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The UN approach to SSR from a development perspective

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Introduction

Security sector reform (SSR) as a “discipline” has its roots in the development agenda,¹ and was spearheaded largely by development entities. For instance, the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) was a frontrunner in this area and the first to develop its conceptual framework for SSR, in 2000. The first multilateral organization to develop guidelines and a handbook on SSR was the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 2005 and 2008 respectively.

SSR has been promoted by development entities based on a number of core assumptions:

- There can be no development without peace and security, and no peace and security without development;
- SSR may provide an organizing principle and conceptual framework around which development and security practitioners can collaborate and work together to bridge the security-development nexus; and
- SSR would thus contribute positively to both security and development goals.²

Similar assumptions underpin the UN approach to SSR and were subjects of discussion during foundational workshops and debates on SSR among UN Member States in 2006 and 2007.³ It was acknowledged at the time that, while different UN entities had long provided a large and diverse array of support to national actors to re-establish or re-enforce security, the Organization had not applied a coherent approach to these efforts. Participants stressed that the UN must develop a conceptual framework for SSR in order to deliver SSR support more effectively. UN Member States emphasized in particular that UN development and security practitioners needed to collaborate better, to: support reform processes that are sustainable; underpin poverty reduction through enhanced security service delivery; and help develop accountable security sectors.⁴

This chapter sets out how the UN approach to SSR has evolved from a UN development perspective, by first examining the evolution of the UN approach to SSR at the policy, institutional, and operational levels, and subsequently, challenges to SSR from a development perspective and how they can be addressed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the UN system is jointly addressing major obstacles at the policy, institutional, and operational levels to enhance the nexus between security and development in SSR, and is bringing about sustainable changes in security sectors in countries where UN peace operations have a UN Security Council mandate as well as in non-mission contexts.

How has the UN SSR agenda evolved at different levels?

The political level

In recognition of the fact that the nature and root causes of violence had changed since 1945, the first in-depth political debates within the UN on the complexities of the security-development nexus emerged in the 1990s.⁵ Engaged in these debates were members of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),⁶ responsible for providing direction to the UN Development System, and of the Security Council,⁷ responsible for peace and security – all of whom shared the view that root causes of violence should largely be understood to lie in the interconnected and multi-layered nature of people's insecurity and lack of development opportunities. Since then, the political discourse of UN governing bodies has continuously underscored that security and development are intrinsically linked and should be pursued in an integrated manner.

Still, it was not until 2006 that SSR featured in these debates as a dedicated concept or area of attention. It was then that Slovakia held a series of thematic debates on SSR, in view of its February 2007 Presidency of the Security Council. This resulted in the first-ever Security Council debate on SSR and the adoption of a Presidential Statement on the role of the UN in SSR support.⁸ As such, while the SSR agenda was spearheaded globally by development donors and organizations, its entry into the UN was not through ECOSOC or other UN development bodies, but through the Security Council.

Following SSR debates, the Security Council progressively mandated peacekeeping operations to advise and support national governments on SSR, with Sierra Leone and Burundi among the earliest examples. As such, SSR increasingly became a priority for UN peace operations. In 2014, another breakthrough was achieved in further formalizing the UN SSR agenda, when the Security Council adopted resolution 2151 (2014). This first UN resolution on SSR stresses that in *post-conflict contexts*, SSR is critical for peace and stability as well as poverty reduction.

The resolution was pushed forward by the co-chairs of the Group of Friends for SSR – Slovakia and South Africa – and recalls that SSR should be pursued within the overall framework of the rule of law and should emphasize national ownership along with accountable, transparent, and inclusive security sectors. It advocates for a sector-wide approach to SSR and highlights the important role of development actors in achieving the sustainability of SSR.⁹

Since its establishment in 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)¹⁰ has also regularly discussed SSR as a crucial priority in peacebuilding contexts.¹¹ The PBC is one of the few UN organs that brings the governing bodies on development and security together: it is comprised of UN Member States from the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Security Council, as well as the five top providers of peacekeepers to UN missions.¹² The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was also established, as a non-operational entity that draws on and brings together operational resources across the UN system on peacebuilding priorities such as SSR. The PBC and PBSO are supported by a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) that provides financing across the security-development nexus, including to UN support to national SSR efforts.

