

**OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Autumn Meeting
3 – 5 October 2014**

New Security Challenges: The Role of Parliaments



OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Autumn Meeting



New Security Challenges: The Role of Parliaments

3-5 October 2014

Centre International de Conférences, Geneva

Speeches compiled by DCAF



DCAF
a centre for security,
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FOREWORD BY THE SWISS DELEGATION TO THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

Hosting the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 2014 Autumn Meeting in Geneva gave the Swiss Parliamentary Delegation an opportunity to highlight our country's chairmanship of the organisation. In choosing the theme of 'New Security Challenges: the role of parliaments' the 300 or so delegates were able to address the numerous security challenges faced by OSCE member countries and their responsibility, as parliamentarians, for assuring security and stability with the OSCE area.

The programme of the Autumn Meeting featured insightful contributions from numerous keynote speakers, which were well received by delegates. Over three days, experts, parliamentarians, OSCE officials and important players from Geneva-based organisations participated in the meeting to share their perspectives and experiences regarding new security challenges.

The crisis in Ukraine clearly dominated discussions and was the focus of attention. The involvement of the OSCE in seeking a political solution to the conflict continues and the deployment on the ground of numerous observers, despite increasingly difficult working conditions, is a clear demonstration of our desire to encourage the parties to enter into dialogue, even in situations of war. It was precisely in that spirit of international dialogue aimed at resolving conflicts that we gathered in Geneva to exchange views and report on the Ukraine crisis and other crisis situations where, all too often, human tragedies play out.

This compilation containing all the keynote speeches given at the Autumn Meeting in Geneva is the result of fruitful collaboration between the Swiss Parliament and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); we would like to extend our thanks to the DCAF for its valuable contribution to the success of the conference. In some ways it is an extension of the spirit of international dialogue that reigned in Geneva during the OSCE PA conference, and which we hope, was seized upon by those present during the sessions and in their many meetings.

For the Swiss Parliamentary Delegation to the OSCE PA:

Andreas Aebi (member of the National Council), President of the Swiss Delegation to the OSCE PA

Christine Egerszegi-Obrist (member of the National Council), member of the Swiss Delegation to the OSCE PA

Hugues Hiltbold (member of the National Council), member of the Swiss Delegation to the OSCE PA.

**FOREWORD BY AMBASSADOR DR. THEODOR H. WINKLER, DIRECTOR
DCAF**

It was a great pleasure to offer the many delegations of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly a very warm welcome to Switzerland and Geneva in October last year, not only on behalf of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the partner of the Swiss Parliament in hosting this autumn session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly¹, but also on behalf of our sister institutions, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Geneva International Centre on Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and other partner institutions which contributed to the session's programme. We were delighted that you chose Geneva as the venue for your meeting and hope that you enjoyed your stay.

The topics addressed, and discussed, during the conference which focused on the role of parliaments and new security challenges – were as important as they were timely². We hope that International Geneva offered you rich expertise in this area. Seat of the European Headquarters of the United Nations, many specialized UN Agencies, as well as a multitude of dedicated NGOs, International Geneva forms a unique concentration of knowledge, expertise and experience to draw on in challenging times.

During your stay, an important step was taken: the inauguration of the “Maison de la paix”. Located right next to the United Nations, in the very heart of international Geneva, the “Maison de la paix” brings together under one roof an outstanding academic institution, the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies, DCAF, GCSP, GICHD, the Small Arms Survey, Interpeace as well as many additional partners. Together they form a hub – a critical mass of expertise.

¹ <http://oscepa2014.ch/partnership-with-the-dcaf/?lang=en>

² <http://oscepa2014.ch/schweizer-delegation-pv-osze/>

DCAF is the world's leading address for expertise on the good governance and reform of the security sector (SSG/SSR). DCAF remains a strategic partner of the OSCE as it was of the Swiss Chairmanship in Office itself during 2014. GCSP is a unique training facility for officers, diplomats, civil servants, and executives. GICHD is the prime partner of the international community in the disposal of explosive remnants of war. The Small Arms Survey is publishing the world's reference book on the problems posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Interpeace is a leading address in peacebuilding. They all contribute, in their specific way, to conflict prevention, conflict transformation, and post-conflict reconstruction. We hope you had a good glimpse of our work during your stay in Geneva.

We hope you had a most successful meeting and a pleasant stay here in Geneva. We are proud to have been chosen as local partner by the Swiss Parliament for this occasion.

Yours sincerely,
Theodor H. Winkler
Director DCAF
Geneva

**Mediterranean Forum of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly:**

**Facing Current Challenges to Security
in the Mediterranean Region - the
OSCE Model**

OPENING OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY MEDITERRANEAN FORUM

Mr. Alain Neri, Chairperson of the Forum, Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Bonjour,

Je suis heureux de saluer les nombreux participants à notre forum méditerranéen. Au nom de l'ensemble de nos collègues, je vous souhaite à toutes et à tous la bienvenue au forum méditerranéen annuel de l'AP de l'OSCE. Cette année notre forum se tient au bord du lac Léman. C'est un privilège et je tiens à remercier particulièrement nos hôtes suisses pour leur très chaleureuse hospitalité.

Notre agenda est chargé. Mes commentaires seront donc brefs. Depuis le dernier forum méditerranéen de Budva qui s'est tenu en octobre de l'année dernière, nous avons été nombreux à nous engager avec nos partenaires méditerranéens. Je me suis d'ailleurs moi-même rendu à Monaco fin octobre de l'année passée afin de participer à la Conférence méditerranéenne gouvernementale de l'OSCE. J'y ai débattu de l'inadmissible et intolérable traite des êtres humains qui afflige les pays du pourtour méditerranéen et bien au-delà. Je pense que nous pouvons être fiers du travail accompli depuis l'année dernière et tout particulièrement je tiens à souligner l'engagement des partenaires lors de notre dernière session d'hiver à Vienne et durant la session annuelle à Bakou. En tant que français, j'accorde une importance toute particulière à la dimension méditerranéenne de l'OSCE, *Mare Nostrum*, notre mer, et au sujet qui est le nôtre aujourd'hui, « Affronter les défis sécuritaires actuels dans la région méditerranéenne : le modèle OSCE ».

Dans ce cadre, je souhaite aller plus loin et prendre le risque d'aborder de manière globale les migrations illégales et les situations de détresse qui continuent de préoccuper la communauté internationale, à savoir et prioritairement la Libye, Gaza, la Syrie et l'Irak. Chacun de ces

conflits représente à lui seul une menace impérieuse pour la sécurité du bassin méditerranéen. Prise dans son ensemble et à l'aune de l'intensité des combats en cours, au cours de cet été, la situation devient quasiment intenable, d'abord pour les populations victimes de violence, mais aussi pour des pays qui se retrouvent pris dans la tenaille de ces tensions régionales. Je pense notamment à la Jordanie ou à la Turquie qui sont soumis à un flux incessant de réfugiés. Permettez-moi de rappeler que le 15 septembre dernier les représentants d'une trentaine de pays se sont réunis à Paris pour une conférence internationale sur la sécurité en Irak. Dans le texte final, ils ont choisi de soutenir la lutte de Bagdad contre les djihadistes de l'Etat Islamique par tous les moyens nécessaires, y compris militaires, dans le respect du droit international et de la sécurité des populations civiles.

Le débat de la lutte contre Daech, autrement connu sous le nom trompeur d'Etat islamique, qui est d'ores et déjà actif aux portes de la région de l'OSCE, est un débat que nous ne pourrions pas occulter. Je tiens à rappeler que la situation en Irak est une menace directe sur des états participants et des partenaires de l'OSCE qui sont limitrophes, et même au-delà, sur toute la région de l'OSCE et particulièrement l'Asie centrale. Je tiens ici à évoquer avec tristesse et émotion le sort d'un citoyen français qui est tombé entre les mains de ces monstres et qui l'a payé de sa vie. Hervé Gourdel, guide de haute montagne, avait été enlevé le 21 septembre à Tizi-Ouzou dans l'est de l'Algérie. Il est mort décapité trois jours plus tard. Un acte qualifié à juste titre d'infamie et de barbarie par toute la classe politique française et bien au-delà. Car pour les auteurs de ce crime il est clair que la vie n'a aucune valeur, absolument aucune valeur. Ils bafouent sans vergogne, toutes les valeurs de l'humanisme et du respect de l'homme qui nous rassemblent. Notre devoir est de condamner de tels actes et de combattre leurs auteurs sans faiblesse et avec une détermination sans faille. Encore un mot si vous le permettez sur la Libye, un état qui a demandé à être associé au partenariat de l'OSCE. La semaine dernière, Laurent Fabius, ministre français des affaires étrangères et du développement international, a rappelé la mobilisation de la France en faveur de la Libye et notre appui à l'action des Nations Unies lors d'un événement organisé par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en marge de son Assemblée générale.

Sans transition, je désire souhaiter la bienvenue aux participants des états partenaires méditerranéens de l'OSCE et je leur donnerai la parole dans un court moment ainsi qu'à nos distingués intervenants assis à mes côtés. Afin de faciliter l'interprétation lors de ce forum, je demanderais à tous ceux d'entre vous qui ont l'intention de lire leur intervention, d'en faire parvenir une copie au secrétariat afin qu'ils puissent la transmettre aux interprètes. Nous allons écouter nos distingués intervenants les uns après les autres. Si vous avez des questions ou des commentaires à leur adresser, je vous invite à le faire dans le cadre qui va suivre leur présentation et les remarques des partenaires. A cet effet, une liste est actuellement ouverte et je vous invite à signaler votre nom et votre pays auprès du personnel du secrétariat assis à mes côtés pour vous inscrire. Avant de donner la parole à Monsieur Andreas Aebi, chef de la délégation suisse auprès de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE, c'est avec un immense plaisir que je donne maintenant la parole à notre cher ami Monsieur Ilkka Kanerva, président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE, pour qu'il introduise nos débats.

Merci.

REMARKS TO OPEN THE MEDITERRANEAN FORUM

Mr. Ilkka Kanerva, President of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Excellencies,
Fellow parliamentarians,
Distinguished guests,

I would like to welcome you to the 2014 Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. I am happy to be here in Geneva with you and I would like to thank the Swiss Parliament and Mr. Andreas Aebi, the Head of the Swiss Delegation, for the hospitality.

There will be more time for welcomes and due thanks this afternoon, so let us now turn directly to the important matters before us, many of which our esteemed colleague, Vice-President Alain Neri, has just introduced.

Since our Autumn Meeting at this time last year, the eyes of the world have often been divided between two hotspots of upheaval and conflict – Ukraine and the Middle East. The OSCE and the Parliamentary Assembly have devoted every possible effort towards de-escalating the former crisis. However, we perhaps have not paid due attention to the latter. It is my sincere hope that this Forum can help remedy that.

What I am referring to is not one conflict, not one source of instability, but multiple conflicts and multiple challenges in a region of highly complex political, cultural and religious realities. These conflicts and challenges are not peripheral to the OSCE area.

One of the biggest security threats to the region and to the whole civilized world is the extremist movement ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. Many OSCE States are now considering ways to counter this common enemy.

ISIS's advance has only complicated the horrific conflict in Syria, which has become one of the greatest human tragedies in recent memory. As the conflict rages, it continues to extend its destabilizing wave across the

Middle East and beyond. Several OSCE states also have significant influence over some of the parties to the conflict.

The renewed violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made a lasting peace only more elusive and cost far too many lives on both sides. As long as it remains unresolved, it also threatens the peace and security of the region at large. Sadly, it also continues to serve as a cover for anti-Semitism throughout the world, including the OSCE area.

The political transition that is still under way in the Middle East and North Africa following the “Arab Spring” continues to deserve our attention. Democratic values have not fully taken root. The process will take time, leadership and concerted international support.

These are all issues that closely affect our Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation -- Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly greatly values the experiences and lessons that they will share with us to help us better understand these dynamics. I want to extend a special welcome to the parliamentarians from Algeria and Morocco who are with us here for this Forum.

OSCE participating States also have an important opportunity today to share their perspectives on these issues. Let us learn from each other’s experiences and consider policies to improve security and stability for our Mediterranean Partners and for ourselves.

Our Mediterranean Forum has many issues to discuss, such as the flow of migrants and asylum-seekers throughout the region. This topic, and the related human rights, political and economic factors, was one of the main themes of our Annual Session this year. Our Declaration called on EU member States to engage further in migration management and to ensure that the contribution and burden of migrants on the European continent is shared equally among member States. But how can this be implemented? How can we work together to reduce the root causes of irregular migration?

In our Resolution on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, we noted that “Equality of opportunity for Mediterranean people and the protection of their human rights are essential to security, peace, stability and sustainable democracy, and hence to economic growth in the OSCE area.” We called on OSCE States to reinforce dialogue with countries of origin and transit. Today we have a prime opportunity.

Yes, we have much to work on. I look forward to the rest of this morning's addresses and to our debate. I urge all of us to seize this opportunity for dialogue and brainstorming, and take lessons learned back home.

Thank you very much.

OPENING ADDRESS

Mr. Andreas Aebi, Head of the Delegation of Switzerland to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Monsieur le Président du Forum méditerranéen de l'Assemblée
parlementaire de l'OSCE,
Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE,
Mesdames, Messieurs les Parlementaires,
Chères et chers collègues,
Mesdames, Messieurs,

En tant que Président de la délégation suisse auprès de l'Assemblée
parlementaire de l'OSCE, c'est un grand plaisir et un grand honneur de vous
accueillir ici, à Genève, à l'occasion de cette rencontre d'automne.
Laissez-moi également vous remercier, Monsieur le Président, de m'avoir
invité à venir m'adresser à ce forum méditerranéen, dédié au thème très
actuel et pertinent des défis sécuritaires contemporains pour la région
méditerranéenne.

A cet égard, laissez-moi brièvement esquisser trois défis actuels
pour l'espace méditerranéen et l'OSCE: le terrorisme, les pressions
migratoires et le financement du terrorisme par le biais d' «enlèvements
contre rançon».

Herr Präsident,
Geschätzte Kolleginnen und Kollegen,
Meine Damen und Herren,

Die jüngsten Ereignisse im Irak und in Syrien führen uns eines der
drängendsten Probleme im Mittelmeerraum vor Augen. Die Brutalität und
Barbarei des selbsternannten Islamischen Staates zeigen, dass die Plage des
Terrorismus noch nicht ausgeremert werden konnte und noch auf Jahre
hinaus eine Herausforderung für die Mittelmeerregion, darstellen wird.

Die Ereignisse im Irak und in Syrien sind nicht nur eine Herausforderung für die Mittelmeeranrainer, sondern für den gesamten OSZE-Raum und die internationale Gemeinschaft.

Obwohl die Schätzungen unterschiedlich sind, so wissen wir doch, dass sich in diesem Moment mehrere Tausend „ausländische Kämpfer“ im Irak und Syrien befinden und in terroristische Aktivitäten involviert sind. Die Kämpfer stammen nicht nur aus den Mittelmeerländern, sondern aus dem gesamten OSZE-Raum. Kampferprobt und ideologisch verblendet, werden diese Leute nach der Rückkehr in ihre Heimatländer ein grosses Sicherheitsrisiko, dem sich die OSZE und ihre Partnerländer jetzt und in Zukunft annehmen müssen, darstellen. In Anbetracht dieses jungen Phänomens sollte die Parlamentarische Versammlung dieses Thema dringlich aufnehmen, um das Problem besser verstehen zu können und über mögliche Lösungswege nachzudenken.

In diesem Hinblick möchte ich dem Schweizer OSZE-Vorsitz dafür danken, dass er das Thema „fremde Kämpfer“ in die Agenda der OSZE für 2014 aufgenommen hat. Die Thematik war Gegenstand der Anti-Terrorismus-Konferenz in Interlaken, die im April stattfand, und wird ausserdem an der kommenden OSZE Mittelmeerkonferenz Ende Oktober in Bosnien-Herzegowina diskutiert werden.

Herr Präsident,
Geschätzte Kolleginnen und Kollegen,
Meine Damen und Herren,

Einen wichtigen Aspekt der Krise im Irak und in Syrien haben wir noch nicht beleuchtet, nämlich die humanitäre Tragödie, die sich in diesen Tagen abspielt. Tausende Menschen flüchten vor der Barbarei und der Gewalt und mussten fluchtartig ihre Dörfer und Städte verlassen. Der Druck auf die Nachbarstaaten, auf die mediterranen Partnerstaaten und den gesamten OSZE-Raum ist erheblich.

Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt die Diskussion, die im Mai dieses Jahres in der mediterranen Kontaktgruppe in Wien geführt wurde, gerade rechtzeitig. Thema dieser Gespräche war die Migration als Folge der Krise im Irak und in Syrien. Der Migrationsdruck sowohl auf die benachbarten Mittelmeerstaaten als auch auf den OSZE-Raum wird uns noch lange

beschäftigen. Auch die Parlamentarische Versammlung ist gefordert und muss das Thema alsbald möglich an einer ihrer Versammlungen behandeln.

Herr Präsident,
Geschätzte Kolleginnen und Kollegen,
Meine Damen und Herren,

Wenn wir über Terrorismus sprechen, dann dürfen wir die Frage nach der Finanzierung der Terrorgruppen nicht ausser Acht lassen, sei das im Irak, in Syrien oder anderswo.

Die steigende Anzahl Entführungen und die Lösegeldforderungen als Folge davon bereiten der Schweiz grosse Sorgen.

Dieses System, in dem das menschliche Leben auf eine Handelsware herabgestuft wird, bringt den Terroristengruppen lukrative Einkünfte und spornt zu weiteren Entführungen an. Das Risiko ist erheblich, egal von welchem Staat man Bürger ist.

Die effektivste Methode um dieses Muster zu durchbrechen ist eine strikt angewandte Politik des nicht Bezahls von Lösegeld. Auch sonst dürfen keinerlei politische Konzessionen gemacht werden. Je mehr Staaten eine solche Strategie verfolgen, desto besser der Schutz vor Entführungen.

Entführungen mit Lösegeldforderungen: Das ist ein Schwerpunkt auf der Agenda des Schweizer OSZE-Vorsitzes während dem Jahr 2014. Und die Schweiz hat sich dazu verpflichtet, diese Thematik international voran zu bringen, zum Beispiel durch die Förderung von Präventionsmassnahmen wie etwa die Versorgung der Bevölkerung mit aktuellen Reiseinformationen und öffentlichen Sensibilisierungskampagnen, die sich an Risikogruppen richten.

Das Thema wurde, wie bereits gesagt, in Interlaken an der Anti-Terrorkonferenz der OSZE und zusätzlich an einem Seminar der Mittelmeerpartner in Malta behandelt. Solche Seminare sind ein Beispiel, wie die OSZE die Mittelmeerpartner unterstützen kann. Die Seminare richten sich direkt an Experten und Fachleute, die in ihrer täglichen Arbeit mit dem Thema konfrontiert sind.

Es ist eine schwierige Thematik und ich bin nur in knapper Form auf ein paar Beispiele eingegangen. Ich denke, wir müssen versuchen, diese Angelegenheit besser zu verstehen. Wir sollten unsere Diskussionen darüber auf parlamentarischer Ebene vertiefen und Wege finden, wie die

OSZE diese Probleme in Zukunft besser bewältigen kann. Denn nicht nur auf die mediterranen Partnerstaaten warten grosse Herausforderungen, sondern auf den gesamten OSZE-Raum. Diese Problematik betrifft uns alle!
Ich freue mich auf eine fruchtbare Diskussion.

Vielen Dank.

ADDRESSES BY THE HEADS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS FROM THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS FOR COOPERATION

Mr. Hachemil Djar, Membre du Conseil de la Nation et Chef de la Délégation Algérienne

Merci Monsieur le Président.

