


COMMON MINIMUM STANDARDS



FOR CONDUCTING CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT VISITS
IN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA



Skopje, 2021

This document was developed through three multi-stakeholder practical workshops on „Operative Procedures for Conducting Intelligence Oversight and Control“, organized by DCAF - Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance in December 2019 (first one), February 2020 (second one), and June, September and October 2020 (the third one, divided into three online events).

The participants in the workshops were civil servants from intelligence and security institutions, responsible for inter-institutional cooperation, and civil servants from institutions with an oversight and/or control mandate within the intelligence and security sector. A total of 18 institutions were represented in the process:

- >> Ministry of Interior,
- >> Financial Police Directorate,
- >> Customs Administration,
- >> National Security Agency,
- >> Intelligence Agency,
- >> Ministry of Defense - Sector Military Service for Security and Intelligence,
- >> Army of the Republic of North Macedonia - Center for Electronic Reconnaissance,
- >> Operational-Technical Agency,
- >> Cabinet of the Prime Minister,
- >> The Unit of the Parliamentary Service for Support of the Committee on Defense and Security, the Committee for Supervision of the Work of the National Security Agency and the Intelligence Agency and the Committee for Supervision of the Implementation of the Measures for Interception of Communications,
- >> Criminal Court,
- >> Ministry of Information Society - State Administrative Inspectorate,
- >> Agency for Protection of the Right to Free Access to Public Information,
- >> Agency for Personal Data Protection,
- >> Directorate for Security of Classified Information,
- >> State Audit Office,
- >> Office of the Ombudsperson and
- >> Council for Civilian Supervision.

This text is the result of a collective effort. During the three workshops mentioned above, participants discussed in detail the provisions of national legislation, current procedures and practices in intelligence control and oversight, and have assessed challenges that need to be addressed in order to improve effectiveness of control and oversight activities. They have decided on the objectives and the content of this document and have established a methodology for elaborating the text. Lidija Raevska from the Ministry of Interior, Jovan Pavlovski from the Ministry of Defense, Natasha Nineska from the State Audit Office and prof. Dr. Ice Ilijevski from the Council for Civilian Supervision contributed to the preparation of the first draft. The review was coordinated by Valentina Novacheva from the Operational-Technical Agency. The participants from other institutions subsequently contributed with adjustments to the final content, through a participative process.

The Common Minimum Standards for Conducting Control and Oversight Visits in the Security and Intelligence Institutions in the Republic of North Macedonia (hereinafter CMS) is an ambitious document, as it aims to define a common denominator for control and oversight activities undertaken by a variety of state bodies. It has its foundation in national laws and procedures, but it takes inspiration from good practices, laws and procedures developed by other European countries. The CMS aims to facilitate, across the security and intelligence sector (including both overseen institutions and oversight actors), a shared understanding and mutually agreed acceptance of minimum standards that should apply in the conduct of control and oversight



visits. The document is not aimed at replacing basic and ancillary documents for conducting control and oversight, but it should serve as a guide on how the legal control and oversight authority should be implemented in practice. It is a joint roadmap that gathers necessary minimum standards, principles and procedures prescribed in domestic legislation and international good practice, that should facilitate and contribute to the success of control and oversight activities..

This document is a pioneering effort in good governance and multi-stakeholder dialogue, that should contribute towards increasing confidence and building mutual respect between overseers and the overseen.

Supported by



This publication was prepared as part of the DCAF-implemented Intelligence Sector Reform Programme in the Republic of North Macedonia (2017-2020). The content of this publication does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the donors or DCAF.



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I. GENERAL PRECONDITIONS

Changes in the manner of thinking and the need for control and oversight over security and intelligence institutions presumes that the institutions subject to control and oversight have the will and awareness of the necessity for their control, as a positive development component. Their functioning should be justified with transparency and the fulfillment of a public interest through oversight and control bodies, which will guarantee the legality and efficiency in the work of security and intelligence institutions in their conducted operational activities, proceedings and financing from public funds.

The scope and depth of control and oversight can be far reaching and at times impossible to implement and represents a significant burden on control and oversight bodies, which should achieve that level of compliance. However, the role of control and oversight is not only to perform that function, but also to increase the level of awareness and information of institutions subjected to control and oversight, in order to achieve the higher compliance level.

