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# Towards a Common UN Approach to Security Sector Reform: Lessons Learned from Integrated Missions

*Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer*

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## List of Abbreviations

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| BCPR | Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP) |
| BINUB | United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi |
| CLJAU | Criminal Justice and Judicial Advisory Unit |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee of the OECD |
| DCAF | Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces |
| DDA | Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN) |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants |
| DFAIT | Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs (UN) |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| EU | European Union |
| HC | Humanitarian Coordinator |
| HQ | UN Headquarters |
| ICF | Interim Cooperation Framework |
| IMTF | Integrated Mission Task Force |
| ISSR | Internal Security Sector Review |
| JSSR | Justice and Security Sector Reform |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti |
| MONUC | United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance (OECD) |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| OHCHR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| OLA | Office of Legal Affairs (UN) |
| ONUB | United Nations Mission in Burundi |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| PDSRSG | Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| QIPs | Quick Impact Projects |
| RC | Resident Coordinator |
| SALW | Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| SCR | Security Council Resolution |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |
| UNAMA | United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone |

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|---|---|
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNIOSIL | United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone |
| UNLIREC | United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean |
| UNMIK | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNMIN | United Nations Mission in Nepal |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in the Sudan |
| UNMISET | United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor |
| UNMIT | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste |
| UNOB | United Nations Office in Burundi |
| UNOCI | United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| UNOGBIS | UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau |
| UNOPS | United Nations Office for Project Services |
| UNOTIL | United Nations Office in Timor-Leste |
| UNPOL | United Nations Police |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNTAET | United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor |
| WHO | World Health Programme |

# Towards a Common UN Approach to Security Sector Reform: Lessons Learned from Integrated Missions[1]

*Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer*

## I. Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) – or security system reform as it is often referred to by developmental actors – is a concept that has gained increasing recognition from the international community. In assisting countries make the transition from conflict to sustainable development the United Nations (UN) engages in a wide range of SSR activities. Although the UN is only one of a number of international actors involved in this effort, by virtue of its mandate, legitimacy, early presence on the ground and experience, the UN has a crucial role to play in supporting SSR across the whole peacebuilding spectrum.

This is particularly true in cases where UN peacekeeping operations are deployed as part of a comprehensive, multidimensional assistance effort that includes political, security, humanitarian, development, rule of law and human rights components and which seeks to bring together all UN actors on the ground in a coordinated approach. These multidimensional peacekeeping operations with specific authority structure and command arrangements – UN integrated missions – have mandates which routinely include broad tasks such as police and defence reform, restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for civil society; and assistance to constitutional processes. All of these tasks are necessary elements of an effective SSR assistance strategy.

Until now, a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR in post-conflict environments has been lacking. This in turn hampers the ability of UN integrated missions to assist national transitional authorities in the early restoration of effective, representative and sustainable security institutions and

processes – the foundation for the successful termination of UN peacekeeping operations and the transition to longer-term recovery and development. There is increasing interest within the UN, and strong calls from the field, for a more strategic and coordinated approach to post-conflict SSR which would set out shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of UN assistance to SSR, and provide clarity on roles and responsibilities across the UN system. UN member states have also expressed interest in the development of a comprehensive UN policy framework for SSR, as evidenced by the Security Council's February 2007 open debate on SSR[2] and the 2007 annual meeting of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on UN approaches to SSR.[3] With the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and its support office, the launch of an inter-agency process based on the UN SSR Task Force, and the Secretary-General's forthcoming report on SSR, there is now a real opportunity to develop a coherent framework for UN engagement in SSR.

Against this backdrop, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated a project entitled "The UN Approach to Security Sector/System Reform (SSR) in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Review of Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in SSR Activities" with funding support from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of Canada, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) as the implementing agency.[4] The purpose of this project was not to capture the UN involvement in SSR across the entire peacebuilding spectrum but rather to take a first step towards establishing a common UN approach to SSR by looking at the role and experience to date of UN integrated missions in post-conflict countries.

The project was made up of three main phases: (i) a desk review of existing UN approaches, mandates and capacities for SSR in post-conflict countries; (ii) case studies carried out by external consultants[5] of SSR-related UN experience in four contexts of integrated missions, namely Burundi, the Democratic Republic of

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[2]   UN Security Council open debate on "Maintenance of international peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform". See: Statement by the President of the Security Council, 21 February 2007, S/PRST/2007/3*.

[3]   Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group (C-34 Report), 23 May 2007, A/61/19, para. 145.

[4]   The project, led by Heiner Hänggi and coordinated by Vincenza Scherrer, with Laurent Banal, Nicola Dahrendorf, Eirin Mobekk and Eric Scheye serving as principal consultants, was monitored by a Steering Committee, composed of representatives of a number of UN entities involved in SSR activities such as DPKO, OHCHR, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM and UNODC, and co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP. At the request of the co-chairs, the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on SSR, succeeded by the UN SSR Task Force (represented by Renata Dwan, Francis James, Jared Rigg and Caroline Smit on behalf of DPKO and UNDP), agreed to provide advice and support to this project. The UN Steering Committee and the project's Advisory Panel established by DCAF (Megan Bastick, Yves Bouchard, Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, Mark Downes, Adedeji Ebo, Anja Kaspersen, David Law, Gregor Zore) reviewed, among other documents, the various drafts of the case study reports and this final report.

[5]   The case studies were carried out by Laurent Banal and Vincenza Scherrer (Burundi), Nicola Dahrendorf with the support of Yves Bouchard (DRC), Eirin Mobekk (Haiti), and Eric Scheye (Kosovo). Semi-structured interviews with approximately 300 people were conducted at UN headquarters and in the field in the course of research missions to New York, Burundi, DRC, Haiti and Kosovo in the period between November 2006 and February 2007. Case study reports on Burundi, DRC, Haiti and Kosovo are available at:
      http://www.dcaf.ch/un_ssr_pcpb/_index.cfm?navsub1=31&nav1=3

Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Kosovo;[6] (iii) development of recommendations for the future UN engagement in post-conflict SSR including the implications of a common UN approach for the mandates, planning, structure and activities of UN integrated missions. This report constitutes the principal output of the third and final phase of this project. Drawing on the results of the first two project phases, this report: introduces the two key concepts used in this study, namely SSR and "integrated mission" (part I); reviews the involvement in SSR of UN integrated missions in terms of mandates, activities and capacities (part II); and, identifies relevant lessons learned and develops recommendations for future UN engagement in post-conflict SSR (part III).

In sum, 15 key recommendations were drawn from the lessons identified. Accordingly, the UN system should:

- develop a common UN approach to SSR;
- address SSR in a holistic way;
- prioritise local ownership in SSR;
- issue coherent and consistent mandates for SSR;
- adopt an integrated SSR support strategy on the ground;
- establish SSR as a core priority in mission planning;
- strengthen UN HQ SSR capacity to support field missions;
- strengthen SSR support capacity in field missions;
- provide sufficient SSR experts with adequate skill-sets;
- increase financial resources for SSR support programmes;
- promote an in-country "One UN" approach to SSR;
- strengthen engagement with national SSR stakeholders;
- facilitate coordination among international donors;
- emphasise service delivery in SSR programming;
- measure performance of SSR support activities.


**Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

Security sector reform is one of the two key concepts used in this study. There is, however, no generally accepted definition of the security sector or what SSR entails, with different actors embracing broader or narrower understandings of this relatively new concept. The same holds true within the UN system, with different entities using different terms and definitions, and having distinct perspectives on what activities SSR should encompass. UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) has developed the concept of *justice and security sector reform (JSSR)*, in order to emphasise that the justice and the security sectors are inextricably linked. Other UN entities such as the Department of

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[6] The case studies were guided by a specific "Methodology for Case Studies", developed for this project, which, inter alia, included a set of criteria for the selection of four missions: (i) mission mandate - requirement: explicitly or implicitly mandated SSR-related tasks; (ii) current phase of mission - requirement: ongoing mission in order to facilitate field research; (iii) scope of mission activities - requirement: substantive UN involvement in supporting SSR in country concerned; (iv) challenges on the ground - requirement: a range of challenges on the ground that are present in integrated missions in order to constitute a representative sample.

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) normally employ the term *security sector reform* to refer to police, defence and intelligence reform, and will use the term *rule of law* when referring to activities related to judicial and penal systems, police and other law enforcement agencies. In the context of peace operations explicitly mandated to conduct SSR activities, the Security Council and the Secretary-General would refer to *security sector reform*, however, without using the term in a consistent way, with its scope ranging from very narrow to quite broad understandings of SSR (see part II).

In accordance with its terms of reference, this study uses the definitions set out in the relevant guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The DAC's broad interpretation of *security system reform*[7] has the advantage of providing an analytical framework within which are located all narrower understandings of SSR used within and outside the UN system. Accordingly, the security system is defined as comprising all the state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people, including (i) core security actors; (ii) management and oversight bodies; (iii) justice and rule of law; and (iv) non-statutory security forces. SSR means – again according to the DAC definition – transforming the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. As articulated by the DAC, SSR covers three interrelated challenges facing all states: (i) developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors; (ii) strengthening the governance of security institutions; and (iii) building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities.[8]

A broad understanding of SSR is particularly relevant in post-conflict contexts, favouring a holistic approach that well reflects the complex and fragmented nature of security governance. This emphasises the need to integrate partial reforms such as defence, intelligence, police and judicial reform which in the past were generally seen and conducted as separate efforts. It also links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of security forces to overriding concerns of democratic governance.[9] And finally, adhering to a broad – governance-oriented – understanding of SSR recognises the reality that non-state actors, whether non-statutory security forces or civil society actors, are highly relevant for security sector reform. This points to the need to move away from piecemeal approaches to SSR and to follow a holistic approach instead. At the same time, taking into account concerns about the broad scope of the concept, SSR programmes on the

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[7] The DAC's reference to security *system* reform is meant to reflect the multi-sectoral nature of the security and justice system and, in particular, to underline the fact that the security system is not limited to the armed forces or the defence *sector* only.