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Voici que la gravité des événements qui font l'actualité met de nouveau la Méditerranée au cœur des débats de cette session. Animé par l'optimisme, l'on serait évidemment tenté de la présenter comme une mer de proximité, le berceau de modèles religieux et culturels qui ont su se hisser à l'universel. Un espace dont la vocation est de rapprocher les hommes et les cultures, de brasser les idées, les langages, de favoriser les échanges et d'intégrer les économies. Mais hélas, les héritages historiques et les réalités de la géopolitique parlent de la Méditerranée autrement. L'histoire nous enseigne que depuis le partage de l'Empire romain entre Byzance et Rome à la fin du quatrième siècle de notre ère, cet espace n'a jamais cessé d'être une zone de tumulte, de clivage, d'affrontement et de rivalité entre les bâtisseurs d'empire et entre les états nationaux expansionnistes.

Quant à la géopolitique, elle prend désormais en compte la Méditerranée au sens large, dans la mesure où, pour des raisons à la fois climatiques, culturelles, sécuritaires et géostratégiques, l'analyse élargie de l'ensemble de la Méditerranée à des espaces périphériques annexes, tels que les pays du Golfe Persique, la Mer noire, la zone du Sahel, et même le Caucase et le Yémen. C'est d'ailleurs dans ce cadre élargi que se posent aujourd'hui des problèmes gravissimes de sécurité et de stabilité. Les événements qui se déroulent en Irak, en Syrie, en Libye, au Sahel, ainsi que les conflits qui persistent ici ou là, sans perspective de solution prévisible à court terme, montrent à quel point une reconsidération du système de coopération en Méditerranée s'impose. D'où la nécessité pour l'OSCE de saisir l'occasion d'Helsinki +40 afin d'évaluer non seulement son propre

parcours depuis sa création, mais aussi d'évaluer les initiatives prises à travers notamment la Déclaration de Petersberg sur le dialogue avec les pays du Maghreb, l'invitation adressée à quelques pays des rives sud et est de la Méditerranée à participer aux réunions ministérielles de l'OSCE, le dialogue méditerranéen initié par l'OTAN avec les pays des rives sud, la Déclaration de Barcelone, et enfin la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense orientée en direction de la région méditerranéenne.

Une telle évaluation, Mesdames, Messieurs, qui sera faite à la lumière des événements actuels, permettra de décrire les réalisations et d'apprécier les résultats enregistrés. Elle permettra de savoir si le système en vigueur porté par deux visions distinctes qui sont d'un côté celle de l'Union européenne, et d'un autre côté celle de l'OTAN, est pertinent et peut se suffire à lui-même, et si une vision nouvelle par laquelle l'OSCE d'un côté, et les pays de la région de la Méditerranée telle que définie précédemment d'un autre côté, ne serait pas mieux indiquée pour un vrai partenariat en matière sécuritaire orienté vers la recherche de vraies solutions au problème du terrorisme. En vérité, il s'agit d'une refondation, dont le principe tire sa raison d'être du fait que ce qui se joue aujourd'hui dans la périphérie sud de l'OSCE est à maintes égards une question de vie ou de mort pour le processus de démocratisation et de l'état de droit que des pays comme l'Algérie par exemple s'attèlent à consolider. Elle signifie également la nécessité d'adapter les politiques de coopération et de transformation qu'a connue la région de la Méditerranée en un court laps de temps tout en allant au fond des choses. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie « aller au fond des choses » ? Cela signifie de ne pas s'en tenir aux approches strictement conjoncturelles, aussi nécessaires soient-elles, mais d'avoir l'audace d'élargir la perspective à une démarche autrement plus féconde de gestion structurelle des conflits qui déchirent les zones méridionales et orientales de la Méditerranée. Ce qui implique de porter collectivement un diagnostic juste de la situation en observant lucidement la réalité actuelle afin de déchiffrer et d'identifier les forces et les faiblesses des approches mises en œuvre à ce jour dans le traitement des crises et ainsi de bien en comprendre les ressorts pour mieux agir. De quoi s'agit-il ? Il s'agit, au-delà de l'actualité et la légitime émotion populaire, relayé par les médias et les mesures d'ordre militaire qui ont été prises, de comprendre les causes profondes de la barbarie qui s'abat sur la région, comprendre pour faire les bons choix et anticiper les secousses futures. En effet, ce qui se passe

aujourd'hui aux frontières méridionales de l'OSCE n'est ni une fatalité ni le fruit du hasard, mais bien la conséquence d'une conjonction de phénomènes dont il faut livrer une explication causale, afin de dégager des solutions durables et leur donner cohérence et pertinence, car aucun fait, aussi grave soit-il, n'est jamais le produit d'une seule et unique cause.

Aujourd'hui, Mesdames et Messieurs, occultant les causes profondes, on a tendance à concentrer son attention sur deux conséquences apparentes de la crise qui affectent cette partie du monde. La première conséquence concerne la riposte militaire perçue comme l'unique solution. La seconde conséquence concerne le djihadisme, perçu à juste titre comme la manifestation meurtrière de la folie de ceux qui en font leur étendard. Or, derrière ces apparences, il y a des éléments de compréhension qu'il convient de cerner du mieux possible pour se convaincre qu'il s'agit en vérité d'une question structurelle à traiter en tant que telle.

S'agissant d'abord de la riposte militaire, il est légitime de se demander si elle est bien de nature à elle seule à véhiculer une solution durable. Il est vrai qu'en raison de la conjoncture, elle apparaît comme une mesure d'urgence nécessaire, mais en analysant les choses de plus près, on peut aussi être en droit d'en douter. Pourquoi ? Parce que cela fait plus de soixante ans que l'approche militaire des crises est pratiquée au Proche et au Moyen-Orient sans fournir de résultats satisfaisants – bien au contraire. Depuis la première guerre israélo-arabe de 1948 jusqu'à celle de Gaza en 2014, en passant par Suez, la Guerre des Six Jours, celle d'octobre 1973, les guerres du Golfe, les guerres du Liban, sans compter les événements du Sud-Yémen en 1986, il n'y a eu que des morts, des destructions, des ruptures, des haines qui ont divisé toujours davantage les communautés humaines, sans autre résultat notable que la montée des extrémismes et la prolifération des mafias qui sont en passe aujourd'hui de dicter leurs lois. C'est dire en bref, qu'une crise multiforme qui dure depuis si longtemps dans le même espace géographique, notamment celle qui oppose les israéliens et les palestiniens, n'en est pas une. C'est à l'évidence toute un système de sécurité collective qu'il faut traiter en tant que tel, afin d'en finir une bonne fois pour toute, faute de quoi, l'exacerbation ira en s'accroissant, et ce sont les extrémistes qui continueront à en tirer profit comme ils le font aujourd'hui. A cet égard et à titre d'exemple, le pari israélien d'un découragement des palestiniens apparaît chaque jour un peu

plus comme une erreur stratégique majeure, car les palestiniens qui n'ont plus rien à perdre, ne baisseront probablement jamais les bras et aucune opération militaire leur fera changer d'avis, aussi longtemps qu'ils ne seront pas rétablis dans leur droit légitime.

Rappeler cette vérité élémentaire, Mesdames et Messieurs, n'est rien d'autre qu'un plaidoyer pour la paix, la justice et la sécurité pour tous, pour dire aussi la nécessité d'étouffer à la racine les arguments que les extrémistes ne cessent de puiser dans l'enlisement du processus de paix. Pour souligner également que les schémas de la dialectique simpliste « sécurité israélienne, menace palestinienne », gravés dans les esprits par les guerres successives, et entretenus par une propagande savamment enregistrée, nourrissant la peur et causant indirectement l'assassinat d'un sage par un étudiant extrémiste israélien en 1995 - je veux citer Yitzhak Rabin - compromettant ainsi les accords d'Oslo. Un tel schéma, Mesdames, Messieurs, ne tient plus la route.

En même temps que le recours à la force dans l'analyse rétrospective, rétroactive et prospective s'impose aujourd'hui afin d'évaluer les effets sur la paix et la sécurité, un second élément occupe l'actualité qu'il faut comprendre également pour mieux agir et anticiper sur le long terme – il s'agit du djihadisme. C'est un phénomène qui a des ramifications avec le monde sous-terrain du crime organisé, de la drogue, et de toutes sortes de trafics lesquels tirent habilement avantage de la mondialisation. C'est donc incontestablement un syndrome mafieux, c'est aussi un mouvement animé par des fanatiques dont le comportement n'obéit à aucune logique rationnelle, mais c'est une erreur de s'en tenir à ces seules explications. Car le djihadisme n'est pas sans liens avec les mutations du paysage idéologique caractéristique de réformisme en pays d'islam lequel est tantôt articulé sur l'effort de réconciliation entre l'islam et la modernité, tantôt sur une volonté de résistance à un Occident conquérant à travers une réforme morale et religieuse, dont l'objectif déclaré est une « réislamisation de la société ». Dans cet ordre d'idées, le djihadisme n'est pas le djihad, lequel renvoie à la lutte de la communauté islamique à des fins défensives. Il s'agit d'un mouvement armé qui s'assainit comme but le renversement des régimes en place sur un espace donné pour leur substituer un régime se prévalent de l'islam dont il déforme totalement l'esprit. C'est donc un mouvement extrémiste, territorialisé, à ne pas confondre avec l'islam.

Ce qu'il faut rappeler ici en guise de simple éclairage, c'est que l'islamisme et le djihadisme qui font aujourd'hui débat, n'ont pas surgi isolément en marge d'une dynamique historique à plusieurs strates, dans laquelle les politiques expansionnistes menés par l'Occident en pays d'islam occupent une place considérable. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'émergence du djihadisme est bien postérieure à celle de l'islamisme. Elle coïncide avec deux événements majeurs qui sont liés, faut-il le souligner, au conflit Israélo-palestinien. Le premier concerne la signature des accords de Camp David qui se sont soldés par l'assassinat du président Sadat. Le second concerne la décision israélienne de proclamer Jérusalem comme capitale d'Israël. L'échec des accords d'Oslo et l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003 ont fait le reste.

Pour résumer, on notera simplement que le djihadisme est un extrémisme belliqueux, qui n'a absolument rien à voir avec l'islam et que ces manifestations ne peuvent être isolés ni des dérives mafieuses induites par la mondialisation, ni de la déstabilisation interne des états où il s'établit, ni de certains choix politiques faits au Proche et Moyen-Orient par les grandes puissances, ni surtout, on ne le répétera jamais assez, de la matrice historique du drame que vit le peuple palestinien depuis plusieurs générations. Aussi, pour circonscrire définitivement ce phénomène, il faut prendre en compte l'ensemble de ces facteurs qui le nourrissent en faisant preuve d'innovation dans les approches et les systèmes de coopération en région méditerranéenne. Aujourd'hui, Mesdames, Messieurs, face à l'énumération morbide des otages décapités, des hommes et des femmes qui souffrent, des enfants terrorisés, des civils morts ou blessés, des ruines en Irak, en Syrie, en Palestine, en Libye, dans la zone du Sahel, et peut-être ailleurs demain, l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE que représentent des pays certes sécurisés, mais désormais pas totalement à l'abri, peut-elle attendre quelque chose des peuples de ces contrées périphériques meurtries ? N'attendez rien, Mesdames, Messieurs, car ce sont ces peuples qui attendent tout de vous. Pour donner suite à cette attente, ne serait-il pas utile d'entreprendre un travail collectif de réflexion pour donner sens à une action collective ? Dans ce cadre, quatre questions au moins, parmi d'autres, pourraient être débattues.

Premièrement, la complexité grandissante de la situation n'autorise-t-elle pas à penser que dans de telles conditions, la démocratie imposée par la force reste une utopie, du moins un idéal théorique bien difficile à atteindre

par nos pays tant que les Occidentaux ne se résolvent pas à plus de réalisme, en se rappelant aussi bien les enseignements de leur propre histoire que ceux d'une partie non négligeable de leurs éminents penseurs pour qui les sociétés en développement peuvent difficilement se gouverner de la même manière que les sociétés de consommation, sauf si l'on admet contre toute évidence, que la politique est totalement autonome par rapport à son environnement socio-culturel et socio-économique.

Deuxièmement, les initiatives de l'Union Européenne, de l'OTAN et de l'OSCE pris au cours de la dernière décennie du siècle dernier, sont-elles encore de nature à véhiculer de vraies solutions à des problèmes de sécurité qui ont tendance à s'aggraver et à se compliquer de plus en plus ? Troisièmement, l'OSCE ne devrait-elle pas se doter d'un organisme permanent d'études prospectives sur la sécurité en Méditerranée dans lequel seraient fédérées les expertises du nord et du sud méditerranéen, indispensables pour donner sens à une action commune ?

Et enfin, quatrièmement, le moment n'est-il pas venu pour une introspection collective contre le décalage persistant entre les déclarations de principes sur la nécessité d'une solution au conflit israélo-palestinien et leur traduction concrète sur le terrain ? Bref, le temps n'est-il pas enfin venu, pour l'OSCE, qui s'apprête à commémorer son 40ème anniversaire, de rénover sa politique méditerranéenne de concert avec ses partenaires et désamorcer avec eux les poudrières qui se trouvent à leurs portes, à commencer par la plus anciennes d'entre elles, celle israélo-palestinienne qui à maintes égards, conditionne toutes les autres ?

Permettez-moi de terminer sur ce sujet précisément en paraphrasant un grand américain, Martin Luther King, pour dire « Rêvons qu'un jour, les petites filles et les petits garçons israéliens et palestiniens pourront tous se prendre par la main comme frères et sœurs et s'asseoir ensemble à la table de la fraternité ».

Je vous remercie.

Mr. Abdesamad Hayker, Chef de la Délégation Marocaine

Merci Monsieur le président.

Merci de nous avoir accordé cette chance de participer à ce débat important.

Je commence par dire que le terrorisme est un crime impardonnable. Permettez-moi de dire que nous devons tout d'abord analyser ce comportement et en chercher les causes. Il est légitime dans ce cadre de poser quelques questions. N'est-il pas le résultat immédiat du déséquilibre entre le sud et le nord sur tous les plans ? N'est-il pas aussi le résultat du comportement de la société internationale envers des sujets du monde arabe, telle que la question palestinienne, l'intervention en Irak, etc. N'y a-t-il pas de relation avec les politiques des grandes forces économiques vis-à-vis des ressources et des fortunes des pays sous-développés et leurs peuples ? La guerre occidentale non-justifiée contre l'islam n'y est-elle pour rien ? Nous devons répondre de manière sincère à ce genre de questions, non pas pour condamner tel ou tel état, telle ou telle personne, et pas non plus pour chercher des excuses aux criminels terroristes, ni pour justifier leurs actes criminels, mais pour changer ce qu'il y a à changer au niveau des politiques internationales.

Monsieur le président, chers collègues,

Permettez-moi de dire que toute approche ne tenant pas compte de l'aspect multidimensionnel de ces défis reste mineure, inefficace et sans aucun impact. Au contraire, elle peut générer d'autres formes d'insécurité et de terrorisme. Toute approche non basée sur le principe de l'équité entre états et de leur responsabilité mutuelle reste handicapée. Toute approche basée sur la consolidation de l'amalgame islam-terrorisme ne fait qu'enrichir et alimenter les intentions du terrorisme et d'autres formes de criminalité. Et par la suite, toute stratégie qui a pour objet la guerre sur l'islam au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme ne fait qu'accroître le problème et aggraver la situation. Au Maroc, on a eu bien-sûr notre part de ces crimes, et notre capitale économique Casablanca était le théâtre d'actes

terroristes lors des attentats de mai 2003, mais ces incidents resteront isolés devant la vigilance de toutes les composantes de la société marocaine et des forces de l'ordre et des services de renseignement et c'est ainsi que l'on entend de temps en temps de dissociations de cellules qui peuvent avoir des intentions terroristes.

Tout d'abord, la nature de notre société caractérisée par la tolérance, la pluralité et la diversité des composantes culturelles et sociales interdit d'accepter ce genre d'actes et leur répétition. Bien-sûr, la bonne perception et la bonne pratique de l'islam qui est devenue une composante essentielle de la personnalité marocaine à travers l'histoire, aussi bien sur le plan social que sur d'autres plans (politiques, économiques et autres) est un deuxième facteur qui nous permet de refuser et de combattre toute forme de terrorisme. Au Maroc, la religion prend sa place dans notre vie d'une manière normale, douce et je dirais ordinaire. Chez nous, le roi est à la fois commandeur croyant et chef d'état. La pratique religieuse est bien réglementée et mise en ordre suite à des législations et des instances spécifiques : les oulémas, les conseils des oulémas, etc. En matière de gestions des affaires religieuses aussi, la politique du Maroc prise dans la nature même du régime marocain, fondé depuis plusieurs siècles, sur le fait que le chef de l'état, aujourd'hui Sa Majesté le roi Mohammed VI, prend sa légitimité de sa qualité de commandeur croyant. L'islam est une constante sacrée de la nation aussi bien que le choix démocratique. On trouve cet attachement aux constantes de la religion sur lesquelles s'accordent unanimement tous les marocains depuis plus de dix siècles. Les constantes en matière de foi, de doctrine et de comportements spirituels sont des constantes que le Maroc partage avec les pays d'Afrique de l'ouest et ces fondamentaux communs servent de guidance aux imams et de source de référence aux magistrats du Maroc et dans les pays de l'Afrique de l'ouest. L'attachement aux principes fondamentaux demeure vivace dans les normes qui contribuent à leur réalisation dans toutes leurs ramifications et qui englobent les domaines politiques, économiques et sociaux dans un style moderne en conformité avec la Constitution.

Sur un axe parallèle, dans le cadre de sa lutte contre le terrorisme, le Maroc a fourni beaucoup d'efforts aussi bien au niveau de la démocratie qu'au niveau du développement économique et social. Combattre le terrorisme nécessite aussi l'élimination de la pauvreté et de la précarité. Je souhaite aussi réitérer depuis cette tribune que notre pays, le Maroc,

conformément à ses traditions et convictions, demeure entièrement engagé dans tout effort multilatéral ou bilatéral visant à combattre le fléau du terrorisme dans toutes ses formes. Ainsi, le Maroc a développé une dynamique importante avec ses partenaires africains dans des domaines liés notamment à la formation, au partage de renseignements et à la coopération, ce qui a permis d'étouffer l'œuvre d'un grand nombre de projets terroristes qui visaient les responsables de ces pays amis, ainsi que des intérêts occidentaux. A ce propos, l'approche multidimensionnelle au Maroc en matière de lutte anti-terroriste, dans la mesure où cette dernière ne s'appuie pas uniquement sur l'aspect sécuritaire mais va au-delà pour trouver son expression dans une stratégie religieuse et spirituelle aboutie, vise à la diffusion d'un islam qui prend les valeurs de tolérance, d'altérité et de juste milieu en toute chose ainsi qu'à travers un développement socio-économique inclusif qui place l'individu au cœur de ses préoccupations.

Je vous remercie.

Parliamentary Conference:

**New Security Challenges: The Role of
Parliaments**

INAUGURAL SESSION

Opening remarks

Mr. Ilkka Kanerva, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Dear friends,
Colleagues,
Distinguished guests,

It is an honour to stand before you today in my new capacity as President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. I would like to start off by thanking our Swiss hosts for their excellent work organizing this meeting. Your hospitality and dedication to making this meeting a success is highly valued.

I would also like to thank Hannes Germann, Speaker of the Council of States of Switzerland, and Minister Didier Burkhalter, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and President of the Swiss Confederation, for participating today.

