on programmatic support, in practice the OSCE's approach has evolved to involve more operational support such as through provision of training, technical advice and monitoring. In the area of SSG/R, such operational support needs to be provided in a way that matches the principles of national ownership and sustainability.

The same methodology of content analysis of press releases combined with interviews was used here to identify some of the key elements of the OSCE's *de facto* approach to SSG/R-related support at the programmatic level (see methodological considerations in Part II).

Secretariat and Institutions

Regarding the programmatic approach of the Secretariat and institutions, a significant proportion consists of holding meetings and delivery of training. Overall, this comprises over two-thirds of all activities examined in the press releases. This is echoed in a recent report on OSCE activities in the fight against organized crime, which notes that “the provision of training, workshops, seminars and other capacity building activities accounted for two thirds of the overall activities carried out by the OSCE executive structures” in this area within one year.¹⁶⁷ Training is often focused on supporting the acquisition of skills relevant to work. An example is the two-week training conducted for Belarusian border control officers to improve their ability to detect forged documents.¹⁶⁸ Supporting curriculum development for national training centres is rarer, but there are instances, for example as part of ODIHR's War Crimes Justice Project which assisted the inclusion of a new curriculum in judicial and prosecutorial training institutions in Belgrade, Pristina, Sarajevo and Zagreb.¹⁶⁹ Another example is the OSCE resource “Police Training Guide: Trafficking in Human Beings”, which will be used as a tool for developing training curricula on this topic in participating States.¹⁷⁰

The analysis highlights that many of these conferences, workshops and seminars (henceforth referred to as meetings) are intended to support raising awareness on and implementation of commitments. For example, ATU has organized a meeting aimed at raising awareness and encouraging participating States to become party to and implement international counterterrorism instruments.¹⁷¹ Similarly, Secretariat and institutions often act as a forum to bring various actors together to discuss approaches to advancing certain agendas. For instance, a high-level meeting was organized for officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Russia to examine ways to increase the effectiveness of the regional fight against organized crime.¹⁷²

Another important area of activity is the development of reports and guidance, in the form of guidelines, best practices, handbooks, etc. It is reported from the field that publishing guidance is an important role of the Secretariat and institutions. Examples include, among

¹⁶⁷ OSCE-SPMU, “Report on OSCE Activities in the Fight against Organized Crime in 2011”, Transnational Threats Department, www.osce.org/spmu/98274.

¹⁶⁸ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE and IOM Co-Organize Training Course for Belarusian Border Service on Detecting Forged Travel Documents”, press release, 6 July 2009, www.osce.org/atu/51133.

¹⁶⁹ OSCE-ODIHR, “Handover of War Crimes Training Curriculum for Judges and Prosecutors”, press release, 31 October 2011, www.osce.org/odihr/84595.

¹⁷⁰ OSCE-SPMU, “OSCE Resource Police Training Guide: Trafficking in Human Beings”, Vienna, July 2013, <http://polis.osce.org/library/f/4074/3790/OSCE-AUT-SPM-4074-EN-3790>.

¹⁷¹ OSCE-ATU, “OSCE Workshop in Vienna Promotes International Legal Framework against Terrorism”, press release, 29 April 2010, www.osce.org/atu/69220.

¹⁷² OSCE-SPMU, “OSCE Organizes Meeting to Promote Central Asian Law Enforcement Co-operation in Combating Organized Crime”, press release, 1 July 2009, www.osce.org/spmu/51110.

others, SPMU's book containing good practices in building trust and understanding between police and Roma and Sinti communities,¹⁷³ and the Gender Issues Section's good practice guide to combating violence against women.¹⁷⁴ Published guidance is used to raise awareness on topics through meetings, or handed over to the field to help translate it in each context.

ODIHR relies upon some unique mechanisms. For instance, the Legislative Support Unit (upon request of a participating State) may undertake a review of the entire law-making process of a country or provides comments on a particular law. ODIHR also engages strongly with civil society through support to monitoring the human rights situation. For example, the Human Rights Education Unit provides training to civil society to monitor places of detention or capacity building, and Polish lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) associations were trained to work in close contact with law enforcement agencies on prevention of hate crimes.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, ODIHR directly conducts trial monitoring to enhance compliance with international standards.¹⁷⁶ Supporting peer-to-peer meetings is another type of frequent ODIHR activity, aimed at exchanging experiences. In Montenegro, ODIHR facilitated an exchange among judges from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and their peers from the region.¹⁷⁷ ODIHR staff consider peer-to-peer exchange to be a good alternative to training, because it enables better capacity building of high-level personnel within a short period of time and contributes to national ownership.

A significant proportion of the work conducted by the Secretariat and institutions is regionally driven. For example, SPMU supported a dialogue on democratic policing in Central Asia that brought together representatives of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.¹⁷⁸ It has also supported regional workshops on democratic policing in Eastern Europe (in Minsk in 2009) and Southeastern Europe (Sarajevo in 2010). ATU co-organized a conference on countering incitement to terrorism¹⁷⁹ and a workshop on exchange of information to fight terrorism,¹⁸⁰ both in Central Asia. ODIHR has promoted discussions of criminal justice reform in Central Asia.¹⁸¹ Such regional approaches have been commended by the field. An example is the seminars in the Balkans on the Code of Conduct, where it has been noted that the Secretariat's efforts in explaining how the Code is relevant for all countries has helped to put politically sensitive commitments into perspective and underline that no country is being singled out. It also encouraged other participating States with comparable contexts and backgrounds to exchange experiences and lessons learned. Regional events to foster cooperation between

¹⁷³ OSCE-SPMU, note 102 above.

¹⁷⁴ OSCE Gender Section, note 112 above

¹⁷⁵ Interview with ODIHR official, April 2013.

¹⁷⁶ OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE/ODIHR Starts Trial Monitoring Work in Georgia", press release, 28 February 2013, www.osce.org/odihr/99716.

¹⁷⁷ OSCE-ODIHR, "Judges from Former Yugoslavia and ICTY Share Experiences on Handling of War Crimes Cases Under OSCE/ODIHR-Led Project", press release, 27 June 2011, www.osce.org/odihr/79030.

¹⁷⁸ OSCE Centre in Astana, "OSCE Promotes Democratic Policing in Central Asia", press release, 13 November 2008, www.osce.org/astana/50346.

¹⁷⁹ OSCE-ATU, "OSCE-Supported Meeting in Central Asia Focuses on Countering Incitement to Terrorism", press release, 9 December 2010, www.osce.org/atu/74533.

¹⁸⁰ OSCE-ATU, "Exchange of Information Key to Fighting Terrorism, Organized Crime Say Participants in OSCE Workshop in Central Asia", press release, 6 June 2012, www.osce.org/atu/91121.

¹⁸¹ OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE-ODIHR Forum in Almaty promotes further reforms to criminal justice systems in Central Asia", 29 October 2012, www.osce.org/odihr/96743; OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE Forum Fosters Debate on Future of Criminal Justice Systems in Central Asia", press release, 15 October 2009, www.osce.org/odihr/51451; OSCE-ODIHR, "OSCE/ODIHR Criminal Justice Forum for Central Asia Charts Directions for Reform", press release, 17 June 2010, www.osce.org/odihr/69446.

border services or judicial systems on war crimes and organized crime are also considered to be of great added value.

Field Operations

A number of insights can be drawn on the programmatic approach of field operations. First, the undertaking of needs assessments within the field is rather the exception than the rule. The documented exceptions showed that assessments have enabled providing a longer-term vision of support which is in line with the priorities and needs of national actors. An important example is an assessment by the Law Enforcement Department of the Mission to Serbia in 2001;¹⁸² this aided in identifying more sustainable approaches to support, such as in the area of training, whereby the OSCE is strengthening efforts to reform the training system itself. As an analogy, whereas international support often seeks to “fill the container”, the mission is looking at the container itself. The department has since undertaken further assessments to refine its support in line with changing needs.

Second, the vast majority of support provided by field operations takes the form of training or awareness-raising seminars or roundtables. Training often focuses on enhancing technical skills, such as a four-day course on identifying precursors,¹⁸³ two-week bomb disposal training for law enforcement¹⁸⁴ and a two-day course for prosecutors, judges and police on securing and analysing forensic evidence.¹⁸⁵ Sometimes training aims at enhancing awareness on an issue, like human rights, while countering terrorism.¹⁸⁶ The risk is that this support is often *ad hoc*, as it does not follow a strategic and thus long-term and sustainable approach. Hence there have been cases where similar training has been repeatedly conducted for the same target audience.¹⁸⁷ In other cases, training was conducted for an audience who could not implement the acquired skills because they were too quickly rotated out of their posts.¹⁸⁸

Conferences, discussions and meetings are frequently geared at raising awareness on an issue; others are organized to strengthen inter-agency cooperation. For instance, the OSCE Centre in Tajikistan has used a dialogue on human trafficking to facilitate coordination between law enforcement, border management, social services, labour agencies, health services, prosecutors, courts and civil society.¹⁸⁹ Other aims are to support the exchange of experience, such as a regional conference which brought together judicial officials to share experiences in applying ethical and disciplinary standards for judges and prosecutors.¹⁹⁰ Public discussions are often organized to support exchanges on a new law or new reform strategy.¹⁹¹

¹⁸² Monk, Richard. Study on Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. July, 2001. <http://www.osce.org/spmu/17676>.

¹⁸³ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, note 136 above.

¹⁸⁴ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Centre Holds Training on Bomb Disposal for Law Enforcement Officers in Kyrgyzstan”, press release, 16 May 2011, www.osce.org/bishkek/77553.

¹⁸⁵ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “OSCE Mission to Serbia, Judicial Training Centre Organize Course on Crime Scene Investigation”, press release, 21 November 2008, www.osce.org/serbia/50386.

¹⁸⁶ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Office in Tajikistan Supports Incorporating Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism in Law Enforcement Curriculum”, press release, 4 December 2009, www.osce.org/tajikistan/51696.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with OSCE official, Sarajevo, August 2013.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with OSCE official, Dushanbe, September 2013.

¹⁸⁹ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE Office Facilitates High-Level Dialogue on Human Trafficking”, press release, 6 August 2010, www.osce.org/tajikistan/72135.

¹⁹⁰ OSCE Mission to Serbia, “OSCE Mission to Serbia Holds Regional Conference on Judicial Ethics and Accountability”, press release, 20 November 2012, www.osce.org/serbia/97355.

¹⁹¹ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, note 132 above.

Study visits are regularly organized by field operations to encourage learning from other experience, and in some cases this can have significant results. For instance, an OSCE study visit of Bosnian parliamentarians to Germany resulted in a parliamentary decision to set up a military ombudsman.¹⁹² However, there are two main challenges involved. First of all, the personnel participating in these study trips have to be well selected. Their positions must be relevant to the overall goal of the trip and they should not be assigned out of favouritism, nor should the same personnel participate in several or unrelated visits. Secondly, these study visits require strict monitoring and evaluation to ensure there are concrete results.

The field also engages in providing equipment to national counterparts, such as supplying computer equipment and setting up crime scene simulation rooms for a police school¹⁹³ and refurbishing a police station to support addressing domestic violence.¹⁹⁴

Key findings

- The programmatic approach most used by the Secretariat is the organisation of meetings followed by the provision of trainings. In the field, it is the other way around, with trainings first and meetings ranking second.
- Training often focuses on the delivery of specific skill sets that can be used by security sector personnel in their day to day jobs. Meetings often focus on raising awareness, promoting the exchange of experiences, or encouraging discussion on legal frameworks on policies.
- The field sometimes provides equipment to counterparts, this is rare for the Secretariat and Institutions.

Lessons Identified from OSCE Experience in SSG/R Support

The OSCE is heavily engaged in supporting SSG/R-related activities, even if this is not done under the heading of SSG/R; but in practice the OSCE's support often lacks coherence. On the thematic level, its approach to supporting SSG/R is not comprehensive, and lacks a strong focus on governance issues. At the same time, on the programmatic level the OSCE's approach is often *ad hoc* and based largely on training and awareness-raising events that are not always planned in a sustainable manner. This is a clear reflection of the lack of a strategic approach to SSG/R, and also results in inadequate considerations on issues such as identifying and building on the comparative advantages of the organization, defining the priorities of the organization and allocating resources accordingly, and promoting cross-dimensional initiatives and ensuring these are translated into practice and not just visible in rhetoric.

This section presents the ten key lessons drawn from the review of the OSCE's experience in supporting SSG/R. It frames the main elements that need to be addressed if the OSCE were to embark on developing a strategic approach to this support. Beyond this, it provides numerous

¹⁹² Interview with OSCE official, Sarajevo, August 2013.

¹⁹³ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, "Crime Scene Simulation Rooms at Bishkek Police School Set Up by OSCE Centre to Be Inaugurated", press release, 29 October 2010, www.osce.org/bishkek/74070.

¹⁹⁴ OSCE Office in Tajikistan, "OSCE Office in Tajikistan Equips Police to Cope with Domestic Violence Cases", press release, 19 August 2010, www.osce.org/tajikistan/72157.

insights into how the OSCE can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its support to participating States.