Despite this, the intergovernmental body for development, ECOSOC, has never explicitly endorsed national SSR efforts as a core area of work in purely *development contexts*, nor has it explicitly acknowledged the importance of SSR for poverty reduction or adopted any reports of the Secretary-General emerging from the UN SSR agenda. Most aligned to the SSR agenda have been discussions within ECOSOC of concepts relating to human security and the rule of law.¹³ Rule of law is broadly defined within the UN as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”¹⁴ While neither the security sector nor SSR is unambiguously referred to in deliberations within ECOSOC or the General Assembly on rule of law, General Assembly resolution 67/1 does call attention to the importance of “strengthening security institutions that are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals and which build trust and promote social cohesion and economic prosperity.”¹⁵ As such, the General Assembly has acknowledged SSR as a development priority within the overall umbrella of rule of law.

In addition, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by ECOSOC and the General Assembly in September 2015 includes Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peaceful, just, and inclusive societies. In this way, ECOSOC and the General Assembly have both endorsed the promotion of peace as an essential development goal. While SDG 16 does not include references to security, security institutions, or SSR, it does affirm that UN Member States should promote peace and the rule of law as part of their development agendas and calls

for accountable and transparent institutions. Together, Agenda 2030 and General Assembly resolution 67/1 represent an indirect endorsement by the Assembly and ECOSOC that SSR is indeed part of the development agenda.

As for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it has placed its support to SSR in its rule of law programme, which sits within its democratic governance portfolio. From 2011 onwards, UNDP's Executive Board has approved strategic plans that explicitly acknowledge UNDP support to SSR along these lines.¹⁶

The institutional and policy level

Driven by the Security Council as a political issue, support to SSR was institutionalized in 2007 in the Office for Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). OROLSI was established on the recommendation of the Secretary-General to facilitate a holistic, integrated approach to UN support for rule of law and security institutions in peace operations.¹⁷ The Office consists of various units dedicated to SSR, police, justice and prison services, mine action, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The SSR Unit is mandated to serve as the Secretariat for the UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF),¹⁸ to promote UN system-wide coherence. The IASSRTF was also established in 2007 and is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP. These co-chairs and the IASSRTF Secretariat have been instrumental in providing technical and political support to discussions taking place at the Member State level, including on Security Council resolution 2151 and SDG 16, as well as in promoting and enhancing regional cooperation on SSR, most notably with the African Union.

Of the fourteen IASSRTF members, eight report to and derive their mandate from the General Assembly and ECOSOC and are considered "UN development entities."¹⁹ Development entities require approval by their Executive Boards on three- to four-year strategic plans, which set out priority areas and the development interventions that will be supported at the field level. Country operations then align their strategic plans to these, before submitting them to the Executive Boards for approval and reporting them to ECOSOC.

The lack of recognition and prioritization of SSR by ECOSOC has inevitably created certain obstacles for UN development entities to engage in SSR, except through the IASSRTF. The IASSRTF has become a vehicle to institutionalize and further develop a coherent UN SSR approach through the development of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGNs) on SSR. In this process, various IASSRTF members have taken the lead in developing ITGNs in their specific area of expertise related to the SSR agenda, respecting their individual mandates but soliciting and integrating cross-cutting expertise from all members.²⁰

The operational level

Since Security Council debates on SSR and the establishment of the SSR Unit in DPKO in 2007, the number of mandates for SSR in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and special political missions (SPMs) has grown significantly. Dedicated components already existed for police and, in some cases, rule of law (focusing on the justice sector), so SSR components initially became focused on reforms in the defence sector.

UN development entities increased support to the security sector significantly starting in 2002, when the OECD agreed to include a large number of security sector support interventions within the definition of official development assistance (ODA).²¹ Apart from extensive comprehensive support to national security policies in both Iraq and Somalia, though, development entities have been mostly involved with police and justice reform elements of SSR, to date. UNDP, UNODC, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are implementing capacity development programming for police that addresses public sector reform and policing techniques like community-oriented policing, as well as providing equip-and-train activities. Support to police from UNDP, UN Women, and UNFPA is also aimed at reducing sexual and gender-based violence; and from UNICEF, at promoting children's rights and child protection.