Being here in Geneva for this Autumn Meeting to discuss new security challenges, I can't help but reflect on the model of Swiss diplomacy that has kept this nation out of war for hundreds of years.

The famous Swiss policy of neutrality has enabled a lasting peace and security that has contributed to a level of prosperity that is the envy of the world.

Switzerland has also made major contributions to the promotion of international relations and security. The Swiss government's initiatives have given rise to such vital institutions as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the four Geneva Conventions. Switzerland also hosts numerous United Nations' and other international organisations.

Last December, Switzerland hosted a conference including dozens of countries, international organisations, civil society groups and private companies who reiterated their commitment to improving the legal framework for all private military and security companies.

The conference took place five years after the adoption of the Montreux Document, in which governments agreed that international humanitarian law and international human rights law apply to the activities of private military and security companies during armed conflict.

The leadership of the Swiss on this issue coincides with the considerable amount of attention that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has also paid to it. As far back as the 1992 Budapest Declaration, the PA was stating that elected parliaments must have the ultimate authority and responsibility for the activities of military forces.

I recall the 17th Annual Session in Astana, where we again took up the issue of private military and security companies. We urged participating States to ensure that these companies observe all obligations in regard to international humanitarian law and human rights and to ensure that participating States extend parliamentary oversight to private military companies and private security companies.

And at the 23rd Annual Session in Baku this summer, the Assembly called upon OSCE participating States to adhere to fundamental principles and norms of international law, as enshrined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. This document, we said, should serve as the basis for inter-State relations as well as politico-military conduct within States, notably the democratic oversight of armed and security forces.

Unfortunately, despite all this, we still have a long way to go in realizing these ideals. In the Ukraine conflict, in particular, there has been much criticism – including from me – over the apparent funnelling of weapons and personnel from Russia into eastern Ukraine, fuelling the armed separatist movement there. In my recent meetings in Moscow, I underscored that Russia's stated commitment to diplomacy and peace in Ukraine requires a full accounting of its impact on the crisis as well as constructive action on the ground.

I repeat what I said in Moscow: Any solution to the Ukraine crisis must be predicated on a genuine commitment by Russia to abide by all Helsinki Commitments, including respect for its neighbour's sovereignty and territorial integrity. I am cautiously optimistic at the recent signs of de-escalation.

While Moscow has borne the brunt of our criticism, we must also remember that the rules apply to both sides of the conflict, and Kyiv is

equally responsible to ensure that armed militias fighting on its behalf respect the Code of Conduct – particularly its stipulations that that all participating States “will at all times provide for and maintain effective guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces” and that each State “will ensure that its armed forces as such are politically neutral.”

There have been troubling reports that some of these militias are anything but politically neutral, and some indications that they are not operating under appropriate and effective guidance and control.

We have also seen foreign fighters of the far left and the far right flocking to Ukraine from other European countries to take up arms on both of sides of the conflict. Some of these individuals appear to be motivated by sincere – even if misguided – notions of ethnic nationalism or anti-fascism.

Whatever the motivations of these fighters, all governments of the OSCE area must speak out against this trend, and take appropriate measures to ensure that our citizens are not exacerbating a conflict that we are working so hard to defuse.

At the moment, many of our countries are also preoccupied by the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and particularly the rise of ISIS. By some estimates, more than 12,000 foreigners from at least 50 countries have gone to fight with rebels in Syria. About a quarter of these are reportedly coming from Western nations. As returning fighters might be inclined to engage in terrorist attacks, ISIS constitutes a concrete risk for all of us. With these radicalized individuals not only gaining combat experience and weapons training, but also access to transnational terrorist networks, there is a very real and growing security threat to the OSCE region, and governments are beginning to respond. The United States has mobilized a military coalition for what could be a years-long campaign against ISIS, and some OSCE countries are moving to revoke passports of their citizens who have left to join extremist groups in Syria and Iraq.

We are also faced with evolving challenges in the economic and environmental dimension, particularly the crisis of climate change. Mass demonstrations were held last month in cities across the world demanding action from world leaders on the climate crisis. As we head towards the Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, this December, it is high time that leaders take seriously these calls as they work towards a legally binding and universal agreement next year in Paris.

With all this in mind, as we discuss new security challenges and the role of parliaments over the next few days, I hope that this Assembly lives up to its highest potential as a forum of debate and a facilitator of the exchange of best practices. As security challenges grow by the day, so too does the need for multilateral co-operation rooted in common principles as expressed in the Helsinki Final Act, the Code of Conduct, the Copenhagen Document and other landmark accords of the OSCE.

While we set the agendas for our parliaments, for our nations and for the whole of the OSCE region, we should recall the spirit of Helsinki and the principles outlined in that founding document nearly 40 years ago. As this anniversary approaches, the Parliamentary Assembly is engaged in a series of seminars known as the Helsinki +40 Project. The first of these was just held at the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on the 25th of September, and was a great success.

As the link between the governmental side of the Organisation and the people in the OSCE area, the Parliamentary Assembly is in a unique position to foster public debate and build support for strengthening the Organisation in the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The Parliamentary Assembly is the OSCE's democratic backbone, bringing not only legitimacy to the Organisation, but also the OSCE's values back to our capitals. The role of our Assembly – as well as parliaments – has never been clearer as a way to build trust among those we represent. To build that trust, however, we owe them a high level of discourse, dialogue and debate.

In this spirit, I look forward to exploring the vital issues of the day with you all here in Geneva, and beyond.
Thank you.

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Hannes Germann' Speaker of the Council of States of Switzerland

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE,
Sehr geehrter Herr Bundespräsident und Vorsitzender der OSZE,
Geschätzte Mitglieder der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE,
Werte Expertinnen und Experten,
Liebe Gäste,
Geschätzte Medienschaffende,
Meine Damen und Herren,

Es freut mich, Sie hier in Genf im Namen des schweizerischen Bundesparlamentes zu begrüßen. Ich fühle mich sehr geehrt, die Tagung des parlamentarischen Organs der OSZE zusammen mit Ihrem Präsidenten und mit dem Vorsitzenden der OSZE, unserem Aussenminister Didier Burkhalter, eröffnen zu dürfen.

Nicht weniger als 53 der insgesamt 57 OSZE-Staaten sind hier an dieser Tagung vertreten. Allein diese hohe Beteiligung stellt schon einen Erfolg dar und zeigt, dass es eine gute Entscheidung war, Genf, die Stadt des Dialogs zwischen Völkern und Nationen, für die diesjährige Herbsttagung auszuwählen.

Auch wenn keine Resolution auf dem Programm steht, werden an dieser Tagung grundlegende Fragen behandelt. Es geht darum, den Handlungsspielraum zu prüfen, den die Parlamente haben, um der Bevölkerung bessere Lebensbedingungen zu verschaffen und sie vor den Folgen von Konflikten zu schützen.

Diese Tagung soll zudem die Gelegenheit bieten, über die Krisen in der Ukraine und im Nahen Osten zu reden und dabei der Diplomatie den Weg zu ebnen.

Aus dem Dialog erhebt sich die Wahrheit – Platon hatte für sein bekanntestes Werk nicht umsonst das Zwiegespräch mit Sokrates gewählt.

Wissen lässt sich nur im zwei- oder mehrstimmigen Dialog erlangen. Nur im Dialog können wir uns von Einzelmeinungen lösen und zu höherer Erkenntnis gelangen. Für die Suche nach der Wahrheit ist der Dialog, jenseits der Propaganda, unerlässlich.

So ist auch der Dialog zwischen den Staaten und innerhalb der Staaten von wesentlicher Bedeutung. Die Schweiz, die seit ihrer Gründung nach dem Bürgerkrieg vom Sonderbund, in Frieden lebt, kennt vier Sprachregionen und vier Landessprachen. Wichtig für sie ist aber vor allem die friedliche Koexistenz ihrer 26 souveränen Minirepubliken. Das Gleichgewicht in unserem kleinen Land hängt mit der Verteilung der Macht auf lokaler, regionaler und nationaler Ebene zusammen. Der Föderalismus bildet den Nährboden für den Erfolg der Schweiz.

Zudem haben sich die demokratischen Institutionen der Schweiz laufend an die Vorgaben von Politik und Gesellschaft anzupassen. Seit Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts wird der Nationalrat, unsere Volksvertretung, nach dem Proporzsystem gewählt, damit auch die politischen Minderheiten eine Stimme erhalten und die Meinungsvielfalt besser widerspiegelt wird.

Geschätzte Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier,
Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger der Schweiz sind zusammen mit dem Parlament für die Bundesverfassung und die Bundesgesetzgebung verantwortlich. Indem sie Volksabstimmungen anregen und in der Regel viermal pro Jahr an die Urne gehen, tragen auch sie ihren Teil zu den Gesetzeswerken bei, welche das gemeinschaftliche Leben in der Schweiz regeln.

Politisieren und Abstimmen sind in der Schweiz ein richtiger Volkssport. Die Volksrechte sind das Fundament der « von unten herauf » gewachsenen Schweiz. Die Urdemokratie in den Tälern der Zentralschweiz hat sich in verschiedenen Etappen über die restliche Deutschschweiz und schliesslich über die französisch- und die italienischsprachige Schweiz ausgebreitet. Die Referendumskampagnen und die Debatten über die Volksinitiativen führen immer zu breiten öffentlichen Diskussionen, die von den Medien gespeist und weiterverbreitet werden. Allen liegt es am Herzen, sich eine eigene Meinung zu bilden.

Die Regierung und das Parlament ihrerseits setzen alles daran, vom Volk nicht desavouiert zu werden. Sie beziehen deshalb andere Meinungen möglichst schon zu Beginn eines Gesetzgebungsprozesses ein. Unsere

Politikerinnen und Politiker gehen, wenn es darum geht, für eine Vorlage eine Mehrheit zu finden, zuweilen gar Allianzen mit einem anderen politischen Lager ein, – gelegentlich sogar entgegen den unmittelbaren Interessen ihrer Partei oder ihrer Wählerschaft.

In Zeiten ungezügelter Globalisierung ist die Schweiz jedoch nicht selten auch froh, dass ihr Stimmvolk bisweilen etwas Gegensteuer gegen gewisse überstürzte Entwicklungen gibt.

Ich denke da zum Beispiel an gewisse internationale Verträge und Gesellschaftsfragen. Das politische System der Schweiz gleicht einer Waage, deren Gewichte stetig den Ausgleich suchen.

Innerhalb des OSZE-Raumes hingegen setzen die meisten Staaten auf langfristige Stabilität. Ihr System erinnert an die übergrosse Uhr im Hotel Cornavin am Bahnhof Genf, deren 26 Meter langes Pendel von der 9. Etage bis hinunter ins Erdgeschoss reicht. Sein langsames, gleichmässiges Hin und Her von links nach rechts und rechts nach links ist in meinen Augen ein Sinnbild für die steten politischen Machtwechsel in den Oppositionssystemen.

Dass mir dieses Bild in den Sinn kommt, hat natürlich damit zu tun, dass die Uhrmacherei und die Mechanik zwei Trümpfe der Schweizer Wirtschaft sind. Aber unsere Demokratien sind nicht bloss perfekt funktionierende Räderwerke. Sie sind sehr vielgestaltig und vor allem lebendig. Unsere Institutionen widerspiegeln die Geschichte unserer Völker, sie sind aus den Beziehungen mit unseren Nachbarn entstanden und stehen für unsere gemeinsamen Werte.

Wenn es um den Schutz der Minderheiten und die Sicherheit unseres Kontinentes geht, baut die Parlamentarische Versammlung der OSZE auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner seiner Mitglieder, nämlich auf den Willen, die Sicherheit durch Zusammenarbeit zu gewährleisten. Ohne diesen Willen kann kein Dialog entstehen und lässt sich kein Vertrauen herstellen.

Ihre Versammlung versucht, eine Plattform zu schaffen, wo die Denk- und Sichtweisen miteinander verbunden werden und sich gegenseitig bereichern, eine Plattform, die Ihnen ermöglicht, die Welt besser zu verstehen, indem Sie sie mit anderen Augen betrachten, nämlich mit den Augen Ihrer Kolleginnen und Kollegen aus anderen Ländern. Ich bewundere die Ausdauer und die Politik der kleinen Schritte Ihrer Versammlung!

Meine Damen und Herren,

Ich danke den Expertinnen und Experten, welche diese Tagung mit ihren Beiträgen bereichern werden. Ihnen allen wünsche ich, dass Ihnen diese Tagung den Rahmen für eine offene Debatte bietet und dass Sie ihre Positionen, Ziele, Überzeugungen und Meinungen darlegen können. Ich wünsche mir, dass Ihnen allen Gehör geschenkt wird.

Möge das spätsommerliche Genf Ihnen Gelegenheit für interessante Begegnungen und Gespräche bieten. Und möge Ihre Versammlung den Weg zu Frieden und Eintracht ebnen!

Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.

RECONSOLIDATING EUROPEAN SECURITY WITH VISION, DETERMINATION AND A STRONGER OSCE

*Mr. Didier Burkhalter, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Swiss Foreign
Minister*

Mr President,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

Welcome to Switzerland. Welcome to Geneva, the capital of peace.

Geneva –this is also the home base of the ICRC. Yesterday, a Swiss delegate of the ICRC was killed in Donetsk. This delegate stands for the essence of Switzerland, for what we are most proud of: the humanitarian support, the humanitarian assistance to people in need. Today, I would like to speak particularly for him and for all the innocent victims of this conflict, and for their families.

The shores of beautiful Lake Geneva are home not just to the ICRC, but also to the European headquarters of the UN and to more than 30 other international organisations. Around 250 NGOs are based here. This is a place where leaders frequently meet to discuss ways out of seminal crises –whether they concern Iran, Syria, Ukraine, or other crises.

Less known is that Geneva was the city to host the first-ever multilateral East-West negotiation process. Between September 1973 and July 1975, delegates from 35 participating States gathered in this very building to hammer out what came to be known as the CSCE Final Act. Signed at the Helsinki summit on 1 August 1975, this Final Act defined the common foundations and basic principles of European security. It has remained the reference text for the OSCE to this day.

It is therefore very appropriate that this year's Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is taking place here. Almost forty years after the Final Act was signed, European security is faced with a deep crisis that must be addressed. Discussion formats like this Parliamentary

Assembly are important for finding ways to reconsolidate European security as a common project.

The Chairmanship of the OSCE reflects Switzerland's sense of responsibility to engage in international efforts to advance peace and security. It also underlines our commitment to the OSCE's approach to advancing security through dialogue, shared commitments, confidence-building and broad cooperation.

Recent developments regarding Ukraine have shown that Switzerland's distinctive foreign policy stance and our broad set of instruments to promote peace can be useful to build bridges and work out compromise solutions. But this crisis has also made clear that it will require a collective effort by everyone involved to restore stability, both to Ukraine and to Europe at large. The OSCE has an important role to play on both accounts.

When I last spoke to you at the opening of the Summer Meeting in Baku, we were half way into the Swiss Chairmanship. I gave you an interim report on OSCE activities in Ukraine and on progress regarding the other Swiss priorities.

Now that the final quarter of our Chairmanship has begun, I will talk about three priorities in the run-up to the Basel Ministerial Council and beyond. These priorities are: continued efforts at de-escalation in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the OSCE, and launching a reflection process on how to overcome the broader crisis of European security.

The first and most imminent priority of the OSCE remains Ukraine.

In the past month, there has been a shift from a military to a political logic in this crisis. It is a fragile shift; we are still far from a political solution. But in view of the more than 3,500 victims and the humanitarian misery caused by the military confrontation in eastern parts of Ukraine, this has been an important development. While August was still dominated by the risk of further military escalation, there is now apolitical momentum that requires our full support.

The Minsk Protocol and the related Minsk Memorandum that was worked out at the highest levels in Kyiv and Moscow provide a basis for moving towards a political process to resolve the crisis. Some progress has

already been made. But the parties must continue to take steps to make the ceasefire more sustainable and implement all commitments agreed in Minsk. All shooting and shelling must now stop. Differences must be resolved through dialogue rather than force.

The Special Monitoring Mission of the OSCE has played a crucial role in the international efforts to assist Ukraine in de-escalating the crisis. Our monitors have done a tremendous job in a volatile environment.

As a result of the Minsk agreements, the SMM has been given new responsibilities, in particular monitoring the ceasefire and effective controlling of the Russian-Ukrainian border. The SMM has also monitored several rounds of simultaneous releases of prisoners in recent weeks—it has been present at the release of more than 430 prisoners so far.

As the Mission adapts to the new monitoring needs, it is expanding to its full capacity of 500 monitors. It is our responsibility of us, the participating States, to enable the SMM to live up to its many demanding tasks and continue to operate in safe conditions. This is why I have written to the OSCE foreign ministers this week and asked their governments to contribute more experts, more specialised equipment, such as armoured vehicles, and additional funding. The Mission's budget has grown by an extra 30 million Euro as a result of the Minsk provisions. I count on your support for the SMM in national debates at home.

Dialogue will remain key to stabilising the situation in Ukraine. We can only resolve this crisis with Russia –we cannot resolve it against Russia. The Swiss Chairmanship will continue to engage in diplomacy. We also stand ready to organise any meeting of the leaders of Ukraine and Russia in Switzerland.

It must be our objective to take the political process further in ways that allow resolving the conflict rather than freezing it. Through my Special Representative Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, the Swiss Chairmanship will continue to work together with representatives of Ukraine and Russia in the Trilateral Contact Group. The meetings and video conferences of this group with the representatives of certain districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions are an essential part of the peace efforts.

The OSCE is also ready to assist the inclusive dialogue within Ukraine that the Minsk Protocol envisages. A nation-wide dialogue will be important to win back hearts and minds and foster a common sense of purpose. The recent clashes over a Lenin monument have indicated how

disputed Ukraine's identity remains. Such incidences suggest that local discussion formats could be useful too.

This Parliamentary Assembly can make vital contributions to de-escalation in Ukraine. One way is through parliamentary diplomacy: The talks between Russian and Ukrainian members of parliament can contribute to building confidence between the two countries. Another way is through observing the early parliamentary elections on 26 October. I trust that the Parliamentary Assembly and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will cooperate as effectively in observing these elections as they did in the case of the presidential elections in May.

The second priority we will focus on is to feed the lessons learnt from the Ukraine crisis into the 'Helsinki+40' process. Enhancing the OSCE's capacity to act must be an essential part of reconsolidating European security.

The OSCE's engagement in the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated the relevance of the organisation as a forum for dialogue, as an operational responder, and as a normative intermediary to remind States of their commitments. But this engagement has also shown the importance of further improving the OSCE's toolkit to deal with crises.

Capacities for early warning and rapid reaction need to be strengthened. The OSCE should also further increase its capacities in mediation and reconciliation. Switzerland possesses many years of experience in mediation and will continue to support the OSCE in this field well beyond our Chairmanship.

The monitoring of implementation of commitments should be improved too, especially in the human dimension. Moreover, the OSCE needs institutional reforms to remain fit for purpose. The budget process should be simplified, and we really should have a bi-annual budget. After ten years of zero nominal growth, we should finally allocate financial and human resources to the OSCE that are commensurate with its tasks.

For all this to materialise, strategic guidance on where the OSCE should be heading is required from political leaders. This is what 'Helsinki+40' in the context of the Ukraine crisis must be about.

Again, the Parliamentary Assembly can and should play a role in this. I have taken good note of the recent launch of your seminar series on

'Helsinki+40' in Moscow. As we are working on the same issues, let us exchange our ideas and work together for a stronger OSCE.