1. Develop an Overarching Framework for SSG/R Support

This study reveals that there are strong calls for developing a strategic approach to SSG/R. Admittedly, there are other potential approaches that could be adopted by the OSCE – such as countering transnational threats, to name one. However, this is only one element of a much broader SSG/R approach. The value of an SSG/R approach is that it encompasses a significant amount of activities in which the OSCE is already engaged and could thus help to increase coherence in the delivery of support substantially. This is particularly the case in the field operations, where a majority of support provided falls into the category of SSR.¹⁹⁵ The OSCE is thus already engaged in this area, and what it needs now is to bring coherence to its support to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness. Ideally, this would entail the development of an overarching framework for SSG/R. Such a framework would also enable enhanced coherence with other international actors which have already developed their approaches to SSG/R. The international community has largely embraced and recognized the value of such a framework for the provision of support which emphasizes national ownership of reforms while maintaining certain values that are already part of the OSCE's *acquis*.

An overarching framework for SSG/R would reiterate its fundamental principles, including those already addressed in OSCE commitments. It would also clarify the overall goal of support in this area, and how the different dimensions should contribute towards it. It would underline the key characteristics of a holistic approach to SSG/R and emphasize some of the hallmarks of an effective thematic and programmatic approach. This ought to be informed by a thorough understanding of the comparative advantages of the organization. It would also highlight what additional expertise and tools are needed.

The development of a strategic framework for SSG/R should not be understood as trying to constrain the manoeuvring room of any department or unit within the Secretariat, institutions, or in the field. Likewise, it should not provide a template that can be transplanted to field contexts. Rather, it should help to inspire enhanced strategic approaches according to each context. Such a framework could for instance be taken as the point of departure in assessing SSG/R needs. This understanding is echoed in the Secretary General's annual report of 2004 on police-related activities, which noted that an overarching framework would enable the OSCE to "link together the operational elements of the Organization in order to guide the formulation of OSCE mission mandates, present a clear statement of purpose in association with existing ones and distinguish between the activities of the OSCE and its international counterparts in the future".¹⁹⁶

Finally, given the cross-dimensional nature of SSG/R support, it is essential that such a framework be truly cross-dimensional and not spearheaded by one department or another. The few voices raising potential concerns regarding the development of a framework were those that felt it would be used as an excuse to solidify one dimension's work in this area over

¹⁹⁵ The exception being perhaps the Mission in Bosnia, which is essentially becoming a second-dimension mission.

¹⁹⁶ OSCE (2005), note 8 above, p. 4.

another.¹⁹⁷ Framework development must thus be a truly inter-institutional endeavour in order to have intended impact.

2. Adopt a Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Support

SSG/R cuts across the three dimensions of security as defined by the OSCE: politico-military, economic/environmental and human. A large number of OSCE commitments, in line with its vision of security, recognize the need for cross-dimensional approaches to security. This implies that the organization should not only try to address issues pertaining to the three dimensions, but also make the link between related issues which are traditionally understood as unidimensional. This is reflected in the commitments, which clearly outline, for example, that an effective fight against terrorism should include enhancing the capacity of the judiciary, intelligence (anti-money-laundering units) and border controls.¹⁹⁸ The MC Decision on Organized Crime (2006)¹⁹⁹ recommends participating States in fighting this type of crime “to apply an integrated approach, mindful of the fact that every element of the criminal justice system impacts on the other elements”. The 2012 OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities also translates this recommendation to the OSCE itself, saying it should be “seeking to strengthen the co-ordination of police-related activities within the OSCE as well as to ensure their complementarity with regards to reform efforts in other sectors of the criminal justice system”.²⁰⁰ Moreover, gender equality and, to a lesser extent, human rights are recognized in the OSCE commitments to require mainstreaming across all three dimensions and across judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement institutions.²⁰¹

The organization’s rhetoric is thus cross-dimensional; however, there is a disconnect with the reality on the ground. First, the human and politico-military dimensions are rather compartmentalized. This was echoed in the interviews, wherein it was noted that in practice SSG/R is often tackled as a first-dimension issue that neglects its essential human-dimension components.²⁰² While issues such as gender or human rights are at times addressed in first-dimension activities, these are often incorporated as “add-ons” at the very end, rather than properly mainstreamed in a cross-dimensional approach from the planning stage. Moreover, entities working on SSG/R issues from the perspective of other dimensions are not systematically included in the discussion on first-dimension issues. It was noted, for instance, that the OSR/CTHB is not invited to the annual security review conferences despite its dealing with a topic that is clearly linked to SSG/R. Conversely, as a reflection of broader compartmentalization, the ODIHR’s Democratization Department sometimes does not

¹⁹⁷ Interviews with OSCE Secretariat officials, Vienna, November 2012; ODIHR officials, Warsaw, April 2013; and OSCE officials, Dushanbe, September 2013.

¹⁹⁸ OSCE, “Programme of Action”, document of Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism, 13–14 December 2001, www.osce.org/atu/42545. Also see the OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, which calls for ensuring “the facilitation and cross-dimensional and cross-institutional co-ordination of all OSCE counter-terrorism activities”. Cross-dimensional approaches are also promoted for the fight against threats like drugs, human trafficking and hate crimes. OSCE-MC, “Combating Hate Crimes”, MC.DEC/9/09, 2 December 2009, www.osce.org/cio/40695.

¹⁹⁹ OSCE-MC, “Organized Crime”, MC.DEC/5/06, Brussels, 2006, www.osce.org/mc/23060.

²⁰⁰ OSCE-PC, “OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities”, PC.DEC/1049, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/pc/92559>.

²⁰¹ OSCE-MC, “Preventing and Combating Violence against Women”, MC.DEC/15/05, 2005, <http://www.osce.org/mc/17451>; OSCE-MC, “Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation”, MC.DEC/14/5, 2005, <http://www.osce.org/mc/17450>.

²⁰² Interview with OSCE official, November 2012.

perceive the link between its work and the security sector. The Legislative Support Unit, for example, highlighted that it was often “completely disconnected from the first dimension”, with security-sector-related laws generally not the object of comments or reviews.²⁰³ Exceptions include those laws it reviews that are related to cross-dimensional aspects such as anti-terrorism, for instance. In general this is a reflection of the fact that ODIHR responds to requests from participating States, thus suggesting there may be a need to raise awareness about legal reviews of laws that are focused specifically on security sector providers.

There are, however, some exceptions. In the area of police reform, in particular, several efforts to recognize and build on cross-dimensional synergies have been made. These include the collaboration between SPMU and institutions in the development of guidelines, such as the Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law-Enforcement Officials²⁰⁴ and the Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies.²⁰⁵ However, more can be done to take forward this cross-dimensional approach in programming on the ground. In the area of defence reform, there has also been a significant exception: one representative of ODIHR’s unit for human rights, gender and security is invited to the 1994 Code of Conduct annual review conference. Similarly, the unit launched a new series of events to be held biannually, “The OSCE-ODIHR Human Rights series with the cooperation and for the benefit of the FSC”, to which the military advisers of the Forum for Security Co-operation are invited to discuss gender and human rights issues related to the military. The first conference was held in April 2013 and was dedicated to the question of women’s access to combat positions. The second took place in October, with a focus on ombudsman institutions for the armed forces. It is a highly innovative initiative whose main goals are building bridges between the first and third dimensions and decompartmentalizing issues and ideas. However, its exceptionality possibly also resides in the fact that security is an explicit part of the portfolio of this unit, as reflected in its title.

Within field operations the cooperation between dimension-based departments is generally also weak – the cross-dimensional approach is often more apparent in departments which are not explicitly dimensional. For instance, the Security Cooperation Department within the Mission to Bosnia is not explicitly assigned to a dimension, although in practice it has strong linkages to the first dimension. However, its work has sometimes been cross-dimensional, for example when it supported the creation of a military ombudsman office for the oversight of human rights in the armed forces of Bosnia.²⁰⁶ Another example is the Democratization Department in the Mission to Serbia, which is essentially cross-dimensional. It has engaged in a range of SSG/R-related projects under the umbrella of an SSR programme, including supporting the financing of research on the LGBT and Roma communities’ relations with the police in Serbia – representing an approach that links the first and third dimensions.²⁰⁷

Finally, the biggest gap in the cross-dimensional approach of the OSCE, at the Secretariat, institution and field levels, lies in the missed opportunities to link the second dimension to the others. In particular, this concerns the good governance and anti-corruption initiatives that are associated with the second dimension. As noted by an OSCE official, corruption and bad

²⁰³ Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

²⁰⁴ OSCE-ODIHR, “Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law-Enforcement Officials”, 2012, www.osce.org/odihr/93968.

²⁰⁵ OSCE-HCNM, “Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies”, 2006, www.osce.org/fr/hcnm/32233.

²⁰⁶ Interview with OSCE official, Sarajevo, August 2013.

²⁰⁷ Interview with civil society representative, Belgrade, September 2013.

governance in the security sector, and in particular the police and judicial system, are the root causes of many crimes which the organization is fighting, including terrorism.²⁰⁸ However, these issues mostly fall through the cracks of the organization's work because OCEEA is mainly involved in economic and environmental areas. It engages with the security sector only on issues such as financial intelligence, anti-money-laundering and cross-border trade. These findings hold mostly true for field operations as well, but with the exception that the second dimension in the field sometimes engages in anti-corruption in the security sector. For instance, in Tajikistan the anti-corruption unit is located in the second dimension but is involved in training the customs service, which is under the guidance of the first dimension.²⁰⁹

The lack of a cross-dimensional approach can be linked to several factors raised in this report. First, there is often a lack of understanding regarding where potential synergies between dimensions exist. More efforts are needed to raise awareness on the synergies, many of which are already highlighted in commitments, but which have not yet trickled down into practice. Second, there is a lack of understanding regarding the overarching goal of the OSCE in this area, and how all dimensions and entities are contributing to it. There is also a lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms and staffing structures to ensure that cross-dimensional planning can take place in practice. For instance, it was noted that a gender focal point cannot be expected to mainstream gender in activities of the first dimension properly if this role is not part of the job description.²¹⁰ Mainstreaming requires the allocation of time for staff to do it properly and also a strategic management decision to promote receptivity to mainstreaming and emphasize its added value. This would entail evaluating departments and units on some essential criteria related to cross-dimensional mainstreaming.

There were strong calls in the field for an overarching SSG/R framework that would enable cross-dimensional engagement based on an institutional vision, rather than on the will or understanding of different staff members. An SSG/R framework would ideally outline the higher-level goals of the OSCE in this area and identify how each dimension should be contributing to these goals by clarifying roles and responsibilities. Similarly, it would need to provide examples of concrete synergies that could be supported and make a strong call for enhanced coordination on these matters.

3. Identify and Build on the OSCE's Comparative Advantages

Many of the traditional comparative advantages of the OSCE – its comprehensive approach to security, broad membership and soft decision-making processes – have lost their uniqueness in recent years. Today, “NATO and the EU have undergone a functional ‘despecialization’ or generalization, thereby becoming ‘OSCE-ified’”.²¹¹ In addition, the Council of Europe has gained clout in the area of human rights as both a forum for exchange and an implementer on the ground.²¹² As an OSCE official summarizes it, “all organizations are increasingly doing the same [work], and their members need to decide what they want each one to do”.²¹³

²⁰⁸ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

²⁰⁹ Interview with OSCE official, Dushanbe, September 2013.

²¹⁰ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

²¹¹ Peter Ingo, “The OSCE, NATO and the EU within the Network of Interlocking European Security Institutions”, 2004, p. 399. <http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/03/Peters.pdf>

²¹² Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

²¹³ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

Such a decision should be based on an understanding of comparative advantages. The challenge is that, beyond the broad advantages enumerated for decades, the OSCE is often unaware of where it can have an added value. As identified in 2006 in the annual report of the Secretary General on policing activities, “The OSCE cannot and should not compete with” the “superior resources and delivery capacity” of other international actors.²¹⁴ It should therefore foster an understanding of its own comparative advantages that can help it prioritize the allocation of its resources. The study has pointed to numerous insights in this regard.

First, the OSCE can have a significant added value in enabling a host country to develop a comprehensive understanding of its needs in SSG/R, from border management to justice, and aiding the development of sector-wide reform strategies. This is because, unlike many other organizations, the OSCE still has a broad approach to security that enables it to engage in a wide range of issues, rather than only being able to look from one angle of support. Moreover, the trusted relationship it often has with host countries facilitates this role. The OSCE should therefore support host countries and international actors to develop common goals. This suggests that there should be a greater role for the OSCE in supporting strategic assessments concerning the needs in the security sector and identifying where there are gaps in support which it can meaningfully cover. Such a process does not appear to be an element of support systematically provided by the OSCE,²¹⁵ although sector component assessments have at times been supported (e.g. an assessment on priorities for increasing the investigative and legal capacity of the State Financial Intelligence Service to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Kyrgyzstan²¹⁶ and assessments of the police reform process in Serbia²¹⁷). Moreover, an enhanced role at the strategic level would entail support to developing national security policies or strategies. In Bosnia the mission did support the development of the NSP, and regularly encourages discussion on the gaps to be addressed in the policy. However, this is not a prominent component of OSCE work, although enhanced engagement at the strategic level would be a good role for the organization.²¹⁸

Second, linked to this, the OSCE can have significant impact in promoting messages and raising awareness on important but sensitive issues. The OSCE could make better use of its political influence and push for certain agenda items or reforms. A decision is needed on the role of the OSCE: whether it should engage in advocating for the implementation of certain commitments or whether its role has become primarily of supporting implementation directly. For instance, it has been noted that in Central Asia it is the only international actor that can use commitments as arguments to engage with national counterparts on a large array of issues. Compared to the European Union, whose deeply integrated rules and culture are often considered too “strong”,²¹⁹ the OSCE’s more neutral voice is perceived as the more legitimate

²¹⁴ OSCE-SPMU, “Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2006”, July 2007, www.osce.org/spmu/26128.