[8] Relevant OECD DAC documents such as *Security System Reform and Governance - DAC Guidelines* (2005) available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_34567_33800289_1_1_1_1,00.html

[9] It must be noted that reforms aimed solely at modernising and professionalising the security forces and thereby increasing their capacity without ensuring their democratic accountability are not consistent with the popular notion of the SSR concept.

ground do not have to encompass all actors and dimensions of the security sector. They do, however, need to be designed and implemented in full awareness of the complex interdependencies that characterise such processes.[10] This means that SSR activities should take into consideration, and ideally be coordinated with, activities in other sectors. For example, the success of police reform is often seen to be dependent on related progress in the area of judicial reform.

External actors supporting SSR processes are expected to follow a number of principles and good practices. In addition to the emphasis on a holistic approach, these principles and good practices include the need for SSR to be nationally-owned, supported rather than imposed by international actors; to be context-specific given that needs will vary from situation to situation; to be a long-term endeavour that continues well beyond the duration of a peacekeeping operation; to be closely linked with other stabilisation and reconstruction priorities such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, small arms and light weapons (SALW) control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues. At its February 2007 open debate on the UN's role in SSR, the Security Council endorsed these fundamental principles and good practices of SSR support (see Annex 1).


## UN Integrated Missions

Another key concept used in this study is the term "integrated mission". According to the revised Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions of 17 January 2006, drafted by DPKO at the request of the Secretary-General, integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution to supporting countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.[11]

Although still an evolving concept, a UN integrated mission is generally understood as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Integration is viewed as a means to improve the management and impact of a peacekeeping operation.[12] Although

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[10] The *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (2007) includes a substantive chapter (pp. 112-234) on implementing SSR sector by sector, including, among others, defence reform, intelligence and security service reform, integrated border management, police reform, justice reform, and prison reform. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_34567_37417926_1_1_1_1,00.html

[11] UNDPKO, *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, 17 January 2006. Available at: http://altair.undp.org/documents/8039-SG_s_Note_of_Guidance_on_Integrated_Missions__Feb__2006.pdf

[12] See: Susanna Campbell, Anja Kaspersen and Erin Weir, *Integrated Missions Revisited: Synthesis of Findings*, Background Note prepared for the High Level Conference on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, Oslo, 29-30 October 2007.

it has been recognised that "form must follow function",[13] hierarchy is an important aspect within integrated missions, as it implies a clear chain of command and central decision-making authority from which all UN country-activities can be coordinated and managed. In this regard, the function of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) is a crucial element. Through the function of the DSRSG who is also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC), thus responsible for the UN entities already present on the ground, both the mission components and the UN Country Team of specialised agencies are included under the leadership of the SRSG.

This definition underlines the importance of a plurality of actors and approaches within a single coherent framework as characteristic features of an integrated mission. It also suggests that there are varying degrees of integration, acknowledging that full integration is an ideal type rather than a reality on the ground. The degree to which integration is implemented and respected at different levels, ranging from the strategic and policy level to the organisational level, may make a difference in terms of the success of an integrated mission.

Seven current and four recently completed UN peacekeeping operations mandated to conduct SSR activities are covered by this definition – keeping in mind that the degree of integration may vary significantly from mission to mission. These are the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and, among the missions completed in the last five years, the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

DPKO-led special political and (civilian) peacebuilding missions are also mandated to support SSR activities, such as the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). These missions may take the form of an Integrated Office[14] (BINUB, UNIOSIL) or benefit from an Integrated Mission Task Force[15] (UNAMA) (see Annex 2). Although not included under the category of integrated (peacekeeping) missions, the SSR experience of special political and/or peacebuilding missions will also be considered in the following part of the study

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[13] See: Espen Barth Eide, Anja Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen Von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Mission: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, UN ECHA Report, May 2005.

[14] An Integrated Office comprises the activities of the UN Country Team and is headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, acting as the United Nations Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative and Designated Official for Security.

[15] An Integrated Mission Task Force is a joint working group which facilitates mission planning and coordination amongst different UN entities at headquarters level.

when appropriate, particularly in the context of Security Council mandates (see part II).[16]


## II.  Overview and Review


Although a common, comprehensive and coordinated United Nations approach to SSR has been lacking to date, security sector reform is very much on the agenda of the United Nations system. UN support to SSR cuts across a wide range of policy areas from peace and security, to poverty reduction, economic and social development, human rights, rule of law and democratisation. An increasing number of UN organs, funds, programmes and agencies are engaged in supporting SSR activities in a variety of contexts, including crisis prevention, early recovery and long-term development. In particular, SSR is understood to be key for ensuring the transition from peacekeeping to longer-term reconstruction and development. It is also acknowledged that SSR is inextricably linked with other stabilisation and reconstruction priorities such as transitional justice, rule of law and human rights; DDR; equal and full participation of women; and children in armed conflict.[17]

The Security Council has only recently begun to explicitly address this issue. At its Open Debate held on 20 February 2007, the Security Council noted that the UN system has made significant contributions to the re-establishment of functioning security sectors in post-conflict environments. Acknowledging the fact that UN peace operations are increasingly involved in SSR support, the Security Council further recognised the need to consider national SSR priorities when mandating a UN operation and noted the importance of close interaction among different UN system entities and other relevant actors, in order to ensure that SSR considerations are adequately addressed during the implementation of Security Council mandates. Finally, the Council invited the Secretary-General to continue to include recommendations related to SSR programmes in his periodic reports on specific UN operations mandated by the Security Council.[18]

In the evolution from traditional "first generation" peacekeeping to complex and multidimensional operations with immediate peacebuilding tasks included in their mandates, UN field missions have, in recent years, gained significant experience in supporting the rebuilding, restructuring and reform of the security sectors in host countries. This is illustrated by the growing number of cases where the Security Council includes in mission mandates, explicitly or implicitly, references to SSR. On the ground, missions are engaged in a widening array of support activities

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[16]  Although the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is mandated to "monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement", the mission has not been included in the sample of cases examined in this report. This is because at this early stage of the peacebuilding and recovery process, a formal platform for SSR programming has not yet been established in the country.

[17]  See: Concept paper prepared for the Security Council open debate, Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, S/2007/72.

[18]  See: Statement by the President of the Security Council, 21 February 2007, S/PRST/2007/3*.

related to SSR. At the same time, the overall capacity of the United Nations in supporting SSR in Member States remains limited. The three sections that follow will provide an overview of how mission mandates address SSR, what kind of SSR support activities missions deliver on the ground, and what UN capacities exist at HQ and in the field to support SSR mission activities. This will primarily be based on the findings of the four case studies from which this report is drawn (Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Kosovo), however, the experience of other peacekeeping operations as well as special political and/or peacebuilding missions will also be taken into account as appropriate.

## SSR in Mission Mandates

Not all peace operations are mandated to address SSR-related activities. The mandates of multidimensional missions, however, have routinely and increasingly included tasks related to the reform or rebuilding of functioning security sectors in post-conflict environments. While references to police, armed forces and judicial reform can be found in earlier mission mandates (e.g. UNMIK, UNAMSIL, UNTAET, UNMISET), the notion of "security sector" was first mentioned in 2002 in the context of UNAMSIL with the Security Council urging the government of Sierra Leone "to strengthen the operational effectiveness of the security sector" (SCR 1436). Early references to the need for UN missions to assist national governments in reforming the security sector can be found as early as 2003 in Security Council resolutions concerning MONUC – "reform of the security forces" (SCR 1493) – and UNMIL – "support for security reform" (SCR 1509). It is only with the later mandate of MONUC in October 2004 that the term "security sector reform" is explicitly mentioned by the Security Council as an umbrella concept for defence and police reform as well as DDR (SCR 1565). Since then, most mission mandates have contained explicit SSR-related terminology such as "security sector reform" (e.g. UNAMA, UNOCI, MONUC), or "reform of the security sector" (e.g. UNOGBIS, BINUB, UNOCI), "strengthening the security sector" (e.g. UNIOSIL), "review of the security sector" (e.g. UNMIT), and "restructuring of the security sector" (e.g. UNMIL).

While SSR-related terminology can increasingly be found in mission mandates, it is not used consistently, even in the context of the same mission (e.g. MONUC, UNAMA). Indeed, the scope of SSR varies significantly in the different Security Council resolutions and related reports by the Secretary-General. In many cases, the Security Council adopts a narrow interpretation of SSR in defining it to include police reform and defence reform only (e.g. BINUB, ONUB, UNAMSIL, UNIOSIL, UNMIL, UNMIT, UNOCI). In a few instances, intelligence reform is considered by the Secretary-General as being a component part of SSR (e.g. ONUB, UNOCI). In some cases, DDR – together with defence reform and police reform – is seen as an element of SSR (e.g. ONUB, MONUC, UNOCI, UNAMA). Generally, reform of the judicial and prison systems is listed as a separate component of a mission mandate rather than part of SSR. Most recent mandates, however, all adopted by the Security Council in early 2007, explicitly

include judicial and prison reform under SSR (e.g. MONUC, MINUSTAH, UNAMA). It is premature to judge whether the Security Council is tending towards a broad interpretation of SSR. What is clear though is the scarcity of references in mission mandates to the civilian oversight and good governance dimensions of security sector reform. Such references may take the form of calls for the application of the "principles of civilian control" of the security forces (ONUB, UNOCI), for a "legitimate and democratically accountable role" of security institutions (MONUC), for the development of "related oversight mechanisms", including the Parliament (UNMIT), or for initiating "good-governance reform … in security sector reform" (MONUC). In mission mandates, references to such a holistic understanding of SSR are still rather the exception than the rule.