And let us be bold and allow for some out-of-the-box thinking when discussing the future of the OSCE. I will mention just one idea that has remained in my mind in recent weeks:

The Ukraine crisis has shown how economic border lines and frictions within the OSCE area can contribute to insecurity in Europe. Organisations other than the OSCE are obviously better suited to resolve trade disputes. But the OSCE has the potential of assisting efforts at strengthening regional connectivity in trade and infrastructure matters. And it has developed confidence-building and monitoring tools that could also be applied to mitigate economic challenges.

We do not have to start from scratch here. OSCE work in the field of border security and border management has included efforts to facilitate cross-border trade. There has also been some fruitful OSCE cooperation with the UN Economic Commission for Europe on these issues.

The OSCE could, for example, support the implementation of some trade agreements by using the expertise of the OSCE Border Management Staff College to improve cooperation between customs authorities.

The OSCE could also encourage states to clarify their commitments under the various bilateral, regional and global trade regimes existing in the OSCE area. Greater clarity and transparency of rules and procedures will enhance the potential to build confidence and trust.

Most importantly, the OSCE as an impartial actor could monitor compliance with certain trade agreements. Whatever trade deal the EU, Russia, and Ukraine work out, some monitoring or verification support measures will likely be required.

I am well aware that such ideas will not materialise overnight, but they are worth examining. Expanding confidence-building and monitoring capacities in the OSCE's second dimension could make a vital contribution to strengthening pan-European security.

Ladies and gentlemen,

There is a third priority that will mark the final quarter of the Swiss Chairmanship, and that is to launch a reflection process on how to overcome the broader crisis of European security.

The Ukraine crisis is not just a tragedy for the Ukrainian people. It is also a blow to pan-European security.

The violations of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia have repercussions that go far beyond Ukraine. They call into question the foundations of European security as defined in the Paris Charter on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act. Disregard for the post-Cold War rule book and the growing political divide between Russia and the West have brought about great uncertainty as to the security and stability of Europe.

Erosion of the consensus on European security set in more than a decade ago. Now that developments in Ukraine have aggravated the crisis of European security, we should address it without further delay.

How can States recommit to the normative foundations of European security as reflected in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter? What measures could be adopted to rebuild confidence and reduce perceptions of threat? How can former cornerstones of pan-European security, such as conventional arms control, be rebuilt? What will it take to reduce the risk of further tension, render security in Europe indivisible, and advance the Astana goal of the OSCE as a security community?

Finding common answers to these questions will take time. We should approach these issues with an open mind as to the result of such deliberations.

Three things are clear from my perspective:

First, the Helsinki principles and the OSCE commitments are not up for renegotiation – the issue here is how to ensure more effective adherence and implementation.

Second, we should not aim at a major overhaul of Europe's security architecture. Rather, debates should focus on possibilities to reconfirm, refine, reinvigorate, and perhaps complement existing elements of cooperative security in Europe.

Third, as an inclusive platform for dialogue, the OSCE has an important role to play in these discussions on the broader issues of European security too.

Last week, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the Swiss Chairmanship organised an informal ministerial-level meeting of OSCE participating States. We had a first discussion on how to reconsolidate European security as a common project. It was a constructive debate, and more than 20 foreign ministers took the floor. We will resume our discussion in Basel in December when we meet again for the OSCE Ministerial Council.

During the meeting in New York, I proposed to set up a Chairmanship-commissioned panel of eminent persons with representatives of all regions of the OSCE. Over a period of six months, the panel could produce a report that would take stock of the current situation and propose a set of recommendations concerning the next steps to be taken in strengthening European security.

There was broad positive feedback to this proposal. We are now operationalising this idea so that the panel can be launched in Basel. It is important that this panel be provided with opportunities for interacting with the political level –with ministers, as well as with you, the General Assembly. Once the panel has issued recommendations, debates at ministerial level could be organised to take stock and decide on next steps and follow-up phases of the reflection process.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In the early 1970s, Europe was divided. To reduce this division and search for common ground, governments decided to hold a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. The several hundred diplomats and experts who gathered in this hall in 1973 were told that the conference was likely to last just a few weeks. In the end, the negotiations took almost two years.

Diplomats moved from hotels to houses. Some of them settled in Geneva for good. Two participants from opposite sides of the Iron Curtain even married during the negotiations. A Soviet participant reported from here: “We are progressing at the rhythm of mankind”.

But then something remarkable happened. After more than 2400 meetings, consensus was established on the Final Act. The notion of cooperative security has since transformed Europe for good.

Today, our continent is far less divided than in the 1970s, but the common foundations of our security are eroding. War and insecurity have returned to Europe. We should do everything possible to reverse this negative development.

There is no need to reinvent the CSCE today. We are fortunate to have the OSCE.

But what we should be inspired by is the vision and determination of the founding fathers of the CSCE to work out an inclusive system of security through dialogue and compromise.

It is this kind of vision and determination that is needed in our efforts to reconsolidate European security as a common project.

With this in mind, I wish you fruitful debates here in Geneva. Perhaps not to the point of marriage, but in the same constructive spirit that led to such remarkable results at this venue almost four decades ago.

SESSION 1:

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSION - SPECIAL DEBATE ON THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Ilkka Kanerva, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Let me first welcome this opportunity to discuss the crisis in and around Ukraine. From the outset, I would like to give a short summary of the positions and action of the OSCE PA in regard to the crisis.

Last February at our Winter Meeting, the PA held a vigorous debate on the situation in Ukraine and on ways to de-escalate the situation on the ground.

Our diplomatic efforts continued through the spring, with high-level visits to Moscow, Kyiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Lviv and other Ukrainian cities to promote de-escalation and to prepare the observation mission to the May 25th presidential election.

The observation mission was a major accomplishment, with more than 100 parliamentarians deploying across Ukraine.

Last July in Baku, the Annual Session of our Assembly expressed grave concern about the situation in Ukraine. It emphasized the role of the OSCE in engaging all parties in a constructive dialogue, monitoring and supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments on the ground.

The Assembly also underlined the respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act. It called on the Russian Federation to reverse the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine.

In Baku our Assembly “called for the creation of an inter-parliamentary liaison group on Ukraine in order to de-escalate the situation on the ground and support the country out of the crisis”.

Since the Baku Session I have held talks, as President of the PA, with many fellow parliamentarians in the region, including Russian Federation and Ukraine.

I consider it important that regardless of the crisis we communicate with each other and keep networks of contacts active in order to plan ahead. Drawing back and delivering disapproving statements is not an option.

But in spite of all efforts the crisis is still going on. However, some important steps have been taken to stabilize the situation in Ukraine.

The work of the Trilateral Contact Group and the signing of the Minsk Protocol were very positive steps forward. The Protocol and the related Minsk Memorandum provide basis for moving towards a political process which aims at resolving the crisis.

It is my understanding that our main role is to promote dialogue and facilitate finding sustainable diplomatic solutions to the conflict in and around Ukraine. We should be able to bring the parliamentary dimension to the demanding process.

It is important that we as Parliamentarians can lend our support to the work of the Trilateral Contact Group and to the full implementation of the Protocol and the Memorandum. This is needed urgently in the light of new outbreak of violence.

As a next step we need to reinforce the Special Monitoring Mission to its full strength, to 500 monitors. We need to mobilize more resources, both human and financial, so that the Mission can provide maximum support to the implementation of the Minsk agreements. As Parliamentarians, we can call for more resources and political will from our Governments to this effect.

Ukraine will hold parliamentary elections on 26 October. The OSCE parliamentary observers will deploy to polling stations across Ukraine, working closely with long-term observers from ODIHR and in co-ordination with colleagues from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament.

Noting the expertise of the OSCE PA in election related activities, it is important that we do our utmost to make these elections succeed.

Upon my recommendation, Minister Burkhalter has designated OSCE PA Vice-President Kent Harstedt as Special Co-ordinator to lead the short-term OSCE observer mission. Vice-President Doris Barnett will serve as Head of the OSCE PA Delegation. I am sure that both of these leaders will ensure a successful observation mission, and I sincerely hope that under these extraordinary circumstances, Ukraine's institutions and voters will

rise to the occasion, as they did during the presidential election earlier this year.

For the needed reforms and stabilization of the state, it is vital that Ukraine lives up to all of its OSCE commitments, including on elections.

On that note, I will hand the floor over to our two keynote speakers today, Simon Lunn of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Astrid Thors, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Thank you both for being here today to share your expertise with us all.

Mr. Simon Lunn, International Advisory Board of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), former Secretary General of the NATO PA

My association with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly goes back to my participation in the founding meeting of the PA in Madrid in 1991, so I can claim to have been present “at the creation”.

I am also pleased to be representing the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). This provides an opportunity to acknowledge the contribution made by Switzerland, through the creation of DCAF, and also through the other organisations here in Geneva; each making a specific contribution to understanding and tackling the challenges confronting our mutual security. This contribution is not always given the recognition it deserves.

I also congratulate Switzerland as Chairs of the OSCE on the choice of a theme which focuses attention on “new security challenges” at a critical moment in the development of conditions in the OSCE region, to focus this session on the most urgent issue of the day - the situation in Ukraine - and for choosing the appropriate forum for such a discussion, the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly.

My initial presentation looked at the potential of disarmament and arms control with reference to Ukraine; this presentation will do the reverse and look at Ukraine from the perspective of arms control. Let me start with the all-important question of Context.

The Current Security Environment

There is little need to dwell on the uncertain and volatile global environment which provides the context for these discussions. New risks and challenges have replaced or supplemented the traditional security threats of the Cold War; the threat posed by the Islamic group ISIS being the latest to command attention.

The OSCE region itself is still marked by unresolved crises and conflicts. The situation in Ukraine is the most recent and serious not only because of the large scale fighting and loss of life, but also because of its far reaching consequences for security in the OSCE region.

The principles that have underpinned security in Europe since the end of the Cold War have been ignored or broken; cooperation and dialogue has broken down; and suspicion and mistrust reinforced.

Arguably, force has been answered by a mixture of diplomacy and political pressure to no avail. Sanctions have been applied by the European Union and North America to persuade Russia to change its approach but with no discernible effect. Efforts on the political front in the form of proposals to stop the fighting and accommodate some of the demands of the Separatists have given cause for optimism but these efforts remain fragile and conditional; and in the meantime the fighting goes on

So it is the military dimension which provides the sense of urgency due to the potential for further escalation of the current conflict. Already we have seen a steady militarisation of the situation through the use of Russian forces in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, the opposition of the Separatists, the initial supplies of small arms and anti-aircraft missiles expanding to heavier weapons, and the counter reaction of Ukrainian forces in the Anti –Terrorist format. Despite the cease fires fighting continues, lives are lost and positions become more entrenched and irreconcilable.

Meanwhile the international Context has been sharpened by the robust reaction of NATO members at the recent Summit in Wales. In addition to condemning Russian actions and agreeing to provide assistance to Ukraine NATO also agreed a package of measures designed to reassure members of the credibility of the collective defence commitment. These will take time but they will heighten the tension inherent in the current climate.

From the point of view of NATO members, in view of Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, such measures are a justified reaction, not only as reassurance to anxious members but also as an absolute rejection of the aggressive activities that have taken place.

But we risk seeing a pattern of action and reaction – not just in Ukraine but in the wider theatre - at a time when cooperation is reduced and communication limited; with the attendant risks of mixed signals and

miscalculation. At such moments, and without being over dramatic, it is worth reminding ourselves of the existence and the danger posed by nuclear weapons.

We all have an interest in finding ways to dampen down the situation and avoid further escalation while a comprehensive political solution that is found.

Looking for solutions means looking at how we got here. There is no time in this presentation to explain or attempt to reconcile the very different views of the same situation and chain of events – unacceptable behaviour has been matched by unwitting behaviour.

But in looking at what is to be done we should recognise two basic elements.

First, now nearly forty years after the Helsinki Final Act, Fundamental Principles on which European security is based have been broken, notably: territorial integrity; the non-use of force to change of borders; but also the right of a country to choose its future. For Ukraine this must mean the right to choose the economic system with which it wishes to associate and which will provide for the future well-being of the country and the aspirations of all its generations.

Second, in saying Ukraine has “a right to choose” means recognising that Ukraine is a complex country where different regions, generations, cities and communities reflect different demands concerning the future of the country – demands which any political settlement must acknowledge, and which the most recent agreements would appear to go some considerable way to satisfying.

Bringing these two elements together implies that there is also the obligation of all states and leadership to act responsibly. That applies to those directly involved but equally to those indirectly involved who may have very different perspectives and interests.

What to do?

Engage and communicate

Keep open all channels of communication, from the regular work of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and other OSCE cooperation platforms, to those of other regional organisations, including of course, the NATO-Russia Council.

The NRC has been a useful forum for cooperation in areas of shared interest such as terrorism, nuclear security, and arms control; and also for diplomatic exchanges on key security issues.

But it is The OSCE as the all-inclusive organisation with Russia as a full member which has to be the primary forum for engagement.

Short Term

The OSCE's various mechanisms must be used to create the conditions on the ground needed to quieten and resolve the situation through: the cessation of hostilities, separation of forces, and ensuring compliance. The continued deployment of OSCE observers and special monitoring missions - and their free movement - is obviously critical to this process.

Longer Term

We should be looking to consolidate stability and strengthen the existing Framework which regulates military forces in the OSCE region: firstly by looking at the Vienna Document and its utility during the crisis. What were the shortcomings? Where does it need strengthening? Can the movements of armed forces be further restricted and made more transparent to reduce the possibility for "unwanted surprises" – not conducive to stability. Do we need new Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs)? Or is it simply a question of implementing the existing ones properly?

Secondly, and looking even farther ahead, we should be looking at the possibility of reviving the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regime or redeveloping a new regulatory regime for conventional forces. In the current climate of conflict mistrust and suspicion these measures and the discussions they would involve appear very unlikely. But it is important to remember the experiences of the Cold War.

Arms Control negotiations can help as a practical way of bolstering stability and as a means of engagement even in times of great tension. We learned from the Cold War that negotiations continued even in bad times and achieved both practical stabilising results and engagement.

Assistance to Ukraine is crucial in order for it to develop its economy and its institutions and to provide the breathing space it so badly needs. This will require an enormous effort officially but also by organisations such as DCAF, which has already an established programme of assistance.

The situation in Ukraine will mean we have to continue to address basic questions and choices in the search for the shape and form of European security: I noted an article in the Financial Times by Mr Sergei Karaganov a well-known and authoritative Russian analyst, who concluded with the statement: “a lasting peace can be achieved only through mutual respect and an accommodation of legitimate interests.”

We would all agree; as long as mutual respect applies to neighbours and that we can agree on a definition of “legitimate”; that is where the discussion will begin.

In this search for longer term security structures, we have to assume we are using the same language and playing by the same rules; if that is not the case then ideas of cooperative security structures will only remain ideas.

Ms. Astrid Thors, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

Dear President, Mr. Kanerva,
Dear Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I am very pleased to be able to address you at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Autumn meeting here in Geneva. I value the exchanges of views with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly – and parliamentarians generally – highly. This is also why, during my country visits, I frequently meet with members of the national parliament, usually the foreign affairs committee or members of the OSCE PA delegation. I would also like to express my gratitude to the support you gave my Institution in the resolutions made in Baku in July this year.

The crisis in Ukraine has been a very high priority this year for my Institution, as it has been for the OSCE as a whole. Since October 2013, when I addressed you for the first time, I have made seven visits to Ukraine. This includes trips to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in March this year and to the regions of Donetsk, Lugansk and Odessa, in addition to the capital Kyiv. My office also conducted a Human Rights Assessment Mission jointly with ODIHR and published a report with recommendations in May. My last visit to Kyiv was in mid-September and I plan more visits before the end of the year.

Dear friends,

As the Chairman-in-Office and Swiss Foreign Minister, Mr. Burkhalter, said in his statement earlier, the Ukraine crisis threatens the foundations of Europe's public order, as confirmed by the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE commitments. These events also impact on the international system of minority rights protection. We should do our utmost to stop these negative developments.

What should our collective response be? The answer is clear: we need to uphold the commonly agreed rules and principles.

In 2008, my Institution launched The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on Minorities in Inter-State Relations, which build upon the experiences of the successive High Commissioners since the establishment of the office in 1992. The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations are relevant to the current crisis in Ukraine, but they are also relevant in other OSCE participating States. The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations build on three central principles of fundamental importance:

First, the respect for and protection of minority rights is primarily the responsibility of the State where the minority resides;

Second, human rights, including minority rights, are a matter of legitimate concern to the international community; and

Third, there is a broad range of international and bilateral instruments that participating States can use to address such concerns, which they should do in good faith and with full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and good neighbourly relations.

If the OSCE is to function properly as a security community, these principles need to be fully respected. Peace and stability in the OSCE area and the credibility of this organisation are both at stake here.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The crisis in Ukraine is complex and has several causes that go beyond the issues that my institution would normally address.

As you well know, my mandate is conflict prevention, early warning and early action at the earliest possible stage in relation to ethnic tensions and conflict. Much of the work happens behind the scenes and focuses on long-term structural causes of tensions. This has also been the case in Ukraine, where my Institution has been engaged for more than 20 years.

It is undisputable that long-standing disagreements about the respective roles of the Ukrainian and Russian languages and different interpretations of history in Ukraine have aggravated this crisis. The deliberate politicization of identity issues has reinforced these divisions during the past 20 years and the regional divide in Ukraine has widened as a result. Recent events in Ukraine have clearly shown that the risk of further polarization of Ukrainian society is high.

A Law on the "Special Order of Local Self-government in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts, "adopted two weeks ago, represents an

attempt to provide a temporary solution to the issue of decentralization, but many questions as to its implementation remain open.

It is important – however difficult it may be – that the eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea are represented sufficiently in Parliament following the elections scheduled for 26 October 2014. I have urged the authorities to ensure that the elections are as inclusive and representative as possible.

Language issues have been used in Ukraine time and again to gain political advantage without considering the risk to national unity. In July 2012, my predecessor Knut Vollebaek warned that language legislation, drafted without genuine dialogue, could undermine Ukraine's very cohesion. Unfortunately, the 2012 Law on the "Principles of State Language Policy" was rushed through without considering any of the amendments suggested by the opposition.

On 23 February this year, a narrow majority in the Verkhovna Rada abruptly decided to cancel this Language Law. I immediately expressed my concern that this hasty action could prompt further unrest and called for restraint, responsibility and dialogue. The acting President at the time quickly vetoed the decision but unfortunately the damage had already been done. Suspicion and growing distrust were the result of this action, and forces inside and outside the country exploited the situation, which contributed to the escalation of tensions.

Tragically, thousands of lives have been lost and the ongoing conflict has resulted in massive displacement and human suffering. Displacement can also cause further tensions. A shaky ceasefire is currently in place, although again in the last days there have been reports of many new civilian victims.

I would like to convey my deepest condolences following the death of the Swiss Red Cross employee killed yesterday in Donetsk.

We also know that our colleagues in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission – with which we enjoy excellent co-operation – are operating under demanding conditions.

After the violence broke out in Ukraine, my Institution changed its focus to prepare for a time when dialogues and long term actions are once again possible and meaningful. I have taken note of the commendable efforts of the Ukrainian Government to develop a new institutional framework for inter-ethnic and national minority issues and to update the

related legislation. I have offered the assistance and expertise of my office in these important reform processes.

Since my intervention in February this year, I have consistently called for a balanced approach to language policies. The policy should promote knowledge of the State language while providing safeguards for minority languages, including the Russian language. It should also strengthen the position of less widely used languages, in line with the principles of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The need for a balanced approach applies to all other aspects of identity, such as symbols and the commemoration of historical events and persons.

The main focus of my Institution in Ukraine immediately prior to this conflict was on the situation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea. In August 2013, just before I took up the office, my predecessor published a needs assessment on The Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine. In its introduction, it states – rather ominously – that “its [Crimea’s] history of competing claims for dominance and other contextual factors put it at enhanced risk of inter-ethnic tensions.” A number of recommendations were made to the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada.