The issuing of measures and sanctions in cases of detected major discrepancies with the legislation is a component part of control and oversight; however, during their implementation, the control and oversight body is primarily performing a preventive function, which is usually described as the “**principle of prevention**”, i.e. promotion of the principle of voluntary compliance with legal provisions.

In the direction of democratic reforms in the security sector in the Republic of North Macedonia, it is necessary for security and intelligence institutions to establish **mechanisms for standards in work processes for multi-layer internal control** (both in management and in finances), which will provide “automatic” control that is unaffected by management subjectivism and will keep “in shape” the work of external control and oversight bodies.

Bearing in mind that control and oversight procedures have been regulated in several different substantive laws in this field, there is a general agreement within the group, who jointly contributed to this document, that there is a need for a legislative regulation of this complex system according to best European practices. A special regulation, through a law, of principles, concepts, plans, etc., would establish a clear systematized approach for control and oversight in every institution, organ or body and create conditions for regular periodical assessments and monitoring of the effect of control and oversight.

1. GOAL AND IMPLEMENTATION

1.1. Goal

The **fundamental goal** of these Common Minimum Standards (CMS) for Conducting Control and Oversight Visits in the Security and Intelligence Institutions is to help in the preparations and finalization of control and oversight from the viewpoint of mapping the procedure and predicting the risks that could make more difficult and/or disable the implementation of control and oversight.

Bearing in mind the variety of oversight and control bodies, each within its own legal competency, the CMS represents a **joint roadmap**, which is not aimed at replacing basic and ancillary documents for conducting control and oversight visits over subjects from the aspect of their legal competence. It aims to provide a common denominator to procedures and practices developed by different control and oversight bodies, in line with national regulations with relevant EU legislation (such as the General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR and Police Directive), and with the security of classified information and other requests arising from the legislative framework, strategies and protocols entailed by the EU accession process and NATO membership of the Republic of North Macedonia.

CMS can inform the preparation of oversight activities within the parliamentary Committees for Defense and Security; Oversight of the Work of Security and Intelligence Services and Implementation of Measures for Interception of Communications, and by the Council for Civilian Supervision. The CMS was primarily

elaborated to support the organization of inspection visits within the premises of security and intelligence institutions. However, many of the preconditions, preparatory and reporting steps detailed here, can inform the organization of other oversight activities specific to parliament (such as hearings, analysis and debate of activity reports, or even inquiries).

The ultimate goal of this CMS document is to contribute to professional and efficient control and oversight of this sector, which strengthens democratic governance, respects the rule of law, prevents misapplication and abuse of power, and provides for legality, effectiveness and efficiency in the work of security and intelligence institutions.

1.2. Implementation

CMS is envisaged as an **additional tool for all concerned parties that have legal competences to perform control and oversight visits of the security and intelligence institutions**. In addition to the legal control and oversight authority prescribed by statutory laws, CMS comes as an additional mechanism aimed to “demystify” control and oversight, helping **the specific preparations and necessary practical steps** for conducting successful control and oversight visits in the fields of defense and security, intelligence and counterintelligence and interception of communications.

CMS is intended for the institutions, bodies and committees that are part of the legislative, executive or judiciary authorities, and/or independent bodies performing control and oversight over security and intelligence institutions, with the purpose of creating a common approach to planning, implementing, completing and documenting control and oversight activities. It is also intended for the subjects of control and oversight to provide reversibility of the procedure (**Annex 1**).

The efficient application of CMS requires:

a) appropriately trained and sensitized personnel

- » identification of working positions in concerned institutions with appropriate knowledge and experience to participate in the control/oversight activities ensure proper training and sensibilization of relevant staff in security and intelligence institutions regarding oversight principles and the legal obligations of overseen institutions during control and oversight procedures;
- » appointing liaison persons/officers responsible for control and oversight procedures in every institution within the security and intelligence sector;
- » preparation of qualified staff in control/oversight bodies on the relevant physical and personal measures necessary for protection of classified information.
- » Additionally, during the establishment of the personnel structure involved in the implementation of the CMS, it is necessary to adhere to the principle of gender equality by providing responsibilities and opportunities for both men and women in the proceedings.

b) logistics support

An important precondition in the implementation of CMS, directly related to the efficiency of control/oversight, is the **availability of financial, material and technical means** to support and perform the functions for control and oversight of all stakeholders, as well as for the engagement of experts in particular and highly specialized fields.

