David Law (Ed.)

Intergovernmental Organisations
and
Security Sector Reform

Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)

LIT

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Preface

The DCAF Yearly Book series is designed to review recent research findings and field experience on themes in the area of security reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG) that have assumed a certain importance in the SSR/G policy and research community or can be expected to do so over the short to medium term. Thus, the 2003 and maiden version of the Yearly Book (*Challenges of Security Sector Governance*) addressed the issue of security sector governance in the Euro-Atlantic and global contexts. The 2004 volume (*Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*) contrasted the tasks involved in reforming an existing security sector with those that need to be engaged in reconstructing a security sector that has been destroyed by conflict. The 2005 Yearly Book (*Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding)* went on to examine the distinct programme features of SSR/G in post-conflict settings. Last year's volume (*Private Actors and Security Governance*) addressed the role of private, non-statutory security sector actors and the challenges associated with their oversight and regulation. As all these studies have underlined, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) play a leading role in the development of thinking about SSR/G and the delivery of programmes in the field. The 2007 Yearly Book will have this dimension as its overriding theme.

A great many IGOs are involved in SSR or in SSR-related activities. This volume looks at a selection of organisations that have taken the lead in the SSR field and/or have the potential for significantly developing their SSR agendas in the future. These IGOs are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This year's volume examines the SSR/G role of these organisations under four headings. Part I focuses on conceptual issues that set the stage for the chapters that follow. The first chapter discusses why and how some IGOs have come to recognise SSR/G as a policy framework for their activities in the area of security and/or development, why others may follow their example and the policy implications that are raised by this trend. The second

chapter maps out the norms and standards for SSR/G that various IGOs have elaborated and offers a framework for categorising and comparing norm development across institutions. The third chapter analyses the commitments that IGOs have undertaken as well as the mechanisms that they have adopted to guide their cooperation with one another in programme implementation.

Part II offers case studies on how IGOs have implemented SSR in programme areas that are particularly representative of their overall action. Thus, the chapter on the OECD reviews the organisation's role in identifying SSR/G best practices and in disseminating them among practitioners. The implementation of SSR/G norms in crisis management and prevention activities is the focus of the chapter on the EU. The chapter on the OSCE looks at some of the key SSR/G components of its field missions. The role of SSR/G norms in NATO's partnership and enlargement programmes provides the substance for the chapter on the alliance. The central theme in the examination of the role of the WB and the IMF is their support for SSR/G implementation through financial and other programme activity and the normative dimensions of this activity as it pertains to SSR/G. Part II concludes with an analysis of ECOWAS, its evolving SSR-related normative framework and the prospects of the organisation developing a regional approach to SSR.

Part III of the Yearly Book offers three case studies on the way various actors, primarily but not exclusively IGOs, have worked together to implement and support the implementation of SSR. Its first chapter will look at IGO cooperation in supporting reform of the public security sector in Eastern and Central Europe. A second chapter will examine how the UN has worked with other actors in supporting SSR in integrated missions where the UN has had a prominent status. The issue of inter-institutional cooperation in SSR programmes in Afghanistan will be the focus of a chapter focussing on NATO's leading role in this theatre.

Part IV brings together the conclusions that can be drawn from the various case studies and puts forward policy recommendations for future IGO work in the area of SSR/G.

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The Editor
Geneva, September 2007

Abbreviations

ABP	Afghanistan Border Police
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
ADZ	Afghanistan Development Zone
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANP	Afghanistan National Police
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Force
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BINUB	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (EU – Western Balkans)
CARPO	CARDS Regional Police Project (CoE/EC)
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP	Common Security and Foreign Policy (EU)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNPF	Counter Narcotics Police Force (Afghanistan)
CoC	Code of Conduct
CoE	Council of Europe
COMISAF	Commander, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre (OSCE)
CPDC	Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (OECD)
CRP	Critical Review Panel (OECD)
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSPWG	Common Security Policy Working Group
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (USA)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN)
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DFID	UK Department for International Development
DIAG	Disarmament of illegal armed groups
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN)
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction (EU)
EC	European Commission
ECJHAT	European Commission Justice and Home Affairs Team
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESP	ECOWAS Standby Force
ETT	Embedded Training Team (Afghanistan)
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUPAT	European Union Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL COPPS	European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC
EUSR	European Union Special Representative in BiH
FSC	Forum for Security Co-operation (OSCE)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAC	Governance and anti-corruption (World Bank)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFSY	Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (IMF)
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GWOT	Global war on terror
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HQs	Headquarters
IAWG	Inter-Agency Working Group
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (UN)
IFI	International financial institution
IF-SRR	Implementation Framework for Security Sector Reform (OECD)
IGO	Intergovernmental organisation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession (EU)
IPTF	International Police Task Force (UN – Bosnia-Herzegovina)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (NATO)
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (Afghanistan)
JRC	Judicial Reform Commission (Afghanistan)
JSSR	Justice and security sector reform
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KPS	Kosovo Police Force
LEOP	Law Enforcement Officer Program on Combating Hate Crime (OSCE)
MAP	Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MOJPS	Minister of Justice and Public Security (Burundi)
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPRI	Military Professional Resources International
MSC	Mediation and Security Council (ECOWAS)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NFP	National Focal Point (OSCE)

NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs (UN)
OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (NATO – Afghanistan)
ONUB	Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCR	Office of the Senior Civilian Representative (NATO – Afghanistan)
PACE	Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
PAG	Policy Action Group (NATO – Afghanistan)
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (NATO)
PER	Public expenditure review (World Bank)
PFM	Public finance management (World Bank)
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PIC	Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia-Herzegovina
PMC	Private military company
PMSC	Private military and security company
POLAD	Political and Development Advisor (NATO)
POLIS	Policing OnLine Information System (OSCE)
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IMF)
PROXIMA	European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (NATO)
PSC	Private security company
PSO	Peace support operations
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
ROSC	Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (IMF)
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement (EU)

SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process (EU)
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative (NATO)
SEE	South-East Europe, South Eastern Europe
SEECP	South-East European Cooperation Process
SEESP	Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
SPAI	Anti-Corruption Initiative (Stability Pact)
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit (OSCE)
SPOC	Stability Pact Initiative against Organised Crime
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN – Kosovo)
SSR	Security sector reform
SSR/G	Security sector reform/governance
TA	Technical assistance
TNI	Indonesian Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNLIREC	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office in Geneva
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organisation

WMD	Weapons of mass destruction
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation

PART I

CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

Chapter 1

Intergovernmental Organisations and their Role in Security Sector Reform

David M. Law

Introduction

This article examines the role of intergovernmental organisations[1] in security sector reform (SSR), a relatively new approach to thinking about security characterised by its comprehensive and integrated understanding of security and development.

This is an important issue for several reasons. As a subject of recent genesis, relatively little is known about SSR outside specialist circles, in particular from a comparative institutional perspective.[2] Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) play, however, a crucial role in SSR. In virtually all recent and current SSR programme delivery, IGOs have either led the SSR effort or supported the lead provided by other actors. How this role is played is of vital importance for the prospects of fostering durable security and development in a wide range of countries. SSR programmes are currently underway in countries in a post-conflict phase (e.g., Liberia), those undergoing a post-communist transition (Ukraine), those that are being newly constituted (Kosovo) and those in conflict (Iraq). At the same time, IGOs have played a leading role in developing norms for SSR. As we shall see, some organisations are involved in both programme implementation and norm development, whereas others are involved in one but not the other. There is a growing realisation that the connection between the state of a country's security sector and its prospects for fostering sustainable social development and prosperity is relevant to all socio-economic contexts, including developed countries. Finally, the way that IGOs have become involved with SSR may be instructive of trends among such institutions in general.

The IGOs addressed in this volume are eight in number: the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They encompass a wide range of institutions, with different mandates, memberships and governance modalities. Their approaches to SSR vary significantly but they have in common an engagement in SSR or in SSR-related activities that may in time lead to fully-fledged SSR programmes. Other IGOs might have also been considered. For example, ECOWAS is the only organisation in the sample that 'receives' SSR programmes but there are other such recipient IGOs in Africa and elsewhere that are involved in SSR. However, we believe that this sample includes the most important IGOs in the SSR field and constitutes a representative grouping.

The article will proceed in the following way. The following section will review the role of IGOs in the contemporary environment and address the question of how IGOs adapt in response to changes in this environment, both in general and with respect to SSR in particular. Then, the profiles of the eight IGOs under study will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will analyse the implications for the IGOs of the relative novelty of the SSR concept and the challenges they face as they pursue their activities in this area.

IGOs in the Contemporary Environment[3]

Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, IGOs have greatly increased in number and influence. Now, with some 250 IGOs in existence,[4] they are more numerous than states and are involved in every significant area of international discourse.

Originally, IGOs were principally seen as instruments through which the sovereign state sought to pursue national interests in the regional or international arena. States embraced the new IGOs as an environment of enhanced predictability for consultations with other states and as a ready meeting place. Such functions remain of utmost importance in the self-understanding of most IGOs and, indeed, of most of their member states. Increasingly, however, IGOs have also come to be seen as actors in their own right, much more than the sum of their parts, and as indispensable purveyors of policies that would go not go very far – perhaps, nowhere at all – without their engagement and sponsorship.

The strong points of IGOs are considerable. An IGO can give legitimacy to an undertaking that a state acting alone cannot. This is a quality most typically attributed to the UN but it is equally true of almost any other IGO. IGOs operate in a policy environment in which there are built-in

checks and balances that can restrain and discourage inappropriate behaviour on the part of members. They can furnish a policy framework in which all member states, regardless of their size and clout, have a seat at the table. IGOs can provide continuity through the disruption of electoral cycles and government reshuffles: IGOs tend to be around for the long term, whereas (democratic) governments (thankfully) do not. IGOs have a capacity for channelling resources from disparate sources and in the process reducing transaction costs.

Of course, there are several counterarguments. One is that the trend pointing to IGOs' growing importance is by no means linear. The number of IGOs apparently peaked in 1985 and has since declined, although the reasons for this are unclear.[5] Second, several IGOs have found themselves in crisis as one or more of their members has engaged in aggressive criticism of the institution or withheld consensus on important decisions. The UN has had to contend with vigorous critiques of both its management and policies, from the US in particular. The OSCE has had to deal with efforts by the Russian Federation to reorder OSCE priorities and relativise its longstanding *acquis*. NATO and the EU have both had their internal functioning, as well as their relationship with one another, disrupted by members' infighting over the issue of Cyprus.[6] There are many other examples. The realist school of international politics would additionally argue that IGOs are playthings of the powerful, to be used when they suit states' interests and to be ignored when they do not. The price in terms of legitimacy that the US has had to pay in Iraq owing to its failure to obtain a UN mandate for the invasion underlines, however, that states cannot ignore IGOs with impunity.