In compliance with ITGNs, the UN approach to supporting national SSR efforts has become more integrated and comprehensive. The IASSRTF has advocated for joint SSR assessments involving the development entities, as well as joint SSR programming that brings together a mission and a UN country team or two or more UN agencies in non-mission settings. Joint assessments in non-mission settings, or in non-peacebuilding contexts, remain limited; but these are likely to become more common in light of the sustaining peace agenda.

Joint assessments conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Iraq, and Guinea have all produced recommendations, some of which resulted in joint programming. The IASSRTE, in collaboration with UNDP, issued a call for proposals to promote and encourage joint SSR programming at the country level. Projects were supported in Kosovo, Honduras, Myanmar, Iraq, Guinea Bissau, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia. Currently, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM) has a mandate to support state building, including in areas of SSR, and has developed a comprehensive approach to security with an integrated SSR Unit that involves DPKO and UNDP to ensure a coordinated political and developmental approach, focusing on good governance and public sector reform. Each of these contexts features UN security and development actors collaborating at the strategic and advisory levels. For example, the Gambia also has a dedicated team to support SSR, while in Burkina Faso, SSR advisory capacity

supported by DPKO is actually housed under UNDP in-country, an interesting arrangement providing joint support in a non-mission setting.

Since the establishment of the UN peacebuilding agenda in 2005, any number of thematic areas covering or strongly related to SSR have received more attention than SSR *per se*, often coupled with the establishment of dedicated inter-agency arrangements at the Headquarters level. Hence, coherence in the operational support provided by the UN to SSR has not developed solely through the evolving UN SSR policy and the IASSRTF. Inter-agency bodies related to SSR include: the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), established by the UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security in 2005 (co-chaired by UNDP and DPKO); the Task Force on Counter-Terrorism Implementation, established by the General Assembly in 2006 (co-chaired by DPA and UNODC); the UN Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking, established by the UN SG Policy Committee 2011 (co-chaired by DPA and UNODC); the UN Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law, established by the UN SG Policy Committee in 2012 (co-chaired by UNDP and DPKO); and the inter-agency Team of Experts on Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, created by Security Council in 2009²² and endorsed by the General Assembly in 2013.²³

Among the most relevant of these to SSR is the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law (GFP). The GFP was initially cost-neutral and Headquarters-based, with the aim was to bring coherence to the work of the UN in mission settings. In DPKO, the OROLSI Police Division and Justice and Corrections Service were a part of this arrangement, but other OROLSI components, including the SSR Unit, were not initially included. Whereas the SSR work of the IASSRTF has remained primarily focused at the policy level, the GFP has become highly field-driven; for instance, supporting the establishment of joint programmes to strengthen and reform police, justice, and corrections institutions in the Central African Republic, Mali, Haiti, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, and Darfur, involving both peace operations as well as UN development agencies, usually with the UNDP acting as a coordinator and fund administrator as well as technical support provider.

Support to SSR also continues to be provided by individual UN entities in the field without any engagement by a dedicated inter-agency arrangement. Increasingly, this type of support employs integrated approaches that include both UN security and development entities. Typically, as with the GFP, the main vehicle for this collaboration is a joint rule of law programme for which the UNDP plays a coordination and administration role.

Whether joint SSR support is encouraged through an inter-agency arrangement or through individual UN entities, funding incentives have generally been a major

determinant of coherence. Financing through the Peacebuilding Fund, assessed contributions for inter-agency programmatic funding, voluntary contributions for joint programmes, and financing from the UNDP Global Rule of Law programme have all been significant boosts to UN coherence in SSR. In recent years, the UN and the World Bank have also increased their cooperation on SSR, through joint public expenditure reviews (PERs) at the country level. DPKO and UNDP also collaborated on a first-ever technical sourcebook designed to highlight the role played by public finance in the delivery of security and criminal justice services. The sourcebook offers a framework for SSR practitioners, to help them better understand how a security or justice sector can be rebuilt or reformed sustainably based on available resources and revenue predictions.²⁴

Additionally, in 2015, a number of high-level reviews were undertaken of the UN peace and security architecture.²⁵ The recommendations materializing from this process are focused on prevention and will bring the UN security and development pillars closer together at the operational level.²⁶

Challenges in SSR from a development perspective, and how can they be addressed

As the SSR agenda has evolved, several challenges have emerged. For one, SSR has frequently been misconstrued as exclusively a national security project, rather than a development priority. Generalized blueprints have also tended to dominate over context-specific plans, with an impact on policy and institutional structures. Moreover, financing remains unpredictable, and monitoring and evaluation of SSR support is limited. These challenges are explored in detail below, with corresponding recommendations.