2. BASIS FOR ESTABLISHMENT

CMS is established on the basis of domestic legislation (special laws regulating the competences of the control/oversight bodies), relevant European good practice in conducting control and oversight, EU Regulations, Directives and Recommendations, NATO membership standards, the agreements for reform and development of the security and intelligence sector, etc. (Annex 2).

3. BASIC PRINCIPLES

CMS is based on and provides for the implementation of the principles of democratic accountability: **legality, accountability, participation and transparency towards the public.**

In addition to these principles, CMS is also based on the principle of “**sufficiency**” whereby control and oversight activities need to be adequately proportioned in order to avoid overburdening and provide for the unobstructed work of the controlled subjects.

Additionally, CMS promotes an approach based on **risk management** and focuses on “smart” oversight, relying on risk factors arising from the available data and information collected during previous oversight visits. The greater the number of risk factors, especially essential factors for appropriate institutional work, the greater the probability is to detect irregularities, which results in a higher level of monitoring, control and oversight in the security sector.

II. BASIC PROCESSES FOR CONDUCTING CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT VISITS IN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS

Field visits, i.e. inspections, mean control and oversight activities in the security and intelligence institutions with the aim of conducting interviews with employees, analyses of events and segments in the work according to a random or planned choice, and access to technical/information equipment, documents and databases (in hard and electronic copies) etc. according to the principle of „need to know“.

There are **three basic processes** that each control/oversight activity should go through. For control/oversight to be efficient, each of the processes should be fully completed before proceedings going to the next one. These processes are:

1. **Process of planning,**
2. **Process of conducting,**
3. **Process of completing.**

These processes need to be carefully implemented in subsequent stages in order to achieve thoroughness and purposefulness.

1. PLANNING OF CONTROL/OVERSIGHT VISITS

Planning of control/oversight visits in the security and intelligence institutions should include the following sub-stages:

1. **Organizing coordinative meetings of the team conducting control/oversight,**
2. **Collecting information - prior research and preparation,**
3. **Drafting and approval of a control and oversight plan.**

1.1. Organizing Coordinative Meetings of the Team Conducting Control/Oversight

- » formal approval and/or decision for conducting control/oversight (depending on the organization of the control/oversight body),
- » identified organizational unit that will be the subject of control/oversight,
- » goals of the control/oversight.

Team for control/oversight:

- » statement on the absence of **conflict of interest**,
- » team coordination (this means detailed explanation of the control/oversight plan and discussion on its content **with all members of the control/oversight team, including their duties**),
- » collecting documents used during oversight, e.g. appropriate checklists,¹ findings from previous controls, copies from appropriate legal regulations, etc.),
- » drafting of additional lists to anticipate the possible need for interviews with employees outside of the organizational unit subject to control/oversight.

1.2. Collection of Information - Prior Research and Preparation

It is necessary to collect information during a previously determined timeframe prior to the planned start of the control/oversight in order to obtain and develop **a profile of the subject on the basis of available data**. It is necessary to collect and analyze a wide range of data in the preparation of control/oversight and for the general understanding of the security and intelligence institution, and the activities, characteristics, tasks and scope of the subject of control and oversight. Good knowledge of the security sector issues, working activities and tasks should be the basis for planning the control/oversight thereof. In general, preparations include:

- » legal framework for control and oversight;
- » legally defined responsibilities and competences;
- » circumstances for regular, ad-hoc, control or acting upon a complaint;
- » notifying the subject within reasonable time;
- » checking of data (checking of publicly available data on the subject or other relevant ways to collect information in order to determine the existence of certain indicators of potential irregularities with the subject, which would confirm the need for more specific checks during oversight);
- » fulfillment of conditions for access to classified information (having security certificates for access to classified information at the appropriate level);
- » defining specific areas, activities and tasks that need to be given special attention, and their introduction into the checklists;
- » setting deadlines for completing individual stages in control and oversight;
- » determining which persons will conduct control and oversight in the subject area (engage outside experts when possible and necessary);
- » providing findings from previous controls and oversight;
- » reports on the work of the subject;
- » determining and assessing the risk on control and oversight effectiveness.²

1.3. Drafting and Approval of a Control and Oversight Plan

The control and oversight plans that are being prepared can be:

- » broad or generic (annual, quarterly, periodical, etc.), or
- » specific plans (prior to every control/oversight).