A further consideration is that the arguments in favour of IGOs are not clear-cut. While it is true that IGOs can confer legitimacy on, say, a peace support operation led by a member state, one can also submit that such legitimacy comes with a high price, that of decisions being held hostage to the lowest common denominator politics that tend to typify IGO consultations. As for IGO checks and balances, these tend to work imperfectly: one need only think of how often it occurs that a member state conceals its intentions – for example, a plan to invade a non-member state – from fellow member states, even as that intention is being acted upon. The point about equal opportunity for all members also requires qualification. In some IGOs, some states, mainly the biggest and most powerful among them, tend to call the shots. The reverse argument can also be made, namely, that IGO membership can bestow on small states an influence well out of proportion to their population or GDP, or inflate the importance of what may sometimes be national 'niche' causes. Finally, as for financing, many IGOs face continual

and chronic funding challenges. Often, an individual member's budget for a particular activity can dwarf that of an IGO operating in the same area. In 2004, for example, US spending in Iraq is estimated to have equalled total UN spending for all seventeen of its ongoing operations.[7]

Beyond this, IGOs tend to display serious deficits in the area of governance. They suffer from a lack of transparency, as anyone will know who has ever tried to track down detailed information on, for example, the varying costs of peace support operations. In addition, IGOs tend to be only indirectly accountable to the constituencies they are supposed to serve. This can limit their inclination to exercise internal oversight over fellow members' activities and encourage mistrust of their operations by the public.

An assessment of the relative pros and cons of states and the IGOs they form yields four overriding impressions. First, IGOs suffer from imperfect governance, as do states. The latter tend to have better tools for dealing with their imperfections – in particular, in democratic states, regularly occurring elections – but in a globalising world their governance challenges are no less daunting. For the time being, however, states would appear to have the edge on IGOs in the governance department. Second, although IGOs do not exactly mirror what goes on in the life of their member states, their performance can clearly be affected if a key member is experiencing strategic shock or going through a revanchist phase, buoyed up by windfall resource profits. Third, IGOs can overcome counter-currents on the state level through enlightened leadership on the international level, however difficult this may be to secure. Fourth and most importantly, states and IGOs are joined-at-the-hip allies in today's globalising environment. IGOs need committed, enlightened member states to ensure that their agendas remain relevant and their activities effective. None of today's states are, in turn, strong enough not to need the support of IGOs in order to pursue their individual agendas effectively.

IGOs are sometimes criticised for being stuck in their ways, and there is more than a little truth in this. However, the period since the end of the Cold War is replete with examples of IGOs undertaking major changes. Some IGOs have created new agencies to deal with new problems. For example, the WB has created the World Bank Institute as its capacity-development arm, and NATO has established such institutions as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to provide a framework for consultations with new partners and prospective members. The Council of Europe, for its part, developed in the early 1990s a new leitmotif – democratic security – that has identified democratic governance as a precondition for the population's security in the post-

communist societies of Eastern Europe. Some IGOs have taken on new functions from other organisations. For example, the EU has assumed many of the defence functions that were once the province of the Western European Union, and the Africa Union has succeeded the Organisation of African Unity, declaring in its founding document a greater attachment to governance and security issues than that entertained by its predecessor. Other organisations have reoriented their main focus: ECOWAS, for example, has evolved from being an organisation with a mandate to foster economic cooperation among West African states to one with important regional security responsibilities. The OECD, as almost all of these institutions, has taken on new members provided that they commit themselves to its principles and meet its conditions for membership. In the UN framework, the 1990s saw greater emphasis on the role of regional organisations, particularly in connection with the issues addressed in the Brahimi Report.[8] At the same time, the IGOs under study here have sought to restructure their interrelationships and develop new paradigms of interaction with one another. The emergence of SSR is a manifestation of these processes of internal transformation and external adaptation, as we shall see in the following section.

IGO approaches to SSR

Until very recently, all the IGOs under study here were engaged in SSR-related activities but did not recognise these as such, let alone have an overall concept for SSR. Moreover, activities that under an SSR approach would have been connected programmatically to one another were pursued in isolation. This characterisation has been overtaken by events as some IGOs have begun to embrace an SSR agenda. This is the case of the OECD, the EU and, most recently, the UN. Others have not yet begun to move towards the development of an overall approach to SSR but this seems likely to happen in time.

In the following sections, we examine the SSR profiles of the IGOs under study here and their key characteristics. In very general terms, the IGOs can be classified in two broad groups depending on their core functions and the factors that have moved them in the direction of SSR. One group consists of the IGOs whose main focus is on development; the other consists of the IGOs whose main focus is on security. But as we shall see, there are also IGOs that are involved in both areas.

The development IGOs started to assume a greater interest in security issues in the mid- to late 1990s when they realised that their development

work, in particular in conflict and post-conflict countries, could not be successful in an insecure environment. As for the security IGOs, the catalyst for their involvement in SSR has also been their experience in conflict and post-conflict theatres, starting with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s and continuing in Kosovo and Sierra Leone towards the end of the decade. Involvement in post-conflict reconstruction made clear to many actors in both of these groupings that they needed to take a comprehensive approach to reconstruction if conflict countries were to be stabilised and a return to conflict prevented. Reform of the security sector so that it could carry out its functions professionally and effectively, as well as on behalf of the population, thus came to be seen as a central component of reconstruction in both the development and security communities.

If the post-conflict environment was a defining experience for both development and security actors in terms of SSR, it was not the only one. Several of the IGOs under study here also became concerned about the state of security sector efficiency and governance in post-communist partner countries as they contemplated the prospects for institutional enlargement and developed intricate cooperation programmes both for potential members and for other non-member states. As a result, democratic security sector governance began to assume a central role in conditionality for partnership and membership for institutions such as the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. Finally, the rise in concern about strategic terrorism after 9/11 has also left its mark on IGO approaches to security and their understanding of how its relates to development, as well as underscoring the need for taking a broad and integrated approach to the security sector, both conceptually and in the field. At the same time, the anti-terrorist campaigns of several countries have focused on building capacity for the security sector to the detriment of efforts to ensure that oversight mechanisms are robust enough to guard against governmental abuse.