The UN often inherits its involvement in post-conflict situations from peace agreements. In the case of eight current missions, the UN's involvement in SSR is defined in a peace agreement. None of these agreements refer to SSR explicitly, nor do they address SSR in a holistic way. But all of them mention implicitly SSR-related tasks such as DDR, integration of armed forces and police reform. Agreements for Afghanistan (2001 Bonn Agreement), Côte d'Ivoire (2003 Linas-Marcoussi Agreement), DRC (1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 2002 Pretoria Agreement) and Sierra Leone (1999 Lomé Peace Agreement) contain general references to SSR-related tasks. More specific and often very detailed provisions for SSR-related tasks are made in the agreements for Burundi (2000 Arusha Agreement; 2003 Pretoria Protocol; 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement), Kosovo (1999 Interim Agreement), Liberia (2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement) and Sudan (2004 Comprehensive Peace Agreement).[19] These provisions shape the SSR-relevant parts of mission mandates as evidenced by the usage of similar terminology, most notably in the cases of Burundi (BINUB, ONUB) and Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and the numerous references to relevant peace agreements contained in Security Council resolutions and related Secretary-General reports (e.g. MONUC, ONUB, UNMIS, UNOCI).

There are currently seven UN missions explicitly mandated by the Security Council to conduct SSR activities: four peacekeeping operations (MONUC, UNMIT, UNMIL, UNOCI), and three DPKO-led political and peacebuilding missions (BINUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL). SSR mandated tasks include: assisting national governments in conducting comprehensive reviews of the security sector (e.g. UNMIT); formulating a plan on or overall framework for the restructuring of the security forces/sector (e.g. BINUB, ONUB, UNOCI); developing a national security policy and architecture (e.g. UNMIL, UNOCI); restructuring national defence, particularly through the identification of relevant bilateral partners and the provision of training support with emphasis on human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and gender issues (e.g. BINUB, MONUC, UNMIL, UNOCI); restructuring of police and other internal security forces, particularly through training and technical advice in specialised areas such as cross-border policing, airport security, criminal intelligence, juvenile justice, etc.

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[19]   An electronic collection of peace agreements is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/

(e.g. BINUB, MONUC, UNIOSIL, UNMIL, UNMIT, UNOCI); strengthening the capacity of judicial and prison systems, again through training and technical advice (e.g. MONUC, UNMIL); support for democratic policing (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB); developing and reforming civilian management bodies such as the Ministry of Defence and the Interior, and related oversight mechanisms such as the Parliament, human rights office, inspector-general, etc (e.g. UNMIT).

The lack of SSR language in some mission mandates does not mean to say that these missions are not mandated to conduct SSR-related activities. On the contrary, three additional missions are implicitly mandated – without explicit reference to SSR – to conduct SSR-related activities (MINUSTAH, UNMIK, UNMIS). This also applies to five recently completed missions (ONUB, UNAMSIL, UNMISET, UNOTIL, UNTAET). These tasks include: to assist national government in preparing a plan for the restructuring of the defence and security forces, including the armed forces, gendarmerie, police and intelligence services (e.g. UNOCI); establishing integrated national defence and internal security forces (e.g. ONUB); transferring skills and knowledge from the mission's military component to members of the national armed forces (e.g. UNMISET); developing, reforming and restructuring national law enforcement agencies, particularly the police and gendarmerie, through mentoring, training, vetting and institutional capacity-building (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNAMSIL, UNMIK, UNMIS, UNMISET, UNOCI, UNOTIL); establishing, restructuring, reforming and strengthening judicial and correctional systems (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNAMA, UNIOSIL, UNMIK, UNMIL, UNOCI); support for democratic policing (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB); supporting parliamentarians and civil society in oversight of the security sector (e.g. UNMIK, UNMIS).

In sum, although not all peace operations are mandated to support SSR, the mandates of such missions have routinely and increasingly included tasks related to security sector reform in post-conflict environments. To date, the majority of peace operations are only implicitly mandated to carry out SSR activities such as police reform or justice reform. However, explicit SSR-related terminology can increasingly be found in mission mandates, although it is not used consistently, even in the context of the same mission. The scope of SSR as defined in mission mandates varies significantly, oscillating between quite narrow and more broader understandings of SSR.

## SSR Support Activities

On the ground, all missions under study carry out SSR-related activities, whether this is through policy and legal advice, technical assistance, providing mentoring or training support to national authorities, security institutions and, albeit rarely, to civil society. SSR activities conducted by missions can range from facilitation, coordination or outsourcing to direct implementation. The translation of SSR-relevant provisions in mission mandates results in a wide range of SSR-related

activities on the ground, covering almost all dimensions of SSR. This includes (1) overarching activities such as security sector reviews as well as development of SSR strategies and national security policies; (2) activities aimed at rebuilding, restructuring and reforming national defence, police and other law enforcement agencies as well as judicial and prison systems; (3) activities aimed at strengthening civilian management and democratic oversight of security and justice institutions; (4) activities closely related to SSR in post-conflict settings such as DDR, SALW control, mine action and transitional justice; (5) activities related to cross-cutting concerns such as gender issues, child protection, etc.

Activities such as assisting national authorities in the conduct of security sector reviews (e.g. UNMIK, UNMIT), the development of SSR strategies (e.g. BINUB, MONUC, ONUB) and the drafting of national security policies (e.g. UNMIL) are both new and the exception rather than the rule. The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) in Kosovo, initiated in 2005, was the first such undertaking by an integrated mission. Since then, a number of similar, comprehensive SSR review and strategy development exercises have been initiated by integrated missions (e.g. UNMIT). The recent involvement of UN missions in this kind of overarching SSR activity reflects an increasing appreciation by international and local stakeholders of the need for a holistic and strategic approach to SSR. It also indicates an area of SSR activity where the UN could develop a comparative advantage in the framework of its evolving common approach to SSR.

Activities aimed at rebuilding, restructuring and reforming national defence, police and other law enforcement agencies as well as judicial and prison systems account for by far the largest share of UN integrated missions' support for SSR. All of the missions explicitly or implicitly mandated to carry out SSR are active in this core area, with strong emphasis on police reform, followed by judicial reform, prison reform and, less so, defence and intelligence reform. Mandates in defence reform are few (e.g. ONUB, MONUC), and related support activities hardly go beyond the facilitation of policy dialogue (e.g. ONUB), assisting the Ministry of Defence to draft its sectoral reform policy (e.g. ONUB), the provision of training modules or actual training with emphasis on human rights and international humanitarian law (e.g. MONUC). There is at least one case where an integrated mission was marginally involved in intelligence reform by coordinating human rights training provided to intelligence officers (ONUB). Although externally-assisted defence and in particular intelligence reform still tends to be dominated by bilateral donors (under the rubriques of military cooperation or defence diplomacy rather than SSR), UN missions are increasingly mandated to assist host countries in defence reform, and it can therefore be expected that this area of SSR will gain in importance in missions' activities on the ground with resulting demands for specialised defence reform capacity at UN HQ.

Police reform constitutes the most substantive SSR-related activity assisted by UN integrated missions. Reforming or restructuring the police is one of the most consistent roles attributed to the UN, present in all peace operations which are implicitly or explicitly mandated to carry out SSR-related activities. This is

reflected by the substantial headquarters (DPKO Police Division) and field (UNPOL) resources and capacity available for UN support to police reform, unmatched in any other SSR area the UN is engaged in. The main form of UN support for police reform, provided by UNPOL, at times in cooperation with UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is training for members of the national police force, by the provision of modules, curriculum development and different types of courses both at academies and as part of "in-service" training. Police training covers a wide range of topics such as human rights, gender, democratic policing, proportionate use of force, criminal investigation, public order policing, patrol procedures, road traffic control and specialised training for judicial police and border police. Beyond training, UNPOL support to police reform includes a variety of tasks such as assisting the government in drawing up a sectoral reform plan, advising senior police management on the reorganisation of police structures, the development of standard operating procedures, vetting and certification of personnel, monitoring and mentoring police officers, and supplying police equipment through UNDP-administered funds. Finally, in some missions (e.g. MINUSTAH, UNMIK), UN police capacity may be co-located with the national police so as to encourage a steady transfer of knowledge, although this practice is sometimes constrained by the lack of UNPOL officers (e.g. MINUSTAH), or the proportionately low number of UNPOL officers when compared to the size of the host country (e.g. MONUC).

Judicial reform is an area that the UN is often engaged in, but that is particularly difficult to support due to the unwillingness of some host governments to address the issue, or to the multitude of tasks and actors involved. Nonetheless, all countries under study have engaged in judicial reform, mostly in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDOC, UNDP or the UN peacekeeping mission on the ground. The mission's support to justice reform takes a variety of forms, including technical assistance to ministries to draw up a justice system reform plan (e.g. MINUSTAH), to review existing or draft new legislation such as a penal code (e.g. MONUC, ONUB); training of judges and other national justice sector officials (e.g. MONUC, and to a limited extent, MINUSTAH); facilitation of the deployment of judges (e.g. MONUC, UNMIK); and mentoring across the justice sector (e.g. MINUSTAH, MONUC). Although prison reform is often mentioned in tandem with justice reform in mission mandates (e.g. MINUSTAH, MONUC), it is an area that has tended to receive less attention than judicial reform. Where integrated missions were active in prison reform, they focused on their mentoring role in the prison sector (e.g. MONUC) and the provision of technical assistance to the relevant agencies in drafting strategic reform plans for that sector (e.g. MINUSTAH). In the case of Kosovo, UN support for prison development has been one of UNMIK's most successful SSR programmes.

Few mission mandates make specific mention of governance-related SSR activities that are aimed at strengthening the capacity for civilian control and democratic accountability. At most, mandates make broad references to assisting the reform

of the police "consistent with democratic principles" (MINUSTAH) or "while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms" (MINUSTAH, ONUB). Or, mandates generally call for the fostering of principles of democratic governance, although without specific reference to the security sector or its component parts (e.g. MINUSTAH). The fact that issues of security sector governance are rarely reflected in mandates implies that the missions can hardly be expected to undertake this as a priority. Moreover, even when support for civilian management and democratic oversight is implicitly mandated, it is questionable to what extent the activity will be implemented in the field when funding is lacking for core capacity-building activities. This is further aggravated by a general lack of understanding amongst both national stakeholders and UN staff of civilian management and democratic oversight and its key role in the SSR process. Consequently, supporting management and oversight bodies has often been approached by missions on an *ad hoc* basis and therefore not linked to the goals of the broader SSR concept. For example, some missions supported the establishment or strengthening of oversight bodies within ministries or security forces, such as general inspectorates for the police (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB). In all missions under study, negligible attention was granted to the development of parliamentary or civil society oversight mechanisms for the security sector. Support to strengthening the capacity of legislatures or civil society actors such as media and NGOs is generally provided by UNDP, albeit rarely with specific focus on the security sector.