SSR is often misunderstood and misapplied as an agenda for national security by military means

As a discipline, SSR was founded in principles of good governance – such as adherence to rule of law and human rights – and the objective of UN support to national SSR efforts is “to ensure that people feel safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions operating under civilian control and within a framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.”²⁷ The OECD, along with most other international organizations and bilateral donors, views the aims of SSR similarly and places accountability and civilian oversight at the centre of SSR in their respective policy frameworks. Nevertheless, among national and international UN counterparts and sometimes among UN practitioners themselves, a common misinterpretation persists that the SSR agenda is one of

national security by military means. This can be dangerously misapplied in policy and practice at the country level as a rationale for security sector capacity building that does not account for an inclusive and accountable sector based on democratic oversight and good governance.

Extending from the policy guidance of UN organs and the ODA criteria set out above, UN development entities can support the military from a rule of law and governance perspective. Development support is vital, for instance, to strengthening core ministry of defence functions, including as far as accountable budgeting, planning, procurement, and salary payments, as well as to the military in emergencies such as natural disasters or a sudden refugee influx. However, a military-centric focus often undermines rather than enhances human development and can make engagement by UN development entities virtually impossible. The following recommendations can help prevent this dilemma:

- UN leadership at the country level should put more emphasis on strategic advocacy and the education of national and international counterparts regarding the developmental approaches and principles of good governance that should underpin SSR.
- UN operational support to SSR should focus more strongly on human rights, accountability, and democratic oversight, and should be reduced anywhere it could result in a state military force becoming oppressive. UN development entities bring important expertise in good governance capacity development, which prevents corruption or misconduct in the security forces by establishing or supporting oversight institutions. ECOSOC members are particularly encouraged to provide stronger political support and direction to promote their involvement; for instance, by more explicitly underscoring that SSR, including development support to ministries of defence, is essential for development and for the achievement of SDG 16 in particular.

Priorities and entry points for SSR are often derived from general blueprints not specific context

Concepts of security vary widely depending on country context. Today's SSR challenges are also incredibly complex, involving corruption and human rights abuses instigated by the state, unprecedented levels of forced displacement, questions of legal identity, and concerns about violent extremism and organized crime. Further, the UN often works in contexts where traditional justice and customary security institutions are prevalent and even preferred over formal justice and security systems, or where formal systems are weak or absent. It is thus problematic that the international community, including UN entities and major bilateral donors, tends to apply SSR support models that can be deemed as fairly "Western" in nature, with SSR

programmes that in some cases look like blueprints that do not fit neatly into the confines of other (complicated) contexts.

These blueprints can lead, for instance, to a siloed focus on the ministries of defence and interior as the first entry points for SSR. Yet, in some contexts, support is better delivered through parliaments, ministries of justice, informal justice and security arrangements, local governments, anti-corruption bodies, human rights commissions, or civil society. Similarly, the provision of criminal justice services to a population is often seen as the best way to instil trust in security forces. However, trust is sometimes more effectively achieved through effective traffic control, eliminating illegal housing evictions, ensuring the non-corrupt provision of identity cards, and developing community-oriented engagement during emergencies. Non-contextualized SSR support is also frequently characterized by expensive support to highly bureaucratic state-centric military, police, or justice models with large overheads and complex command and control structures. In some cases, this calls for costly infrastructure in areas where local populations have already constructed resilient local bodies.