The involvement of the eight IGOs under study in this chapter differs as a function of several factors. Table 1.1 offers a notional typology of IGO engagement in SSR that considers how they differ by thematic approach, geographic focus, the instruments that they use and the country contexts where they tend to be active. Some of the IGOS under study in this volume – in particular, the EU and the UN – are potentially 'complete' organisations for SSR as their profiles incorporate all components in the table. As we shall see, however, there are limitations to the roles they currently play in SSR. The remainder of this section gives a brief profile of each organisation. It concludes with Table 1.2, which provides an overview of the different activities in which the IGOS are involved.

Table 1.1   Typology of IGO Engagement in SSR[9]

Thematic approach	Development	Security	Governance
Geographic focus	Global	Regional	Sub-regional
Instruments	Policy advice, technical assistance, programme implementation	Norm-setting	All of these
Country contexts	Developing	Transition	Developed
	Post-conflict		

OECD DAC

The OECD was established in 1961 as the successor organisation to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, with a mandate to support democracy and the market economy. It conducts research, compiles statistics and develops policy guidelines and norms with a view to coordinating policies and identifying good practice.

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD DAC) comprises the twenty-two major bilateral development donors in this area, as well as the European Commission. A subsidiary committee of the DAC is the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), which brings together conflict prevention and peace-building experts from

bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including from the UN system, EC, IMF and WB.

As part of their work on poverty reduction and enhancing aid effectiveness, donors became increasingly involved during the 1990s in conflict and post-conflict recovery. The OECD DAC assumed an increasingly important role as a forum for discussion on the interface between development and security, and later for the elaboration of best practices for donor activity in the area of SSR. This culminated in 2004 in a document entitled *DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance.* This articulated what has become a widely used definition of the security sector (in the OECD discourse, the 'security system'):

> '…core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia).'[10]

The *Guidelines* provided the basis for the development of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, which provides guidance on operationalising these guidelines in policy-making and programming.

The EU

The EU's role in SSR has evolved along several tracks. The first is reflected in the EU's status as the world's most important development donor. In this capacity, the EU has been guided by concerns similar to those of other IGOs active in the development area. The other track has been the EU's emergence as a global security player, with the development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy as of the mid-1990s and its engagement in several peace support missions. Here, its trajectory has been similar to IGOs involved in the security field. At the same time, EU thinking has also been shaped by the state of security sector governance in partner and potential member countries, a factor that is subsumed in the Copenhagen criteria for future membership elaborated in 1993.[11]

The EU emerged as a key player in SSR only in the first part of the current decade. In 2003, the EU elaborated its first-ever European Security Strategy, which stresses the need for the EU to consider a wider spectrum of missions, including undertaking SSR as part of its institution-building activities.[12] Then in 2005-2006, the EU Council and Commission adopted their respective SSR concepts. These affirm the EU role in SSR and specify various ways in which the EU can contribute to its implementation. In both concepts, the EU uses the OECD's broad definition of the security sector and its main SSR principles. In 2006, the EU also adopted an overarching EU framework for SSR. This document is designed to bring the SSR work of the Commission and the Council together by setting out the respective responsibilities of the two pillars as well as the modalities for joint action.[13]

The UN

The UN, as in the case of the EU, has traditionally been involved in activities in both the security and development fields, but it is only recently that an effort has been made to build effective links between them. On the development side, the key actor is the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which has SSR-related programmes in developing and transition countries in such areas as crisis prevention and recovery, democratic governance and poverty reduction. On the security side, the key actor is the UN Department of Peacekeeping and Operations (UNDPKO), which has the lead role in peacekeeping and peace support operations. UNDPKO only becomes operational in a country when it finds itself in a conflict or post-conflict situation. UNDP, on the other hand, tends to have a long-term presence in the country. Its programmes can be operational both prior to and after conflict. The fact that the two organisations often find themselves working in one and the same peace-building context can give rise to issues of coordination and programme coherence.

The UN took its first steps towards SSR when it began to realise that there had to be greater policy coherence between its development and security activities, and better coordination of the main departments working in these areas. In 2006, the Secretary-General created a Working Group on Security Sector Reform with representatives of both UNDPKO and UNDP. That same year, Slovakia, with a view to having the UN Security Council (UNSC) Presidency in 2007, organised the first two in a series of three workshops designed to prepare the way for a discussion of SSR at the level of the UN Security Council (UNSC).[14] Held in February 2007, the UNSC debate has set the stage for the Secretary-General to produce a report on SSR

by the end of 2007.[15] This may have an impact on the organisational structure of the Secretariat and could lead to the UN developing its own SSR concept. The Slovak initiative is being complemented by a Canadian government-sponsored study that focuses on the UN's approach to SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding.[16]

OSCE

Originally established as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975, the OSCE acquired IGO status in 1995. In pursuit of its mission of ensuring peace and security in Europe, the OSCE has adopted a comprehensive approach which combines the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions of security.

The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994), adopted as a 'politically binding' instrument, is the main OSCE statement on SSR and for roughly a decade represented the most forward-looking and comprehensive document of its kind. It calls for the democratic control not only of the military but also paramilitary, internal security forces and intelligence services, as well as of the police. It links the behaviour of security actors within a country to its external security relationships and considers their effective oversight and democratic control to be an indispensable element of stability and security.

Recently, some OSCE members have expressed an interest in updating the Code to take into account the evolution of thinking in the area of SSR. Some members prefer to focus on enhancing implementation of the existing Code. Others appear to have lost interest in the Code altogether.[17]

CoE[18]

The CoE was founded in 1949 to promote the development of common democratic principles throughout Europe. Thus, in contrast with the other IGOs under review here, the CoE's approach to SSR has been conditioned not mainly by a development or security vocation, but exclusively by governance concerns. In particular, the CoE's focus on human rights and the rule of law, as well as the need for governmental accountability in these regards, has moved it in the direction of SSR. As in the case of other IGOs under study here, the changes occurring in the international environment in the 1990s also encouraged it to venture into the area of security, which had traditionally been off-limits for this organisation. In 1993, it coined the expression *democratic security* to underscore that without democracy, there could be no

security. This message was inspired by the situation of post-communist countries in the queue for CoE membership.