The criteria that every specific control and oversight plan **(Annex 3)** should contain are:

- » number and title of the control/oversight;
- » subject and scope of the control/oversight;
- » compliance (security certificate);
- » goals of the control/oversight;
- » methods and techniques of the control/oversight;
- » team members who will conduct the control/oversight;
- » organization unit subject to the control/oversight;
- » manager of the organizational unit where the control/oversight will be conducted;
- » list of contact persons;
- » concrete activities of the control/oversight team members;
- » important conclusions from previous controls/oversight;
- » priorities/key issues and possible problems;
- » dates planned for start, duration and end of the control/oversight;
- » timely announcement of the control/oversight;
- » drafting minutes and a final report on the conducted control/oversight;
- » users of the final report of the conducted control/oversight.

2. CONDUCTING CONTROL/OVERSIGHT VISITS

2.1. Types of Control/Oversight Visits

Control of the legality of the implementation of the working methods and measures, as well as oversight of the work of security and intelligence institutions are conducted:

- » with prior announcement, or
- » without prior announcement to the security and intelligence institution subject to the control/oversight.
- » The actions of the control and supervisory bodies:
 - » comes at their own initiative, or
 - » on the basis of a complaint.
- » Regarding content, the conducted control and oversight visits are divided into:
 - » thematic control/oversight;
 - » control/oversight of a specific case, or
 - » inspection of the work of the security and intelligence institution subject to the control/oversight.

2.2. Course of Control/Oversight Visits

Location - control and oversight visit can be conducted on the official premises of security and intelligence institutions (headquarters, regional units, operational facilities, archives, information-communication databases, etc.), but also on the premises of the control and oversight bodies.

Identification - upon arrival at the security and intelligence institutions subjected to control/oversight, the representatives of the control and oversight bodies are received by a person appointed as liaison by the institution and they present their identifications by showing an official identification card, personal identification card or another personal identification document.³ A security certificate is presented, if needed.⁴

Initial meeting - control/oversight should start with an initial meeting-dialogue with the responsible person in the security and intelligence service, and the meeting should also include a discussion on the scope and procedure of the inspection supervision. These are the steps included:

- » presentation of the team in front of the management of the organization unit subject to control and supervision;
- » discussions and tour;
- » presenting the goal of the control/oversight and providing a short overview of the approach that will be taken. This includes the availability of information on the responsible person in the subject, such as documents and checklists that are filled in during oversight, with the aim of the person responsible receiving a clear picture on the findings, conclusions and recommendations;
- » query the management on additional areas that they believe should be examined, outside of the planned scope of the control/oversight;
- » checking of books and data (in hard copy or electronic form);
- » filling out of checklists, which will help prepare a major part of the minutes, including details on detected irregularities (the person responsible will be informed that before the end of the control/oversight they will have an opportunity to go over these insights and provide written comments that will be included in the official document/minute);
- » submitting a list of necessary documents to be provided for inspection;
- » inviting persons from a previously prepared list of contact persons whose presence is needed to conduct control/oversight.

Access to data, information and documents - the security and intelligence institutions is obliged to provide the representatives of control and oversight bodies access to all data, information and documents according to the “need to know” and “need to share” principles, as well as on the basis of law and by-laws.

Handling collected data, information and documents - control and oversight body representatives are obliged to keep, i.e. handle, the classified information and personal data they collected during the conducted control and oversight in accordance with the laws and by-laws regulating this issue.

Duration of control and oversight - the time frame for conducting control/oversight, as well as the deadline for submitting a final report are set previously with concretely determined dates for the separate stages of the actions. Pursuant to the "sufficiency" principle, the duration of control and oversight may not interfere with the on-going work of the security and intelligence institutions.

Final meeting - the final meeting is used to summarize all activities undertaken during control and oversight and the responsible person or a person authorized by them is informed about the findings, conclusions and adopted decisions. Additionally, the representative of the subject of control/oversight is informed about the next steps (manner of reporting, acting on complaints, repeated control/oversight, etc.).

Suspension of control and oversight - in cases when the security and intelligence institutions have immediate operational activities the control/oversight may be suspended for certain reasonable time, which is determined in agreement between both parties, pursuant to the "sufficiency" principle.