The UN is well-positioned to work closely with communities to understand local security and justice needs, conduct multi-disciplinary analyses, and design appropriate and comprehensive interventions. However, the full potential of UN SSR support is often unmet due to a reliance on generalized blueprints, combined with unhelpful conceptual, institutional, and financial incentives (as explained in the next section). The following recommendations can help the UN provide better context-specific support:

- The UN should place a stronger emphasis on multi-disciplinary analysis and on understanding local contexts as a necessary basis for any SSR support. This is vital to designing appropriate and effective interventions that improve security and justice, and to preventing harmful interventions that undermine local structures.
- The UN should strengthen its current collaboration with the World Bank and increase engagement on economic projections, to ascertain the realistic financial capacities of national authorities and local governments over time. This should complement UN analysis and should inform SSR advice on, for instance, the composition of military and police. It should also prevent or limit overinvestment in capacities and structures that cannot be maintained by national authorities.
- The UN, and UNDP in particular, should much better utilize extensive expertise, partnerships, and programme support in areas such as institutional capacity development in order to strengthen core government functions and the capacities of security ministries to deliver services (whether these services are related to criminal justice, traffic control, passports, or disaster response), as well as to strengthen local governance, parliaments, disaster risk reduction, and poverty

reduction. This would also play a role in addressing SSR-relevant issues such as demobilization or the prevention of youth engagement in conflict.

Blueprints for SSR support are reinforced by policy and related institutional structures

Because the UN's system-wide approach to SSR evolved alongside a number of other strongly interlinked and interrelated system-wide UN areas – such as DDR, rule of law, transnational organized crime, and sexual violence in conflict – for which the relationship with SSR is unclear at the policy and operational levels, these unresolved policy issues impact UN institutional arrangements at the Headquarters level and are often mirrored at the country level. This affects operational support. From the standpoint of development, it is particularly pressing that the relationship between rule of law and SSR is further clarified. For instance, SSR is placed within the framework of rule of law at the policy level, but peace operations often have a separate rule of law unit exclusively covering the justice sector, along with a police unit and an SSR unit, all with separate reporting lines. As a result, SSR units in peace operations, which increasingly apply comprehensive approaches to security, including supporting national security policies, are doing so independent from rule of law and police components. To overcome some of these issues, the SSR Unit in DPKO has recently joined the GFP arrangement at the Headquarters level to build coherence between rule of law and SSR, but the collaboration will take time to be fully implemented at the field level.

On the UNDP side, support to defence, police, justice, and corrections are all placed within the rule of law programme, which encourages a coherent SSR approach. However, silos continue to exist where police and justice programmes remain separate at the country level, or where it has been challenging to bring justice and police support together to address the criminal justice chain. This is generally due to donor earmarking and programme or project design (e.g. separate outputs for justice and police), or to staffing profiles – justice sector experts are hired for their experience within the justice sector and police experts for their work within the police, but these experts often lack experience with overall reform in the area of rule of law.

The following recommendations can help the UN resolve policy and structural obstacles to SSR:

- UN leadership should build on the UN prevention agenda, policy committee decisions, and the GFP review to clarify the relationship between rule of law and SSR at the policy, institutional, and operational levels. The GFP should be used to achieve coherence in country-level support to national SSR efforts.
- In peace operations, rule of law, police, and SSR units should be integrated, and should include development actors, to work on the basis of joint outcomes

and programmes or joint frameworks under a comprehensive justice and SSR approach. The UN should also make more concerted efforts to recruit staff with experience in comprehensive reforms that extend beyond one single component area.

Financing is often insufficient for long-term and coherent SSR support

The Security Council continues to be the main body mandating UN support to SSR in countries with peace operations, with the DPKO SSR Unit serving as primary Headquarters support to those operations. Security Council mandates are often extensive and open-ended, but the resources allotted to SSR are usually limited and directed at quick impact projects; and when no funding is awarded to SSR, UN missions engage strictly in an advisory capacity. Further, SSR efforts are often uncoordinated and disconnected from work taking place in the justice sector or in service of the wider public sector reform agenda, because funding remains ad hoc and sporadic. Meanwhile, development actors may struggle to secure funds for SSR, because the work is seen as the remit of the peace operation.