²¹⁵ Interviewees often reported that the lack of systematically conducting proper assessments was a weakness in the OSCE’s approach. A notable exception was SPMU, which has been more engaged in supporting assessments – these are often internal documents.

²¹⁶ OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “OSCE Facilitates Co-operation on Anti-Money Laundering between Ukraine’s and Kyrgyzstan’s Financial Intelligence Services”, press release, 12 July 2013, <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/103549>.

²¹⁷ Monk, note 180 above; Mark Downes, “Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service”, January 2004, www.osce.org/serbia/18310.

²¹⁸ OSCE-SPMU, “Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2006”, July 2007, www.osce.org/spmu/26128.

²¹⁹ Alyson Bailes et al., “Reflections on the OSCE-EU Relationship”, 2008, p. 75, <http://core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/07/BailesHaineLachowski-en.pdf>.

one to suggest politically acceptable solutions.²²⁰ In Southeast Europe as well, the OSCE is perceived as having “values, rather than interests”.²²¹ Its success in raising awareness on sensitive issues can be seen in Kyrgyzstan, for instance, where the government approached the OSCE for support in drafting its national anti-corruption concept.²²² However, there are still missed opportunities regarding, for instance, reminding states of their commitments enshrined in the 1994 Code of Conduct. The organization often does not use its political power for fear of alienating host nations and participating States more broadly. More efforts could be made to engage in raising awareness of sensitive topics while remaining committed to national ownership.

Third, the OSCE can play a role in filling the gaps. The organization’s flexibility, by virtue of its limited bureaucratic mechanisms and broad comprehensive approach to security, has been raised as an advantage. This is particularly the case in its ability to deliver rapid assistance and “fill the niches overlooked or left behind by larger players – niches that can sometimes thwart the achievement of higher-level objectives”.²²³ For instance, in Serbia it was noted that the OSCE is the only actor able to address sensitive issues such as those concerning the status of homosexuals in the security sector.²²⁴ Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan UNODC was engaged in a massive prison reform programme; however, due to EU funding rules, it could not adapt its programme to respond to new needs. The OSCE was able to complement UNODC’s work by addressing the targeted needs, which was raised by national counterparts as an excellent example of the potential for complementarity among international organizations.²²⁵ However, this requires a clear understanding of strategic objectives to ensure that support is not *ad hoc* and adequate risk assessments are carried out so that it does no harm and can have an impact.

Fourth, all four missions examined in this study have field offices, although they vary greatly in number, size and depth of engagement, ranging from six staff members in two field offices in Serbia to about 150 people employed across 14 field offices in BiH. This presence in the field, which is a special feature of the OSCE, was recognized as a strength by all stakeholders and in all contexts. It gives the organization unparalleled immediate knowledge about the realities of a country. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan the community police advisers located across the country are considered the “eyes and ears” of the organization.²²⁶ They can support the detection of tensions at an early stage for early warning purposes and conflict prevention.

At the same time, there is much potential to channel the concerns of communities on the ground into discussions on reform at the strategic level. However, in field operations there is sometimes a disconnect in linking work at the local level to the broader strategic picture, although this can be a key area of added value for the organization. Many international actors interviewed noted that they would like to be able to tap more into this wealth of knowledge at the local level. Staff in the Osh field office in Kyrgyzstan also noted that there would be opportunities to enhance the feeding of information from the ground into strategic discussions at “headquarters” level.²²⁷ Furthermore, the OSCE’s presence on the ground enables it to draft high-quality reports based on empirical evidence from the local level on specific issues. These

²²⁰ Pál Dunay “The OSCE inCrisis”, 2006, p. 75, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp088.pdf>.

²²¹ Interview with head of mission, OSCE Mission to Serbia, Belgrade, September 2013.

²²² Interview with head of mission, Bishkek, July 2013.

²²³ OSCE-SPMU, note 212 above.

²²⁴ Interviews with civil society representatives, Belgrade, September 2013.

²²⁵ Interview with national counterparts, Bishkek, July 2013.

²²⁶ Interview with OSCE Kyrgyzstan staff member.

²²⁷ Interview with OSCE officials, Osh, July 2013.

reports, such as “Delivering Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina”²²⁸ and “Ensuring Accountability for Domestic Violence”,²²⁹ developed by the OSCE Mission to BiH, are widely depended on by both national and international actors.²³⁰ Their creation requires significant human resources present on the ground to gather the data, but otherwise they are rather cost effective, thus matching the resources of the organization.

Another advantage of working at the local level is that it enables the OSCE to move forward with its work even when there is stalemate at the state level. This is particularly true regarding SSR, a sensitive issue for which political will often fluctuates, and thus a strong local presence allows the organization to prepare the ground while waiting for the right political momentum. Furthermore, engagement at the local level can sometimes produce more impact for beneficiaries in a short timeframe and with less financial resources. Unfortunately, in the case of Bosnia, for instance, the field offices consisted primarily of human-dimension staff and were thus unable to be a vehicle for engagement with the first dimension. It would have been beneficial to have, at the minimum, a first- and a second-dimension specialist or focal point within these field offices to communicate to the headquarters significant advances or challenges on the ground (e.g. in the development of security-related laws at the local level).

A final comparative advantage of the organization is its ability to foster international coordination. There are formal relations and meetings for cooperation at a high level between the OSCE, the United Nations, the European Union, the Council of Europe and NATO;²³¹ what is missing is meaningful coordination at the strategic level in terms of long-term objectives.²³² While important, this is less of a concern at the Secretariat and institutions level; but at field level such strategic coordination is often essential to the success of reform efforts. Indeed, it is crucial that through coordination the international community can speak with one voice to lobby for a coherent approach to reform efforts based on national needs. Moreover, coordination is required to ensure that international actors respect the priorities identified by the government and share responsibilities in contributing to them. It is also essential to avoid duplicating efforts, for instance by sharing laws that each actor is currently engaged in supporting.²³³

It is widely felt by international and national actors that there is a potential role for the OSCE in promoting coordination in the area of SSG/R. This is because the OSCE generally has a broader approach than most other international actors due to not being limited by a narrow focus on specific topics, such as gender or organized crime, and can therefore be of value in coordinating broader strategic efforts. Also, it can count on the trust of national governments, and, in comparison to many bilateral donors, has the staff capacity to fill the role of coordinator adequately.

²²⁸ OSCE Mission to BiH, “Delivering Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from 2005 to 2010”, May 2011, www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2011051909500706eng.pdf.

²²⁹ OSCE Mission to BiH, “Ensuring Accountability for Domestic Violence: An Analysis of Sentencing in Domestic Violence Criminal Proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Recommendations”, December 2011, www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2012022017152706eng.pdf.

²³⁰ Interviews with representatives of civil society and the international community, Sarajevo, August 2013.

²³¹ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

²³² Sven Biscop, “The EU, the OSCE and the European Security Architecture”. In: *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 4:1, 2006. p. 26.

²³³ Representative of international community, Bosnia.

There are several examples of where the OSCE has been requested by national governments to take on this role. For instance, the OSCE's memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the Serbian Ministry of Interior²³⁴ and the Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs²³⁵ both called for the organization to play the lead role in international coordination efforts. Moreover, the OSCE has initiated several successful coordination mechanisms, such as a matrix on international efforts in capacity-building events in the area of border security management in Tajikistan.²³⁶ However, there is still much coordination required in other areas across the countries examined; while coordination regarding the justice sector and the police is sometimes advanced, other areas are often weaker.

4. Enhance a Sustainable Approach to SSG/R Support

The OSCE's approach to support varies significantly based on the context. However, there are some commonalities throughout the organization. First, not enough emphasis is placed on using assessments. This means that support tends to be path dependent, without considering changing needs or new avenues, which is problematic when considering that entry points for SSG/R support may open and close according to the political and security dynamics.

Moreover, the support provided is often based on training. Because there is such a high focus on providing training and seminars to accompany reform, processes targeting the institutional systems are often not the main focus of support. While staff of relevant ministries participate in the different activities, reform of the structures within which they work is often neglected. In fact, it has been suggested that training is frequently conducted with a focus on visibility, rather than long-term impact and sustainability.²³⁷ In practice, this means that support may be based on *ad hoc* projects. As previously recognized in the report of the Secretary General on policing: "small unconnected projects have little chance of accomplishing sustainable results".²³⁸

Enhanced efforts are also needed in programme planning to determine goals and identify exit strategies. Generally, the absence of proper monitoring and evaluation tools, and in some instances skills, exacerbates unsustainability. Overall, there are relatively few examples where efforts have actively been made to identify ways to transfer activities to national stakeholders or ensure they are embedded into a national approach. One example is ODIHR's engagement over a two-year period with the Tajik Ministry of Interior Academy to support curriculum development. Its Hate Crimes Unit also has a sustained relationship with the government on the basis of an MoU. Another example is in Serbia, where the Democratization Department attempted to transfer training of parliamentarians which is repeated every four years to include it as part of the standard curriculum provided by the defence college to national authorities. In the same mission's Law Enforcement Department, at first training was provided by international staff, then evolved into co-training with national experts, and finally management of the training was entirely handed over to the Ministry of Interior. Another example is the successful training of trainers on corruption awareness and prevention for the customs service in Tajikistan, where two trained customs officers now instruct their colleagues as part of the overall training programme. In these three cases sustainability was

²³⁴ Interview with OSCE official, Belgrade, September 2013.

²³⁵ Interview with OSCE official, Dushanbe, September 2013.

²³⁶ Interview with OSCE official and international counterpart, Dushanbe, September 2013.

²³⁷ Interviews with representatives of international community, Bishkek, July 2013, and Sarajevo, August 2013.

²³⁸ OSCE-SPMU, "Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-related Activities in 2005", November 2006, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/22448>.

achieved by following a long-term approach which embedded the training into the regular curricula and/or educational routines of both national entities, having a high level of local ownership, and handing the training over to the national authorities at an appropriate point.

It has been noted that even *ad hoc* training can still provide entry points for supporting deeper agreements with ministries on changes that need to be made in the institutional and legal environment, on the creation of coordination groups between police and civil society, on data collection etc.²³⁹ However, this requires a change in mentality and programme design, whereby training is perceived as a means to an end and not as the objective of a programme. More emphasis is required on supporting national ownership. This would take place by basing reform efforts on national needs ideally reflected in a MoU, supporting national assessments of these needs, and including national actors in monitoring and evaluating progress. There is also a need to recognize that reform efforts take place within a political context. As noted in a recent article, OSCE approaches to police assistance programmes have often been “devised as technical exercises, run by law enforcement officers, with only limited attention paid to the political context in which they were implemented”.²⁴⁰

Finally, staff in field operations noted that the shortcomings in sustainability are also linked to the shortcomings in cross-dimensional approaches. More could be achieved by identifying priorities and objectives to which the different departments can contribute. This would allow a move away from one-off activities to a more consistent programme of work aimed at providing comprehensive support. Given the lack of resources and the fact that often there are only a few people assigned to specific reform areas, it was suggested that potentially impact could be enhanced on the basis of a more cross-dimensional approach, which would entail each department conducting less work in individual areas but contributing more time to some joint work towards higher-level objectives.²⁴¹ A similar idea has been adopted by the field operation in Kyrgyzstan, where common strategic priorities have been identified to which all departments must contribute based on their own expertise.

In sum, a strategic framework would need to encourage a more impact-oriented approach to support that moves away from *ad hoc* approaches and reflects more on ways to enhance the sustainability and national ownership of the support.

5. Increase Cross-Dimensional Engagement with Civil Society

One of the strengths of the OSCE is its ability to build relationships with both a host country’s government and civil society. The human-dimension structures, in particular, are very experienced in engaging with civil society at both institution and field level. ODIHR, for instance, uses civil society organizations (CSOs) as implementing partners in participating states where there is no field operation.²⁴² Some of its units work at developing collaboration between CSOs and security providers, such as the Hate Crimes Unit’s project on linking Polish LGBT associations with the police,²⁴³ or the Gender and Security Programme, which has provided awareness-raising to civil society on gender issues. ODIHR has also undertaken

²³⁹ Interview with ODIHR official, April 2013.

²⁴⁰ David Lewis, “Security Sector Reform in Authoritarian Regimes: The OSCE Experience of Police Assistance Programming in Central Asia”, 2011, www.shrblog.org/cms_file.php?fromDB=84&forceDownload.

²⁴¹ Discussion at informal roundtable on SSR, OSCE Mission in Dushanbe, September 2013.