Following the events this spring, the situation in Crimea has become increasingly precarious. I last visited the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in March. Since then, I have not been able to return, but I follow the situation very closely. Based on the information I receive from different sources, I remain deeply concerned about the vulnerable position of both the Crimean Tatar and the Ukrainian-speaking communities on the Crimean peninsula.

Several of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar community have been banned from accessing their homeland. I have been receiving persistent and credible reports about detentions and disappearances, about pressures to renounce Ukrainian citizenship, about intrusive searches in the homes, businesses, and public organisations of Crimean Tatars, including in the premises of the Mejlis. I have received reports about violations of the rights to freedom of religion of Crimean Tatars and decreasing opportunities for teaching in Ukrainian in Crimea. All these actions have the potential to further escalate tensions in Crimea.

Referring to the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations, I recall that any authority exercising effective control over a territory is obliged to protect

the safety, security and human rights of all those residing on that territory, including persons belonging to national minorities.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In volatile times, we are reminded of the importance of conflict prevention. At the times of conflict, we feel deep sadness and frustration that our efforts have not been sufficient to prevent the conflict. Conflict - prevention mechanisms, like my Institution, have an important role to play in identifying potential triggers of conflict and in recommending ways to defuse and avoid tensions, but they cannot prevent conflicts alone.

My Institution cannot deliver its core mandate of “early warning” and “early action” without the support and co-operation of the participating States. We can only be effective when participating States engage in a continuous, open and direct dialogue with us. I believe the parliamentarians have an important role to play also in this regard by keeping the governments accountable.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for the co-operation I have enjoyed with the Swiss Chairmanship, the OSCE PA, and the two other independent OSCE Institutions, ODIHR and RFoM, as well as the OSCE SMM in Ukraine.

SESSION 2:

THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION

THE SHIFTING FACE OF VIOLENCE: NEW CHALLENGES

Prof. Keith Krause, Graduate Institute of International Relations and Development Studies, Geneva

I want to talk today briefly about the changing nature of contemporary armed violence, and draw out some implication for policy-makers and analysts. My scope is global, and I will not concentrate on the OSCE region, since there are many global challenges – such as the current violent confrontations in Syria and Iraq – that have the potential to affect all of us in one way or another. But I want to put such events in a slightly larger perspective, so that we can see what has changed – and perhaps what has not changed – in the nature of armed violence today.

Overall, I have five points to advance, which I will present briefly and a bit provocatively. The first two concern the changing nature of warfare, and the overall burden of armed violence:

- The sharp divide between organised and “dis-organised” violence is increasingly blurred, challenging our conventional categories of different types of violent conflict;
- Certain forms of organised violence might be declining – but only in particular places and under certain circumstances – and other forms of violence might actually be increasing, posing real challenges to safety, security and well-being.

The last three focus on the actors, the instruments, and the institutions:

- Non-state armed groups have long played a significant role in violent exchanges, not only challenging the state, but often working with or being part of the state, and we have a weak understanding of how to deal with them.
- The instruments of violence – small arms and light weapons, including advanced and sophisticated weaponry – are more widely available than at any time in the past, with more lethality in the hands of more people than ever before.

- More attention needs to be focused on building effective and accountable institutions to provide security and safety – within and between states – since one of the main triggers for current armed conflicts is institutional failure: the failure to provide security, justice and representation to all the people within states and societies.

Taken together, these points raise a difficult question: do the many different forms of violence that predominate today signal the advent of a more insecure and unsafe world, or is lethal violence slowly but surely diminishing over the long-run?

The first part of my argument – regarding the shifting nature of contemporary violence – is simple. War, as we have thought of it in the 19th and 20th centuries, no longer exists, at least war “as a battle in a field between men and machinery... as a massive deciding event in international affairs” between states, such war no longer exists.” (General Rupert Smith). Many other analysts have made similar observations about the experience of modern battle, or about asymmetric warfare, or the ascendancy of so-called “operations other than war,” “low intensity conflicts,” insurgency and counter-insurgency” in military strategy. The kinds of military engagements that we see state armies involved in are radically different, and likely to remain so, so we must rethink what armies do, how they provide security, or create insecurity.

From a numerical point of view we also have evidence of this shift, and an optimistic perspective can be taken. The Uppsala Conflict Data project reassures us that the number of wars has more or less steadily declined. It records around 30 active armed conflicts in 2013, well down from the peak of more than 50 in the early 1990s, and only seven relatively large-scale wars (with more than 1000 battle-related deaths). Not surprisingly, these wars are in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This situation is somewhat worse than in most recent years.

But in a longer-term perspective there has been a more or less steady decline since the end of the Cold War, and a near-total disappearance of wars between states. The vast majority of the 30 or so armed conflicts are small-scale, with a few hundred or a few dozen deaths, internal or civil in nature, and involving one or more non-state armed

groups. The number of victims of war – usually described in terms of battle deaths – has also declined, with low estimates putting it in the order of 50,000 per year. Gone are the massive conflicts such as the wars in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, the independence wars in Africa in places such as Angola and Mozambique, or the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s (all of which took hundreds of thousands of lives), the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, and the relatively large post-Cold war conflicts in South-eastern Europe.

So there is some good news. It is true that the number of intensely violent conflicts has declined. It is also true that war between states has almost disappeared from the picture. And it is true that many contemporary wars are – at least relative to the 20th century – relatively small scale in terms of the number of direct victims in battle. But I want to look a little more closely and ask: “what is missing from this picture?”

Generally speaking, focusing on war as a violent confrontation between two (or more) armed groups over clear political aims excludes a great deal of enormously destructive violence that has powerful implications for domestic, regional and even international security and stability. Inter-tribal and clan conflicts in Yemen, for example do not count as war even though the Yemeni government has acknowledged that perhaps as many as 4000 people per year are killed in what are called “land disputes.” These are not inter-personal or individual acts of violence and they weaken the Yemeni state, demonstrate its inability to provide security and justice, and make the entire Arabian Peninsula a zone of insecurity in which other forms of violent extremism can take root. Another example would be post-election violence in Kenya that claimed more than 1000 lives in 2008, which does not count as an armed conflict, even though it was clearly linked to loosely organised groups, including some that were state-sponsored, and was not a spontaneous outburst or random individual acts of violence.

War may have disappeared, but armed violence has been transformed in many ways, and its overall burden is still large. Drawing upon the forthcoming volume of the Global Burden of Armed Violence, we know that at least 508,000 people died violently on average every year between 2009 and 2013. Only ten percent of these direct victims of violence died in armed conflicts: the overwhelming majority – 90 percent – died in so-called non-conflict settings. It is true that some of the most

violent countries on the planet (measured by deaths per 100,000 civilians) are in war zones such as Syria, Afghanistan, or South Sudan. But there are more violent places, many of which are in Latin America and Caribbean. Honduras, Venezuela, and El Salvador are all more dangerous places to be than Afghanistan. Colombia, Jamaica, and Guatemala are all more dangerous than South Sudan. There are more than 30 countries with rates of violent death greater than 10 per 100,000, and 12 with rates greater than 30 per 100,000 – which is more or less equivalent to a war zone.

Analysts and policy-makers tend to make sharp distinctions between criminal or economically motivated violence, and political or ideological violence (either intra- or inter-communal). Yet today the lines between these different forms of violence are blurry. Many armed groups in parts of Africa pursue political as well as criminal aims, being involved in large-scale trafficking or resource exploitation. Criminal groups, such as in Mexico, conduct military-style operations, recruit their members from former armed forces personnel, and engage in battles with each other and the army on national territory. More than 40,000 people have died in Mexico's drug wars since 2009, making this one of the largest "non-wars" today. And the "in-between" categories of such phenomena as urban armed violence, which can be political and/or criminal, or para-military violence, which is legally criminal but often sanctioned by the authorities, or state violence, or domestic terrorism, show that a neat divide between political/ideological and economic/criminal violence is unsustainable.

The three key points here are that:

- most contemporary violence is not in conflict zones;
- most of the states worst affected by armed violence are not at war;
- the levels of armed violence in non-conflict settings are higher than in most war zones.

These facts pose serious challenges to regional, national and international security, and many of our policy responses are not adequate, whether they involve mediation and conflict resolution, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, or more robust and forceful intervention in zones of insecurity that are impossible to control. What can modern armies do against urban terrorists and gangs? Or to combat diffuse networks conducting hit and run attacks against civilians such as Boko Haram in Nigeria?

Let me turn briefly to my last three points: start with the nature of the actors involved. Most large-scale violence involves one or more non-state actors, and there are three important things to note about such groups. First, many of them are driven by economic and criminal, as opposed to political or ideological, motives. Examples abound, from the warlords of West Africa, to the vigilantes and political gangs of Nigeria, to the armed Janjaweed in Sudan, or the FARC in Colombia. In its most simple form, many contemporary armed groups are driven by “greed” instead of “grievances,” attempting to capture or exploit natural resources, or engage in illicit trafficking of drugs, people or other illegal goods. This phenomenon is widespread, even where very few people are injured or killed, and it has a serious negative impact on social, economic and human well-being. Extortion and crime is a tax on economic activities, it is unproductive and it has a negative impact on foreign and local investment and trade.

Non-state armed groups are also often not coherent, rational, unitary actors. There are often significant divisions among the leadership over goals and tactics that undermine its cohesion and can lead to splintering and division. There can be divisions between the leadership and the followers (including both combatants, and the broader support base) that can also lead to strategic incoherence. And there can be divisions among the groups of combatants that can produce tactical incoherence or dissent, with local commanders or fighters pursuing their own local goals and not part of a larger logic.

Finally, these groups are also seldom genuinely “non-state” actors. They do not always operate in opposition to the state, and are often supported by external states in a practice of “mutual intervention” in each other’s affairs. In addition, in many cases, armed groups have their origins in state-sponsored militias, and self-defence groups, and are otherwise tolerated or indirectly supported by the state. Obvious cases include paramilitary groups, that do the dirty work of state institutions or political elites, through social cleansing, targeted assassinations, and campaigns of terror, or politicized street gangs that perform similar functions for different political factions.

This kind of activity has real-world implications for strategies of engagement with armed groups, including in particular the scope for negotiation, the potential for restraint in the use of violence, and post-conflict strategies for dealing with ex-combatants. How does one

negotiation with Islamic State in Syria in Iraq, or Boko Haram? How does one defeat them? What does one do with the ex-combatants after the fighting ends, mostly made of men who often have no other skills than violence? How does one tackle large-scale and violent criminal gangs that have close ties to political elites and are embedded in the state, corrupting and weakening it?

The instruments of violence – small arms and light weapons – are also more widely available than at any time in the past. As research by the Small Arms Survey has pointed out, there are approximately 990 million small arms and light weapons in the world today. Of these, about 200 million (or less than one-quarter) are in the hands of national armed forces, about 765 million (almost two-thirds) are in civilian possession, about 26 million (less than three percent) are in the hands of police forces, and less than 1 percent are in the hands of insurgent groups. At least in terms of “ordinary lethal force” the state’s monopoly of violence is purely a legal, and not a practical, one in most parts of the world, and more lethal firepower is more readily available to more people than at any time. One useful index of this is the average price of an AK-47 (or its many variants) on markets around the world: in places with porous borders such as Africa and the former Eastern bloc, prices are relatively low (an average of 156 USD in Africa and 303 USD in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), compared to an average of 520 USD in the Americas and 927 USD in Western Europe.

This does not only concern unsophisticated small arms and individual weapons – but such things as advanced man-portable air defence systems that pose a threat to civilian as well as military aviation. There are many reports of advanced shoulder fired air defence systems now in the hands of rebel groups across North Africa and the Middle East, after the widespread looting of arsenals in Libya and Syria. Given the rapid collapse of the Iraqi army in the face of the Islamic State onslaught – and the massive quantities of weapons that fell into their hands – we can question the wisdom of supplying such weapons to volatile regions.

The spread of large quantities of military-style automatic weapons to the four corners of the world has overturned the delicate balance between force and negotiation in many places (especially in traditional communities), and increased the destructiveness of conflicts when they do break out. These facts have some direct practical and policy implications.

- we need to minimise the risk of armed groups gaining access to large quantities of weapons, by restricting the transfer of weapons to non-state armed groups;
- we need to make sure that weapons that are delivered to states and authorised users are securely stored and stocked, and that good physical security and stockpile management policies exist;
- we need to mop up the surplus of weapons that exist when states change their military or strategic policies – these guns should be collected and destroyed, not sent elsewhere where their use (and misuse) is more likely.

Let me conclude with saying a few words about institutions. One of the primary functions of the modern state is to provide security to its citizens, from external threats through national defence and armed forces, and from internal threats through police and the justice system, designed to provide public order and safety, and to ensure peaceful and legal means of resolving conflicts and disputes. In many cases, the failure of the state to fulfil these functions is at the heart of contemporary conflicts and armed violence. Groups take up arms and get organised where there is no force to stop them, and no means of addressing their real or imagined grievances through appropriate channels.

The lessons for policy makers are many and I have only highlighted a few. In simple terms, strategies for ending conflicts and reducing armed violence and insecurity have to focus on building effective, accountable and representative institutions that simultaneously help to make the state's legal monopoly on organised violence a reality, and to ensure that this monopoly is not abused.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: REGULATING PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES

Ambassador Theodor Winkler, Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,

DCAF is an International Foundation established on the initiative of the Swiss Government to promote democratic security sector governance through security sector reform. Our mission is to support effective, efficient security sectors which are accountable to the state and its citizens. It is an honour and a privilege to present to you today a ground-breaking area of our work – the development of public-private partnerships in the area of private security regulation.

Private security companies may seem rather far away from DCAF's core work on security sector reform and governance. So let me start by telling you why DCAF has taken such a central role in this field. We are convinced that understanding the role and impact of the private security sector - both positive and negative - is intimately linked to wider questions of security sector governance. Today, simplistic assumptions about who actually delivers security around the world are constantly challenged. The reality in both the global North and the global South is not that of a Weberian state with a monopoly on the use of force. It is more often than not a hybrid, often fragmented system composed of a diverse array of public and private actors whose roles and responsibilities are blurred. And if you are committed - as we are - to changing the realities on the ground for the better, you need to address all actors that impact on the security of the state as well as its citizens.

In order to address governance gaps involving private security actors, DCAF has gained significant expertise and experience over a number

of years as Switzerland's strategic partner in developing innovative approaches to private security regulation. I believe that much can be learned from the innovative, multi-stakeholder approach that has evolved to support private security regulation. As we have heard over the last two days, security challenges are increasingly complex, constantly evolving and do not respect national borders. To address challenges to international security, enable social and economic development and protect the rule of law, we need innovative solutions developed by all those with a stake in the outcome.

What I would like to do in this presentation is to outline the development of the two complementary initiatives at the international level that form the Swiss Initiative on private security regulation. I will then give a perspective on what has been achieved already and, more importantly, what remains to be done. Finally I will reflect on the experience of public-private partnerships in this field and their wider relevance.

The development of the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct

DCAF supports two complementary 'soft law' initiatives under the overall title of the 'Swiss Initiative' that seek to regulate private security companies: the Montreux Document (focusing on the obligations of states) and the International Code of Conduct (focusing on the industry itself). Both seek to promote international humanitarian law and human rights law in conflict settings or in 'complex environments' where governance is weak. They are thus intended to complement and in no way to take the place of effective national legal and other regulatory measures.

Why did Switzerland take the lead in addressing this issue? It will come as no surprise to you that abuses linked to private security in Iraq - highlighted by the global news media - provided a powerful catalyst to act. The scale and scope of their activities was striking. The figures speak for themselves. During the first Gulf War the ratio of uniformed military to contractors was 55:1. The ratio for the Iraq war was 1:1. Moreover, the size of the industry was reflected in an increasingly diverse set of activities - expanding from logistical support to the protection of military personnel and assets, training and advising of armed forces, the maintenance of weapons systems or the interrogation of detainees.

Concerns within the international community were raised on multiple levels. First, there was a sense of impunity that the industry seemed to exist in a legal void. There was also an unease that a large and continuously growing industry was operating under the radar screen. It was against this background - the growing trend towards commercial security service provision and a clear need for greater accountability - that the process leading to the Montreux Document needs to be understood.

The Montreux Document

Beginning in 2006, DCAF supported the Swiss Government, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to launch an intergovernmental initiative to clarify legal issues surrounding the use of private military and security companies in conflict situations. The process was guided by two principles:

- De-politicise the issue as far as possible - it was made very clear that the process sought neither to legitimise nor condemn the industry;
- Don not try to create new obligations for states - rather, the goal was to clarify the ways international humanitarian and human rights law apply to the operations of private military and security companies (PMSCs). The process also sought to identify concrete good practices that states could implement.

From this starting point, a two and a half year process led to the agreement on 17 September 2008 of the Montreux Document. It consists of 27 core international obligations and 73 good practices designed to assist states in complying with these obligations. Core obligations include ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, protecting human rights, ensuring criminal accountability and underlining state responsibility for violations committed by PMSCs. The good practices are intended to enable states to determine which services should be contracted out, to establish a domestic authorisation system and to ensure effective national oversight, including parliamentary, oversight. The Montreux Document can effectively be considered as a blue print for regulating the private security industry. This is the approach that was for instance adopted by Switzerland when they

drafted their specific legislation on provision of private security services abroad.

The International Code of Conduct

Even as the Montreux Document was being developed, it was clear that a focus on states was not sufficient. The industry itself needed to be closely involved in its own regulation. This was the logic that led to the development of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (the ICOC for short).

The Code is the fruit of a multi-stakeholder initiative launched by Switzerland in 2008 and again supported by DCAF. Over the course of an 18-month process, some of the world's largest private security companies, states (including Switzerland, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and civil society organisations (including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First) worked hand in glove. They elaborated a ground-breaking code of conduct for the private security industry, based on international human rights and humanitarian law standards. The Code was agreed in November 2010.

The objective of the process was articulate the human rights responsibilities of private security companies and to set out international principles and standards for the responsible provision of private security services, particularly when operating in complex environments. The Code translates these commitments into principles that a private company can apply. Prohibitions on torture, trafficking and other breaches of international law are clearly set out. Standards relating to training, vetting of personnel and the use of weapons are established. Companies are then obliged to develop and implement internal management processes and procedures to integrate their commitments within the corporate structure. One final but crucial point: Signatories also agreed to work towards the establishment of an independent oversight mechanism that would ensure compliance with the Code.

So what has been achieved?

First of all, both the Montreux Document and the Code of Conduct have gained widespread international support:

- From a starting point of 17 endorsing states in 2008, today 50 states as well as 3 international organisations (the OSCE, the NATO

and the European Union) have endorsed the document. I would like to underline that 33 OSCE member countries are Montreux document supporters. This is the largest of any regional grouping.

- The ICoC was initially signed by 58 private security companies. Today, over 700 companies from around the world have signed the Code. 139 of these companies have already taken the additional step to join the new ICoC Association.

Both initiatives have also taken important steps to ensure that obligations and good practices are implemented.

The Montreux Document has seen a sustained process to raise awareness and build political support. To date 5 regional conferences have taken place in Chile, Mongolia, Australia, the Philippines and Senegal. This has focused attention and provided new understandings of the real challenges linked to private security on the ground in different parts of the world. This experience has contributed to an important lesson-learning exercise. In the run up to the 5th anniversary of the Montreux Document, DCAF conducted a major research project to assess progress and address gaps in implementation. These issues were debated at last year's Montreux + 5 conference and provided the basis for a renewed focus on the need to provide dedicated support to states in this area.