In non-mission settings, particularly in development contexts, financing SSR and integrated UN approaches is a growing challenge. Without strong support from ECOSOC in making SSR a priority for developing countries, it remains difficult to maintain financing and political support for support to SSR by development entities. And while the DPKO SSR Unit is mandated to provide system-wide support in mission *and* non-mission settings, DPKO is financed by the peacekeeping support account and does not have access to financing for non-peacekeeping settings. So far, UN reforms on sustaining peace do not appear likely to alter this fundamental structural obstacle, even as the sustaining peace agenda further prioritizes cross-pillar approaches that cut across all phases of a conflict cycle as central to the work of the Organization. In countries classified as peacebuilding, the PBC offers an opportunity for additional resources, especially in transition contexts, by encouraging joint and sustainable approaches to SSR.

The following recommendations can help the UN fill financial gaps that impact SSR support:

- To overcome financial limitations and expand joint work on SSR, the UN should establish integrated units in mission settings that operate system-wide and mobilize resources either by advocating for assessed contributions from the mission mandate or bring in voluntary contributions from donors to support implementation of the mission mandate on SSR.
- In non-mission settings, the UN Secretariat and UN development entities should consider establishing an umbrella for SSR expertise from the UN Secretariat

at the UNDP, in existing rule of law teams, and should engage with PBC and development donors to bring financial resources for longer-term reform.

- ECOSOC Member States and PBC Member States should leverage the reform agenda of the current Secretary-General to increase attention on SSR as a priority for development, the sustaining peace agenda, and the prevention of conflict by engaging the PBC and ECOSOC to endorse more resources for SSR in both mission and non-mission contexts.

Shortcomings in monitoring and evaluating UN SSR support and in demonstrating results

Compared to peace operations, development projects are generally required to provide much more detailed evidence of results to donors. One of the biggest shortcomings of UN SSR support from a development perspective is how difficult it has been to demonstrate the effects of SSR support on the accountability and effectiveness of security institutions, and further that this accountability and effectiveness has led to increased safety, security, poverty reduction, and human development. While the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report and other sources emphasize that SSR is vital for development, there is little direct data to show how UN SSR support has directly impacted poverty reduction in specific countries.

Among the challenges to demonstrating the effects of SSR support are the short-term, one-year mandates of peace operations. This essentially discourages the UN from designing longer-term engagements or the monitoring and evaluation frameworks to measure results beyond short-term outputs (such as people trained, equipment delivered, etc.). The UN is seeking to overcome this through joint programming with UN development entities, but it remains challenging to measure impact at the outcome level. Other challenges are related to some of the political and conceptual issues set out above. For instance, in some countries where SSR has negative political connotations, the UN has provided SSR support without necessarily labelling it as such, which makes it rather difficult to measure its impact. Finally, though ITGNs provide a good guide, some remaining conceptual issues make it a challenge to develop good SSR indicators against which to measure results.

The following recommendation can help the UN better assess SSR outcomes:

- The IASSRTF and the GFP should support the development of a multi-year joint monitoring and evaluation framework that is flexible enough to be contextualized at the country level. This would support UN field offices to measure all interventions and projects on SSR and rule of law in concert. While various tools exist to obtain relevant information, political commitment and investment are necessary to ensure that impact over time is measured. This task could be housed

under the Resident Coordinator system and should be linked to SDG 16 in close collaboration with national authorities.

Conclusion

The UN has made great strides in developing an approach to SSR that adheres to founding principles and assumptions, yet obstacles remain at the political, policy, and operational levels. The development-security nexus has long been acknowledged by UN Member States and it is clear that both UN development entities and security entities have a vital role to play in the provision of support to national SSR efforts.²⁸ A more explicit endorsement by ECOSOC of SSR as a development priority, including in non-peacekeeping contexts, would help in advancing and improving the sustainability and effectiveness of UN SSR support.

In many cases, the UN approach to SSR has provided an organizing principle and conceptual framework that has allowed development and security practitioners to collaborate in order to bridge the security-development nexus. However, depending on the political context, other conceptual frameworks sometimes prove more useful to advancing SSR. On top of this, conceptual confusion and institutional silos, coupled with funding challenges, continue to hinder optimal collaboration. UN SSR support should pursue more sustainable and locally-driven approaches, avoiding blueprinted support packages.