The CoE role in SSR encompasses several areas. First, through its various programmes designed to strengthen capacity in the areas of accountability, human rights and law, it helps prepare states for EU membership. Second, it carries out investigations, such as the recent enquiry into European states' involvement in alleged secret detentions of individuals arrested as terrorists and the rendition flights used to remove them from certain jurisdictions. Third, it has a policy advisory role; for example, after Montenegro recently applied for membership, the CoE advised it on its constitution, including the clauses related to the security roles and responsibilities of the different parts of government. Fourth, the CoE also carries out training activities for police officers to sensitise them to their legal rights and responsibilities. Fifth, the CoE is an important setter of standards for the security sector.

In 1999, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) passed a resolution on oversight of the intelligence sector.[19] In 2001, PACE passed its *Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics,* which sets out the rules of behaviour for police and law enforcement bodies in accordance with the principles of democratic governance.[20] There have also been resolutions on the human rights of armed forces personnel and conscientious objectors, and guidelines on protecting human rights in the fight against terror. The Council's most important norm-setting exercise came in 2005 with the recommendation of its parliamentary assembly on the 'Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States'.[21]

The CoE is also a watch guard for the accountability of its member states' security practices. For example, when Serbia recently applied to be readmitted as a member, the accountability of Serbia's security sector to the government and the population was a crucial concern.[22] In addition, the Council's European Court of Human Rights has been instrumental in dispensing justice in several cases of human rights abuses at the hands of security sector personnel where national courts would not become involved or where options for appealing their decisions were exhausted, as has occurred not only in cases involving people from Turkey and Chechnya, but also in cases where Western European members of the CoE were implicated.[23]

NATO

Formed in 1949 as a defence alliance, NATO's mandate has expanded to include a wide range of security-related activities. This process has not been without controversy. Some of its members consider that NATO should remain focused on the collective defence of its members, rather than be distracted by broader security issues, particularly those where such countries hold that the EU must take the lead or be exclusively involved. Notwithstanding this, NATO has several SSR-relevant experiences that could point in the direction of a more expansive SSR role in the future.

First, NATO has a long involvement as an instigator and facilitator of defence reform in its member states. In fact, it has presided over several generations of defence reform, and as such it is the multilateral leader in this area.[24] Second, NATO has made democratic governance of the security sector and the ability to contribute to the Alliance's capacities central concerns of its approaches to enlargement, *inter alia* in its 1995 *Study on Enlargement*.[25] This is also a central feature of its Membership Action Plans for the next generation of members, for the time restricted to states from the Western Balkans. Third, NATO has become involved in the reform of armed forces other than the military in countries such as Ukraine, where the situation on the ground and concerns about the impact of security actors in addition to the military – for example, paramilitary forces, intelligence services and border guards – on the prospects of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration are high on the agenda.[26] Fourth, NATO has recently developed a series of programmes designed to strengthen the effectiveness and accountability of institutions concerned with defence. Programmes such as Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) have invariably also ended up addressing dimensions of the security sector beyond defence and the military.[27] The same is true of NATO programmes addressing the need to build assets for fighting terrorism. Such activities, however, tend to privilege capacity building and to lack a governance component.

Beyond this, there is the impact on NATO's SSR stance of its experiences in peace support operations. A major preoccupation of current defence reform efforts is to try to ensure the necessary capacity for the various peace support operations in which NATO is involved.[28] But NATO has also seen that its role as a security provider and contributor to post-conflict reconstruction is contingent on factors and actors other than those normally associated with the military. This has become abundantly clear in Afghanistan, for example, where police and gendarmerie assets at the country's disposal have been insufficient to provide the necessary support to its military operations;

NATO has only recently begun to understand that reconstruction efforts – in the security sector and more broadly – are essential for the success of its mission there.

ECOWAS

Because of West Africa's status as one of the poorest regions of the world, ECOWAS is a unique case among the IGOs under study here; rather than providing programmatic and technical support for SSR, the fifteen states that comprise this IGO are themselves often the recipients of SSR.

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 primarily as a body for encouraging economic integration and development of its members' economies and societies. In the late 1970s and 1980s, security issues also began to appear on the ECOWAS agenda. Two important defence protocols were adopted in 1978 and 1981, which called for mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs and the establishment of a regional mechanism for mutual assistance in defence matters. A succession of internecine conflicts with subregional ramifications in the second half of the 1980s led to members giving ECOWAS a stronger security role. A non-aggression pact was agreed between them, entering into force in September 1986. In 1991, members passed a declaration of political principles, committing themselves to upholding democracy and the rule of law. By virtue of these documents, ECOWAS has distinguished itself from other regional organisations in that it has placed equal emphasis on external and internal threats to security, and has made it possible for members to intervene in other members' internal affairs when their security is imperilled.

These provisions assumed great operational importance after the end of the Cold War and the accompanying upsurge in armed conflict in the region. To address such threats, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a multinational peacekeeping/peace enforcement force, the first such group to be established by a regional body. ECOMOG has been deployed to deal with contingencies in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. In 1999, the experience of regional security cooperation was consolidated when ECOWAS Heads of State signed a protocol establishing a *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.*

In addition to participating in peace support missions and training participants for such deployments, ECOWAS has been involved in a series of other activities of relevance to the security sector. It has developed a certain expertise in the area of small arms and light weapons (SALW) disposal. The

ECOWAS regional parliament has been gradually building its capacity to monitor national security sectors. ECOWAS has an emerging role in the area of judicial oversight and human rights monitoring, and it has sponsored programmes designed to build security expertise on the part of regional civil society bodies. In 2006, ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff agreed on a regional Code of Conduct for Armed Forces, a norm- and standard-setting exercise that takes its inspiration from the OSCE Code of Conduct but sets different accents and in certain respects goes further.