²⁴² Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

²⁴³ Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

efforts to strengthen civil society oversight through its support in the area of trial monitoring. In field operations, human-dimension projects are run in very close cooperation with civil society, such as those concerning prevention and prosecution of hate crimes or human trafficking²⁴⁴ and those which build capacity to monitor trials.²⁴⁵

In the case of some structures specialized in first-dimension issues, however, engagement with civil society is often weaker. The Secretariat mainly engages with representatives of the government and national institutions – its primary focus is not civil society, although the latter is often invited to training events or workshops, particularly on issues such as domestic violence or victims' identification in the fight against human trafficking. In the field, the first-dimension-dedicated structures rarely actively engage with civil society. At most they invite representatives to events, but do not actively try to build its capacity. As an example, the Police Reform Programme in Kyrgyzstan was criticized by interlocutors for not having attempted to engage with civil society regarding its perceptions of reform needs and opportunities. This lesson has been learnt and applied in Tajikistan, where the field operation is supporting dialogue among civil society members on priorities for police reform. However, it was still noted that more could be done to support dialogue between civil society and national authorities overall, rather than facilitating compartmentalized exchanges with each group separately. While these findings are context specific, in some cases there were concerns among CSO representatives that the OSCE may even be replacing the capacity of civil society by engaging in the type of activity that could be done by CSOs if they had the necessary resources.²⁴⁶ Admittedly, some field operations operate in contexts where it can be too sensitive for CSOs to engage actively without the OSCE. However, more efforts could be made to strengthen civil society or provide an OSCE umbrella, as was done in Serbia. In cases where the human dimension is heavily engaged with civil society while the first dimension is not, missed opportunities are likely, especially in view of CSO calls for more engagement in first-dimension issues.²⁴⁷ For instance, in Tajikistan civil society is interested in joining in a dialogue with the government on defence reform and human rights of the armed forces; however, there has been little clarity within the field operation so far on who would be able to facilitate this dialogue.

In the field, some departments appeared either not to be aware of the importance of building civil society capacity on SSR or not to know how, which suggests the need for guidance on this issue. There would be much value in drawing from best practices identified in Serbia, where the mission's SSR programme developed many innovative approaches to identify civil society actors and strengthen them by, for example, calling for proposals from CSOs on key SSG/R issues as well as funding and mentoring a civil society expert to research policing issues for a year. It was recognized by civil society groups that the support received from the OSCE enabled them to be perceived as associated with the organization, and has thus enhanced their access to the government and allowed them to increase their impact.²⁴⁸

The OSCE's approach to supporting activities in the area of SSG/R across all dimensions should clearly include a strong engagement with civil society. An SSG/R framework should underline why engagement with civil society is so important, both to strengthen its capacity to influence and perform oversight of reform processes, but also because of its value in ensuring

²⁴⁴ Interviews with OSCE officials, Sarajevo, August 2013.

²⁴⁵ Interview with OSCE officials, Bishkek, July 2013.

²⁴⁶ Interviews with representatives of civil society, Belgrade, September 2013.

²⁴⁷ Interview with civil society representative, Tajikistan, September 2013.

²⁴⁸ Interviews with representatives of civil society, Belgrade, September 2013.

that reform efforts are reaching the final beneficiary, the people. These are essential principles of SSG/R that risk being overlooked if not appropriately defined in a strategic framework.

6. Delineate Roles and Responsibilities in OSCE SSG/R Support

Given the large number of OSCE entities, departments and units engaged in supporting SSG/R, clarity on roles and responsibilities in this area is important for achieving coherence. The division of roles and responsibilities within and between the Secretariat and institutions is relatively clear.²⁴⁹ Within these entities, the roles and responsibilities between departments and units that are focused on a specific security provider (e.g. SPMU, Borders Team) are clearly delineated. This is because it is implicitly understood that each entity has the lead in its area of expertise (e.g. police reform or border reform) unless more specialized expertise can be offered by another source – for example, expertise on countering hate crimes with regard to police reform, which falls under the responsibility of the Hate Crimes Unit within ODIHR. With respect to OCEEA, it takes the lead on anti-money-laundering, which is inseparable from countering the financing of terrorism. However, when it comes solely to countering the financing of terrorism, ATU takes the lead. Similarly, in countering terrorism, ATU focuses on enhancing national capacities and efficiency in preventing and fighting terrorism, while ODIHR's Human Rights and Terrorism Unit solely concentrates on improving respect for human rights in counterterrorism and instituting legal safeguards to this aim.

The challenge, however, is that the roles and responsibilities are often too clearly delineated, which results in a compartmentalized approach. There are missed opportunities to identify synergies to build on. For instance, it was noted that TNT should engage more closely with judges and prosecutors in its work, even if it has been facilitating joint training courses and practical exercises for police, prosecutors and judges in different fields of crime prevention and investigation. It was recognized, however, that this may potentially attract resistance from other entities within the Secretariat and institutions, which have a stronger focus on working in the area of rule of law.²⁵⁰ Another result of the compartmentalization is that the focus of Secretariat-supported meetings on the 1994 Code of Conduct has until recently mainly been only the military, even though the law enforcement side could have been included, as the code stresses the importance of the democratic control of both the military and the police forces.²⁵¹ Clarity on roles and responsibilities ought to provide an opportunity to build on synergies between different entities, rather than strengthening the compartmentalized approach. It is therefore important to provide clarity on the potential synergies in the area of SSG/R, and for strategic management to encourage such synergies to be built upon.

Finally, while the division of work may be relatively clear to the Secretariat and institutions themselves, there were calls from the field for more clarity and transparency on the responsibilities of different departments and units, including the location of relevant expertise. Field staff often complained about uncertainties on points of contacts for requests for expertise.

²⁴⁹ The Secretariat mainly supports the chairmanship and participating States, and its primary partners are states and their various ministries. The institutions have specialized expertise. For instance, ODIHR has a clear human rights mandate and often works closely with civil society. HCNM also has a specialized mandate, which is to monitor the situation of minorities in OSCE countries, in particular respect for their cultural rights and their representation in state institutions.

²⁵⁰ Interview with senior OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012.

²⁵¹ Interview with OSCE official, Vienna, November 2012. A recent exception is in May 2013, when SPMU participated in a conference on the code of conduct in Sarajevo.

Within the field, responsibilities are generally clearly delineated. Nevertheless, roles are sometimes blurred, especially when several departments work on the same topic without a clear lead. This was, for instance, the case in the Centre in Kyrgyzstan with regard to the provision of support for activities against organized crime. In Tajikistan anti-corruption activities are supported by the second-dimension department, while previous work on anti-corruption with customs officials had been provided by the first dimension. Currently, given the understanding that anti-corruption initiatives are relevant across the dimensions, there are voices calling for its placement at the strategic level within the head of mission offices. However, this is not considered feasible due to the fact that head of mission offices are not intended to provide project-based support. In Serbia some confusion has been reported in the area of anti-trafficking, where it appears that this portfolio is moving from one department to another. The lack of clarity regarding which dimension or department is responsible for a particular topic may result in the duplication of processes, or leaving the topic unaddressed altogether. This is particularly evident with the issue of parliamentary oversight of the security sector. In Kyrgyzstan the parliamentary portfolio is within the responsibilities of the first-dimension department. However, the first dimension did not engage proactively in areas such as strengthening oversight of police, because it perceived this as a responsibility of the Police Reform Department; meanwhile, the Police Reform Department thought that the first dimension would be in the lead on this issue. Thus the topic of parliamentary oversight over the police has largely remained unaddressed. This highlights the need to encourage a strategic vision which clarifies priorities in the country, as well as roles and responsibilities in achieving these, for the whole field operation.

Finally, in theory, the division of roles between field operations and the Secretariat is clear. The role of the Secretariat and institutions is understood by the field as to provide expertise to missions on request, share best practices with participating States and support regional approaches. The field operations, with their significant capacity and knowledge regarding the local context, lead most of OSCE's support in their host country. In some cases, however, the Secretariat and institutions may also provide direct support to the national government or civil society. Mostly, support is provided in cooperation with the field operation (if there is one), although some examples of parallel engagement have been given by field staff.

To enhance effectiveness, there were calls for the Secretariat and institutions to define more clearly their roles in SSG/R support in relation to field operations. For instance, it was noted that the Secretariat and institutions are particularly important in fostering regional cooperation, communication and exchange of experience by, among others, organizing regional workshops to bring together different entities. This is a role they are often able to perform in a more effective manner than the field operations due to their access to contacts across the organization and their "bird's-eye view".²⁵² Their potential role as "intermediary" between OSCE participating States and field operations from the same geographical region should therefore be capitalized upon.

Similarly, the Secretariat and institutions can play a role in encouraging cross-dimensional synergies within missions. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan ATU initiated a project managed by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek on addressing extremism in prisons, thus supporting synergies between the first and second dimensions. The Secretariat and institutions could generally add value in identifying and encouraging the development of cross-dimensional synergies in field operations. Moreover, it was pointed out that the Secretariat and institutions could play a

²⁵² Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

more important role in facilitating or encouraging assessments of sectoral needs on which field operations' strategies of support could be based.

Another area of work which was generally highly appreciated in the field is ODIHR's composition of legal opinions, which were considered particularly useful by the field as an entry point for engagement. More efforts could be made to increase legal advice available on laws related to the security sector.

The role of the Secretariat and institutions in producing and sharing tools or guidelines was also considered of great value by the field; even if these lack context specificity, they were highlighted as providing useful entry points for support or standards to aim for, according to the context. For instance, the "Guidebook on Democratic Policing"²⁵³ and the "Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies"²⁵⁴ were recognized as very helpful.

It was also noted that the Secretariat and institutions could play a stronger role in facilitating the identification of specialized expertise required by the field, for instance by managing a roster of experts on SSR. Similarly, the role of SPMU in the development and management of POLIS²⁵⁵ was considered exemplary, in that it enabled the building of institutional knowledge of past events, projects and expertise. It was recommended that tools like POLIS be expanded to other areas of SSR where they could be useful.²⁵⁶ It was noted, however, that field staff are often unaware of the tools available, and more efforts are required to raise awareness of their existence. Likewise, the Secretariat and institutions could play a greater role in ensuring that relevant commitments are known and understood by the field staff concerned. It is important to mention, for instance, that the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Affairs is not always known of and used by all field staff, including senior mission staff.

Finally, it was frequently raised by personnel that their field operation has valuable lessons to share with other operations engaged in similar activities.²⁵⁷ It was noted that rather than seeking expertise from the Secretariat, it might be at times more relevant to consult experts from other missions. The Secretariat could facilitate the exchange of experience between missions standing at different stages of reform processes not only through the development of guidebooks that compile best practices, but also by enabling staff from one mission to provide advice to others or perform short-term assignments within them. This would likely reduce costs related to hiring of external expertise. A good practice in this regard is ODIHR's annual trial-monitoring meeting, which gathers representatives from OSCE field operations and CSOs, and facilitates the collection and repository of experiences. This has resulted in the development of ODIHR's Trial Monitoring Manual, which collects good practices.²⁵⁸

In sum, the division of roles and responsibilities between the Secretariat and institutions is clear. However, this frequently leads to compartmentalization, as the incentive for joint approaches is low. Within field operations, the division of roles and responsibilities between departments varies greatly according to the operation. Sometimes more clarity is required on roles, which should be reflected in a broader strategic vision or framework. With regard to the relationship between the secretariat and the institutions, on the one hand, and the field

²⁵³ OSCE, note 103 above.

²⁵⁴ OSCE-HCNM, note 203 above.

²⁵⁵ [OSCE Online Information System on Law Enforcement Activities within the OSCE Area, http://polis.osce.org.](http://polis.osce.org)

²⁵⁶ TNT is in the process of expanding POLIS to all areas related to transnational threats.

²⁵⁷ Interviews with OSCE officials, Belgrade, September 2013.

²⁵⁸ OSCE-ODIHR, note 67 above

operations, on the other, the findings suggest that more efforts are needed to delineate the roles and responsibilities between the two clearly to enhance effectiveness. A number of important roles for the Secretariat and institutions were identified that should be further encouraged, such as support for cross-dimensional approaches, guidance development and engagement in regional initiatives.

7. Enhance Effective Coordination in SSG/R Support

Cooperation and coordination are important factors for coherence in the provision of support. In general, cooperation and coordination are not institutionalized and thus take place in an *ad hoc* manner. In view of the high staff fluctuation, this is not sustainable as most cooperation is currently personality driven. There are some specific tools intended to be used for information sharing which provide a basis for coordination.²⁵⁹ In practice, however, coordination is not effective unless a common vision of support is identified and acted upon. For instance, it was noted that this has been a challenge for TNT, which was created to bring different units (SPMU, ATU and Borders Team) closer to each other and strengthen their coordination. However, as one official reports, “the only change the new department brought” is the number of meetings a year, and “there is no common goal. It has not improved coordination.”²⁶⁰ A key lesson is that coordination can only be enhanced if a strategic vision is established and promoted at the highest levels. A more consistent, institutionalized approach could also mitigate the impact of staff rotation on transversal coordination and cooperation.