All UN integrated missions examined undertake some form of SSR-related activity aimed at addressing the legacies of conflict such as support for DDR, SALW control, mine action or transitional justice. This does not come as a surprise given that integrated missions operate in post-conflict settings. The SSR-related activity that is most supported by UN peacekeeping missions is DDR; however, the extent of the UN's involvement in DDR varies according to the country context – variations ranging from missions playing a direct role in administering parts of a DDR programme (e.g. MINUSTAH), or coordinating between its military component and other, national or international, key actors (e.g. ONUB). UN support for DDR programmes is mostly closely linked with SSR initiatives, as evidenced by the integration of SSR capacity in the DDR component of a mission (e.g. MONUC until 2006, ONUB). Other SSR-related activities that are regularly supported by UN integrated missions, albeit not under an overarching SSR umbrella, include SALW initiatives such as arms collection (e.g. UNMIK), monitoring cross-border arms trafficking (e.g. ONUB), mine action (e.g. MONUC, UNMIK) and transitional justice initiatives (e.g. ONUB). The most active agency within the UN family is UNDP when it comes to SSR-related activities such as DDR, small arms control, mine action and transitional justice, with the peacekeeping mission's relevant units and other UN entities – such as OHCHR in the area of transitional justice, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in the areas of DDR and mine action, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) – playing a secondary role.

As stated by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), gender mainstreaming is a key cross-cutting activity. This also applies to SSR. Although mission mandates do not explicitly link gender concerns with SSR tasks, the extent to which gender issues are mainstreamed into SSR activities on the ground still largely depends on the level of cooperation between the gender section and the various entities of the mission involved in such activities. This cooperation tends to be greater with those entities that work on more established SSR and SSR-related activities, police reform and DDR in particular. Indeed, the type of SSR support activities with a strong gender component include general gender training for police (e.g. MINUSTAH, MONUC, UNMIL), specific training for police staff handling victims of sexual violence (e.g. ONUB), the deployment of UNPOL gender focal points in police stations to check that women are fairly treated (e.g. MINUSTAH), awareness-raising for the proper treatment of female combatants (e.g. ONUB), designing gender material to be distributed to former combatants (e.g. MONUC).

In sum, the UN's SSR assistance in the framework of integrated missions covers the whole range of SSR support tasks, with activities aimed at rebuilding, restructuring and reforming police and other law enforcement agencies accounting for the lion's share. Justice and, less so, prison reform is also regularly addressed but rarely in the context of SSR. Partly due to the short term mandates provided by the Security Council, there is a tendency for integrated missions to concentrate on the short-term need for a rapid capacity build-up for security and justice institutions to dominate over security sector governance concerns, leaving important oversight and control issues under-addressed. This is, and although the integrated mission concept is set to improve this, breaking away from a short term focus is proving to be difficult. Among the SSR-related activities in post-conflict settings, DDR is the one most closely linked to the SSR support provided by integrated missions, while cross-cutting activities such as gender mainstreaming are still rarely part of, or at least linked to, integrated missions SSR programmes.

## SSR Support Capacities

According to the 2006 Inventory of UN Capacity in Peacebuilding,[20] the overall capacity of the United Nations in supporting SSR in Member States remains limited and in the case of specialised defence reform capacity is practically non-existent. More substantive capacity is available in the area of transitional justice, judicial and legal reform and prison reform although even in this area human resources capacity was found to be modest, especially at headquarters. Where SSR and related capacity exists, however, the mapping exercise concluded that it remains highly fragmented, dispersed and poorly coordinated.

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[20] Executive Office of the Secretary-General, *Inventory: United Nations Peacebuilding Capacity*, United Nations, June 2006. Available at: http://www.undp.org/cpr/iasc/content/docs/Oct_Links/doc_4.pdf

At the Headquarters level, a number of UN organs, departments, programmes, funds and specialised agencies address a variety of SSR issues. The 12 entities identified by the Inventory as having some capacity in the broad area of security and justice reform are the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO, OHCHR, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), UNICEF, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), UNODC, and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Other entities such as UNHCR or the PBSO may also be included in this list. Although these entities are considered to be active in the field of SSR, their respective capacities are limited as none is competent over the full spectrum of SSR activities. Moreover, the SSR-related capacity of most is rather marginal. The bulk of SSR support is provided by DPKO, particularly its Police Division, and UNDP both at headquarters level and in the field.

The increasing focus on the security and justice system as a locus of UN endeavours in post-conflict contexts and, more specifically, the growing number of requests from the field for guidance and support from headquarters have recently resulted in a number of initiatives within UN entities as well as at the inter-agency level. This includes the creation of specifically dedicated units at headquarters, including DPKO's Criminal Justice and Judicial Advisory Unit (CLJAU), UNDP/BCPR's Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) Unit, OHCHR's Rule of Law and Democracy Unit, and, most recently, the integration of DPKO's police, judicial, corrections, DDR, mine action and fledgling SSR capacity under the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions.

At the inter-agency level, a DPKO-led inter-agency working group on SSR was established in late 2006 to submit options to the Secretary-General and his Policy Committee in early 2007 for a common UN approach to SSR. This resulted in the recommendation by the Policy Committee to establish an inter-agency SSR support unit, administratively based in DPKO to serve as a system-wide focal point and technical resource.[21] An inter-agency SSR Task Force was created to manage the support unit. This Task Force is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP, and aside from having been given a coordinating role, is mandated to draft the Secretary-General's report on UN approaches to SSR requested by the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 2007. Despite such focus and attempts to enhance UN-wide arrangements for supporting SSR capacity, a common UN approach to SSR is yet to be articulated while coordination at both headquarters and mission levels remains informal and ad hoc.

On the ground, there is a lack of dedicated SSR capacities. Only three current missions have a SSR or joint DDR/SSR section or unit (BINUB, MONUC, UNMIT) and in all three cases these are of very recent origin; the SSR entities of

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[21]  The recommendation of the Secretary General's Policy Committee still needs to be approved by the General Assembly.

both MONUC and UNMIT were established in August 2006, and BINUB's in January 2007. Apart from these three current missions, one completed mission had a similar structure in the form of a joint DDR/SSR section (ONUB). In most missions, however, there has been no dedicated section, unit or focal point for SSR, but rather support for SSR and related activities has been compartmentalised across the different components and sections – often placed under separate DSRSGs – dealing with police, DDR, justice, human rights, gender issues or political affairs. The case of MINUSTAH serves as an illustration because the Justice Section, UNPOL and Human Rights are under the Office of the Principal DSRSG whereas DDR, the Gender Unit and Child Protection are placed under the Office of the DSRSG (RC/HC) responsible for humanitarian and development issues. The situation was very similar within ONUB where the DDR/SSR unit was under the office of the Principal DSRSG, whilst the human rights section and the gender unit were under the DSRSG (RC/HC). Even in the few cases where dedicated SSR structures exist, other mission components such as UNPOL (e.g. MONUC, ONUB), the rule of law unit (e.g. MONUC), the DDR section (e.g. MONUC), human rights and gender sections (e.g. ONUB) would carry out additional SSR and related activities separately. UNMIT constitutes an albeit partial but notable exception to the rule in the sense that the DSRSG for Security Sector and Rule of Law is responsible for (almost) all mission components involved in SSR and related activities: security sector support, human rights and transitional justice, administration of justice support, police and military.

The paucity of dedicated SSR capacities on the ground is also illustrated by the very small minority of all staff located in field missions that are actually dedicated to SSR. A number of SSR-specific posts have been budgeted in missions with a dedicated SSR unit, for example, ONUB (seven posts) and UNMIT (eight posts). On the other hand, in missions which lack a dedicated SSR structure, a significant number of staff from different components and sections are involved in SSR-related activities. This holds particularly true for UNPOL personnel engaged in the mentoring and training of national law enforcement agencies. Civilian experts involved in judicial and prison reform or human rights training for security forces would also fall into this category. At the same time, UN peacekeeping missions are often understaffed in this key area of post-conflict peacebuilding. Moreover, the human resources capacity in place for conducting SSR does not always correspond to the necessary skills required, particularly concerning training, management or language expertise. This, however, is also a weakness of personnel-contributing Member States as much as of the UN itself. Even when the adequate number of staff are in place, the short duration for which they serve (usually not more than 11 months) and the consequent loss of institutional memory is another limitation of missions' SSR support capacity.

In terms of financial resources, peacekeeping missions rely on assessed contributions which only provide for human resources within the mission. This means that they have difficulty funding SSR support projects which are not covered by the assessed budget. One way to circumvent this under current

frameworks – other than through the Trust Funds through which assistance can be provided[22] – is through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) designed to be small-scale, low-cost projects with a discernable impact on urgent community needs. However, SSR activities often do not qualify for QIPs given the requirement to demonstrate direct benefits for the local population.[23] In contrast to peacekeeping operations, UN Programmes, Funds and Specialised Agencies are able to fundraise for their projects. This holds particularly true for UNDP which can mobilise donor funds for SSR in the field. On the other hand, UNDP too faces constraints in supporting SSR and related activities as it is responsible to development donors, who are often cautious about providing support to certain aspects of SSR, especially rebuilding and restructuring of armed forces which is considered a politically sensitive topic, particularly from an ODA perspective.

In sum, the UN's overall SSR capacity remains limited and is practically non-existent in certain areas of SSR such as defence reform. Where SSR capacity exists, it remain highly fragmented, dispersed and poorly coordinated although, not least as a result of demand from the field, a number of initiatives to improve the UN system's SSR capacity have recently been launched at the headquarters level. DPKO, particularly its Police Division, and UNDP are those two entities with the largest capacity to support SSR and related reform activities in the field. Both entities also play a key role in the recently launched inter-agency process to elaborate a common UN approach to SSR. At field level, most missions lack a dedicated unit or focal point for SSR; support for SSR and related activities tends to be compartmentalised across the different components and sections – often placed under separate DSRSGs.