WB and IMF[29]

The WB and IMF were established in the framework of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. The WB has tended to look at the social, economic and institutional drivers of development, whereas the IMF has concentrated on fiscal and monetary aspects. The attitude of both these IGOs toward security issues has tended to be extremely cautious. During the Cold War, neither was much involved in this area. As the Cold War faded, they developed an interest in the levels of military spending in the states to which they offered loans, and/or whose economic performance they monitored. Their scrutiny of this issue was imbalanced, however, as they tended to look only at spending levels for the defence sector and not at other components of the security sector.

The argument against taking a broader and more intrusive view has been based on an interpretation of the WB and IMF statutes that prevents them from overtly intervening in political affairs of the states where they are active. In the 1990s, however, pressures started building for change. Like other IGOs focused on development, they started making priorities of poverty reduction and good governance. They also found their activities increasingly targeted on conflict and post-conflict countries. This encouraged the WB to extend its lending and advisory activities to such issues as demining and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants.

Constraints on the two bodies becoming involved in SSR activities that do not qualify for official development assistance remain strong. However, pressures have been growing for the two institutions to review their approaches. One such pressure is manifest in the preparedness of members of the donor community to press for a more generous understanding of what can be included as official development assistance, or in the jargon, what is ODA-ble.[30] Beyond that, the two organisations are under pressure to put their considerable technical expertise to use in a more holistic way – one

which focuses on the interdependence of budgetary, fiscal and economic issues with security concerns.

Comparing SSR-Relevant IGOs

Table 1.2 (p. 18) addresses the general role of the IGOs with respect to SSR, the geographical scope of this role and the country contexts where the IGOs are active.

 Given the diversity in their profiles, IGOs have varied widely in their approach to carrying out SSR field activities. Table 1.3 (p. 19) gives an overview of the different programme areas where the IGOs are active.

Conclusions

The different avenues by which the IGOs under study here have come to SSR and the relative novelty of the concept have several implications.

 First, there is a great deal of diversity in the approaches of the IGOs to SSR. For example, while SSR, meaning security sector reform, is the most generally used term, the OECD uses the term *security system reform* and UNDP *justice and security sector reform.* These terms reflect the specific concerns of individual organisations: the OECD uses *system* instead of *sector* to de-emphasise the military connotations of the latter, while the UNDP uses the term *justice* to underline that the process is as much about justice as it is about security and to avoid any notion of justice being securitised. These different terminologies point to significant differences in IGO approaches to SSR that can have repercussions for the way they work together in the field. Diversity can also be found within institutions. As we have seen, the origins of SSR in the work of the EU Council and the EU Commission are quite different. The former has become involved in SSR mainly through its ESDP activities. The Commission's experience in the area of SSR has primarily developed out of its activities in the area of development. Similarly, the leading UN agencies involved in SSR, UNDPKO and UNDP, also entertain different perspectives on SSR by virtue of their different functions.

 Second, there is a great deal of unevenness and fragmentation in the design and delivery of SSR programmes. None of the IGOs under examina-

Table 1.2   IGO SSR Profiles[31]

Name of IGO	SSR Focus	Geographical Scope	Country Contexts
OECD DAC	Norm and policy development	Global	Developing, transition, post-conflict
EU	Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development	Global	Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed through members' ESDP activities
UN & agencies	Capacity-building & technical assistance	Global	Developing, transition, post-conflict
OSCE	Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development	Regional/ Euro-Atlantic & Euro-Asian	Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation
Council of Europe	Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development	Regional/ Europe	Transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns norm development and implementation
NATO	Capacity-building and technical assistance Norm development	Regional/ Euro-Atlantic	Developing, transition, post-conflict; developed countries as concerns defence reform
ECOWAS	Norm development	Regional/ West Africa	Developing, post-conflict
WB	Capacity-building & technical assistance	Global	Developing, transition, post-conflict
IMF	Technical assistance	Global	Developing, transition, post-conflict

Table 1.3   SSR Field Activities[32]
(bold ticks indicate main activity)

	EU	UN	OSCE	CoE	NATO	ECOWAS	WB
Special Post-Conflict Programmes[33]	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Gender & Security	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Civil Society & Media Capacity Building	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Regulation of Private Security Companies			✓				
Judicial & Legal Reform	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Police Reform	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Border Service Reform	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Intelligence Reform		✓		✓	✓		
Defence Reform	✓	✓	✓		✓		
Good Governance[34] **of the Security Sector**	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

tion here has the necessary expertise to be able to deal with all the components of the security sector. They tend to focus on some but not all of the security forces, or may only be concerned with the oversight functions of certain bodies, say the parliament, while ignoring those of the judiciary and civil society institutions.

Third, the IGOs do generally not see themselves as being part of the security sector. But it is clear that they are, especially when one considers that IGOs perform many of the functions of government as in a post-conflict environment such as Kosovo. Organisations such as the EU and NATO are also key players in the security sectors of their member states.

Fourth, IGOs may lack the necessary policy tools to implement SSR effectively. As we have seen, only two institutions – the OECD and the EU – have as yet SSR concepts, an indispensable tool for orienting an institution's SSR activities. In addition, only one institution – the OECD – has developed SSR policy guidelines taking into consideration how SSR has been approached in different country and regional environments; this work is, however, restricted to post-conflict settings. Furthermore, little effort has been made so far to catalogue norms applicable to SSR, a shortcoming that the following chapter may help correct.

Fifth, the novelty of SSR also tends to mean that material, administrative and personnel resources for SSR are underdeveloped. Part of the problem is finding the necessary capacity; for example, there is a shortage of personnel trained for designing and delivering SSR programmes, which can require hard-to-find skill sets, multi-disciplinary work experience and new kinds of managerial, sector and country expertise. This can be an important constraint on the further development of the IGO SSR agenda.