One important recommendation has been to strengthen the dialogue between states and international organisations in order to ensure the Montreux Document contributes directly to national regulatory efforts. This objective will be realised through the creation of a Montreux Document Forum in December this year. The Montreux Document Forum, to be co- chaired by Switzerland and the ICRC, will provide a centre of gravity for the initiative. It will facilitate outreach, promote good practices and facilitate the sharing of experiences among participants.

In order to provide 'teeth' to the oversight role of the Code of Conduct, an Association was created in Geneva in 2013. This Association has a multi-stakeholder governance structure made up of governments, companies and civil society. With the support of a dedicated secretariat, supported by DCAF, the Association will be responsible for certifying member companies, fulfilling a monitoring role and addressing complaints by third parties.

The Code has already gained significant support from companies. Part of this dynamic is because major clients (including the UK, US and Swiss governments as well as the United Nations) require Code adherence as a pre-condition for contracts. To give just one example, a UN tender for private security in Pakistan resulted in more than 10 hitherto unknown local companies applying to join the Code. These companies would otherwise have been invisible. Thus, a membership conditionality imposed by the client makes soft law increasingly hard and as a result encourages good behaviour.

Where are the challenges?

The Swiss Initiative has made great strides. In the last few years, an industry that was indeed operating below the radar screen is now increasingly visible. As a result, new challenges and accountability gaps have become apparent.

At the national level, the Montreux Document has brought to light a major elephant in the room – the existence of a burgeoning and often unregulated domestic security sector in many different states. Our work in different regions has shown that the growth of domestic private security often takes place in both a regulatory void but also with laissez-faire approach in policy terms:

- Governments, national parliaments and civil society are often unaware of the size, mandates, weapons holdings and ownership structures of private security companies. The background profiles and training of individuals can be equally unclear.
- At the same time, little attention is given to the human security implications of this phenomenon. Is the private sector filling gaps in public security provision or is this actually marginalising the poor and vulnerable and displacing insecurity?
- As a consequence, there is little or no public debate or discussion on the private security sector.

Putting these questions on the agenda of national oversight bodies is essential. You, as members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, clearly have an influential role to play.

In the case of the Code, greater understanding of the contours of the industry has made visible important shifts and changing dynamics:

- While 10 years ago states were the main customers, now non-state clients – notably major extractives companies seeking protection for their operating sites and personnel – occupy the bulk of the market. Engaging with this key group will be essential in order to mainstream good practices throughout the industry.
- The business has also changed. While much of the initial focus has been on land-based activities, the private maritime security industry has expanded greatly in response to the increased threat of piracy. Addressing the particular challenges of private security in territorial waters or on the high seas is therefore essential.
- Finally, the Code initiative has made great strides achieving buy in from the international private security industry. However, to be truly international, it still needs to reach and engage with small and medium size companies operating beyond Europe and the US.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the multi-stakeholder dynamics we have sought to encourage provide a useful framework for advancing on contested and complex security questions where interests are strong and responsibilities are fragmented. We need to take these positive dynamics and apply the lessons of smart partnerships in other areas. To give one very current example, Switzerland is promoting just such an approach - with DCAF's support - in the area of cyber security governance. The Geneva Internet Conference taking place here in Geneva on November 17-19 will look at exactly this challenge of multi-sector governance of the World Wide Web. Given the multiple actors and interests involved, finding a neutral and inclusive space will be essential in order to address critical issues, gaps, and future developments in Internet governance.

Returning to the topic of my presentation, the Swiss Initiative on private security regulation was underpinned by a powerful multi-stakeholder dynamic. Pooling of expertise by states, international organisations, companies and civil society organisations was essential. At least as important has been the process of confidence-building. Working together has led to shared understandings, an increase in trust and willingness to compromise across groups not previously used to working together. This has resulted in major steps forward.

As I have underlined, serious challenges remain at the national level. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has wisely recognised this. The July 2014 Resolution calls on OSCE States to establish concrete means to hold the private security sector accountable. As a trusted partner of the OSCE institutions and member states, let me give you a clear message: DCAF is deeply committed to support this drive for greater accountability and oversight in the OSCE region. Tell us your needs - we are here to support you in any way we can!

Thank you.

THE ROLE OF THE OSCE

Ms. Desiree Schweitzer, Deputy Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to provide you with an overview of the economic and environmental activities of our Office.

The Swiss 2014 OSCE Chairmanship gave a **clear focus for this year's Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF) process: "Responding to environmental challenges with a view to promoting co-operation and security in the OSCE area"**. Throughout 2014 participating States have discussed together with representatives of OSCE Field Operations and Institutions, as well as with experts from international, regional and non-governmental organisations, the business community and academia **how the OSCE can contribute** to the global efforts to reduce disaster risks.

What were the concrete topics that were addressed? At the First Preparatory Meeting in January in Vienna participants discussed the human, social and economic impacts of natural disasters and assessed how preparedness and prevention can reduce losses. The role of environmental good governance and sustainable management of natural resources were also highlighted. The Second Preparatory Meeting in Montreux in May combined an in-depth discussion of disaster risk reduction, including DRR at local level and cross dimensional impacts of disasters, with hands-on experience of its practical application in case of Switzerland. The Concluding Meeting in Prague underlined the OSCE's added value in the context of global processes related to disaster risk reduction – the global Disaster Risk Reduction Agenda (Hyogo Framework for Action 2) as well as the Development Agenda (Sustainable Development Goals) and international climate negotiations. One session was specifically devoted to assessing lessons learnt in the wake of the devastating floods in South-Eastern Europe in May this year. The recommendations of the Forum discussions

will contribute to the elaboration of a document that, if agreed by pS, will be presented at the Ministerial Council in Basel at the end of the year.

Before I move to the next topic, I would like to mention **a few examples of the OCEEA's work to help address risks of disasters**: one of them is a project that we have been implementing for the last five years in the South Caucasus to strengthen national and regional capacities in wildfire management; another example is enhancing flood management capacities in the Dniester River Basin shared by Moldova and Ukraine. We are also taking some first steps in the field of community-based disaster risk reduction through the public environmental information centres-so called Aarhus Centres – that have been established and supported by the OSCE for over a decade. Ecosystem restoration to mitigate floods in two transboundary river basins in Eastern Europe is another new initiative that we are engaged in.

With this I would like to turn to another important area of our work which is **water**.

We have been promoting sustainable water management and transboundary water co-operation at an increasing pace this year and the topic will continue to be one of our priorities in 2015 under the incoming Serbian Chairmanship.

In July 2014, our office co-organised a **Security Days event with the theme "Enhancing security through water diplomacy: The role of the OSCE"**. The keynote was delivered by His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan – as you might know, he was until recently Chairman of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation and is currently the Chairman of the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East Plan. The Security Day discussions reconfirmed the linkages between water and security: that water can be a potential source of tensions and conflicts, but also a tool for confidence-building and co-operation. The discussions highlighted the importance of water diplomacy as a new entry point for foreign policy to foster bilateral and regional co-operation among States. This event provided a good basis for the 23rd Economic and Environmental Forum in 2015, which will be dedicated to **"Water governance in the OSCE area – increasing security and stability through co-operation"**.

Our Office, including through the Environment and Security (ENVSEC) Initiative will also continue to support bilateral and regional co-

operation among countries in the area of water management, like in the Dniester River Basin between Ukraine and Moldova, and on the Kura River between Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Let me at this point add a few words about **climate change** – a topic which was extensively covered in the recent Baku Declaration by the Parliamentary Assembly:

In the OSCE context, the linkages between climate change and security were addressed in the 2007 **Madrid Ministerial Declaration** on Environment and Security. The **OSCE Conference on the security implications of climate change in the OSCE region**, followed in 2009 in Bucharest. From 2010-2013 we organised sub-regional workshops in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, South Eastern Europe and Central Asia to draw climate change and security scenarios and identify priority sectors that would be affected by climate change. And, in 2013, we joined forces with the European Commission Instrument for Stability within the framework of the ENVSEC Initiative, to **assess climate change impacts on security** in Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, identify geographical areas that would be most affected and to develop a transboundary adaptation strategy for the Dniester River Basin. This project is ongoing.

Among the wide range of our activities, I would like to particularly emphasise the **promotion of environmental good governance**. Keeping in mind that the role of an active and well informed civil society that acts as a partner of the government is crucial to reduce environment and security risks, our Office since 2002 has supported the establishment and strengthening of Aarhus Centres in the OSCE area. They are an accessible resource for citizens and governments and work closely with government at all levels. This is how they are able to build a bridge, allowing governments to attract the resources of civil society for effective and participatory environmental governance. Currently, the OSCE supports a network of 56 Aarhus Centres in 14 countries.

Before I turn to our economic activities allow me a few words on our engagement in enhancing **energy security and sustainability** in the OSCE region.

We are currently implementing two Ministerial Council Decisions adopted last year in Kyiv: MC.DEC/5/13 on “Improving the environmental footprint of energy-related activities” and MC.DEC/6/13 on “Protection of

energy networks from natural and man-made disasters”, which is linked to this year’s Forum theme.

On the first Decision related to sustainable energy, our main actions to this date took place in the field. Two examples:

Earlier this year, on March 27, our Office co-organised with the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat a seminar on renewable energy in the Mary State Energy Institute of Turkmenistan with the aim of establishing a national Centre of Excellence on Renewable Energy. New projects involving the Centre of Excellence are now being developed.

On June 17, in Dushanbe, a Regional Conference on Energy Cooperation was co-organised with the OSCE Office in Tajikistan. During this Conference, it was proposed to establish an Energy Diplomacy Centre in Tajikistan under the auspices of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and with the support of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan.

When it comes to the second Decision, our first undertaking this year was the organisation of the Expert Workshop “Sharing Best Practices to Protect Electricity Networks from Natural Disasters” on July 2, in Vienna. It provided participants with insights on good practices, knowledge and experience from different countries and stakeholders across the entire process of protecting electricity networks from natural disasters.

This event was a good starting point to facilitate discussions and develop strategic and productive relationships for co-operation among participants. Our next activity will be to compile and publish the proceedings of the Workshop, together with some additional inputs from selected experts, in a Handbook of best practices to protect electricity networks from natural disasters.

Ladies and Gentlemen, with this I would like to turn to my last topic, our **economic activities**.

The **Dublin Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism** adopted by the Ministerial Council in 2012 provides the OSCE with a comprehensive mandate to promote well governed, transparent and non-corrupt economies and, in turn, growth, stability and security. Our Office has continued this year to provide assistance to participating States in implementing their commitments in these areas, in particular those related

to the UN Convention against Corruption and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations.

In all our anti-corruption work in 2014, our Office has closely co-operated with the OSCE field presences in organising capacity-building seminars and assisting host governments, at their request, to strengthen the participation of civil society in combating corruption and decision-making processes, particularly related to corruption prevention. Activities in this sphere are a practical contribution towards a more comprehensive implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and, in particular Article 13 on “Participation of society”.

I would like to give you a few concrete examples of how we provide this support:

In June 2014 in Tirana, we supported the organisation of a “Regional Expert Seminar on Prevention of Corruption – Main Trends and Examples of Successful Practice in Eastern Europe and Central Asia”. The event was hosted by the Albanian authorities and took place in the framework of the OECD Anti-Corruption Network (ACN) for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It gathered around 50 senior anti-corruption officials and leading civil society representatives from countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia as well as experts from international organisations.

Our Office has also supported efforts of OSCE field operations to promote and offer training based on the OSCE Handbook on Data Collection in support of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing National Risk Assessments (NRAs). In partnership with the World Bank, we have rendered components of technical support towards National Risk Assessments in Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro.

As recent as last week, in Tashkent, our Office and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, in partnership with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Uzbekistan and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) organised a workshop on a “National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorism financing”. Participants discussed best practices of the National Risk Assessment’s implementation in the OSCE region and were introduced to the recently launched Russian version of the OSCE Handbook on Data Collection in Support of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and National Risk Assessments.

This week, in Vienna, our Office in partnership with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing organises a Regional Training on Cross-Border Co-operation against Corruption and Money Laundering for practitioners in the fields of anti-corruption and anti-money laundering. This event aims at strengthening the capacity of the OSCE participating States (particularly CIS countries) to successfully initiate, investigate and prosecute cases of both corruption and money laundering in which defendants, evidence and assets are located in multiple jurisdictions.

Let me also briefly touch up on some **other activities in the economic field**.

In the area of **transport** our Office's main focus remains on capacity-building and training activities for customs, trade and transport officials as well as private sector representatives. This year, so far we have conducted at the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, two CIS-specific regional workshops on risk management in customs and trade facilitation respectively.

In late November we will organise together with the World Customs Organization a third and final training seminar, again at the premises of the BMSC. This seminar will focus on the usefulness for customs administrations to introduce Authorised Economic Operator or trusted trader programmes. The introduction of such programmes is of high relevance for the region. Both customs agencies and the private sector can benefit from it.

My last point: We are also putting emphasis on integrating a **gender perspective** in our activities.

- In accordance with MC Decision No. 10/11 on **Promoting Equal Opportunity for Women in the Economic Sphere** our Office will continue to support women's economic empowerment and the development of women's entrepreneurial skills. We plan to implement next year a follow-up project to further strengthen women entrepreneurs' professional networks, market access, business management and product development skills in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
- In the environmental sphere, gender-sensitive policy interventions can contribute to fair sharing of natural resources and maximize social and economic benefits. This is essential to reduce conflict

potential at all levels. Together with the Gender Unit, we recently developed a project that focuses on **gender mainstreaming, women empowerment, and conflict prevention in water management in Central Asia and Afghanistan**. The project aims at contributing to conflict prevention and comprehensive security by increasing women's participation and capacities in conflict resolution and water management.

Let me conclude by mentioning that we are aware of the important role Parliamentarians play in the economic and environmental field, in terms of their legislative authority (national legislation, ratification of international legislation); in their ability to create opportunities for civil society to take part in the development and review of national legislation; and in bringing the security perspective to international and global level discussions on thematic issues, particularly through Parliamentary Unions.

Thank you.

SESSION 3:

HUMAN DIMENSION

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Mr. Peter Maurer, President, ICRC

Mr Chairman, Excellencies,

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address you here today.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and the OSCE have very different mandates –in a nutshell: you seek to prevent conflict, we seek to ease its impact –but our work still overlaps in many areas.

The OSCE is unique in bringing together an unparalleled amount of political actors with a large bandwidth of opinions and positions. You thereby represent a forum in which future security challenges can be thought through and eventually addressed.

In particular the fact that you as Parliamentarians are discussing here is of crucial importance. Still too often, Parliaments do not play the full role they should be able to play when it comes to debating security and humanitarian issues and linking international challenges to national legislative processes.

ICRC & OSCE

I am here today to talk about “New security challenges and the ICRC” and thus to offer a distinct humanitarian perspective to your debates. Let me therefore just start with a few remarks on our two institutions.

The three key dimensions in the OSCE’s work-security, economic, human-are critical for the ICRC, through our work within armed conflicts we are close to your security dimension. Our support for livelihoods relates to the economic and our mandate to mitigate the impact of conflicts to the human dimension.

All OSCE member states are also High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions. You own the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is only its custodian. And with the Geneva Conventions comes the collective

responsibility to respect and ensure respect for International Humanitarian Law. So the OSCE and the ICRC both have to work hand-in-hand to protect and strengthen IHL. But we also have operations in the same regions, notably in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. And our work overlaps when we think about so called frozen conflicts (protracted crises), such as in the Caucasus or the Balkans or when we work on issues like missing persons or on population displacements and migration.

Both of our organisations are strongly determined by normative work and policy consensus. But there are also clear distinctions.

The OSCE is a political; the ICRC is a humanitarian organisation.

You have all been elected, and you have a responsibility towards your constituencies. Your mandate is to build a safer world based on sustainable political solutions.

The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose exclusively humanitarian mandate is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence, and to provide them with assistance and ensure their protection.

The ICRC does not shape the future. Its mission is to ease the impact of armed conflict and violence in the present and thus to assist and protect victims of conflict. We work to prevent abuses within conflict, but we cannot prevent conflict beyond engaging for the prevention of violations of IHL. That is a political job – your job.

So we work on some of the same issues and we work in the same contexts. Our roles are different. But they are largely complementary. While you make an effort to integrate different perspective, our focus is to keep the humanitarian perspective separate from other agendas and to allow the greatest possible acceptance by parties to conflict and ensure the largest possible access to all those in need. The OSCE is aspirational, trying to build and form security and cooperation. The ICRC is seeking full respect of applicable norms and preserves a minimum of shared humanity in conflict.

Again, the OSCE seeks to prevent conflict. The ICRC seeks to prevent the most serious abuses in conflict.

New Security Challenges – “New challenges in an old game”

As a humanitarian actor, the ICRC has a distinct perspective on new and emerging security challenges, which are often not really new but a complex combination of old and new factors. Six key areas are of particular concern.

Firstly, the **changing global environment**: Armed violence today takes place in the context of evolving international power structures and therefore changing patterns of influence on internal and international conflict dynamics. This forces the ICRC to considerably enlarge its engagement with States who are at the same time HCP to the GC in order to support them “to respect and ensure respect” for International Humanitarian Law. At the same time, many emerging countries have capacities and capabilities, which are made available to international relief operations thus increasing the necessity for cooperation and coordination and the potential for mutual support in these efforts. In that sense the ICRC has considerably enlarged its interactions with emerging countries and non-traditional donors in the last couple of years (Delegations in China, Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and India).

Secondly, we have been witnessing the emergence of **new actors in today’s battlefields**: New and often fragmented groups with unclear chains of commands and structures and extremist postures force us to considerably scale up capacities for engagement. Many of these new actors have at the same time access to the same weapons and strategic skills for warfare and communication capacities as states. The number of armed groups leads to increasingly de-structured conflicts, in these new contexts, different form of violence mix (conflict driven, criminal, inter-communal etc.); moreover, warfare happens more often in urban areas thus affecting larger numbers of civilians. Together, this leads to a transformation of our operational environment and challenges us: how to draw these actors to abide by the existing laws on the conduct hostilities/use of force or the treatment of detainees according to the established customs of war; and what legal framework (IHL or HR law) to apply.

Thirdly, we see the shapes of **battlefields changing**: conventional armed conflict is amplified by the easy availability of arms and the addition of new means and methods of warfare: cyber warfare, remote use of weapons, covert operations or militarised policing are relatively new phenomena. The geographic areas of the applicability of AC are increasingly

difficult to define. (Example: Drones in Yemen, Somalia, bombardments in Syria).

Fourthly, we see a **deepening and expansion of conflict dynamics**, which transform national dynamics and their humanitarian impact increasingly into regional and global threats: Syria /Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Sahel, Sub-Saharan Africa, Ukraine: We witness a trend from temporary disruption, to protracted conflict to regional system disintegration in terms of health, water and sanitation, nutrition, habitat and education. In those new dynamics, we increasingly are aware of recurring issues of violence and violations of law like sexual violence, violence against health care workers and health facilities, which need different qualities of response than just temporary relief.

We are fifthly **observing an erosion of the capabilities of conflict-affected states** to provide essential services to populations: long-term protracted conflicts erode state capacity.

And finally, we see that **social media and global interconnectedness** add pressure and speed that can exacerbate conflicts and create additional constraints. This defies our effort to establish and maintain confidential dialogue with the authorities on critical humanitarian issues and to maintain a space for positive change away from public pressure.

Challenges emerging from this security environment are practical, legal and political for the ICRC

I would like to illustrate them with some questions and contextual remarks:

- How to negotiate security and access? How to engage with a multiplicity of un-structured armed groups? (Example: Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan)
- How to adequate IHL in such new contexts?(International/Internal AC/ OSV-qualification)

Who is a combatant and who is a civilian and what is direct participation in hostilities and therefore a legitimate target?