## III.   Lessons and Recommendations

For more than a decade, UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions have become increasingly involved in a wide range of peacebuilding activities. This also includes SSR, an area which has recently been recognised by the Security Council as being of growing importance for post-conflict stabilisation and longer-term development.[24] Based on the four case studies from which this report is drawn (Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Kosovo), a number of lessons can be drawn from recent experience of UN integrated missions in SSR. These lessons, with related recommendations, are summarised below.

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[22]   For example, MONUC obtained US $52 million for support for police reform in 2006.

[23]   A small exception to the rule was ONUB's DDR/SSR unit which was able to access one QIP of a modest US $25,000 in order to fund the preliminary infrastructure works for the training facility for the National Defence Force.

[24]   As early as July 2005, in the framework of an open debate on its role in humanitarian crises, the Security Council emphasized "that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilization process in post-conflict environments". Statement by the President of the Security Council, 12 July 2005, S/PRST/2005/30.

## 1. Develop a Common UN Approach to SSR

For many years now, the United Nations system has been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities although not necessarily under the label of SSR. As in most international organisations, SSR assistance provided by the UN system is fragmented – it is scattered across different entities, delivered in the context of various policy frameworks and subject to different funding mechanisms. There is a lack of conceptual clarity amongst relevant actors within the UN system over what SSR is, coupled with a lack of expertise, and appropriate human and financial resources dedicated to these efforts. The case studies have shown that the absence of a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR is not the only but a major cause of incoherence and inconsistencies in the way the UN supports SSR in the context of integrated missions. It has resulted in an inconsistent usage of SSR terminology across and even within mission mandates; in a bewildering range of SSR understandings within headquarters and across the various missions; in the – often delayed – development of SSR strategies within missions on an *ad hoc* basis (if at all); in uncoordinated support for SSR activities by various UN entities within the mission and the UN family on the ground; and in insufficient implementation of SSR assistance due to a lack of appropriate guidelines as well as human and/or financial resources.[25] The challenge for the UN is to elaborate a common SSR approach that effectively provides a strategic framework to the whole range of UN actors engaged in SSR activities, taking into account their specific mandates, expertise and capacities. In this context, the UN may have to review the way the human, material and financial resources at their disposal are organised, as well as their internal procedures.

**Recommendation:** The UN should develop a common, system-wide approach to SSR, providing a strategic framework through which all the various actors could address the various components of SSR, depending on the specific context, in a coherent way. In developing such an approach, the UN should, first, reach consensus on a concept of SSR; second; determine what and where is its comparative advantage in SSR and consequently define requirements for its engagement in SSR and address the current gaps; third, generate lessons learnt and best practices and develop implementation guidelines on an inter-agency basis;[26] fourth, determine an appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities for SSR among the various UN entities; fifth, allocate the necessary capacity and expertise; and finally, establish coordinating mechanisms within the UN family and with other external actors delivering support for SSR.

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[25]  Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, "Towards an Integrated SSR Strategy: The Case of the UN", *International Peacekeeping* (forthcoming).

[26]  The most prominent example of such guidelines is the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*, recently endorsed by OECD DAC Ministers and Heads of Agencies. See footnote 9.

## 2.    Address SSR in a Holistic Way

Given its broad agenda, SSR necessitates a holistic approach as acknowledged by the UN Security Council.[27] At the same time, the width of the SSR agenda calls for modesty because no single actor can be involved in all areas of SSR but must rather set priorities and identify core tasks. Thus, SSR programmes do not have to encompass all actors and dimensions of what is broadly understood as the security sector. They do, however, need to be designed and implemented in full awareness of the complex interdependencies that characterise it. Compartmentalised or piecemeal approaches to SSR ignore how SSR activities affect each other and may ultimately have detrimental effects because "neglect of one [aspect of SSR] inevitably leads to the weakening of others".[28] This is exactly where SSR support delivered by integrated missions exhibits considerable deficiencies. All four case studies show that integrated missions prioritise certain aspects of SSR to the detriment of others, or leave key dimensions of SSR under- or even unaddressed. For example, support for overarching activities such as security sector reviews and the development of SSR strategies which should precede any specific SSR activity are still the exception rather than the rule, although some integrated missions have recently been assigned with such tasks (e.g. UNMIK, UNMIT). A recurrent problem is that efforts of integrated missions sometimes focus on enhancing the capacity of the police services, while paying scant attention to judicial or prison reform, thereby undermining efforts aimed at improving security and justice delivery (e.g. MINUSTAH). Furthermore, experience of integrated missions shows that the governance dimension of SSR, particularly support for parliaments or civil society, has frequently been left to the side in favour of re-establishing the capacity of basic security actors such as police and armed forces. While at the outset of a mission it may not have been logistically and politically practical, a greater understanding and focus on the importance of supporting the broader governance aspect of SSR might have assisted in sowing the seeds for the creation of civilian and democratic oversight mechanisms. Moreover, with very few exceptions (e.g. MINUSTAH), cross-cutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and child protection did not play a role in the SSR support activities of the integrated missions examined. Finally, there is a lack of understanding of how related activities such as DDR and transitional justice are linked to SSR, a key requirement to success for post-conflict peacebuilding.[29] In short, the integrated missions examined largely failed to address SSR in a holistic way which in turn reflects the absence of, and the urgent need for, a common UN approach to SSR.

**Recommendation:** UN integrated missions should develop a holistic approach to SSR which, however, does not mean that they have to engage in the entire SSR spectrum of activities themselves. In particular, there is a need to ensure (1) that support for overarching activities such as periodic security sector reviews and the

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[27]    See: Statement by the President of the Security Council, 21 February 2007, S/PRST/2007/3*.

[28]    UN Security Council, *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, Report of the Secretary-General, 3 August 2004, S/2004/616, para. 23.

[29]    See: Alan Bryden, "Understanding the DDR-SSR-Nexus: Building Sustainable Peace in Africa", Issue Paper commissioned by the UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) as a contribution to the 2nd International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, 12-14 June 2007. Available at: http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=34308&nav1=4

development of SSR strategies begins at the outset of an integrated mission and is carried out in close consultation with local actors, including civil society; (2) that judicial and prison reform are considered an integral part of SSR, and that these are not treated as entirely separate components of reform; (3) that SSR programming is carried out in a way that takes fully into account the governance dimension – civilian management and democratic oversight – in order to balance most integrated missions' prioritisation of the capacity-building of security forces; (4) that cross-cutting issues such as the diverse security and justice needs of women and girls are addressed in all areas of SSR; and (5) that the linkages between SSR and SSR-related activities such as DDR are systematically explored and factored-in.

## 3.   Prioritise Local Ownership in SSR

It is axiomatic that an SSR programme that is not shaped and driven by local actors is not sustainable.[30] According to the UN Security Council, SSR "should be a nationally-owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question".[31] International actors should therefore avoid the imposition of external models and concentrate on strengthening the capacity of local stakeholders to develop, manage and implement SSR. This may be extremely difficult in immediate post-conflict settings when the ability to implement reforms resides essentially with external actors such as UN peacekeeping operations. However, this does not imply that local ownership at the outset of a mission must be at the same level as the ownership a couple of years into the process. Rather it suggests that local ownership must be progressively increased and be one of the principal objectives and outcomes of UN support to SSR programmes. It also suggests that the UN mission considers national frameworks and local knowledge already in place before embarking on SSR processes. This includes support for nationally-led needs assessment and consultation processes with key national stakeholders. Another important factor is that transitional governments often operate in sensitive political contexts that may constrain their ability or will to engage in SSR. This was a lesson learned from Haiti where careful political leverage should have been applied from the outset to encourage the early implementation of some SSR activities under the transitional government. In the case of Burundi, the importance of evaluating the UN's relationship with national authorities according to the legitimacy they have (i.e. whether or not it was a transitional government or an elected government) was also underlined. This is because transitional governments are likely to be replaced by elected authorities which may not share the same priorities as those underlined by the transitional government. Therefore, local ownership should not be limited to government ownership, which is often difficult to achieve in a transition period, but should also involve non-governmental actors and civil society. In all the integrated missions under study, major obstacles have stood in the way of ensuring local

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[30]   See: Laurie Nathan, *Security Sector Reform and the Imperative of Local Ownership*, Birmingham: Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, 2007.
[31]   See: Statement by the President of the Security Council, 21 February 2007, S/PRST/2007/3*.

ownership of the SSR process. In the case of MINUSTAH and UNMIK, the organisational culture seemed, initially at least, to have been one of imposition rather than consultation in the sense that SSR activities were prepared or carried out with the consent of the local government but without involvement of local stakeholders, which added to the alienation of the latter. Missions have also suffered from difficulties in developing local ownership because national governments were not willing to engage in SSR at all, or in the way suggested by the UN (e.g. MINUSTAH, MONUC, ONUB). In Burundi, for example, the national authorities rejected ONUB's proposal for a holistic approach to SSR and insisted instead on a piecemeal approach, whereby each reform area (police, defence, intelligence) was undertaken separately from one another. This case illustrates the tension which may occur between local ownership and the need for a holistic approach to SSR. Only one of the missions under study has been involved in an inclusive SSR needs assessment exercise: The Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) process which involved broad sectors of the society was initiated by UNMIK and administered by UNDP's Field Office in Kosovo, with funding support from donors channelled through UNDP.

**Recommendation:** UN integrated missions should prioritise the development of local ownership of SSR by supporting local stakeholders developing and implementing a joint SSR strategy. Support for comprehensive needs assessments and inclusive consultation processes led by local stakeholders should play a key role in this process. In this context, UN missions should also strive to expand local ownership beyond the government and core security institutions to include non-security ministries, parliament and other statutory oversight bodies as well as civil society, including women's organisations. Public information campaigns may be used to raise awareness and thereby generate support for the SSR process.