A sixth and related problem is that available resources are not always organised in such a way as to give effective support to SSR activities in the field. For example, financial instruments may be unconnected or 'unconnectable', thereby discouraging a holistic approach to programming. Moreover, the cross-cutting nature of SSR programmes often conflicts with the reflex to compartmentalise that is apparent in most institutions. This problem is highlighted when a SSR programme requires cross-departmental efforts.

Seventh, the lack of common points of reference within and across institutions complicates communication and cooperation in IGO activity. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, until recently, intergovernmental organisations focussing on SSR had little contact with one another, despite the fact that in the 1990s they found themselves increasingly involved in the same countries and regions. Similarly, they have been slow to develop a culture of cooperation with other entities engaged in SSR, such as national

governments and non-governmental actors. This is a crucial point because both these types of actors are often involved in implementing SSR programmes alongside IGOs.

Perhaps the most important challenge concerns governance. IGO mechanisms to ensure that their activities are carried out in a transparent and accountable manner are underdeveloped and in general suffer from the fact that oversight is weak or only indirectly exercised by member states. This is a particular problem for IGOs delivering SSR programmes in countries that are not members, where concerns as to the motivations driving programmes can easily arise. In post-conflict countries, where IGOs and other actors may temporarily have to supplant the functions of a local government because local elites are discredited, decimated or otherwise in disarray and incapable of playing their role, this problem can be particularly acute. IGOs thus face challenging issues of legitimacy and credibility in their SSR activities. We will return to these issues in the concluding chapter.

Notes

1   Authors disagree in their understanding of the key criteria determining whether an entity is an intergovernmental organisation. A representative definition would be the following: intergovernmental organisations are permanent bodies that states create to address matters entrusted to them and which result from international agreement among states. See Clive Archer, *International Organizations* (London: Routledge, 2001), 31-36. International organisations also include international non-governmental organisations, defined by the UN Economic and Social Council as any international organisation not created by means of an intergovernmental agreement.

2   Since its founding in 2001, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has produced a significant body of research and policy documents on security sector reform and governance. See, in particular, the four previous Yearly Books in this series as well as a variety of other articles. This material is available on the DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch.

3   For background on this section, the following books on IGOs have been consulted: Archer, *op. cit.*; John-ren Chen, ed., *The Role of International Institutions in Globalisation: Challenges of Reform* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003); Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds., *The Legitimacy of International Organizations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001); K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

4   Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organisations 2006-2007* (Munich: K. G. Sauer, 2006).

5   Archer proposes that the steady drop in the number of IGOs may be due to '…the poverty of many states and the increased unwillingness of the richer states to finance the IGOs',

op. cit., 25. The current number of IGOs is placed at 244 (Union of International Associations).

6   Staff-to-staff meetings between the EU and NATO take place under their Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2002, but this cooperation remains low-profile due to the ongoing dispute between the Republic of Cyprus (in the EU but not in NATO) and Turkey (in NATO but not in the EU) over the status of Northern Cyprus (in neither).

7   James Dobbins et. al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: from the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2005).

8   United Nations, Brahimi Report, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).

9   An earlier version of this table appeared in David Law, *Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, Background paper for the workshop on 'Developing a SSR Concept for the United Nations', Bratislava, 7 July 2006 (Geneva: DCAF, 2006).

10 OECD, 'The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice', (Paris: OECD, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr.

11 European Commission, 'Enlargement – Accession criteria', European Commission, accessed 4 September 2007 at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process /accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm.

12 European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', (Brussels, 12 December 2003). The strategy addresses key threats and ways to address them, as well as discusses policy implications for Europe.

13 For more on the EU role in SSR, see David Law and Oksana Myshlovska, 'The Evolution of the Concepts of Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance: the EU perspective', in *The European Union and Security Sector Reform*, eds. Philipp H. Fluri and David Spence (Biggleswade, UK: John Harper Publishing, forthcoming).

14 For more information on these three workshops, see their event profiles at DCAF, 'UN Security Council and Security Sector Reform: A DCAF Project', http://www.dcaf.ch/unssr/_events.cfm?navsub1=30&navsub2=2&nav1=3.

15 See UNSC, 'Security Sector Reform In Post-Conflict States Critical To Consolidating Peace: Report Needed Aimed At Improving Un Effectiveness, Security Council Says', UN Doc. SC/8958 (20 February 2007); UNSC, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', UN Doc. S/PRST/2007/3* (21 February 2007).

16 The complete results of this study will appear in the forthcoming DCAF publication, *The Role of UN Integrated Missions in Security Sector/System Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations*.

17 For an article on the relationship between the Code and SSR, see David Law, 'Security Sector Reform and the Future of the Code of Conduct', *Helsinki Monitor* 17, no. 2 (2006): 160-174.

18 More detail is provided on the CoE than on other IGOs as no chapter in this volume has been exclusively devoted to it.

19 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Control of internal security services in Council of Europe member states', Recommendation 1402 (1999).

20 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Committee of Ministers draft recommendation on the European code of police ethics', Opinion No. 223 (14 March 2001).

21 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states', Recommendation 1713 (2005).

22 See Council of Europe, 'Speech by Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro', Belgrade (6 April 2006); *Council of Europe*, 'Serbia and Montenegro: Compliance with obligations and commitments and implementation of the post-accession co-operation programme', SG/Inf(2005)16 final (11 October 2005).

23 For a list of all judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights since 1967, see 'Chronological List of Judgments and Decisions' (30 August 2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.

24 For an overview of NATO strengths and weaknesses in this area, see David Law, 'Security Sector Reform in the North Atlantic Area: unfinished business', in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva: DCAF, 2004).