Lastly, SSR clearly contributes to both security and development goals, but there is a lack of data and monitoring and evaluation to measure the impact of UN SSR support. Moving forward, it is vital that the UN demonstrate *how* its support to national SSR efforts has ultimately enhanced the safety and development of societies.

Notes

- ¹ See Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, Occasional Paper no. 4, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003).
- ² See Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr, "Returning to the Development Roots of Security Sector Reform," in *Back to the Roots: Security Sector Reform and Development*, eds. Albrecht Schnabel and Vanessa Farr (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012), 3–4.
- ³ United Nations, 5632nd Meeting of the Security Council (S/PV.5632), 20 February 2007; Security Council Report, *Update Report: Security Sector Reform*, 14 February 2007.
- ⁴ United Nations, *Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept*, report from the Roundtable co-organised by Slovakia and Canada, New York, 8 November 2006; United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/3), 21 February 2007.
- ⁵ United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (A/47/277-S/24111)*, 17 June 1992; United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (1994)*; United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000;

- United Nations, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/564), 2 December 2004; United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (A/59/2005), 21 March 2005.
- ⁶ ECOSOC is the UN governing body for sustainable development. It has 54 members elected by the General Assembly. Seats are allotted based on geographical representation.
- ⁷ The Security Council has the sole authority to take measures that impinge upon national sovereignty in the interest of the maintenance of peace and security. The Council has 15 members, including five permanent members (US, China, Russia, France, and UK) with veto power and ten non-permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.
- ⁸ Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2007/3).
- ⁹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2151 (S/RES/2151), 28 April 2014.
- ¹⁰ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1645 (S/RES/1645), 20 December 2005; United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (A/RES/60/180), 20 December 2005.
- ¹¹ See for example United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (A/RES/70/262), 12 May 2016.
- ¹² This was proposed in 2005 by Secretary-General Kofi Annan. See United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (A/59/2005), 21 March 2005. It was also endorsed by Security Council Resolution 1645 (S/RES/1645) and General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (A/RES/60/180).
- ¹³ On human security, see United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (A/RES/66/290), 25 October 2012; and United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (A/64/701), 8 March 2010. On rule of law see United Nations, Economic and Social Council Resolution 2004/25 (21 July 2004) and 2006/25 (27 July 2006).
- ¹⁴ See reports of the Secretary-General on the rule of law beginning with United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/616), 23 August 2004; and United Nations, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (A/RES/67/1), 30 November 2012.
- ¹⁵ United Nations, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law (A/RES/67/1), para. 11.
- ¹⁶ For example see UNDP Strategic Plans 2011–2013 and 2014–2017.
- ¹⁷ United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General (A/61/858/Add.1), 17 April 2007.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 205, 206, and 210.
- ¹⁹ These are: UNDP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Office of Under Secretary General on Africa (OSAA), and UN Women.
- ²⁰ The current set of ITGNs, published in 2012, consists of guidance notes on: (i) national ownership of SSR (led jointly by UNDP and DPKO); (ii) gender-responsive SSR (led by UN Women); (iii) peace processes and SSR (led by DPA); (iv) democratic governance of the security sector (led by UNDP); (v) UN support to national security policy- and strategy-making processes (led by DPKO). An additional guidance note, on transnational organized crime and SSR (led by UNODC), was issued in 2016.
- ²¹ “Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation,” in *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris: OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2001), 119.
- ²² United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1888 (S/RES/1888), 30 September 2009.
- ²³ United Nations, A Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (A/68/633), 3 December 2013.
- ²⁴ Bernard Harborne et al, eds., *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, United Nations, 2017).

- ²⁵ See United Nations, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice and Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (2015); United Nations; Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968–S/2015/490), 29 June 2015; United Nations, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/70/95–S/2015/446), 17 June 2015; Security Council Resolution 1645 (S/RES/1645); and General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (A/RES/60/180).
- ²⁶ Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (A/69/968–S/2015/490).
- ²⁷ United Nations, Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (2012), 1.
- ²⁸ As reflected in the adoption of General Assembly resolution 67/1 on the rule of law, Security Council resolution 2151 on SSR, and SDG 16 in the framework of the 2030 Agenda.