## 4. Issue Coherent and Consistent Mandates for SSR

In recent years, the Security Council and UN Member States have repeatedly stressed the importance of SSR to peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. This is illustrated by the fact that UN integrated mission mandates now more regularly refer to SSR or contain SSR-related terminology, though rarely in a coherent way. In most cases, integrated missions are only implicitly mandated to carry out SSR-related tasks (e.g. MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNMIK), although in recent years explicit SSR mandates have become more regular (e.g. MONUC). The scope of SSR varies significantly in the respective Security Council resolutions, from very narrow to sometimes broader understandings of the concept, in some cases even comprising SSR-related tasks such as DDR (e.g. MONUC, ONUB). More often than not, SSR-related tasks are compartmentalised in different areas such as police, judicial reform or armed forces restructuring. Reflecting a lack of clarity by the Security Council on the significance of SSR in post-conflict settings, SSR mandated tasks are subsumed under different headings such as rule of law, law and order, security, or DDR. Mandated tasks related to the governance dimension of SSR are still an exception to the rule, although they are

more frequently to be found in the most recent mandates. Measured by the mandates it has issued, the Security Council has yet to realise its commitment to pursue a holistic approach to SSR, based on a broad but consistent understanding of the concept, which could provide more coherence in tailoring SSR-related mandates for integrated missions according to the specific needs and context of the country in question. The adoption by the Security Council of incoherent and inconsistent mandates for SSR results, in part, from the absence of a common UN understanding of, and approach to, SSR. It might also reflect the novelty of the concept and the institutional learning process of the UN in this regard, as well as shifting political interests among the members of the Council. Nonetheless, the lack of clarity in the use of the SSR concept in mission mandates risks further undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of UN support to SSR in the framework of integrated missions.

**Recommendation**: The Security Council should issue coherent and consistent mandates in the area of SSR, applying a holistic notion of SSR as described above, while tailoring SSR mandated tasks to the requirements of the specific context and with a view of prioritising local ownership. In particular, it should define the scope and priority of SSR within a specific mission, the specific SSR activities the mission is tasked to support, and how SSR mandated tasks are linked to SSR-related and cross-cutting activities carried out by the mission such as rule of law, DDR and gender mainstreaming.


## 5.    Adopt an Integrated SSR Support Strategy on the Ground

A common theme that emerged from the case studies has been the lack of a SSR strategy either within the field mission or emanating from headquarters. Indeed, SSR strategies mostly evolved on an *ad hoc* basis within the field missions without guidance from headquarters. While in Burundi, the DDR/SSR Unit had established its own mission-specific understanding of SSR from the outset of the mission, in MONUC and UNMIK, a SSR strategy was only developed at a very late stage of the mission. The absence of an integrated SSR support strategy has resulted not only in a proliferation of different SSR concepts in integrated missions but also in serious deficiencies in the delivery of SSR support as evidenced by the lack of attention for the governance dimension of SSR, or the prioritisation of one SSR activity to the detriment of others in almost all missions under review (see above). This has led to a variety of *ad hoc* structures for SSR support within missions and the UN family on the ground, resulting in a lack of coordination and sometimes duplication of work. Different UN entities may work on the same topic, without attempting to integrate their distinct but related programmes. The absence of an integrated SSR strategy risks complicating the transition from short-term stabilisation to longer-term reconstruction and development, reflecting the all-too-familiar tensions between the "logic of peacekeeping" (SSR as an exit strategy) and the "logic of development" (SSR as an entry strategy). In Kosovo, for example, the UN system successfully stabilised the security and justice environment but was much less successful in supporting the

further development of the local security and justice sector. Although the importance of "quick wins" has been recognised, SSR is a long-term process that cannot adequately be planned for in a short one-year timeframe. Hence the need for an integrated SSR strategy that cuts across the conflict cycle in taking a long-term vision.

**Recommendation:** Based on a common UN approach to SSR and the respective Security Council mandates, integrated SSR support strategies should be developed for all multidimensional peacekeeping operations with a mandate for SSR. Such a strategy would reflect a holistic and long-term approach to SSR, approaching SSR in all its dimensions and emphasising linkages between SSR and related tasks. It would assign specific roles and responsibilities for all UN actors involved, guide SSR planning and implementation from the outset of the mission, and ensure that SSR is perceived by the UN system as a entry strategy for long-term development assistance rather than a short-term exit strategy for peacekeeping. The implementation of an integrated SSR strategy should be facilitated through joint programming between HQ and field mission and within mission components.

## 6. Establish SSR as a Core Priority in Mission Planning

Until recently, SSR has not been seen as a core priority in mission planning, reflecting the novelty of the concept, the absence of a common UN approach to SSR and the lack of sufficient resources to support mission planning. In most cases to date, integrated missions did not have dedicated SSR expertise in their mission planning, although specific expertise on certain areas of SSR such as police or judicial reform has always been available and resulted in strategic planning for these sub-sectors. The lack of adequate SSR planning was present in all missions under study. Planning deficits often resulted in poor mission design concerning the implementation of SSR mandated tasks and in a compartmentalised, ill-coordinated and inconsistent approach to SSR. There has, however, been improvement. Mission planning was made a core priority in new peace operations (e.g. BINUB, UNMIT). Also, strategic planning for SSR was undertaken in the later phase of long-standing missions (e.g. MINUSTAH, MONUC). The establishment of a dedicated inter-agency SSR capacity at headquarters should further improve mission planning for SSR, providing minimal human resources needed for short-term assessment visits to host countries. Mission planning must evaluate how the fragile political contexts will impact on the ability of the UN to undertake SSR, and preliminarily assess the specific SSR needs of the host country.

**Recommendation:** SSR should be consistently integrated into the strategic and operational planning of new integrated missions. Strategic planning for SSR support should take place at the earliest phase of the mission, possibly even in the context of negotiations on peace agreements with UN involvement, and an inter-agency headquarters entity with an SSR focus should be involved in the planning stages early on. SSR experts should be included in every mission planning team.

Mission planning assessment visits should carry out preliminary stock-takings of the security sector and respective reform requirements, keeping in mind that one of the key tasks of the mission may be to support nationally-led SSR needs assessments and consultation processes later-on.

## 7. Strengthen UN HQ SSR Capacity to Support Field Missions

Apart from the lack of a common UN approach to SSR and SSR related strategies, the absence of a dedicated SSR capacity at headquarters to provide adequate support for SSR programmes in integrated missions was a recurrent theme in the four case studies. This is not to say that HQ capacity is lacking in all areas of SSR; the situation is different with the support provided in the specific areas of police reform (DPKO Police Division) and, to a lesser extent, judicial reform (DPKO CLJAU). What field staff interviewed particularly missed was a HQ based SSR structure that: provides an overall body of knowledge to tap into; collects and filters lessons learned; provides the field with concrete examples of best practice and performance indicators that they can apply; develops general instructions and guidance on how a SSR unit should operate in the field and, in particular, its structure in terms of human resources and expertise; and supports field staff in SSR training and selection of SSR experts. This institutional deficit weakened the importance attributed to SSR in mission planning; the selection of SSR experts with appropriate skill-sets; the ability of the field mission to design, fund, implement, monitor and evaluate SSR assistance programmes; the ability of the UN system to ensure an integrated approach to SSR and to coordinate its support to SSR with local and other international stakeholders. This may change, however, with the recent establishment of an inter-agency UN SSR Task Force and the recommendation of the Secretary General's Policy Committee to create an inter-agency SSR support unit administratively located within the new DPKO Office for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions to serve as a system-wide focal point and technical resource.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that a dedicated structure for SSR be established (strengthened) at HQ level and supplemented by the creation of a network of SSR focal points in all entities involved in SSR support tasks across the UN system. The dedicated structure would be responsible for establishing SSR policy and guidelines for all peace operations engaged in military,[32] police, judicial and prison development (including civilian control, democratic oversight and gender mainstreaming). Additionally, the structure would be responsible for managerial oversight of the activities of the SSR units/teams located in the field missions (see below), and provide specialist advice and guidance to the missions.

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[32] Against this backdrop, DPKO may consider to build up a HQ capacity to support field missions in defence reform and to locate this activity clearly in an overarching SSR framework.

## 8.  Strengthen SSR Support Capacity in Field Missions

With the exception of police reform related activities, SSR capacity in most integrated missions is comparatively weak and fragmented across the various mission components. The common theme that emerges from all four case studies is the lack of a dedicated and adequately staffed SSR structure in the field which would permit the mission to deliver the required support for the SSR process. Even when such a structure is in place (e.g. MONUC), SSR capacity is very small in proportion to the rest of the mission components. In terms of human resources, integrated missions are often understaffed in the area of SSR. In the case of ONUB, the DDR/SSR section was one of the smallest sections of the mission and faced difficulties in refilling existing positions. In the case of MINUSTAH, UNPOL only had 44 per cent of its required staff while the justice section was operating at less than 50 per cent in key posts.[33] In addition to the problem of understaffing, the existence of a dedicated SSR structure in an integrated mission does not necessarily mean that there is sufficient capacity, capable of addressing SSR in a holistic and coordinated way. Given the broad scope of SSR, there are always other mission components involved in specific SSR activities, often to a much greater extent than the SSR component, such as UNPOL in the case of police reform. This is further complicated by the fact that SSR-related and cross-cutting activities are often carried out by mission components which are under the command of different DSRSGs. All four case studies concluded that the creation of a strategic SSR unit within the mission would facilitate the development and implementation of a single integrated SSR strategy in the field.

**Recommendation:** Integrated missions involved in SSR should have a strategic unit of SSR experts responsible for the development and managerial oversight of the implementation of the UN's SSR strategy to be located directly within the SRSG's office to ensure its possession of sufficient political and bureaucratic leverage to permit an "integrated" approach to SSR programmes. This unit or function should serve as a hub for ensuring coherence and coordination of SSR activities, and should be responsible for charting and monitoring progress of the SSR process, for liaising with national counterparts and international actors, and ensuring that actions are taken at different levels concurrently and sequentially. The unit should also feed policy advice and project proposals into existing structures, such as SSR Joint Commissions or other sections of the missions not traditionally involved in SSR.