There are some examples of more institutionalized coordination. For instance, the focal point system allows structures to coordinate efforts not only with the field but also across the whole OSCE and between the Secretariat and institutions.²⁶¹ The gender network is made up of between one and three staff appointed as focal points in each of the 15 missions, the Office of the Secretary General, all institutions and the Parliamentary Assembly. They assist and advise their colleagues on gender issues, are in regular contact with each other, and meet on an annual basis to coordinate and stay informed of the others’ activities. There are also police, organized crime and border management focal points which have a very similar function. Similar to those that exist OSCE-wide, field-focused focal point networks can be an effective coordination mechanism. An excellent example is the gender network of the Mission in Serbia. It was put in place at the initiative of the mission’s gender focal point to enhance cooperation on gender mainstreaming within the field operation. The network initiates regular meetings and informal contacts, assigns focal points to participate in the gender training offered at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and supports gender mainstreaming in each department’s projects. It is also considered an exemplary network because there is at least one focal point in each department and the leadership of the network is at a senior level – given that the deputy head of mission acts as its head. However, it was noted that the value of the focal point system depends largely on its position within the organization, a factor which affects its ability to influence decisions on proper training opportunities and specifically designed terms of reference (ToRs). In practice, most focal points have no ToRs or have to develop their own. Moreover, the right person has not always been appointed as a focal point – ideally the focal point would either be appointed at a high level or be a person whose

²⁵⁹ For instance, the thematic annual reports, such as on police-related activities or the implementation of the gender action plan, aim to share information on what is being done by both the Secretariat and the field in these areas.

²⁶⁰ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2012.

²⁶¹ There are a number of focal point mechanisms within the OSCE, including on gender, counterterrorism and early warning, among others.

position can have a significant impact on mainstreaming, for example someone responsible for supporting national curriculum development.

In general, all field operations have weekly meetings of senior management. While this is acknowledged to be an important coordination tool at the operational level, it rarely translates into effective coordination at the strategic level. An exception is the case of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, where the mission leadership developed five strategic priorities, known as “hubs”, which each department has to report on regarding how it can cooperate with other departments to achieve the goals. While this tool offers much potential, it remains to be seen what other measures will be needed to ensure its maximum impact. At the moment, it enhances transparency on coordination and enables opportunities to be identified. However, it is still based very much on personalities with regard to the ideas for cooperation that are put forward. Setting up a coordinating structure above departments is another option that has been recently put in place in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in the form of a project coordination unit within the head of mission’s offices. It is expected to have an overarching view on all projects, forward project documents to concerned units, and help avoid duplication. To be effective in identifying synergies, these staff need training on SSG/R. One of the coordinators has personally attempted to acquire such SSR training from outside the OSCE, thus demonstrating the potential value of training.

Any strategic framework developed should clarify why cooperation is needed, how it can be of added value and how it should be encouraged. Ideally, cooperation should be developed through the example of identifying strategic objectives that every department should report on regarding how they try to achieve their goals and how they can engage with each other to improve their efforts in the process. The role of focal point networks is an important one; such a network could be established on SSG/R to enhance cooperation. However, experience shows that the impact of these networks depends highly on the hierarchical level of staff appointed as focal points, the training they receive, and clarity on their roles and responsibilities as reflected in specific ToRs.

8. Adapt SSG/R Support to Available Human Resources

The OSCE’s experience in supporting SSG/R is largely defined by its capacities and resources. The available staff, expertise and financial means often direct the approach. A challenge with respect to human resources in the area of SSR relates to another broader organizational challenge, which is that most positions are covered by secondments. In practice, this means that programmes are often shaped by expertise available within countries that support secondments, rather than by strategic vision.²⁶² At times the consequence is that the staff in the secretariat and institutions does not possess the necessary expertise to implement projects or provide support to the field as requested. The absence of a strategic vision for SSR makes it challenging to contextualize the secondments of available experts in an overarching structure and shape their ToRs in such a way that they can engage beyond providing sectoral expertise. This is particularly difficult when one considers that some field operations often rely on the specialized expertise which is meant to be made available by the Secretariat and institutions. It was suggested by field staff that having a roster of experts in the area of SSR (with comparable skills and SSG/R competencies) to fill in gaps in expertise would help mitigate this challenge and provide a resource for the field to tap into.

²⁶² Interview with ODIHR official, April 2013.

Another common challenge across the Secretariat, institutions and the field is the high rotation of staff, which exacerbates the loss of institutional knowledge. To some extent this is mitigated in the field, where national project officers often stay for long periods within the operations. Nonetheless, there is a need to invest more in knowledge management tools to counteract this challenge. More mechanisms to exchange and disseminate lessons learned and best practices throughout the organization would have a positive impact in this regard. There is also a need to invest in identifying project needs and clearly setting out the required skill sets – particularly in field contexts where the skills required may evolve significantly over the cycle of a project. Thus staff engaged in SSR-related areas should be able to access adequate SSR training.

In addition, direct SSR-related capacity is limited within the Secretariat, institutions and the field. While expertise is often strong in specific areas such as policing, judicial reform, human rights of the armed forces and anti-trafficking, there is no expertise in SSR *per se*. Without complementing component-level expertise with some broader SSR expertise, there is the risk of gaps emerging in the provision of support, such as lacking understanding of potential synergies or capacities to support institutional reform. If SSR is gaining ground within the support provided by the OSCE, as indicated by the research, it is important to reflect this by the identification and acquisition of specific SSR expertise. This could take the shape of focal points across the Secretariat, institutions and the field who have undergone training in SSR, or an actual SSR adviser position responsible for providing expertise to staff requests on SSR. Moreover, SSR training for selected staff members could help to ensure a broader understanding of synergies.

It was also raised that in the area of SSR, the question of the right type of expertise in field operations is very important. While experts sometimes have sector-specific expertise (e.g. previous work experience in the national police), it is not always the expertise required for managing programmes in the field. In fact, challenges with seconded personnel who do not have relevant management expertise were often seen. It was considered that there is at times a tendency for seconded experts to transplant the approaches suitable in their country of origin into the host country's context.²⁶³ While specialized expertise is still required, there is also a need for more project cycle management, negotiation and leadership skills among staff. Specialist skills needed (e.g. in curriculum development, human resources management, etc.) could later be acquired for targeted purposes through a roster, for instance. There is a need to ensure that the skills received are those that are required on the basis of assessments. Moreover, in several field operations there was keen interest among the staff to access SSR training. Those who had attended an SSR training course in the past recognized how it had significantly enhanced their approach to support.²⁶⁴

Finally, the impact that one can expect to see achieved in the area of SSG/R is significantly linked to the capacity that is allocated. There is a broader question to ask regarding how much impact one staff member in a mission can really have when working alone on a country's border reform, for instance. When only one staff member is allocated for a particular issue, it is questionable whether it is then possible to provide strategic support. In practice, the support provided often takes the form of answering *ad hoc* requests, for instance for training. This can be useful if OSCE personnel are contributing to a broader strategic framework developed by national actors or agreed with other international actors. However, if this is not the case, there is the risk that the support provided is lost and does not have an impact. In that case, it may be

²⁶³ Interviews with OSCE officials and former OSCE staff, September 2013.

²⁶⁴ Interviews with OSCE officials, September 2013.

advisable to conduct regular assessments to ensure that staffing tables correspond to the realities on the ground. Moreover, it requires greater investment in identifying priorities on a regular basis. Similarly, in OSCE field operations that do not have a clear mandate in a certain area, and hence no team or structure dedicated to it, there is nevertheless sometimes a focal point, such as for borders or the police in BiH. Such a position can be useful if the focal point acts as an entry point for supporting secretariat or institutions' initiatives by identifying contacts and facilitating their support on the ground. But at times the focal point interprets his or her role as needing actively to identify and engage in supporting events in this area. The benefit of this approach is questionable, because it may lead to *ad hoc* events without a strategic guiding framework and with no potential for impact.

9. Adapt SSG/R Support to Available Financial Resources

The challenges identified in the area of human resources go hand in hand with budget constraints.²⁶⁵ The core budget is allocated almost entirely towards fixed costs and salaries, while the majority of projects are mainly funded by extra-budgetary contributions. As an example, the annual unified budget of the Rule of Law Unit at ODIHR's Democratization Department is about €80,000 (excluding staff costs), while the project-based extra-budgetary funding amounts to €2 million (including staff costs).²⁶⁶ Hence programmes are dependent on participating states' interests and priorities. In many areas the OSCE has expertise, but requires EU funding to implement relevant programmes.²⁶⁷

A key finding is that funding often directs the approach and extent of the activities, in the sense that most projects conduct low-cost activities, such as training and awareness-raising events, and pursue a relatively short-term approach. The OSCE needs to be creative in identifying best approaches despite limited funds. The Secretariat could aid this process by facilitating formal or informal exchange mechanisms on best practices regarding the allocation of limited resources in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Moreover, developing guidance regarding those approaches the OSCE can engage in which give the highest impact possible while remaining within organizational resources may be considered.

Some of the projects for which the OSCE has received the most praise from both national and international actors are based on extra-budgetary resources. This is because in these cases, projects have been planned with the resources necessary to have an impact. An example is the Community Security Initiative of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, a project which required over €1 million. Due to the significant human resources dedicated to the project, much work in this area was accomplished and considered to have had a positive impact,²⁶⁸ so the project was pointed out as useful in a strategic sense for the Office in Bishkek. It was noted that when unified budget projects could be associated with the Community Security Initiative they often gained more national support. A similar success story is the Border Management Staff College (BMSC) in Tajikistan, which has a budget of €7 million over a six-year period. The BMSC was widely commended for its ability to provide in-depth training to high-level officials from the OSCE region and beyond, including a strong focus on Afghanistan.²⁶⁹ A €1 million project of the Mission to BiH on developing the entity- and local-level courts'

²⁶⁵ OSCE-CPC, "Survey of OSCE Field Operations", Vienna, 28 October 2011, www.osce.org/cpc/74783.

²⁶⁶ Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

²⁶⁷ Interview with OSCE official, Warsaw, April 2013.

²⁶⁸ Interview with national counterparts, Bishkek, July 2013.

²⁶⁹ Interviews with national counterparts and representatives of international community, Dushanbe, September 2013.

capacity to handle war crimes cases is another example of a large extra-budgetary project with significant potential impact. These examples show that the OSCE is capable of having an impact where it plans long-term work based on adequate funding needs, such as through its extra-budgetary projects. But when it is operating with low budgets and resources, expectations regarding the type of SSR impact that the OSCE can meaningfully achieve should be tempered. However, maintaining reasonable amounts of unified budget funding per project is considered essential because it enables field operations to retain flexibility, a characteristic of the organization that was praised in all field contexts. Indeed, while bilateral donors require very detailed negotiated budget plans, the core budget of the OSCE is more flexible, at least in comparison to the bilateral donor-based budgets.

Finally, joint programming between the entities of the Secretariat and institutions would enable better use of limited resources in areas where different actors are engaged on the same issue. Moreover, such collaboration could benefit from the available synergies. For instance, when SPMU provides training to police on issues relating to international humanitarian law, it would be possible to cooperate with the FSC Support Unit to incorporate military personnel in relevant parts of the training.²⁷⁰ This would allow cost sharing for certain activities.

10. Strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation of SSG/R Support

A strong lesson for the OSCE is the need to engage more in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to understand its strengths and weaknesses better and permit corrective measures. Furthermore, M&E is of utmost importance in the area of SSG/R, where it is often difficult to perceive the tangible results of support and there is a need to learn from positive and negative experiences alike. In practice, however, M&E within the OSCE takes place in an *ad hoc* fashion, though there have been increased efforts to enhance its approach to monitoring and evaluating its support in recent years. In particular, the CPC Programming and Evaluation Support Unit (PESU) released a manual on “Project Management in the OSCE” in 2010, to complement its performance-based programme budgeting approach.²⁷¹ In February 2013 the Office of Internal Oversight established an evaluation framework to enhance the coherence of evaluation activities. At the same time, an evaluation group was established which brings together the different evaluation components across the OSCE.

Evaluation approaches vary across the organization. Within CPC, PESU gives field operations advice on conducting self-evaluations, and provides training and assistance. The project coordinator at ODIHR runs a programme monitoring system consisting of quarterly project review meetings. At the time of writing, these structured reviews of ODIHR projects did not use indicators, but looked at implementation or timing issues and assessing whether the projects were meeting expectations, should be improved or should be abandoned.²⁷²

There remain, however, significant challenges in effective M&E. While there are increasing calls from participating states for an enhanced focus on accountability and value for money, the political environment is also largely recognized to limit a culture of evaluation given the reticence to use indicators which might allow conclusions to be drawn on the implementation of commitments by participating States and not just on the OSCE’s support. Consequently,

²⁷⁰ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2013.

²⁷¹ OSCE-CPC, “Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers”, 2010, www.osce.org/cpc/70693.

²⁷² Interview with ODIHR official, April 2013. This may have changed since with the arrival of a new project coordinator.

evaluations of OSCE work are generally focused at the output level and rarely examine the collective impact of sector-wide support in a country. Limiting factors include the facts that the OSCE operates under different mandates and with different budgets. Another challenge is that a majority of OSCE projects consist of the organization of events, the impact of which is considered particularly hard to measure.²⁷³ As a result, there is significant reporting on both states' and the OSCE's activities, but not on their impact.²⁷⁴ For example, the field operations currently report on a yearly basis to the Permanent Council, and annual reports are published on virtually all themes of the organization's work.

There are some examples of good practice. ODIHR's Rule of Law Unit, for instance, qualitatively evaluates the success of its work by looking at, among other things, whether the recommendations coming out of regional experience-sharing events are included in reform agendas of the particular countries, if trial monitoring reports lead to deeper engagement with the state, and how many requests it receives, which serves an indication that its work is positively regarded by states. Some OSCE entities even chose to reserve some of their projects' funding for quantitative indicator-based evaluation. This is the case of the Human Rights, Gender and SSR Team, which is in the process of conducting its second independent evaluation, as well as the Hate Crimes Programme, which monitors the cascade of training and will conduct next year a survey on its impact among 20,000 trained Polish police officers.