3. COMPLETION (DOCUMENTING, DISTRIBUTION AND FOLLOW-UP OF THE CONTROL/OVERSIGHT VISITS FINDINGS)

3.1. Preparation of a Draft Report

After completion of the control/oversight visits, in a determined time frame and on the basis of the findings, conclusions and adopted decisions presented at the final meeting, the control/oversight body prepares a draft report, which contains, in principle (**Annex 4**):

- >> type of control/oversight,
- >> reasons (regular, ad-hoc, on complaint, control etc.),
- >> concluded condition,
- >> recommendations and corrective measures for improving the condition (if irregularities are determined).

Namely, the draft report includes the determined condition arising from the conducted control and oversight activities, as well as the findings of the control and oversight bodies (comments, consequences, suggestions, recommendations, etc.). These minutes/reports can be signed by both parties.

The draft report should be completed during the field visit, i.e. at the location where the control/oversight is conducted. In certain cases, as an exception, the minutes may not be completed during the field visit. It then must be completed within time frames prescribed by law and submitted to the subject of the control/oversight.

This report is submitted to the subject of control/oversight that needs to state their opinion within a given time frame and submit any comments on the control/oversight and inform of possibly remediated detected irregularities, conducted corrective measures and recommendations.

All of these elements must be clearly and precisely written in the report/minutes, reinforced with adequate data supporting the finding, conclusions or the given sanction. Better and clear documenting and reporting leads to better files/cases that can afterwards be searched and checked for misdemeanor procedures or for complaints and objections to the conclusions and given sanctions. Adversely, badly comprised or unclear cases can compromise enforcement and judicial proceedings, thus undermining the trust in the role of the oversight body and the quality of the entire procedure.

To facilitate the procedure and standardize the process, it is recommended to prepare a unified form of the minutes/report on the conducted control/oversight.

3.2. Preparation of a Final Report

The final report is prepared taking into account all minutes, reports, information and all factors that have influenced the conducting of the control/oversight, and in principle it contains:

- » type of control/oversight;
- » reason(s) for control/oversight;
- » methods and techniques used;
- » detailed description of the detected conditions;
- » determined shortcomings and violations (if any are determined);
- » elements for further investigation (if any);
- » recommendations and corrective measures (divided into short, medium and long term according to the time needed for their remediation, pursuant to the principle of "sufficiency");
- » remarks/comments by the subject of the control/oversight;
- » determining the level of classification depending on the data contained in the report.

The final report can also contain separate opinions of members of the body on certain elements of the control/oversight. In cases when violations of legal procedures have been detected, the body conducting the control/oversight should immediately inform the public prosecution, competent bodies and the Parliament and, in certain cases, the public as well.

3.3. Documenting the Control/Oversight Visits

This procedure concerns subjects performing control and supervision and is performed in all stages of control/oversight consecutively and it means the filling out of checklists, recording interviews, preparing minutes, draft-reports and final reports, while respecting the deadlines for preparation and distribution of the reports.

The complete documents arising from and/or attached to the subject of control and oversight is recorded in the archive and is appropriately stored in a paper or electronic form. The established case is handled according to the positive legal provisions (Law on Archive Material, the Decree for Office and Archive Operations and the provisions arising from the Law on Classified Information).

3.4. Distribution of the Report

Depending on the level of classification, the final report is submitted to end uses in accordance with the "need to know" principle, taking care of the level of classification and security certificate that the user has.

The report is submitted to the subject of control/oversight, the whole report or parts thereof are submitted to the stakeholders, i.e. the complainant (if any) and other institutions (in cases when serious irregularities outside of the scope of competence have been determined).

3.5. Follow-up of the Control/Oversight Visits Findings

Based on the deadlines set for resolving the shortcomings and violations (short-term, medium-term and long-term, guided by the "sufficiency" principle), a follow-up control/oversight visit is planned to determine if and how many of these remarks/recommendations have been resolved. After this visit, the competent authorities are informed about the achieved progress.

III. TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

The level of secrecy of the work of the security and intelligence sector should be based on the potential harm that might arise from the unauthorized disclosure of information. Transparency and access to information are fundamental principles of democracy and classification of information must be used sparingly.

In democratic societies the emphasis of intelligence communities ought to be on openness with some exceptions. Openness of security and intelligence institutions work is a necessary condition of democratic governance and protection of human rights, so secrecy should be regarded as an exception that in every case demands a convincing justification.