## 9.  Provide Sufficient SSR Experts with Adequate Skill-Sets

SSR is a very sensitive area of intervention for external actors, and for this reason should be conducted by staff experienced in promoting and supporting local ownership in SSR programming and capable of adapting to the local political, technical and linguistic requirements. The case studies highlighted the difficulty of

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[33]  This is based on figures provided in December 2006 for UNPOL, and in June 2007 for the Justice Section.

finding and recruiting people with specific SSR as well as programme management, training and language expertise. In particular, language skills were often lacking in integrated missions deployed to French speaking countries (e.g. MONUC, MINUSTAH, ONUB) necessitating the use of translators during political negotiations or in training sessions with national stakeholders, thereby complicating UN assistance to SSR activities. Also, mission personnel involved in training local military, police, or judicial officers did not always have the necessary pedagogical skills to complement their professional experience. Given the multidisciplinary skill-sets required for SSR, a fundamental problem is the lack of staff experienced in: managing and supporting the development of civil administrations and public service reform; the establishment of security sector oversight mechanisms; the promotion of civil society participation; and, the mainstreaming of cross-cutting concerns such as gender into SSR programmes. This expertise is rarely found among military, police and legal staff of integrated missions involved in defence, police or justice reform. Recruitment processes should therefore ensure that expert personnel Member States select for service in integrated missions possess the requisite developmental managerial skills. Finally, and not surprisingly given the absence of a common UN approach to SSR, there is a lack of training opportunities for staff involved in SSR programmes. The different backgrounds of mission staff, however, call for the provision of systematic SSR training at all staff levels and in all aspects of SSR. SSR training should be based on a series of standardised operational practices and procedures for the respective SSR areas, adaptable to different local standards.

**Recommendation:** The UN should recruit staff for integrated missions' activities in SSR that possess the requisite skill sets, particularly with regard to language, pedagogical and developmental management skills. In this context, DPKO should amend its staffing tables for future peace missions so that positions are explicitly identified and the skills required for these positions clearly specified. Longer-term contracts should be encouraged to ensure institutional continuity of SSR efforts. Finally, staff involved in SSR programmes should have access to adequate training, and SSR modules should be included in pre-deployment training.

## 10. Increase Financial Resources for SSR Support Programmes

Peacekeeping missions which engage in peacebuilding tasks such as SSR often suffer from the constraints of limited financial resources. In particular, they have difficulty funding projects which are not included in the assessed budget, i.e. SSR support tasks going beyond the mere provision of advisers or trainers drawn from mission staff. Quick Impact Projects (QIP) may be viewed as a way to compensate for the lack of access to assessed funds, however, given their constraints in terms of timelines (short-term) and funding (small-scale), they are of limited use for long-term SSR interventions. In all missions examined, the non- or limited availability and the often slow release of funding has hampered the implementation of SSR support activities and thus undermined, in the face of national stakeholders, the credibility of UN interventions in this area. A prime

example of this is the case of Burundi, where ONUBs UNPOL officers deployed to support police stations in the provinces were unable to provide any of the basic material required for the carrying out of their activities. Similarly, UNPOL faced difficulties in convincing Burundian police officers to attend UN workshops when no per diem compensation could be offered by ONUB, and at times the UNPOL officers themselves reportedly put money aside from their own salaries in order to contribute to these basic costs. Another problem has been the slow release of funds which has contributed to hampering project implementation. For example, in Haiti $ 3.7 million was granted to the DDR unit of MINUSTAH in 2005, yet this was not made available until May 2006. This meant that the unit had only one month to spend the money before it had to be returned for the new budget period, resulting in over ambitious planning for the short period of time. UN Programmes, Funds and Specialized Agencies have an advantage over the peacekeeping missions in the sense that they are able to fundraise for their projects as they often have dedicated personnel with expertise on fund-raising and advocacy (which the missions do not). In practice, UNDP is one of the only mechanisms by which the UN can disperse donor funds for SSR in the field. In principle, donor funds for the SSR activities of integrated missions should have become more easily accessible since the expansion in 2005 of the OECD DAC guidelines on the eligibility of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which now covers a wide range of SSR interventions, particularly in the area of civilian management and democratic oversight as well as SSR-related and cross-cutting activities.[34] Even where SSR activities are now ODA eligible, however, there is often poor commitment on the part of the bilateral donors to support activities related to the security sector, either because they consider certain SSR activities as politically too sensitive or as a component part of their bilateral assistance to the country in question.

**Recommendation:** Financial resources for UN integrated missions in the area of SSR should be increased by facilitating access to assessed budget funds and, if appropriate, to QIP funds. Furthermore, DPKO and in particular, the mission leadership, should work more closely with UNDP in the field in order to achieve adequate funding for SSR projects. Finally, senior UN leadership should engage in a strategic dialogue with bilateral donors on how best to provide funds for the SSR activities of UN integrated missions. As difficult as it may be, the UN should explore ways and means of reinforcing its common approach to SSR by developing a common or integrated funding mechanism, following the example of some leading donor countries who have established cross-agency funding pools for SSR and related interventions.

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[34] According to the relevant OECD DAC guidelines, revised in 2005, the following activities in the areas of security and development are ODA eligible: (1) management of security expenditure; (2) enhancing civil society's role in the security system; (3) supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers; (4) security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control; (5) civilian activities for peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution; (6) controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The supply or financing of military equipment or services and use of military personnel to control civil disobedience remains excluded from ODA eligibility. Accessible at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf

## 11. Promote an In-Country "One UN" Approach to SSR

The large number of departments and agencies on the ground highlights the need to ensure a coherent approach to SSR within the UN family. A key partner on SSR of the peacekeeping missions has been UNDP; however, cooperation between the two has often been hampered by bureaucratic hurdles and perceptions of the missions having a short-term vision as opposed to the longer-term developmental goals of UNDP and other UN entities on the ground. In particular, the mission is often accused of arriving in a country where the UN Country Team is already established, and adopting an intrusive approach which involves dictating its plans without adequate technical awareness or political familiarity with the context on the ground. In the missions reviewed, the lack of a coordinated, not to say integrated, approach of the UN family has undermined the ability of the UN to speak with one voice when cooperating with national authorities on SSR issues. Work on justice reform has often been particularly problematic because of the large number of UN actors involved. For example, in Haiti, a judicial reform plan was drafted by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MOJPS) with the support of the Justice Section at MINUSTAH, whilst UNDP drafted a completely separate judicial reform project document. Nonetheless, cooperation on SSR and SSR related programmes has at times been encouraged by integration, such as in the case of ONUB where the head of the OHCHR was also the head of the Human Rights division. Another example of integration is provided by the case of MINUSTAH which possessed an integrated DDR unit formed of members of DPKO and UNDP. In this case, however, the workload was eventually separated, with UNDP taking on the violence reduction programme whilst DPKO focused on DDR per se. This split was due to several reasons, including the difficulty of adapting to different budget cycles, and the idea that this would streamline management and be more cost-effective. Nonetheless, following the unit's experience of integration, UNDP and MINUSTAH were able to maintain a similar vision for their work on DDR.

**Recommendation:** The "One UN" approach should be adopted in order to implement the integrated SSR strategy recommended above for each integrated mission involved in SSR. This implies the need for joint planning, joint programming, joint staffing policies, joint budgeting and joint programme locations (within the mission). In order for the UN to deliver coherent and consistent messages to national authorities, a senior level UN staff member (if possible with local language skills) should be appointed as a focal point for negotiations with government officials on SSR. This person should ideally be the head of the SSR strategic unit.

## 12. Strengthen Engagement with National SSR Stakeholders

Cooperation with national stakeholders is of great importance in order to achieve ownership of the SSR process as well as to initiate activities in a timely fashion. The extent of cooperation between the UN and national stakeholders will depend greatly on the political and security context, the priorities and the actual power of the government, and the strength and preferences of non-governmental actors. Nonetheless, as illustrated by the case studies, efforts must be made to encourage successful cooperation by establishing coordination structures or improving those that are in place. Following the model set by the police components of peacekeeping operations, the option of negotiating the deployment of liaison officers/teams within the main national structures (e.g. headquarters of the main security actors and/or the relevant ministries) should be considered as this could permit a well-informed assessment of capacities and national requirements and also facilitate confidence-building between the mission and national government. In each case, the impact this may have on national ownership should be well anticipated, to avoid cases where this is perceived as external interference. It is essential to closely involve members of civil society in the SSR process. Consultations with civil society groups provide an entry point to effective outreach and enhanced transparency. This was something that was lacking in all cases examined, although relations with local stakeholders, and in particular, civil society were often better with the UN Programmes, Funds and Specialised Agencies than with the missions. Communication strategies and public information campaigns need to address the various security needs of the population, in particular in cases where there is a record of abuse towards vulnerable population groups by entities that are meant to be providing security. Negative perceptions have often developed in civil society due to a lack of information, transparency and understanding of the UN mandate and activities. This is particularly the case in the area of SSR, where the local population needs to be reassured about the steps taken and the consequences of the reform processes.

**Recommendation:** UN peacekeeping missions should establish from the outset a coordination structure with national stakeholders, involving other relevant international actors (see below), with precise terms of reference (responsibilities, chairmanship, management and periodicity of the meetings, etc.). Efficiency should be increased by separating the different levels of coordination – technical level separated from the strategic/political level. The terms of reference should also include baseline objectives that would need to be met for the handover of the coordination structure to national authorities. Supporting the development of a communications strategy and linking SSR to public information campaigns should also help improve communication with local stakeholders. In order to ensure that engagement with national stakeholders consists of a two way process, it should be inclusive and also embrace consultation with civil society.