Field operations examined were particularly weak in M&E. As one interviewee noted, field operations are often "throwing seeds which they hope will eventually flourish".²⁷⁵ However, there is no strategic approach to engaging in certain areas with the foreknowledge of what impact the engagements could have. Self-evaluations generally do not make efforts to understand the results of an initiative, but rather resemble progress reports concerning work within the country and activities supported. It appears that, in general, efforts are not made to interview partners and stakeholders on their perceptions of support.²⁷⁶

The consequence is a lack of corrective action (as within the Kyrgyz Police Reform Department in earlier years), path dependency, and a lack of redirection and focus on where the organization can create meaningful impact. As such, there is a need to invest more in evaluations, especially if the new system only enables identifying indicators as a formality, but does not attempt to follow up with M&E. More independent evaluations should be commissioned, and when self-evaluations are conducted these should include engagement with beneficiaries and stakeholders. For example, an interesting approach was that of the SSR programme in Serbia, which annually convenes all implementing partners in an "implementation review meeting".

²⁷³ Interviews with officials, OSCE Secretariat, November 2012.

²⁷⁴ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2012.

²⁷⁵ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2012.

²⁷⁶ Interview with OSCE Secretariat official, November 2012.

PART V: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The mapping study demonstrates that the OSCE is heavily engaged in supporting SSG/R-related activities; however, it is not doing this under a coherent umbrella. That is to say, a variety of activities in support of reforming the security sector are undertaken, but without reflection on how they are contributing to a common goal. Consequently, efforts are often perceived as *ad hoc*, and with limited impact. However, given its expertise, comparative advantages and experience with SSG/R-related reform activities, it would be a significant missed opportunity for the organization to not develop a coherent approach to SSG/R which can enhance the effectiveness, coherence, impact and sustainability of its support.

This section presents the main conclusions from both the mapping and the comprehensive review, which are structured around the three principal aims of the study, as listed below. The conclusions are followed by a discussion of the concrete recommendations, which are structured as general recommendations that are also relevant to the OSCE beyond SSG/R; strategic recommendations on the OSCE's approach to SSG/R; and specific operational recommendations for various OSCE target audiences.

Conclusions

The purpose of the mapping study was threefold: (i) to achieve an enhanced understanding of the extensive engagement of the OSCE in SSG/R at both normative and operational levels; (ii) to identify its comparative advantages in SSG/R; and (iii) to reflect on means to enhance the coherence of OSCE activities in this field.

An enhanced understanding of the extensive engagement of the OSCE in SSG/R

The study reiterated that the OSCE has both a strong normative and operational role in supporting SSG/R.²⁷⁷ Its normative role is reflected in the number of commitments that have been adopted relating to key principles of SSG/R. In particular, it pioneered the first document concerning the fundamental principle of democratic control of the security sector in the form of the 1994 Code of Conduct. Moreover, the OSCE Secretariat, institutions and field operations are widely involved in providing support in this area. At the Secretariat and institutions level a number of entities are engaged, ranging from those that focus on security sector actors (e.g. police, border security forces) to those that provide support to SSG/R through a thematic lens (e.g. combating trafficking or terrorism). At the field level, while only a few operations are explicitly mandated to work on specific SSG/R activities, all the current 15 field operations have engaged in several SSG/R areas, either directly or indirectly. These mainly address activities in the areas of police reform, border reform and judicial reform, but a range of other SSG/R-related issues have also been supported.

²⁷⁷ OSCE-MC, note 2 above; Victor-Yves Ghebali, note 7 above.

The study has examined the OSCE's *de facto* approach to SSG/R at three different levels. At the strategic level, while the Secretariat and institutions have not yet actively embraced a strategic approach to SSG/R, some of the field operations are starting to use SSG/R as a framework for support. This is because SSG/R is considered by field staff to enable greater coherence among reform efforts, strengthen prioritization of activities, encourage cross-dimensional coordination towards long-term objectives and give enhanced legitimacy in the OSCE's engagement with the host country on these issues. At the thematic level, the OSCE is strongly involved in topics that relate to SSG/R from a transnational threats perspective; less focus is placed on issues related to strengthening the civilian management and democratic oversight of the security sector. Finally, at the programmatic level a significant amount of the OSCE's support at both Secretariat and institutions, as well as in the field, consists of providing training and organizing seminars and workshops to raise awareness or facilitate exchanges of experience.

While there are other angles from which the OSCE could frame its engagement, SSG/R provides many advantages. First, it is broad enough to cover a large number of OSCE activities and thus support much-needed efforts to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the organization. Essentially, if the OSCE can enhance its support to SSG/R, then much of the organization's work can benefit from this. Second, it is the only framework which underlines the need for certain minimum principles to be upheld, many of which are in line with a number of existing OSCE commitments. In particular, this relates to democratic control of the security sector, but also to principles such as accountability, transparency, human rights and gender mainstreaming. While the commitments emphasize the principles embraced, there is often a missing layer to clarify how these can be translated into programmatic support; consequently, the principles are not always effectively addressed in the work of the organization. Without a clear strategic approach to SSG/R, it is possible to cherry-pick support and essentially provide assistance in the areas of, for instance, equipment or training without thinking about the bigger goal of enhancing the safety of the people. Finally, in practice the field is already driving a nascent approach to SSG/R – while the Secretariat and institutions have only superficially engaged with SSG/R as a concept, the field operations are in practice increasingly trying to use it as a framework for support. This has not yet become a field-operation-wide discussion, as the SSG/R concept is currently only pioneered through the development of some individual projects at the departmental level. Nonetheless, it is a reflection of the field increasingly recognizing the value of such an approach. Given this reality, the OSCE can no longer afford to provide support in the area of SSG/R without basing it on some kind of strategic guidance.

The OSCE's comparative advantages in supporting SSG/R

The OSCE has a number of comparative advantages to offer via its support to a coherent approach to SSG/R. Its cross-dimensional approach to security is widely acknowledged to give it the necessary tools to provide holistic support. The OSCE could thus build on its reputation as a neutral partner with a broad approach to security in order to support the development of a comprehensive national approach to SSG/R. Providing enhanced support to participating States in the conduct of assessments or development of strategies could be a pertinent role for the organization. It could also offer a holistic approach to supporting SSG/R, given that it has expertise in diverse areas of SSG/R across its three dimensions. The OSCE could make more use of its political influence to raise awareness of those issues addressed in its commitments which may be perceived as sensitive and thus do not advance in certain contexts. Regarding field operations, it could also draw on its numerous offices to identify the

priorities of SSG/R at the local level and help integrate these into strategic discussions on reform. Moreover, by virtue of its flexibility and limited bureaucratic mechanisms, the OSCE could often play a key role in filling the gaps left by other international actors. However, this would require enhanced investment in conducting assessments to identify gaps and ensure that the support provided contributes towards a broader strategic goal and is not perceived as *ad hoc*. Another area of added value is its potential to foster international coordination; this builds on the fact that the OSCE often has the trust of national governments.

Similarly, recognizing its comparative advantages should go hand in hand with understanding some of its weaknesses so as to address these and optimize support. In particular, there are important gaps in the organization's strategic, thematic and programmatic approaches to SSG/R. At the strategic level, direction is often weak and influenced greatly by path dependency. More efforts should be made to identify the priorities that the OSCE can engage with based on thorough assessments and in line with its comparative advantages. At the thematic level, the OSCE should engage more with those themes that make the most difference in SSG/R support, which includes addressing difficult topics such as corruption, oversight of the security sector and civil society capacity building. Finally, at the programmatic level, more efforts are needed to move beyond *ad hoc* projects which are not aimed at contributing to a wider goal. Capacity building should be seen as a means to an end and not as the objective of support. This requires engaging more seriously with impact-oriented approaches.

Ultimately, the OSCE needs to reflect more on its strengths and weaknesses and align these with the reality of the resources at its disposal. What is missing is a strategic framework that identifies its advantages and seeks to capitalize on them.

Enhancing the coherence of OSCE activities in the area of SSG/R

Turning to the final principal aim this study seeks to achieve, there is much that the OSCE can do to enhance the coherence of its activities in this field. First of all, as already noted, a strategic approach needs to be developed, ideally in the form of a strategic framework. The first attempt to adopt a framework for SSG/R at the political level in 2007 under the Spanish Chairmanship did not have the intended result. Among the many reasons for this put forward by interviewees are a lack of understanding of the SSG/R concept among many participating States, and the concept's anchorage in political governance issues which inhibit it from being addressed as a purely technical issue. The introduction of the SSG/R concept in the OSCE context is therefore perceived primarily as a deeply political question. Any attempts to engage with this concept at the political level therefore need to be gradual. Efforts should be made to communicate to participating States that such an approach is not intended to give them a commitment, but rather to enhance OSCE efficiency and effectiveness in its own support to participating States. Essentially, it should be perceived as a component of enhancing the OSCE's technical support.

Such a framework should recognize the need to operationalize a truly cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R, while retaining the flexibility which is one of the comparative advantages of the OSCE. The framework should therefore not diminish the value of the OSCE's cross-dimensional approach, but rather should emphasize the understanding that SSG/R is about reinforcing that approach. Moreover, such a framework should not be perceived as a set of guidelines to be transplanted into each context. Instead, it should inspire a coherent approach from the OSCE and serve as a basis for monitoring and evaluating its support in this area.

Essentially, the framework could give a more cohesive approach as well as an impact-oriented method to think about planning. Furthermore, without a thorough analysis of needs on the basis of assessments, monitoring and evaluation, the organization will not be able to enhance service delivery.

A number of key lessons have been identified that can help to enhance the coherence of the OSCE's approach to SSG/R support. First, and again, there is a pressing need for an overarching framework for SSG/R. Second, the OSCE needs to adopt an explicitly cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R – meaning not only that all three dimensions are part of SSG/R, but also that the linkages between them are actively encouraged through an integrated approach to support. This requires developing an understanding of where the cross-dimensional synergies lie. Third, as discussed above, there is a need to identify and build on the OSCE's comparative advantages. Fourth, the OSCE should enhance the sustainability of its support to SSG/R. This entails developing more impact-oriented support as well as reflecting more on how to ensure national ownership through the building of sustainable national institutions and capacity. Fifth, enhanced engagement with civil society is needed. While the third dimension is often strongly engaged in this regard, this approach has not always been shared by the first dimension. As such, there is a clear need to raise awareness on the value of engaging with civil society across all three of the SSG/R dimensions and to identify entry points for this support. Sixth, a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities in the OSCE's support to SSG/R is required. In particular, reflection is needed on how coherence between support from the Secretariat and institutions in relation to support from the field can be enhanced. Seventh, linked to this, effective coordination in SSG/R support should be enhanced, particularly at the strategic level. The field operations, for instance, have offered innovative examples of how coordination can be improved at this level through the development of strategic objectives which every department should report on detailing their cooperative efforts towards their achievement. Eighth, there is a need to adapt SSG/R support to the available human resources because the impact one can expect to see achieved is correlated to the capacity allocated. Moreover, enhanced efforts could be made to ensure that the right skill sets are identified and/or developed among staff. Ninth, SSG/R support must be adapted to the available financial resources. Currently, the funding provided often dictates the approach and results in many short-term, *ad hoc* activities. Thus there is a need to recognize other approaches to support which can mitigate costs and still be effective, particularly through proper assessments designed to prioritize resources. Finally, tenth, significant investment is required in the area of monitoring and evaluating SSG/R efforts, as well as reviewing progress in achieving the above.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are structured according to three categories: first, general recommendations that, while highly relevant to enhancing the OSCE's support to SSG/R, are broad in nature and can be applied to the OSCE overall; second, recommendations at the strategic level which are intended to enhance the OSCE's approach to SSG/R; and third, SSG/R-related recommendations at the operational level which are targeted at the various OSCE audiences. These are aimed at broad groups rather than specific entities, as it is considered that such recommendations at a more specific level should result from an internal OSCE process. The recommendations at the strategic and operational levels are based on the understanding that by combining political discussion with practical steps, it is possible to enhance the OSCE's support to SSG/R.