What is the legal framework for acceding detainees in NIAC as we are increasingly confronted with detainees held by NSAG? (POW, security detainees)

How do we address the fact that we may have an incomplete legal basis for new methods of warfare? (Cyber warfare)

How should we cope with the urbanisation of warfare and the particularly challenging application of the rules of war and the use of weapons and ammunitions in urban environments and densely populated areas? (Gaza, Lugansk, Donetsk, Aleppo).

How to protect civilians in protracted situations of violence below the threshold of IHL applicability? In that context: how to manage the interaction of IHL and HRL. (Example Bangui)

How do we address increasingly regional and global challenges with national response structures?

How do we deal with recurring patterns of violence and violations? (Middle East, Ebola)

You are members of legislative bodies and you know how difficult it is to make sure that legislations and policies are up to date with reality. We face this same struggle with IHL and humanitarian diplomacy. Is the legal framework that we base our operations on sufficient? And how do we ensure that existing norms are respected by belligerents and political authorities.

5. Response patterns

By in large and over the last two decades, the international community is responding to the broader and deeper challenges by a stronger integration of peace, human rights, developmental and humanitarian agendas: humanitarian action is often integrated into more comprehensive response systems, functions as a replacement for the lack of political solutions or is politicised and instrumentalised as confidence building step in broader and more comprehensive frameworks.

ICRC has taken issue with such approaches in particular in sensitive conflict ridden areas and contexts of emergency as they come at the price of complicating or preventing access, politicising a shared space of humanity, marginalizing or antagonizing parties who do not share some of the political visions of an integrated international response and restraining avenues of collaboration and engagement.

We have therefore advocated in favour of keep the implementation and development of IHL as well as humanitarian action in emergencies and crisis situations clearly distinct from some of the more ambitious and more

political agendas of the international community. In order to do so, we have engaged with HCPs to negotiate modalities, which allow for a credible NIIHA.

Some examples of distinct processes

Let me just mention some approaches, which ICRC has chosen to respond to the challenges mentioned:

We have launched a distinct process of engaging HCPs to create a regular meeting of HCP to the GVA convention to discuss problems of application of IHL.

We are engaged in different processes of clarification of the law: different initiatives at different levels:

- Detention in NIAC
- Clarification through expert driven process on weapons and battlefields: cyber, remote, automated warfare, video gaming
- Address with specific legal, policy, advocacy process recurring patterns of violence and violations/ HClD: result of process. Recommendations to practitioners and legislators: national legislation and international consensus building
- SV: advocacy and programming
- Engaging with state and NSAG: traditional and new forms and formats of engagement
- Professional development: HMLS, community of negotiators (access)

Such distinct processes do not mean that we are not ready and willing to exchange, coordinate and eventually cooperate with other institutions but that we have a more ambitious and stringent requirement for consensus-building in order to ensure acceptance and implementation of the law and security and access for our staff on the ground in increasingly complex environments.

Conclusion – Message to parliamentarians

With evolving power shifts, conflict patterns and response systems, the humanitarian space can be expanded, but the truth is that humanitarian action – and the ICRC within it – has limits.

When politics cannot prevent or stop conflict, the minimum we need from you is that you ensure that humanitarians have the necessary political space to help victims without discrimination. That we can fulfil our mandate in the best possible conditions, without being instrumentalised, with the greatest access possible, and with the highest security guarantees possible.

The ICRC would greatly welcome it if there was a political commitment that States embrace their responsibilities for conflict resolution which is ultimately the best response for putting an end to human suffering. And we appreciate parliamentary support for national and international legislative frameworks, which allow us to better cope with the new security environments and its impacts.

Thank you.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION IN PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. Gianni Magazzeni, Chief, Americas, Europe & Central Asia Branch, OHCHR Geneva

Thank you Mr. President,
Excellencies,

It is a pleasure to be here this morning to speak about the role of the UN in protecting human rights. Let me start by saying, although today it is clear, that human rights is a very important pillar of the work of the UN in line with the Charter and the priorities of the UN Organisation next to peace and security and economic and social development. We have started in the UN to focus on creating a legislative framework for human rights protection which started with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today, some 10 international human rights treaties cover basically every single aspect of human life: civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, protection of women, protection from discrimination and so on. But with the process of ratification of these treaties by member states, the critical issue was country level implementation. The international community and the UN human rights machinery were set up with UN human rights treaty bodies as well as with Special procedures mandate holders who are monitors working on specific mandates to see to what extent there are gaps in country level implementation with respect to the ratification of international treaties and with laws and practices that may not be consistent with them.

If we look for a moment at the mandate of the High Commissioner, according to General Assembly Resolution 48/141 of 1993, it is to play a role not only in preventing human rights violations but also in looking at challenges to the realisation of human rights, that is to say ongoing violations. It is basically about promoting and protecting human rights for all worldwide. It is a huge mandate, including the coordination of human rights activities within the UN system.

‘Realising human rights’ – what does that mean for us, as the OHCHR? It means country engagement. Of course everything we do at country level is in cooperation with the government concerned, but it is within the framework of the treaties ratified by member states as well as by the political commitments member states made within the context of the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review.

At country level we engage in monitoring and reporting, promotional activities, advocacy and awareness raising and of course supporting the strengthening of a national human rights protection system which means also better and stronger state institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights as well as strengthening the links with parliaments, the judiciary, and civil society organisations.

We cannot carry out these activities alone – we work very closely with regional organisations and I will say a few words about our cooperation with the OSCE. We have about 68 field presences of different types: regional offices; country offices; stand-alone offices with a main focus on the promotion and protection of human rights and on direct implementation of certain activities for advancing the implementation of the legal requirements or the political commitments made by member states. We also have a large number of human rights advisors, and also human rights components of peace missions that work within the context of the Security Council decision. This is a good infrastructure, but is not sufficient for us per se to be able to really make a difference at country level.

The critical challenge of ensuring human rights at country level depends on our ability to engage more effectively with national stakeholders: parliaments, governments, judiciaries, national human rights institutions as well as civil society organisations, the media and the academic community. All of that has been done in the past 20 years since the creation of the High Commissioner’s Office during the Vienna Conference in 1993 and the subsequent decision by the General Assembly to create the mandate of this very high and prominent figure within the UN system that deals with human rights, though it is not the only body that is expected to promote and protect human rights at the country level. Of course our work takes place primarily within the UN system, with the UN country teams, the resident coordinators, our development colleagues who are present in a much larger number of countries and who are also

responsible for advancing additional development and social and economic elements at the national level. I think it is important to emphasise that this partnership with the UN system as a whole is linked to the work of each and every one of the members of the country team, our colleagues in UNHCR, UNOCHA, and UNICEF – critical protection agencies that deal also with important issues that concern the promotion and protection of human rights.

Equally important is the relationship with member states, and in particular governments. Of course at the country level, very often the foreign ministry is the main interlocutor for the High Commissioner of the UN, but clearly all ministries are critically important, whether it is the Ministry of Justice, Interior or Defence, or other state entities such as the parliament and national human rights institutions. Last November, the Secretary-General has launched a very important and ambitious plan, 'Human Rights Up Front' (HRuF) which resulted from a reflection process by the Organisation on the failures of dealing with protection issues in the past. I think that this is a very important element to flag to you because it means that the UN system as a whole will look more closely at the human rights legal obligations and political commitments made by member states in the countries where they operate.

If we look for a moment at the situation in Ukraine, which has been a very important issue for the OHCHR in the past six months, I would like to point out the set-up of a human rights monitoring mission by the Commissioner, as part of its universal mandate, in March 2014. The mission consists of approximately 34-35 staff, most of them national, whose primary mandate is the monitoring of and reporting on the human rights situation on the ground. It is important for an organisation like the OHCHR to be able to share critical facts on the ground not only with our Human Rights Council, but with any other body at the international level. We have had multiple activities in the past six months, including 5 reports that were published on a monthly basis as well as a comprehensive report presented to the Human Rights Council just a few days ago which highlights the concerns and challenges both on the human rights and on the humanitarian front. Clearly, there were many human rights violations since the Maidan process which are linked to weak rule of law institutions, corruption, non-independent judiciary, and an excessive use of force by security forces. Over time we have seen a deteriorating situation in the East escalating in an

armed conflict, resulting in a huge number of civilians violently killed, huge numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) including some 17,000 Crimean Tatars who are now scattered throughout Ukraine. Of course, the OHCHR in Ukraine cannot solve all problems, but it is very critical in trying to address protection, human rights violations, as well as providing information on the situation so that the government and other actors can take necessary measures to reduce insecurity, provide protection, and reduce violations of human rights. We very much hope that the EU-Ukraine Agenda for Reform will embed the many recommendations the Office has provided to the government of Ukraine in its reporting and that it will contribute to a much stronger national protection system which will ensure development, peace and security.

If I may say a few words about the role of parliamentarians in the context of human rights: it is fundamental, not only in terms of legislative reform or the monitoring of the implementation of legal obligations at the country level. It is also the body that can eventually launch a national human rights action plan ensuring that there is human rights education in primary and secondary schools and beyond; but it is also the body that can help set up national independent human rights institutions. I will end with some specific recommendations. One is about the setting up of human rights committees within parliaments. Human rights committees often exist but they do not necessarily always look at the internal situation—sometimes they are more focused on external issues. The Office of the High Commissioner tries to gather information for each member state on the legal and political commitments made, as well as all the recommendations made by the Human Rights Treaty bodies to member states regarding the action that needs to be taken at the country level to reduce violations and implement the promotion and protection of human rights and create a strong and effective national protection system. Therefore, there is a need for greater awareness of all these international mechanisms and tools – as often this is not the case. The national mechanisms should have an oversight function over the government which has the primary responsibility to ensure compliance and the fulfilment of legal obligations and political commitments made. Of course, we would also recommend that there is a close link with national human rights institutions which, like the parliament, have an independent role, and are often constitutionally anchored. They are also linked to our Office and are part of the multiple

mechanisms at the national level that ensure the promotion and protection of human rights. Equally, we work very closely with regional mechanisms. We have very recently signed a joint declaration with the Council of Europe in 2013 and with ODIHR OSCE in June this year and we look forward to much closer cooperation with countries where OHCHR offices are based, whether it is in the Balkans, South Caucasus or Central Asia.

Finally, when it comes to governments, it is important to note that in addition to ratifying treaties, they participate in the Human Rights Council in Geneva every 4.5 years. We recommend to them to have a senior-level coordination mechanism among the many different ministries that looks at the implementation of the hundreds of recommendations they receive and often accept related to the promotion and protection of human rights. Furthermore, this coordination mechanism should eventually lead to a national human rights action plan, often passed and approved by the parliament in the given country. As I said before, it is important that a human rights committee can assume an oversight function vis-à-vis those recommendations and has the capacity to monitor the implementation of the commitments made in the context of an action plan.

Thank you very much.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FROM EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Mr. Guy Rhodes, Director of Operations of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I will provide a rather general presentation on explosive hazards globally in the context of the protection of civilians. I start with looking back in history before moving forward to the present. It has been 100 years since the start of World War I and parts of Belgium and France remain plagued with Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). In Belgium alone, there is an average of 150 to 200 tons of UXO of war that are still recovered and destroyed each year. While much of it has aged, a proportion still presents a very real danger to civilians. Indeed, in March this year, 100 years on, two construction workers in Belgium were killed and two more seriously injured when an unexploded shell detonated at a worksite.

In 2011, 45 tons of Explosive Ordnance Waste (EOW) are still being recovered and efforts continue today. Similar figures exist in Japan where 4 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams are on callout on average once a day, that is 400 callouts a year 70 years after the war. Last month, a French tourist was killed on a beach in Brittany and another one seriously injured. In Hannover last month also, 14,000 civilians were evacuated from their homes in the middle of the night when a 4,000 lbs British bomb was found on a housing estate. Contamination of this era is widespread across Europe, with significant contamination remaining in a number of countries, other examples being Russia, Poland and Ukraine. The message here is that countries that have been exposed to significant conflict have contamination from explosive remnants of war which will remain for many years. In most cases, the idea of determining a baseline for the full extent of explosive

remnants of war and looking at the contamination and proactively clearing every item is unrealistic, impractical, and a waste of resources.

In most of Western Europe, the response of UXO has essentially shifted from a proactive approach to one that is typically reactive. Police, civil defence or military are on call to deal with Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) as and when they are found, but where only limited proactive searches occur. The construction for the London 2012 Olympic park occurred in the Docklands of London and risk management models based on bombing data from World War II were used to help advise on mitigation approaches. In other parts of Europe and the world where conflicts are more recent or ongoing, civilians are of course exposed to far greater risks from explosive hazards, requiring both political and operational approaches to protect civil populations.

Perhaps the most well-known movement to highlight the disproportionate effects of some weapons on civilians is the call for the ban of anti-personnel landmines (APMs). APMs are cheap to produce, easy to lay, victim-activated, long-lasting, difficult to detect, and expensive to clear. The Anti-personnel Mine Convention, or Ottawa Treaty, has been instrumental in protecting civilians from this type of explosive device – banning the use, stockpile and export of APMs and also requiring states party to their Convention to survey and clear contamination on their territory within a period of 10 years. 182 countries have signed the Convention but the implications and the associated stigma around the use of mines make the Convention even more wide-ranging in its impact.

A similar, more recent Convention came into force in August 2010: the Convention on Cluster Munitions. This too prohibits all use, production, transfer and stockpiling. Cluster munitions affect civilians disproportionately for a number of reasons. They have a wide area effect and are unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants and leave behind a proportion of unexploded sub-munitions which are particularly lethal and pose a threat for many years as can be clearly seen in Lao PDR and Vietnam. Currently, the Convention has 113 signatories out of which 84 are also state parties. Although any similar ban on anti-vehicle mines (AVMs) is somewhat off, the impact of AVMs should not be understated. Both in a humanitarian setting where aid delivery and the movement of displaced populations are concerned, but also in a development context many years after a conflict is finished. In Cambodia over the last 5 years for instance, there have been

324 reported victims of APMs, but also 283 victims from AVMs. Victims from AVMs exceeded those of APMs for the first time last year. Even if the production of AVMs is unlikely to be prevented, certain measures should be promoted in future to increase the protection of civilians and assist clearance activities. This can be supported by placing a greater emphasis on the need to record geographic coordinates of mines and minefields as stipulated in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. A greater focus on AVM recognition and impact in risk education programmes is essential and states should also explore ways to improve detectability including perhaps a minimum metal content specification in future production models.

Other broader types of ERWs are perhaps more relevant after conflict in many situations: bombs, mortars, artillery shells, grenades, etc. Such contamination also needs to be addressed with some urgency during and after conflicts for two principle reasons. First, they also pose a direct threat to civilians as they can explode if tampered with or accidentally encountered. Second, an increase in significance is that UXO and AXO can be sources of high explosives for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). For this reason, visible ordnance and abandoned ordnance should be identified, secured and as soon as possible practically disposed of in bulk demolitions. The source of explosives for IEDs is not just limited to AXO and UXO on the battlefield or from former exercise grounds and ranges, but can be recovered from poorly secured or overrun ammunition depots. The ammunition depots themselves also pose significant risks to civilians who live or move in the vicinity of such sites, particularly if facilities are not properly managed. Where fires occur or when unstable ammunition ignites whole depots, they have devastating effects. Such accidents are sadly fairly commonplace, occurring two to three times a month with a frequency that appears to be on the rise, according to research from the Small Arms Survey and others. Between 1998 and 2011, 302 instances of unplanned explosives, explosions in 76 countries have been recorded, although the actual figures may be more. Approximately 4,000 people have been killed and 12,000 injured linked to these incidences. Explosions in Nigeria in 2002 and Congo Brazzaville in 2012 are particularly remembered as they resulted in huge numbers of victims due to ammunition sites being located in built-up areas. In addition to the appalling victim counts, the political and economic costs of unplanned explosions are also very high. For example, in

2011, an explosion at a port in Cyprus amounted to a total cost of 2.4 billion euros, representing 13 percent of the GDP in the country.

Without going into details, much can be done to make ammunition stocks safer and to reduce the potential for theft of ammunitions, sabotage or unplanned explosions and the OSCE is particularly active in this regard. While there are other standards and guidelines in existence, including the **OSCE Best Practice Guides**, there are two important references for mine clearing operations and safe management of ammunition. These are the **International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)** which my organisation administer and manage on behalf of the UN and the **International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) of UNODA**.

There are many challenges that lie ahead. These include the ability to further universalise the various conventions governing conventional weapons, raising awareness, training and implementation of the IMAS and IATG and perhaps most challenging but essential: exploring approaches to influence non-state actors.

Thank you.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Ms. Margareta Wahlstrom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman,

I am going to talk about why disaster risk reduction is so important and what parliamentarians' role is in this regard. The advantage of being the last speaker is that I can say how it all fits together, because you will find some similarities among what we are saying in terms of both national and global action.

I will present some data about disasters and explain why this topic is so significant for the OSCE mandate - this very powerful triple mandate that the organisation has and for which parliamentarians are so critical for its implementation. Over the past 30 years in particular, the trend of disasters is that the economic losses are accelerating and escalating very quickly. There is much success in reducing the loss of lives, particularly in some parts of the world, while in others regrettably the loss of lives keeps going up. The success in reducing the loss of lives is possible thanks to building early-warning system capability for warning people, organising people for evacuation and getting people out of harm's way. However, you cannot get people's assets out of harm's way as easily and therefore with the growing global wealth and wealth growing in most countries in the world, the figures are quite staggering. In the OECD countries alone, which control well over 50 percent of all the wealth in the world, the exposure to disaster losses every year has increased by well over 170 percent. In most parts of the world, the loss to disasters to the annual GDP is growing faster than the GDP is growing itself. Already 40 years ago, scientists were telling us in the United Nations and elsewhere, that unless we watch carefully, the effects of disasters due to environmental destruction and population growth, the exposure in the most vulnerable areas of countries, are going

to have a significant impact on countries' economies and also a significant contribution to undermining security and safety.

The fastest economic growth is happening in the most exposed areas of countries: coast lines exposed to hurricanes, cyclones and typhoons, or river basins – many of the biggest global centres in the world are located on some of the most dangerous seismic fault lines. I just came back from Japan yesterday and we talked about the 2011 earthquake and tsunami and the consequences of Fukushima. The reality in Japan is that they are expecting within the next 30 years a similar major earthquake in Western Japan and of course everyone fears an earthquake in Tokyo. Japan is a very rich country and has good technology and is working continuously on its infrastructure, on its buildings, and therefore the impact can be mitigated. Many countries in the world do not have the knowledge, capacity or the financial resources to do that. The result on the economy is that for many countries the cost of disasters is much higher than their economic growth. In Europe there has been an enormous increase in flooding over the past decades and only recently did we see major initiatives over flooding. We could talk at length about the reasons why this took so long – it is related to property rights, to who pays for reconstruction and to countries' ability, willingness and tradition to work together across borders, but the main issue around disasters today and certainly for the future is that they really test trans-boundary cooperation. Disasters know no borders: water waves, air waves, displaced people who are forced to leave their region due to drying up of common water resources and water basins, all leading to potential disasters and certainly disrupting people's and countries' economic basis. Looking at it from an OSCE perspective – and this was the topic at the ministerial meeting a few weeks ago in Prague – what is the link between disaster and security? Many people ask, 'Is there really a link? Should we really bring the two together?' I do not think that we really need to bring them together in the work that I am doing, but rather in the consultation over the past two and a half years globally, regionally and nationally, for a new 2015 disaster risk management framework. Countries say that conflicts cause and sometimes also help disaster risk to be on the table. Nationally and locally of course the interdependency between conflicts and safety and disasters is very clear. I would say that recognising this helps look at it also from an international perspective, because the work we do in partnership with countries is to

look at risk assessment capability, the capability of institutions to manage risks, access data and information and also having adequate national risk governance frameworks and institutions. I mentioned the floods here in Europe and in the connection of demining, many of you are familiar with the dramatic impact of the latest flooding in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which exposed lots of mines in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and of course forced people in the intervention who are not used to dealing with this aspect of disasters. So this link is critically important to all of us.