Bearing in mind the fact that the public is always interested in the work of security and intelligence institutions and that control/oversight bodies are obliged to respect the democratic principles of transparency, it is especially important not to present classified information and/or excerpts from classified information to the public, but to inform the public in a manner that will not harm the specific interests and scope of work of these institutions.

Additionally, having in mind broader societal interests, control and oversight bodies should have integrity when informing the public if abuse or violations of regulations by the subject of control/oversight were determined.

Greater transparency regarding the security and intelligence institutions would help to reduce public suspicion of these organizations and heighten public confidence in them.



ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 – INSTITUTIONS, ORGANS AND BODIES INVOLVED IN THE CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

Entities that are subject to control and oversight – security and intelligence institutions

1. Ministry of Interior - Public Security Bureau
2. Financial Police Directorate
3. Customs Administration
4. National Security Agency
5. Intelligence Agency
6. Operational-Technical Agency
7. Ministry of Defense – Military Service for Security and Intelligence
8. Army - Center for Electronic Reconnaissance

Entities that may conduct control and oversight visits in the security and intelligence institutions

1. Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security
2. Parliamentary Committee for Supervising of the work of the National Security Agency and the Intelligence Agency
3. Parliamentary Committee on Oversight of the Implementation of Measures for Interception of Communications
4. Supreme Court Justice
5. Pre-trial Judge
6. Public Prosecutor of Republic of North Macedonia
7. Public Prosecutor
8. Ministry of Finance – Central Unit for Harmonization of the Public Internal Financial Control System
9. Ministry of Information Society and Administration – State Administrative Inspectorate
10. Agency for Protection of the Right to Free Access to Public Information
11. Agency for Personal Data Protection
12. Directorate for Security of Classified Information
13. State Audit Office
14. Ombudsperson
15. Council for Civilian Supervision

ANNEX 2 – LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INSTITUTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA

1. Constitution of the Republic of North Macedonia
2. Law on Police
3. Law on Internal Affairs
4. Law on Interception of Communications
5. Law on Electronic Communications
6. Law on the National Security Agency
7. Law on the Operational-Technical Agency
8. Law on the Finance Police
9. Law on the Customs Administration
10. Law on the Intelligence Agency
11. Law on Defense
12. Army Service Law
13. Law on Ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty
14. Law on Ratification of the Stabilization and Association Treaty between the European Communities and their Member States on the one hand and the Republic of Macedonia on the other
15. Law on Personal Data Protection
16. Law on Criminal Procedure
17. Public Internal Financial Control Law
18. Law on Budgets
19. State Audit Law
20. Law on the Assembly
21. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
22. Law on Classified Information
23. Law on Ombudsperson
24. Law on Public Prosecution
25. Law on Free Access to Public Information

ANNEX 3 – CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT PLAN

Organizational unit

No. _____

Archive sign _____

Date _____

Place _____

CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT PLAN

Number and title of the control/oversight	
Subject of the control/oversight	
Team members conducting the control/oversight	
Organization unit subjected to the control/oversight	
PHead of the organization unit subjected to the control/oversight	
List of contact persons	
Goals of the control/oversight	
Activities covered by the control/oversight	
Limiting factors	
Important conclusions from previous controls/oversight	
Priorities/key issues/questions and possible problems to be followed during the visit	
Planned dates for start, duration and completion of the control/oversight	
Preparation of minutes and final report on the conducted control/oversight	
Users of the final report on the conducted control/oversight	

Comment:

Prepared by: _____

Approved by: _____

ANNEX 4 – DRAFT REPORT

Control/oversight body

Subject of control/oversight

No. _____
Archive sign _____
Date _____
Place _____

DRAFT REPORT

Committee for control/oversight: 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____	Liaison officer in the subject of control/oversight 1. _____ 2. _____ (deputy)	Type of action: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• regular• ad-hoc• on complaint• control
---	---	--

Purpose of control/oversight:

Limitations (regarding the various competences of control/oversight body):

Documents for inspection:

Current situation:

Conclusion:

Recommended corrective measures:

Deadline for remediation of remarks/recommendations:

Submitted to:

Acquainted liaison officer:

1. _____
2. _____(deputy)

Control/oversight by a committee comprised of:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____