General Recommendations for the OSCE

- *Include the results of the mapping study in Helsinki+40.* One of the key aims of Helsinki+40 is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. In practice, a significant number of the activities supported by the OSCE, in particular in the field, fall under SSG/R. The study highlights that there are numerous shortfalls in the OSCE's support to this area, which affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization as well as the impact it can have. Addressing these would require, among other things, conducting proper assessments to enable prioritization across a large range of activities, developing a strategic framework for support, clearly delineating roles and responsibilities, and engaging in proper monitoring and evaluation to enable corrective action and avoid path dependency. It is recommended that the key lessons identified in this report are taken up by the Helsinki+40 process. Consideration could be given to establishing an additional coordinator/working group which would focus on SSG/R, organizing a seminar on this topic and/or developing a concept paper to enable addressing these lessons formally within the Helsinki+40 process.
- *Review the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat, institutions and field.* To build on the comparative advantages of each OSCE entity, there is a need to review the roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat, institutions and field in the provision of SSG/R support. The flexible and hybrid nature of the organization means that it is at times difficult to understand which entity should be in the lead for different issues. This is part of the strength of the organization, but if not adequately managed it can also become a weakness. A key recommendation that is also relevant beyond SSG/R is the need to define more clearly the roles of the Secretariat and institutions in relation to the field. For instance, the work of the Secretariat and institutions in fostering regional cooperation and exchange should be encouraged. Moreover, they should play a stronger role in enabling the identification and exchange of expertise between field operations.
- *Strengthen the OSCE's approach to planning.* The OSCE's planning for SSG/R support has often been considered weak, and has resulted in *ad hoc* approaches to support. The one-year budget cycles are often raised as the obstacle to long-term planning. However, efforts can nonetheless be made to enhance the OSCE's approach to planning, for both SSG/R support activities and beyond. First, this entails investing more in assessments that inform the support provided. There is a need to ensure that projects are based on needs and not only available expertise within the organization. Second, more efforts should be made to undertake long-term planning, with the caveat that a project might have to be amended according to the next budget. Moreover, in the case of extra-budgetary projects, it is entirely possible to engage in multi-year planning. Finally, efforts should be made to take an impact-oriented approach to planning, which seeks to plan for sustainable results. This may require designing fewer, but larger and more strategically oriented projects, which might achieve more impact than the prevailing host of smaller projects. This is also closely linked to the need to enhance planning for exit strategies on the basis of designing programmes aimed at further strengthening national capacities.
- *Enhance the OSCE's knowledge management system.* The OSCE would benefit from a systematic knowledge management system in the area of SSG/R. There are also opportunities to enhance knowledge management within the organization as a whole. This could include supporting a dedicated best practices capacity or a framework which sets

out how knowledge will be captured and actively exchanged beyond the existing annual meetings of focal points. As an integral part of this, the network of OSCE focal points should be strengthened. Successful focal point systems have already been set up in the areas of gender and early warning, for instance. There are numerous lessons identified from these experiences that can serve to strengthen the OSCE's focal point system more broadly. For instance, more efforts should be made to ensure that appointed focal points are at a senior enough level to enable action to take place. Focal points should also have clearly drafted terms of reference, which has not always been the case so far. Finally, it should be recognized that for focal points to perform their role seriously, there is a need to factor this in as part of their work time rather than as something that should be fitted in alongside their existing tasks.

- *Strengthen the OSCE's approach to monitoring and evaluation.* The OSCE, and in particular its field operations, would require enhanced engagement in assessments and M&E to move away from what is sometimes path-dependent support to SSG/R activities. This is extremely important in the SSG/R area, where support must be monitored and adjusted according to fluctuations in the political and security environment. However, it is also of great relevance for the organization as a whole. There have therefore been strong calls for improving M&E within the organization to enhance the effectiveness of the work and enable corrective action and prioritization. In practice, however, the M&E undertaken is often superficial – i.e. a ticking-the-box approach of identifying indicators rather than actually effectively monitoring and evaluating progress. Consideration should be given to how to encourage more systematic and meaningful approaches to M&E which can enhance the coherence of the OSCE's support. In particular, this may require investing more in independent external evaluation as opposed to self-evaluation.
- *Explain the importance of monitoring and evaluation to participating States.* OSCE staff have often raised the point that effectively monitoring and evaluating SSG/R support is not possible because participating States do not want progress within their countries to be reviewed. Thus a clear distinction must be made between reviewing participating States' progress in implementing commitments and reviewing the support provided by the OSCE. Effective M&E ought to be conducted to ensure that the support provided is effective and meets the needs of the country. Participating States should understand this distinction and encourage an enhanced engagement in reviewing the OSCE's support in meeting certain criteria, such as efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact.

Strategic-Level Recommendations on SSG/R

- *Raise political awareness on the OSCE's approach to SSG/R.* Political discussion is needed to raise awareness on the value of strengthening the OSCE's approach to SSG/R. For instance, specific OSCE security days organized by the Secretary General could be devoted to the concept. Such a forum could be used to show from different thematic perspectives how the introduction of an SSG/R approach could help the OSCE to build more on its strengths. Consideration could be given to inviting representatives of international organizations which have already embraced the SSG/R concept (European Union, African Union, United Nations) to inform the OSCE participating States about their experiences in introducing and using such an approach. Discussing how ownership of the concept was achieved within the United Nations among member states, such as the USA and Russia, could be useful. Finally, consideration could be given to holding a joint PC-FSC meeting to underline the truly cross-dimensional and cross-institutional nature of

SSG/R. Reflection could also be made on establishing a Group of Friends of SSG/R. This would consist of those participating states that are interested in playing an important role in supporting the OSCE in developing a coherent approach to SSG/R. Such a Group of Friends could meet on a regular basis to help shape the OSCE's SSG/R agenda and raise awareness on the importance of this issue. As a comparison, the United Nations has a Group of Friends of SSR which has been instrumental in furthering the debate on how the body can enhance its approach and is used as a platform for reviewing UN policy documents in this field. Alternatively, if it is not possible to create a new SSG/R group, consideration should be given to other existing Groups of Friends where SSG/R could be tabled. An example could be the Group of Kiev.

- *Develop a strategic framework for SSG/R.* In line with one of the key lessons from this study, there are calls for the development of a coherent OSCE approach to SSG/R from staff of field operations, institutions and Secretariat alike. This could ideally be reflected in a strategic framework. The framework should define the goals of SSG/R from an OSCE perspective, clarify how all three dimensions can contribute to these goals, and incorporate many of the key lessons outlined in this study. Such a framework should be developed at the strategic level and not be linked to any one dimension or department. This may require the framework document to be drafted by an OSCE-wide task force which would include representatives from the Secretariat and institutions, have strong consultation with the field and/or have the direct supervision of the Chairmanship. This would reflect how SSG/R is a truly cross-dimensional area of activity which, for instance, cannot be compartmentalized into the work of either the Permanent Council or the Forum for Security Cooperation. It is important for the ownership of the organization that the Chairmanship in office with the broad support of the participating States leads the development of the strategic framework for SSG/R. The strategic framework, however, could take different forms. If there were political endorsement, it could take the shape of an MC decision or a joint FSC-PC decision. In the absence of a politically endorsed decision, the framework could be developed at a sub-consensus level and take the form of a Secretary-General's report or internal guidelines developed by an inter-institutional working group (see below). Such a document may not be able to address the many challenges of a political nature, but it would nonetheless represent a significant step forward in enhancing the coherence and impact of OSCE support.
- *Develop an inter-institutional working group or task force on SSG/R.* In view of the development of a strategic framework, and subsequent efforts to move forward the agenda, consider the establishment of an inter-institutional working group or task force on SSG/R. The goals of the group/task force could be to develop the strategic framework for SSG/R, guidelines or tools on SSG/R, and/or training modules. The working group should be entirely cross-dimensional and include representatives from the Secretariat and institutions. Moreover, it requires a clear mechanism for consulting with field operations to ensure the inclusion of their insights to maintain relevance for their work.
- *Establish an SSG/R focal point system across the OSCE.* Beyond the setting up of an inter-institutional working group/task force, there is a need to develop a focal point system across the OSCE (Secretariat, institutions and field) to encourage the identification of and build on cross-dimensional synergies. The focal points should be at a senior enough level to enable action to take place. Focal points would need to have clearly drafted terms of reference, and a potential requirement would be to receive training in SSG/R to ensure an understanding of synergies and principles, learn how to encourage cooperation and joint

approaches where possible, and lastly learn how to manage a matrix on activities being supported in the area of SSG/R.

- *Engage with the United Nations on approaches to supporting SSG/R under Chapter VIII of the Charter.* There are currently efforts within the UN to revitalize Chapter VIII and enrich collaboration with regional organizations. This is a unique opportunity for the OSCE to define its relationship with the UN in general and in the area of SSG/R in particular. At a strategic level, it would especially be of value to encourage dialogue between the OSCE and the UN on ways to enhance the coherence of international support to SSG/R in the field. As highlighted in the study, too few efforts are made to encourage a dialogue on strategic objectives in SSG/R among members of the international community regarding encouraging national actors to develop a vision of priorities, to identify how international actors can provide complementary support, and to identify gaps in support. If the UN and the OSCE were to speak with a common voice in favour of developing such a vision in this area, coherence could be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, and more broadly, the OSCE should consider how it can enhance engagement with the UN and other multilateral and regional organizations in an exchange of experience on support to SSG/R efforts. This could take the form of sharing guidance or discussing entry points for sensitive issues, among other things. It could be done by building on existing forums, such as through promoting exchange of experience in supporting SSG/R as a topic at the OSCE Security Days conference or in the form of a regional conference. Discussion and cooperation on SSG/R with UN representatives could thus transfer practical knowledge as well as help to provide political legitimization.

Operational-Level Recommendations on SSG/R

OSCE-wide

- *Support cross-institutional experience sharing among OSCE staff.* This could take the shape of an annual event like those organized for the border focal points. To ensure its utility, it should bring together focal points from the Secretariat, institutions and the field, as well as representatives from the OSCE's Core Group of Friends. It should have a clearly structured agenda that provides the platform for experience sharing on previously identified issues where brainstorming is required, and it should also encourage field operations to share their ideas concerning how the Secretariat and institutions can better support their work in the future.
- *Support the development of best practices on SSG/R support.* The cross-institutional experience sharing can contribute to the identification of best practices on SSG/R support. These and other best practices should be collected and mined in order to contribute to guidance development at the appropriate level.
- *Encourage the development of a strategic vision within field operations.* Participating States and in particular the Chairmanship in office, in cooperation with the OSCE Secretary General should encourage a more strategic vision of SSG/R support in field operations. It is recommended that the Chairmanship consider opportunities to foster this message. For example, one opportunity could be the inclusion of SSG/R as a topic at the annual and/or regional meetings of heads of mission. Furthermore, the heads of mission should be encouraged to define their strategic vision, communicate this vision to staff and

monitor changes made within the mission to adapt to the vision (see recommendation below). Such a vision should be based on an assessment of country-specific needs and in line with the capacities and added value which each operation can offer. Heads of mission should ensure that staff are assigned to those places where they can have the most impact in line with the priorities of the vision. Moreover, they should ensure that the field operation's main priorities are shared by all staff and coordination is encouraged.

Secretariat and Institutions

- *Highlight the importance of the 1994 Code of Conduct as a fundamental principle of SSG/R.* The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is one of the normative foundations of SSG/R. There is a clear need to rethink how the Code is used as a tool in strengthening the fundamental principle of SSG/R, without prejudicing independent initiatives aimed at the promotion of the Code itself. While recognising the important efforts of the FSC, its support section, and ODIHR in promoting various elements of the Code, there is a need to further highlight its importance. First, the Secretariat should improve awareness of the Code of Conduct among OSCE staff, including in the field. Second, it should consider developing some tools to facilitate further use of the Code as an entry point for support. This could include developing examples of best practice. A good example is the initiative led by Switzerland within the FSC to compile practical examples on the democratic control of armed forces to accompany the Code. Another suggestion is developing a short module which field operations could adapt to their own awareness-raising events. Finally, more efforts should be made to ensure that awareness-raising events on the Code are sustainable and have the necessary impact. For instance, the Secretariat should ensure that when seminars on the Code are supported they have some form of output, such as identification of gaps in the implementation of commitments as well as recommendations on how to address and monitor these. Additionally, it may be possible to build an alumni network to monitor the impact of progress in this area or to draw upon for speakers at future events.
- *Develop guidance for OSCE staff on SSG/R and related topics.* The Secretariat and institutions should pursue their role in developing guidance in close consultation with the field operations (as mentioned above). Such guidance on SSG/R should be developed as a cross-dimensional initiative by a cross-OSCE task force or working group, or alternatively by a commissioned external expert. Some of the topics identified as requiring guidance are supporting a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R, supporting sustainable and impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R, and identifying entry points for engaging in support to democratic governance and management of the security sector, among others.
- *Develop training and relevant tools on SSG/R.* Consider developing a specialized training curriculum on the OSCE's approach to SSG/R, which could be delivered to relevant staff at the Secretariat, institutions, and in the field. Consider also preparing briefing notes on SSG/R which can be delivered to senior staff during their orientation.
- *Enhance knowledge management tools.* There is a need to enhance central repositories of knowledge in the SSG/R area. One such knowledge management repository is POLIS, which is a collection of documents created and supported by a policing community. POLIS was cited as a good example of a tool which is useful to the field because it captures past activities, contains resources and includes a database on experts. However, more efforts should be made to raise awareness about this tool, as not all staff members

are aware of its existence. This type of tool should be developed in other areas, based on assessment of needs from field and drawing on the experience of POLIS. It could include an index on OSCE resources on SSG/R, including points of contact. Lastly, the Secretariat and institutions should play a role in supporting the development of a roster of experts in SSG/R.

- *Support joint assessments in the field to engage in prioritization of activities.* The conduct of assessments to inform programme direction is still an exception to the rule. Consequently, there is a tendency towards path dependency as well as engagement in a number of activities which may not necessarily have an impact. The Secretariat and institutions should encourage joint assessments in the field to support the prioritization of activities. Assessments could be conducted by representatives of different departments in the field engaged in SSG/R-related support as well as by representatives of the Secretariat or institutions. External actors can also be hired to undertake such assessments.
- *Facilitate the exchange of experience in SSG/R between field operations.* The Secretariat and institutions could play a role in facilitating exchanges of experience on this topic between field operations. There were strong calls from the field for more interaction with other field operations staff to exchange experience. This would involve communication between operations active in the same region, to discuss common challenges and opportunities; it could also take the form of staff from one operation supporting the staff of a different operation in activities where the former is more advanced.