Disaster risk reduction has always been part of UN work and in most countries a development issue rather than a humanitarian issue. This is because the work is about strengthening institutions and ensuring that they have the necessary capability, instruments and resources to manage risks. Many countries are heavily decentralised, others are centralised, so depending on the national structures, the capability to manage disasters at local level, to respond to them and to anticipate them, lags behind. In March 2015, the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction will take place in Japan. Later in the year, the UN memberships will come together to determine a new development vision and in December 2015 hopefully a new climate agreement will take place. These three events are closely linked. People who work for disaster risk reduction hope that the new 2015 opportunity will be a clear recognition of how closely linked climate change, disaster risk and development are. You may think this is obvious. However, due to politically very distinct global processes, it is not as obvious as it may seem. So this is one of the main areas that we work on and I think the importance of national parliaments and regional parliaments cannot be understated in understanding and supporting this area of work. Disaster risk is accumulating faster than ever before precisely because of the options countries have at their disposal for development, where physical assets are growing, and the extent to which the population is aware of these risks. Disaster risk is also growing because of the impact of climate variability and change. The most costly disaster today in the world, globally speaking, is urban flooding. The way cities are constructed means that old infrastructure, plumbing and drainage cannot cope with water and we fail to look sufficiently into how to prevent this. I am bringing a message of things that can be done. A lot of things can be done.

A few years ago, understanding that this issue requires an all-of-society approach, and that not only governments are important as they need support from the entire population, we established a parliamentary network and a parliamentary advisory group and thanks to the passion and hard work of these individuals, we learned a lot about what parliamentarians and parliaments can do. I will share with you some of the recommendations based on this experience where parliaments have already proven that they are critically important.

Public awareness, advocacy and education – every parliamentarian is linked to a local constituency and can bring much practical experience to the discussion. In addition, all parliamentarians are professionals – scientists, lawyers, experts in many areas – and they can bring very concrete ideas both to the public in their region and country as well as to the global agenda.

Most countries already **have legal frameworks that include risk management**. The challenge is that they are all segregated from each other. Many countries do of course have environmental protection frameworks and for 30 years the recommendation has been, in environmental impact assessment, to include disaster risk. There is no need to necessarily create new legislation but it is important to make sure that the existing one looks at this over-arching legal framework that would encompass risk assessment, for example on urban planning, land use planning, environmental protection, building standards, education, health system, safety of schools and hospitals. Check for these opportunities, when discussing legislation, and look at how it interacts with other legislation. Also, it is important to **prevent ‘policy induced risks’** (when regulations and legal frameworks have clashing interests. This can happen when not checking what legislations already exist and what they include and it can lead to contradictions and create new risks). Over the past few weeks we have been engaged in Human Rights Council discussions on the rights of indigenous people, of people with disability, of women, and human rights overall. All these treaty bodies have found that disaster risk is a major area that needs to consider all these rights. In most countries this is already obvious. Countries have ratified the treaties. Now how do we make them speak to each other?

Information access and availability of risk information to citizens – Information is not necessarily withheld because of the impression that it is

not good to let people know what risks there are. Sometimes data is not accessible because it is too complicated. Examples include global climate data. We often say local governments should plan for the future but they very rarely have the capability to use global data and even when downscaled to national level, it is still complicated for a local government to use this data as a basis for a 30 years plan for infrastructure for example. Much work in many countries today focuses on ensuring that local governments can use this risk data for flood management or land use planning.

Assist in establishing adequate and efficient risk governance frameworks – In many countries and international institutions for that matter, it has been brought to our attention that one of the bottlenecks is unclear responsibilities among different institutions. In fact, sometimes they end up competing. Accountability can be strong, but I have been told by national governments that it can also lead to turf wars. So, frameworks for risk governance are about responsibilities and institutions, the quality of institutions but also helped through the legal basis to understand who is responsible for what and when. Governance is actually a top priority for the 2015 discussions. Although the 2015 discussions may focus less on institutions, they will nonetheless help countries across the world to learn from each other and find efficient frameworks for risk governance. For example, it is often said that decentralisation is a good thing to do. What has been learned by many countries is that when it comes to disaster risk management, it may actually impose new challenges because it requires investment that sometimes only the central government can be involved in. Local governments may have different political priorities than central governments.

You may have never heard of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. We are probably one of the smallest entities in the United Nations. I just want to share with you why you may have never heard about it, while hoping that you will hear more about it in the future. The reason is that we are in fact headquartered here in Geneva with regional representations around the world, but we can only implement what we do through **collaboration with national governments, local governments, parliaments, civil society groups, international institutions, the UN system of course and regional parliaments** which are very active in this area. So

this is why you probably hear a little bit less about us and hopefully much more about the work that is being conducted.

My final point which I think parliamentarians may be able to help with is that in our collaboration with national governments we are very often faced with the challenge that they do not necessarily talk with each other. I will give you a very precise and practical example. In our preparation for the world conference next March, we work with national expert institutions and many ministries. Their relations with the foreign ministries are often not very strong. But of course it is the foreign ministries which represent countries when it comes to international negotiations. A **better mechanism at national level for working together as one** is a very critical element that can be supported by parliamentarians because many of your countries' parliaments are already engaged in this work and I hope that you have encountered them. If not, I hope that after this meeting you will encounter them in your national parliaments and that you will also realise how many regional parliaments around the world already have put this item very high on their agenda.

Thank you.

CLOSING SESSION

**REMARKS BY THE HEAD OF THE SWISS DELEGATION TO THE OSCE
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, MR. ANDREAS AEBI**

Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée fédérale suisse, cher Ruedi
Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE,
Estimés collègues,
Mesdames, Messieurs,

Je souhaiterais avant tout vous remercier, au nom de la délégation Suisse, d'avoir répondu à notre invitation et d'être venus aussi nombreux à Genève. C'est un honneur pour nous de vous recevoir sur les rives du lac Léman.

L'organisation d'une conférence parlementaire en Suisse pendant l'année de la présidence suisse de l'OSCE a toujours été l'un de nos objectifs principaux. La Genève internationale se prête parfaitement aux enjeux de l'Assemblée Parlementaire OSCE. Vous ne trouverez nulle part ailleurs, sur un aussi petit territoire, une telle densité d'experts émanant d'organisations internationales, d'ONG, de fondations ou d'instituts universitaires.

Es war uns bei der Planung des Programms ein Anliegen, das vor Ort versammelte Fachwissen nutzbringend in die Konferenz einfließen zu lassen. In diesem Zusammenhang gebührt Herrn Botschafter Winkler und seinem Team vom DCAF ein ganz besonderer Dank. Ebenso möchte ich den Parlamentsdiensten, dem internationalen Sekretariat in Kopenhagen und allen anderen Helferinnen und Helfern danken.

Der fruchtbaren Partnerschaft all dieser Akteure haben wir das attraktive Programm und den reibungslosen Verlauf der Konferenz zu verdanken!

Meine Damen und Herren,
Lassen Sie mich an dieser Stelle einige Highlights der Tagung revue passieren:

Am Eröffnungstag wurde im Mediterranen Forum aufgezeigt, mit welchen gewaltigen Problemen der östliche Mittelmeerraum konfrontiert ist und dass wir uns diesen Problemen stellen müssen, weil sie den gesamten OSZE-Raum betreffen.

Mit einer Spezialdebatte über die Situation in der Ukraine traf die erste offizielle Session sogleich den Kern der politisch-militärischen Dimension. Astrid Thors und Simon Lunn hatten die schwierige Aufgabe, ihre Präsentationen im Hinblick auf die Situation in der Ukraine kurzfristig neu auszurichten. Sie haben diese Aufgabe hervorragend gemeistert, Danke. Die Themenpalette der zweiten Session reichte von ökonomischen Interessen in der modernen Kriegsführung bis zu Naturkatastrophen und Wirtschaftsfragen. Für die erhellenden Ausführungen danke ich Keith Krause, Botschafter Winkler und Desirée Schweitzer.

Ich bedanke mich ebenfalls bei der Rednerin und den Rednern, die heute Morgen zu uns gesprochen haben. Aus Schweizer Sicht hat mich besonders der Auftritt von Peter Maurer gefreut. In der Schweiz ist man zu Recht stolz auf die humanitäre Tradition unseres Landes. Leider ist die humanitäre Hilfe auch mit Gefahren verbunden, wie uns der tragische Tod eines Mitarbeiters des IKRK vor Augen geführt hat.

Im Namen des Schweizer Parlaments möchte ich hier mein Beileid ausdrücken.

Weiter hörten wir heute Morgen Gianni Magazzeni zu den Menschenrechten und Guy Rhodes zu Minen und Clustermunition sprechen. Last but not least befasste sich Margareta Wahlström mit Fragen des Risikomanagements.

Vielen Dank an alle Rednerinnen und Redner! Sie haben uns drei erkenntnisreiche Tage beschert! Ich bin sicher, dass alle Teilnehmer dieser Herbsttagung etwas aus dem reichhaltigen Programm mitnehmen werden. Das Programm sollte uns zum Denken anregen und uns inspirieren, um die drängenden Probleme im OSZE-Raum anzupacken.

Denn eines ist sicher, meine Damen und Herren: Die Arbeit wird uns so schnell nicht auszugehen!

Die OSZE, und damit auch wir Parlamentarierinnen und Parlamentarier der Mitgliedstaaten, sind mehr denn je gefragt. Längst überwunden geglaubte Gräben sind im Begriff sich wieder aufzutun. Ich rufe Sie dazu auf, sich in Ihrer Rolle als Parlamentarier mit allen Kräften für

die Sicherung des Friedens und die Förderung der Sicherheit in Europa zu engagieren! Lassen wir den Geist von Helsinki wieder aufleben!

Mit der Unterzeichnung der Schlussakte von Helsinki wurde 1975 der Grundstein für die Überwindung der Teilung der Welt in Ost und Westgelegt. Was viele vielleicht nicht wissen: Die zweijährigen Verhandlungen, die zur Unterzeichnung führten, wurden hier in Genf geführt.

Die doppelte Rückkehr an die Ursprungsorte unserer Organisation – ich denke auch bereits an die Jahrestagung im nächsten Jahr in Helsinki – soll uns gleichzeitig ein Denkanstoss sein für die Erneuerung der Schlussakte von Helsinki. Bereits hat die Parlamentarische Versammlung wertvolle Arbeit zur Unterstützung des „Helsinki +40“-Prozesses geleistet. Noch ist dieser Weg aber nicht zu Ende. Ich ermuntere Sie, Geschätzte Kolleginnen und Kollegen: Beteiligen Sie sich am Reformprozess und bringen Sie Ihre Ideen ein!

Unser Engagement ist auch bei der Lösung des aktuell drängendsten Problems im OSZE-Raum gefragt. Die Parlamentarische Versammlung muss in der Ukrainekrise Verantwortung tragen. Erlauben Sie mir an dieser Stelle eine kurze Klammer zu öffnen: Auf der Website der OSZE werden Sie mit neutralen und objektiven Informationen zu den Entwicklungen in der Ukraine versorgt –dank den zahlreichen OSZE-Beobachtern.

Wir Parlamentarier sind es uns gewohnt, Konflikte im Dialog zu lösen. An unseren Tagungen treffen sich Volksvertreter aus 57 Staaten. Nutzen wir diese Chance, um den Dialog zu befördern! In diesem Sinne unterstütze ich die Gründung der „Interparlamentarischen Verbindungsgruppe“. Ich wünsche mir, dass die Gruppe bald mit der Arbeit beginnen kann.

Meine Damen und Herren,

Um zu reden, braucht es nicht immer einen offiziellen Rahmen. Genauso gut eignen sich informelle Anlässe. Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, bestimmt haben Sie schon bemerkt, worauf ich hinaus will: Unsere Herbsttagung neigt sich dem Ende zu und ich möchte Sie gerne für die Schifffahrt heute Nachmittag auf dem Genfer See einladen.

Sehr geehrter Herr Nationalratspräsident, Lieber Ruedi,

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident der Parlamentarischen Versammlung,
Geschätzte Kolleginnen und Kollegen,
Meine Damen und Herren,

Hiermit möchte ich mich noch einmal bei allen Beteiligten bedanken und mich im Namen der Schweizer Delegation in gut Schweizerischer Tradition in den Landessprachen von Ihnen verabschieden.
Auf Wiedersehen!

Au revoir!
Arrivederci!
A revair!
Und auf Neuschweizerisch: Goodbye!

**REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,
MR. ILKKA KANERVA**

Distinguished guests and colleagues, dear friends,

After three days of learning from each other and debating the way forward for the entire OSCE region, we know this conference has been a success.

As you may remember, in my opening remarks I underlined that the Swiss have managed not only to stay out of armed conflicts, they have also promoted a proactive approach to international relations and security.

Over the past three days, we have had a great opportunity to familiarize ourselves with it. We have heard a wide range of views from experts, parliamentarians, OSCE officials and high-level representatives of Switzerland.

We have also discussed the situation on Ukraine. It is clear to all of us that the situation in Ukraine is a serious problem. It has become one of the political hotspots in the OSCE area. The crisis challenges the security of Europe as well as the capacity of the OSCE as a whole. It also challenges the values and basic principles of our organisation. We can never accept the violation of any of our basic principles.

Finding a solution to the Ukrainian problem is naturally the responsibility of the parties concerned, but the OSCE as a whole, we as parliamentarians, and the Parliamentary Assembly as an institution, should now work together to provide active support and contribution to the numerous attempts in finding a political solution.

From the Assembly's side, the next step is the parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 26 October. This will be an important mission, and I encourage all member countries to take part in this mission led by Kent Harstedt and Doris Barnett.

We have also reiterated our commitment to greater engagement with our Mediterranean partners.

On this point, I would like to warmly thank our hosts, represented today by Mr. Lustenberger, Speaker of the National Council of Switzerland,

and Mr. Aebi, Head of the Swiss Delegation to the OSCE PA, and the entire Swiss Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, headed by Ambassador Winkler, for making this meeting a success. We have all been able to learn from the experience of such keynote institutions, as the International Committee of the Red Cross, DCAF and OHCHR, to mention but a few.

I would also like to use this opportunity, and I trust I speak for us all, to thank the staff of the Swiss Parliament and our professional team of interpreters who have done an excellent job allowing people from Canada to Mongolia to discuss and understand one another. Thank you to the staff of the International Secretariat for its work to make this conference a reality as well.

From all the things a man can create bridges are the most valuable and the most important. I believe this session has been a great opportunity for us to build such bridges and continue the dialogue.

To make the results of our discussion most meaningful, we must, upon returning to our capitals, turn them into concrete plans we can implement in our own countries and on the international level. So let us all commit ourselves to working towards this objective.

Thank you.

CLOSING REMARKS BY THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SWITZERLAND, MR. RUEDI LUSTENBERGER

Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OSCE, cher Monsieur Ilkka Kanerva,
Cher Président de la Délégation suisse, cher Andreas,
Chers Collègues parlementaires,
Mesdames et Messieurs les Invités
Mesdames et Messieurs,

Der Schweizer Delegationsleiter, Herr Nationalrat Andreas Aebi hat vorhin einen allseitigen Dank ausgerichtet. Sehr gerne schliesse ich mich namens des eidg. Parlamentes diesem Dank an Sie alle an. Meine Anerkennung geht zudem an alle meine hier anwesenden KollegInnen des Nationalrat- und Ständerates sowie an alle Mitarbeiter des Generalsekretariats in Kopenhagen und der Schweizer Parlamentsdienste und selbstverständlich an den Herrn Delegationsleiter selber auch.

Es erfüllt mich, die Schweiz und ihre Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit Stolz, dass die Durchführung der Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE in der Eidgenossenschaft, hier in Genf nicht nur Wirklichkeit geworden, sondern nach drei Tagen nun auch erfolgreich abgeschlossen werden kann.

Die Parlamente des OSZE-Raumes haben sich mit ihre Stimme – meine Damen und Herren – vernehmen lassen. Das passierte zum Teil sehr deutlich, Sie haben Ihre Meinungen und Positionen in unserem institutionellen Rahmen kundgetan.

Im Zentrum war dabei nicht unerwartet der Konflikt in der Ukraine. Obwohl die Debatte darüber zum Teil sehr emotional geführt wurde, sind alle Botschaften der etwa 40 Redner vom Plenum mit dem gebührenden Respekt angehört worden. Obschon grundsätzliche Differenzen unüberhörbar zu spüren waren, ist die Notwendigkeit einer trilateralen Kontrolle unter der Federführung der OSZE hervorgehoben worden, und sie ist m. E. auf eine breite Zustimmung gestossen.

Ein solcher Mediationsprozess wäre ein guter Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer raschen Lösung der Krise; die Versammlung hat ein klares Zeichen in diese Richtung gegeben.

Meine Damen und Herren,

Darf ich zum Schluss der Tagung ganz kurz auf ein politisches Thema eingehen, das mir sehr am Herzen liegt. Es ist die Gewaltenteilung in unseren Demokratien. Ich halte es mit Montesquieu und seinen "Persischen Briefen", die besagen: „Die Willkür lässt sich wesentlich entschärfen, wenn die Herrschenden und ihre Beamten in der Ausübung der staatlichen Macht kontrolliert werden.“

Der französische Schriftsteller kritisierte damit die damaligen Zustände im absolutistisch regierten Frankreich scharf.

Die Erfolgsgeschichten der Demokratien in Europa zeigen -gerade auch im Vergleich mit anderen politischen Systemen – dass die Demokratie als Staatsform eben besonders wirksame Regelmechanismen enthält.

Die wichtigste davon, so erscheint es mir, ist die Gewaltentrennung, eine, die funktioniert und nicht nur auf Papier geschrieben ist. Die Trennung der Staatsmacht in drei unabhängige Gewalten ist jenes Instrument, welches eine Machtkonzentration und damit auch einen Machtmissbrauch verhindert oder zumindest einzudämmen vermag.

Sie und ich, meine Damen und Herren, als volksgewählte Parlamentarier verfügen über eine sehr grosse Legitimität, weil wir sie eben vom Souverän, vom Volk bekommen haben. Sie gibt uns den verfassungsmässigen Auftrag, Gesetze zu erlassen, also zu „legiferieren“.

Und, sie gibt den Parlamenten in der Regel noch einen zweiten, nicht minder wichtigen Auftrag, nämlich die parlamentarische Oberaufsicht über die anderen Gewalten auszuüben. Diese Kombination gebietet uns, unsere Aufgaben mit grösster Sorgfalt und Gewissenhaftigkeit auszuüben; damit bleiben wir glaubwürdig gegenüber unseres Souveräns.

Sie, meine Damen und Herren, als Mitglieder der parlamentarischen Versammlung der OSZE, Sie haben die Legitimität Ihrer Arbeit hiervon ihren Parlamenten direkt erhalten. Das stärkt Ihre Organisation und führt entsprechend zu einer grossen Anerkennung. In dieser Arbeit wünsche ich Ihnen weiterhin viel Glück und Erfolg zum Nutzen unserer Mitbürgerinnen und Mitbürger in Europa und in der ganzen Welt.

Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre develops and promotes norms and standards, conducts tailored policy research, identifies good practices and recommendations to promote democratic security sector governance, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes.



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