### 13. Facilitate Coordination among International Donors

International assistance to SSR requires a variety of different actors – multilateral, bilateral and transnational – each with their own capabilities and experience in a specific area of SSR, underlining the need for coordination of these efforts. Coordination is also important in order to prevent local stakeholders from potentially playing the donors off against each other in order to reap benefits for themselves. However, coordination between UN entities and other external SSR actors is frequently carried out in an ad-hoc manner. This is often due to a simple lack of political will, because international actors usually do not like being "coordinated" by others, rather than the absence of concrete measures for coordination.[35] The UN has played a part in several structures for coordination with donors such as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) in Haiti, the International Coordination Group in Burundi or the Joint Commission on SSR in the DRC. However, the level of effectiveness of cooperation may differ according to a number of factors, such as, whether or not an actor is clearly in the lead, and if this has been agreed amongst the international community or is just assumed by other actors involved. In Burundi, for example, coordination was perceived by most bilateral donors as the area of comparative advantage of ONUB. Indeed, ONUB had the capacity to organise meetings, and to prepare a mapping of the different activities the UN, NGOs and donors were engaged in. In Haiti, on the other hand, cooperation between the UN and donors was problematic. This was also the case in the DRC, where the role of the UN in coordinating SSR efforts was not always clear, particularly as the EU was another strong player in the international community's efforts to support SSR in the DRC.

**Recommendation:** Given its mandate, legitimacy and presence on the ground, whenever an integrated mission is involved in substantive SSR activities, the UN should play a key role in the coordination of SSR activities amongst external actors. This could be as simple as signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with other major actors on the ground on who should take the lead on different issues, to actually taking a proactive role in the coordination of SSR efforts. For example, the UN could facilitate the mapping of the SSR activities of all the external actors engaged in SSR in the country in question, by defining the gaps in SSR engagement that need to be filled and by including other relevant international actors in its coordination structures with national stakeholders. The UN could also play a role in defining the guidelines by which training should be conducted so that these are harmonised and do not reflect the specific standards of each donor government providing the training.

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[35]  See: Vincenza Scherrer, "Challenges of Integration: Cooperation on SSR within the UN System and Beyond", in David Law (ed.), *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, Münster: LIT, 2007, pp. 181-197.

## 14. Emphasise Service Delivery in SSR Programming

UN integrated missions tend to view capacity- or institution-building as being the objective of SSR rather than a means to an end. The primary goal of SSR, however, is to support the provision and equal access of all to security and justice in ways that foster democratic governance and human rights. The distinction is crucial because the existence of a capacity says nothing about whether that capacity is used and whether it is used in an effective, efficient and accountable way commensurate with democratic standards. Although based on the findings of the four case studies, this lesson is not specific to the SSR support activities of UN integrated missions but applies to external assistance to SSR in general.

**Recommendation**: All SSR-related UN development policies should be (re-) written to emphasise that SSR's primary objective is to strengthen service delivery rather than build institutional capacity.

## 15. Measure Performance of SSR Support Activities

Finally, perhaps the most pivotal lesson learned in SSR programming is the need to ensure consistent and coherent management of the implementation and performance of initiatives, concentrating on defined and measurable outcomes. This was something that was lacking in the field missions examined as no monitoring teams existed for SSR, and specific SSR performance indicators were largely underdeveloped. Without such monitoring and evaluation there is a risk of implementing programmes without assessing their chances for success, or of overlooking opportunities to improve their performance.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that a UN-system wide set of criteria for measuring SSR performance be developed, and that this criteria be anchored in qualitative indicators. It is also recommended that UN SSR programmes measure the performance of national security and justice providers as the means by which to assess the success of the UN's SSR activities in the field. Furthermore, this monitoring and evaluation could be carried out by trained local actors in order to increase ownership and credibility.

## ANNEXES

### 1.  UN Security Council Documents on SSR

### A.  Excerpt from the Statement by the President of the Security Council at the 5632nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 20 February 2007 (S/PRST/2007/3*)

"The Security Council recalls the Statement by its President of 12 July 2005, in which it emphasizes that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilization and reconstruction process in post-conflict environments.

"The Security Council stresses that reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, to extending legitimate state authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict. In that regard, professional, effective and accountable security sector, and an accessible and impartial law-enforcement and justice sectors are equally necessary to laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development.

"The Security Council underlines that it is the sovereign right and the primary responsibility of the country concerned to determine the national approach and priorities of security sector reform. It should be a nationally-owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question. The Security Council acknowledges that strong support and assistance of the international community are important to build national capacities thereby reinforcing national ownership, which is crucial for the sustainability of the whole process. (...)

"The Security Council underlines that security sector reform can be a long-term process that continues well beyond the duration of a peacekeeping operation. (...)

"The Security Council emphasises that security sector reform must be context-driven and that the needs will vary from situation to situation. The Security Council encourages states to formulate their security sector reform programmes in a holistic way that encompasses strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, civilian oversight and good governance. The Security Council emphasises the need for a balanced realisation of all aspects of security sector reform, including institutional capacity, affordability, and sustainability of its programs. The Security Council recognises the inter-linkages between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilisation and reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues. (...)

### B.  Excerpt from the Concept paper prepared by the Slovak Presidency for the UN Security Council Open Debate on 20 February 2007 (S/2007/72)

"(...) 4. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is driven by the understanding that an ineffective and poorly governed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to peace, stability, poverty reduction, sustainable development, rule of law, good governance and the respect for human rights. The **security sector** – or the security system as it is referred to by developmental actors – is defined as including all those institutions, groups, organisations

and individuals – both state and non-state – that have a stake in security and justice provision:

- *Core security actors including law enforcement institutions:* armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coastguards, border guards, customs authorities and reserve and local security units.

- *Security management and oversight bodies:* parliament/legislature and its relevant legislative committees; government/the executive, including ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; national security advisory bodies; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies; and civil society actors, including the media, academia and NGOs.

- *Justice institutions*: justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; the judiciary (courts and tribunals); implementation justice services (bailiffs and ushers), other customary and traditional justice systems; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; etc.

- *Non-statutory security forces*: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; political party militias.

5. The security sector shares many of the characteristics of other service delivery systems (although it has unique characteristics as a result of the central role that the use of force plays in this sector). As the United Nations Secretary-General noted in 1999, the security sector "should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other public service". Thus, the **overarching objective of SSR** is to ensure that the security institutions perform their statutory functions – to deliver security and justice to the state and its people - efficiently and effectively in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles of good governance and the rule of law, thereby promoting human security.

6. SSR depends on **national ownership** because reform of the most sensitive sector of the state must be shaped and driven by local actors and supported, if necessary, by external actors. This may be extremely difficult in some countries, particularly those in post-conflict environments, but it is a pragmatic imperative as well as a matter of respect. SSR that is not locally shaped and driven is not sustainable.

7. SSR is **holistic** because (1) it provides a framework for military and defence reform as well as reforms in non-military parts of the security sector such as the police and judicial institutions; (2) it links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the security and justice institutions to overriding concerns of good governance, rule of law and democratic accountability; and (3) it aims at building state capacity to deliver security and justice and simultaneously engaging non-state actors relevant for security sector governance.

8. SSR is **context-specific** because each country engaged in SSR constitutes a special case and hence a different reform context. Consequently, the way SSR is approached and implemented very much depends on whether a country finds itself in a long-term democratisation process, in transition from war to peace or in a post-conflict setting. Another important contextual factor is the regional security environment which may be amenable or not to national SSR. Thus, SSR cannot be undertaken in a mechanical fashion and there is no one-size-fits-all.

9. SSR is a **long-term** endeavour that takes place over several years if not decades, and requires substantial resources. A host of security needs might be urgent but there is never a quick-fix solution. Short-term targets lead to dysfunctional and unsustainable outcomes. Institutional capacity, affordability and sustainability of programmes, sequencing, timing and flexibility are all aspects of SSR which need to be balanced against each other. (...)"

## 2. UN Peace Operations Mandated to Conduct SSR Activities

**Table I: Peacekeeping operations**

| Acronym | Location | Established - Completed | Explicit SSR mandate | Implicit SSR mandate | SSR Unit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **UNMIK** | Serbia (Kosovo) | June 1999 (SCR 1244) | - | SCR 1244 (June 1999) | - |
| ***UNAMSIL** | Sierra Leone | Oct. 1999 – Dec. 2005 (SCR 1270) | - | SCR 1436 (Sept. 2002) | - |
| ***UNTAET** | Timor Leste | Oct. 1999 – May 2002 (SCR 1272) | - | SCR 1338 (Jan. 2001) | - |
| **MONUC** | DRC | November 1999 (SCR 1279) | SCR 1565 (Oct. 2004) | SCR 1493 (Aug. 2003) | X |
| ***UNMISET** | Timor Leste | May 2002 – May 2005 (SCR 1410) | - | SCR 1410 (May 2002) | - |
| **UNMIL** | Liberia | September 2003 (SCR 1509) | SCR 1509 (Sept. 2003) | - | - |
| **UNOCI** | Côte d'Ivoire | April 2004 (SCR 1528) | SCR 1721 (Nov. 2006) | SCR 1528 (Feb. 2004) | - |
| **MINUSTAH** | Haiti | June 2004 (SCR 1542) | - | SCR 1542 (April 2004) | - |
| ***ONUB** | Burundi | June 2004 – Dec.2006 (SCR 1545) | - | SCR 1545 (May 2004) | X |
| **UNMIS** | Sudan | March 2005 (SCR 1590) | - | SCR 1590 (March 2005) | - |
| **UNMIT** | Timor Leste | August 2006 (SCR 1704) | SCR 1704 (Aug. 2006) | - | X |

\* Completed missions      Case studies on which this report is based are highlighted


**Table II: Special political and/or peacebuilding missions (DPKO-led)**

| Acronym | Location | Established - Completed | Explicit SSR mandate | Implicit SSR mandate | SSR Unit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **UNAMA** | Afghanistan | March 2002 (SCR 1401) | SCR 1623 (Sept. 2005) | SCR 1536 (2004) | - |
| ***UNOTIL** | Timor Leste | May 2005 - July 2006 (SCR 1599) | - | SCR 1599 (April 2005) | - |
| **UNIOSIL** | Sierra Leone | January 2006 (SCR 1620) | SCR 1620 (Aug. 2005) | - | - |
| **BINUB** | Burundi | January 2007 (SCR 1719) | SCR 1719 (Oct. 2006) | - | X |

\* Completed mission

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