Field Operations

- *Set up an internal focal points network for SSG/R.* Consider establishing a focal point system for SSG/R within the field operations to encourage cross-dimensional approaches and enhance coherence in support. Ideally, the head of the focal points network would be at a senior level (e.g. deputy head of field operation), and would coordinate the work of the focal points within the various departments – as is the case with the gender focal point network in the Mission to Serbia, which is headed by the deputy head of mission. The focal points would receive clear terms of reference as well as training on SSG/R.
- *Conduct training on SSG/R for all relevant staff.* Ensure that staff members in coordination functions at the strategic level (i.e. project coordinators within the head of mission offices), as well as any other staff directly engaged in SSG/R, receive training in this field. Additionally, this training should be based on the tools developed by the Secretariat and institutions.
- *Capitalize more on field offices.* The field offices are always recognized as an advantage of the OSCE by international actors as well as by OSCE staff themselves; but in the area of SSR they are not fully capitalized upon. For instance, there is a need to ensure that field offices are not just serving primarily the needs of one dimension. There is also the need to encourage more feedback between field offices and headquarters to enable, for instance, key concerns to be fed to the strategic level when discussing reforms. Ultimately, reflection should be made concerning how to capitalize on these field offices to enhance SSG/R support.
- *Enhance cross-dimensional coordination.* Cross-dimensional coordination is particularly important in the field, where it can enhance the provision of comprehensive support. It

should be encouraged through the establishment of strategic priorities and goals, which every department must report on regarding their cooperative efforts in the pursuit of their achievement. Moreover, matrices outlining SSG/R activities could be managed by the SSG/R focal point or project coordinator in the head of mission offices to enable better sharing of information on activities planned with different stakeholders. This could also include sharing information regarding which staff or entities within the host government have already benefited from a study visit facilitated by the OSCE.

On the eve of the Swiss Chairmanship in 2014, there is a window of opportunity to breathe fresh air into an organization which may be considered as one of the most successful regional forums for security dialogue and cooperation of all times. If it is to maintain its relevance and value, the OSCE needs to learn to adapt to current times, and in particular to enhance the coherence and impact of its support. Against this background, the objectives of the Swiss Chairmanship are to contribute to fostering security and stability, improving people's lives and strengthening the OSCE's capacity to act. Strengthening security sector governance is thus one of the ten key priorities of the Chairmanship. While it is explicitly listed under "fostering security and stability", it can be argued that strengthening the OSCE's approach to SSG/R can also support the other two objectives. Indeed, the underlying goal of all SSG/R activities is to improve the security and safety of the people, thus seeking to improve their lives. Moreover, a number of the recommendations identified in this study could contribute to strengthening the OSCE's capacity to act. In this respect, they are highly relevant to the OSCE's Helsinki+40 process. While intended to strengthen the OSCE's support to SSG/R, the study ultimately points to a number of key issues the OSCE would need to tackle as part of its efforts to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization as a whole – thus contributing to more sustainable delivery of security to the people living in the OSCE region.

ANNEXES

A.1 Mapping Overview Tables

Table 1.1 Secretariat and institutions' support to SSG/R

Office	Security and justice providers					Civilian management and democratic oversight of the security sector				Cross-dimensional issues related to SSG/R				
	Defence reform	Police reform	Border security reform	Judicial reform	Intelligence reform	Parliamentary oversight	Civil society oversight	Management	Independent bodies	Gender and SSR	Corruption	Combating trafficking	Anti-terrorism	Drug trafficking
Gender Section/ SG Office										x				
FSC/ CPC	x					x		x						
SPMU/ TNT		x	x	x			x	x		x	x	x	x	x
Borders/ TNT	x	x	x								x	x	x	x
ATU/ TNT		x	x	x								x	x	
SRC/ THB		x	x	x				x				x		
OCEEA			x	x	x						x		x	
ODIHR/HRD	x	x	x				x		x	x		x	x	
ODIHR/DD				x		x	x		x	x				
ODIHR/TND		x		x		x	x							
HCNM		x		x										
PA						x								

Table 1.2 Overview of SSG/R mandates²⁷⁸ in OSCE field operations²⁷⁹

Field operation	General mandate ²⁸⁰	Security and justice providers					Civilian management and democratic oversight of security sector				Cross-dimensional issues related to SSG/R				
		Defence reform	Police reform	Border security reform	Judicial reform	Intelligence reform	Parliamentary oversight	Civil society oversight	Management	Independent bodies	Gender and SSR	Corruption	Combating trafficking	Anti-terrorism	Drug trafficking
Albania			x	x	x							x	x		
BiH	Dayton	x								x					
Kosovo			x		x ²⁸¹				x	x					
Montenegro	x														
Serbia			x		x										
Skopje	OHRID				x ²⁸²										
Moldova															
Ukraine	MoU ²⁸³														
Baku	x														
Yerevan	x														
Ashgabat	x														
Astana	x														
Bishkek	x														
Tajikistan	o		x	x								x			
Uzbekistan	o											x	x		

²⁷⁸ This table only refers to *explicit* mandates for SSG/R. It should be recognized that field operations can also engage in support on the basis of implicit mandates for engagement in SSG/R derived from the broad wording addressed in many of their mandates.

²⁷⁹ This table is designed to give an overview of SSG/R mandates with which the various field operations were initially tasked. It only includes explicit mandated activities according to Permanent Council decisions and their respective extension mandates. The sign “o” stands for previous mandates that were later updated or changed. The sign “x” correspond to active mandates. Please note that it is an initial synopsis compiled on the basis of desk research and interviews.

²⁸⁰ Formula applied to different OSCE field operations with almost identical or very similar general wording:
 “– Promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as the cooperation of [name of the country] within the OSCE framework, in all OSCE dimensions, including the human, political, economic and environmental aspects of security and stability;
 – Facilitate contacts, co-ordinate activities and promote information exchange with the Chairman-in-Office and other OSCE institutions as well as co-operation with international organizations and institutions;
 – Establish and maintain contacts with local authorities, universities, research institutions and NGOs and assist in arranging events with OSCE participation.”

²⁸¹ UNMIK mandate.

²⁸² Projects in the area of rule of law.

²⁸³ The MoU between the OSCE and the government of Ukraine refers to support to projects deemed necessary by the project coordinator.

Table 1.3 Overview of SSG/R activities in field missions²⁸⁴

Region	Field operation	Security and justice providers					Civilian management and democratic oversight of security sector				Cross-dimensional issues related to SSG/R				
		Defence reform	Police reform	Border security reform	Judicial reform	Intelligence reform	Parliamentary oversight	Civil society oversight	Management	Independent bodies	Gender and SSR	Corruption	Combating trafficking	Anti-terrorism	Drug trafficking
South-Eastern Europe	Albania		x	x	x	x	x					x	x		
	BiH	x ²⁸⁵	x	x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x		
	Kosovo		x		x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Montenegro		x	x	x		x		x	x		x	x	x	x
	Serbia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Skopje		x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x	x	
Eastern Europe	Moldova		x	x	x						x		x	x	
	Ukraine		x	x	x			x			x	x	x	x	
South Caucasus	Baku		x	x	x							x	x	x	x
	Yerevan		x		x		x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
Central Asia	Ashgabat		x	x	x							x	x	x	x
	Astana		x	x	x			x		x		x	x	x	
	Bishkek		x	x	x			x	x		x	x	x	x	
	Tajikistan	x ²⁸⁶	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Uzbekistan		x	x	x					x			x	x	x

²⁸⁴ The table includes activities that OSCE field operations have supported or are supporting in the area of SSG/R. It is an initial synopsis compiled on the basis of desk research and interviews.


²⁸⁵ While significant support to defence reform has been provided in the past, it had stopped at the time of writing.

²⁸⁶ This only constituted of support to the Ministry of Defence in professionalizing its efforts in mine action.


A.2 Comprehensive Review Tables

1 Secretariat and institutions, thematic approach (number of press releases)


1.1.1 Transnational Threats Department, *Strategic Police Matters Unit*, thematic approach




1.1.3 Transnational Threats Department, *Action against Terrorism Unit*, thematic approach




1.1.2 Transnational Threats Department, *Borders Unit*, thematic approach




1.2 Conflict Prevention Centre, thematic approach




1.3 Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, thematic approach



1.4 Office of the Secretary General, Gender Issues Section, thematic approach




1.5 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, thematic approach



2 Field operations, thematic approach (number of press releases)


2.1.1 Overall thematic approach




2.1.2 Overall thematic approach in police




2.1.3 Overall thematic approach in judiciary




2.1.4 Overall thematic approach in borders




2.2.2 OSCE Centre in Kyrgyzstan, thematic approach




2.2.1 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, thematic approach



2.2.3 OSCE Mission to Serbia, thematic approach




2.2.4 OSCE Office in Tajikistan, thematic approach




3 Programmatic approach (number of press releases)

3.1 Overall programmatic approach by Secretariat and institutions



3.2 Overall programmatic approach by field operations



A.3 List of Interviewees

OSCE Secretariat, Vienna

Miroslava Beham, senior adviser on gender issues, Gender Issues, Office of the Secretary General (OSG)

John Crosby, operational support officer, Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)

Knut Dreyer, senior police adviser, Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), Transnational Threats Department (TNT)

Mark Fawcett, senior policy officer, Policy Support Service, CPC

Fabian Grass, FSC support officer, Forum for Security Co-operation

Christopher Hornek, assistant programme officer, Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU), TNT

Adam Kobieracki, director, CPC

Sebnem Lust, associate project/programme evaluation officer, Programming and Evaluation Support Unit, CPC

Ian Mitchell, head, External Co-operation Section, OSG

Marcel Pesko, director, OSG

Ruth Pojman, deputy coordinator, combating trafficking in human beings, Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

Amandine Roussel, policy support officer, Policy Support Service, CPC

Hanna Sands, gender officer, Gender Issues, OSG

Thorsten Stodiek, police affairs officer/adviser on research and analysis, SPMU, TNT

Anne Suotula, policy support officer, Policy Support Service

Goran Svilanovic, coordinator of OSCE economic and environmental activities, Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities

Jonathan Trumble, customs adviser, Borders Unit, TNT

Niamh Walsh, senior adviser, OSG

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Warsaw

Martha Achler, chief, Legislative Support Unit, Democratization Department

Pavel Chacuk, human rights adviser, Human Rights Department

Floriane Hohenberg, head, Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department

Oyvind Hoyen, human rights officer, Human Rights Department

Benjamin Moreau, chief, Rule of Law Unit, Democratization Department

Andreas Sampson, consultant, Human Rights Department

Nathalie Tagwerker, deputy head, Democratization Department

Patricia Tcherneva-Rowland, project coordinator

Andreea Vesa, human rights officer, Human Rights Department

Douglas Wake, first deputy director

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo

Vladica Babić, assistant minister, Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption of BiH

Kika Babić-Svetlin, expert adviser for planning, monitoring and evaluation, Gender Equality Agency of BiH

Samir Bašić, national project officer and focal point for OSCE's ATU and SPMU, Department of Security Cooperation, OSCE Mission

Edina Bećirević, Atlantic Initiative

Amb. Fletcher M. Burton, head, OSCE Mission

Sanja Čatibović, national project officer, compliance with OSCE politico-military commitments, Department of Security Cooperation, OSCE Mission

Jasna Dragičević, project officer, democratic oversight of defence, security and intelligence sector and mission focal point for border issues, Department of Security Co-operation, OSCE Mission

Mevludin Džindo, assistant minister, Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption of BiH

Christopher Engels, head, Rule of Law Section, Human Dimension Department, OSCE Mission

Eric Frejabue, adviser in home affairs and public security, EU Special Representative in BiH

Željko Grubešić, expert adviser, Joint Committee on Defence and Security, BiH Parliamentary Assembly

Ahmet Hadžomerović, assistant minister, Sector for Policy and Planning, Ministry of Defence, BiH

Denis Hadžović, director, Centre for Security Studies, Sarajevo (CSS)

Majda Halilović, Atlantic Initiative

Adnan Kadribašić, expert adviser, Gender Equality Agency of BiH

Úna Kelly, senior programme manager, Justice Sector, Delegation of the European Union to BiH

Brigitte Kuchar, programme manager, Political Office, Delegation of the European Union to BiH

Sead Lisak, director, Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption of BiH

Haris Lokvancic, human security adviser, Swiss Embassy, Sarajevo

Earnan Naughton, deputy director, Department of Security Co-operation, OSCE Mission

Vera Orloff, policy and information officer, Department of Security Co-operation, OSCE Mission

Ermin Pešto, assistant minister, Sector for Border and General Security, Ministry of Security of BiH

Nerimana Rifatbegović, adviser in home affairs and public security, EU Special Representative in BiH

Lukas Rosenkranz, deputy head of mission, Swiss Embassy, Sarajevo

Boško Šiljegović, parliamentary military commissioner of BiH

Dragan Slipac, deputy director, Agency for the Prevention of Corruption and Coordination of the Fight against Corruption of BiH

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