25 See NATO, 'Study on NATO Enlargement' (September 1995).

26 After the adoption of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine in 1997, NATO-Ukraine cooperation evolved from a narrow focus on defence and military reform to a broader one including such areas as economic aspects of defence, civil emergency planning, and science and environment. After 2004, NATO further expanded its reform agenda in Ukraine by emphasising the need to ensure a fair and free electoral process, to guarantee media freedoms and the rule of law, to strengthen civil society and the judiciary, to improve arms export controls and to allocate adequate financial resources for the implementation of planned defence and security sector reforms. See NATO, 'NATO-Ukraine Action Plan' (22 November 2002); NATO, 'NATO-Ukraine Target Plans for 2006 in the Framework of NATO-Ukraine Action Plan: Executive Summary' (no date), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b060407e.pdf.

27 DCAF, 'Defence Institution Building: Papers Presented at the Conference on the 2005 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)' (Lvak, 2005), available at http://www.dcaf.ch.

28 See NATO, 'Final Communiqué: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session' (14 June 2007).

29 See Chapter 8 in this volume.

30 The OECD DAC, for example, has expanded the range of activities it considers as official development assistance. A 2005 directive lists six security-related activities that now qualify, and SSR figures among them. See OECD DAC, 'Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?' (3 March 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/32/34535173.pdf.

31 This table is taken from David Law, *Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform*, *op. cit*.

32 The OECD has no field activities (although this may change as the organisation seeks to implement the best practices elaborated in *The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice*). The IMF has no SSR-related field activities. They are therefore not included in this table.

33 These include demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR); mine action and reduction and control of small arms and light weapons (SALW).

34 For our purposes, good governance of the security sectors includes three components: democratic oversight, accountability and transparency.

Chapter 2

Overview and Typology
of IGO Norms for
Security Sector Reform and Governance

Oksana Myshlovska

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the existing and emerging international norms and
principles relating to security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) devel-
oped by the intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) that are the focus of the
present volume, that is, the Council of Europe (CoE), Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB) and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The norms have been identified on the basis of
an analysis of the main IGO documents in the SSR/G field.[1] They include
both overarching SSR/G principles and specific norms relating to different
security sector actors. The objective of this exercise is to enhance under-
standing of the existing international normative regime relating to SSR/G
and to identify gaps and underdeveloped areas therein.

    International norms shape and are in turn shaped by the international
system. Norms '…affect state behaviour by providing solutions to coordina-
tion problems, reducing transaction costs, providing a language and grammar
of international politics, and constituting the state actors themselves'.[2] In
addition to their role at the international level, norms have an impact on the
domestic policies implemented by states.[3]

    The importance of norms to international relations has been demon-
strated by the emergence of regime theory, which underlines the importance
of institutions within the international system and their influence on the be-
haviour of governments. The most commonly used definition of a regime is

the one formulated by American political scientist Stephen Krasner: 'Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations'.[4] Another American political scientist, Robert Keohane, has developed the notion of reflective and rational choice approaches to the study of international organisations. A 'reflective' approach '…emphasizes the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics'. In the 'rational choice' approach, international norms are understood as instruments of international cooperation. Thus, Keohane contends that the discussion about norms is as important as the norms themselves: '…understanding how people think about institutional norms and rules, and the discourse they engage in, is as important in evaluating the significance of these norms as measuring the behaviour that changes in response to their invocation'.[5]

IGOs play an important role as an instrument for norm-setting in international relations. One author, Jose Alvarez, contends that '[a] large portion of the rules that we have to govern nations, both those that are formally legally binding and those that are not, are now initiated, formulated, negotiated, interpreted, and often implemented through the efforts of IOs [international organisations]'.[6] Furthermore, Robert Keohane puts norms and rules at the centre of international institutions. He defines institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations'.[7] Although they are arguably the most important norm entrepreneurs in international relations, IGOs are not the only ones. Especially as 'soft' norms are concerned, a number of other actors such as states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media can play a significant part in norm creation.

The chapter consists of the following parts. First, it defines the term 'norm' and discusses conceptual issues related to SSR/G norms and IGOs. Secondly, it reviews different approaches to norm classification and provides examples of various norm types in the SSR/G field. Thirdly, it describes and compares the general SSR/G norms and norms pertaining to specific security sector actors that have emerged from the comparative analysis of IGO documents. In conclusion, the existing gaps in IGO norms relating to SSR/G as well as emerging norms are discussed.

IGOs and SSR/G norms

There is an ongoing debate among scholars in various disciplines on the definition of a norm. For the purpose of this chapter, a norm is defined as a 'standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity'.[8] Norms express a convergence in thinking at the international level about certain forms of behaviour and standards. As such, they are important for mobilising resources and actions on behalf of particular ideas and strategies. In addition, commonly shared principles and norms can provide legitimisation to IGO actions.

Norm-setting activity related to SSR/G has taken place mainly over the last decade.[9] SSR/G norms have emerged in response to the need for methodologies on how to transform post-colonial, post-authoritarian and post-conflict security sectors. Norms or common standards have become evermore important with IGOs taking on many new responsibilities in the field after the end of the Cold War.[10] Leading the process of reform and transformation in many transition and developing countries, as of the mid-1990s IGOs began to use SSR/G methodologies to structure their involvement in the field and render it more effective.

Membership or development assistance conditionality – more commonly known as benchmarks – developed by various organisations has become one of the most effective incentives for norm implementation. Norms serve as a basis for establishing the benchmarks against which progress in implementation can be measured. Some IGOs have instituted an ongoing cooperation and dialogue process with partner and would-be member countries to monitor norm implementation on an ongoing basis. These include, for example, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Planning and Review Process, the EU Accession and Progress Reports, and the NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs). Progress reports reviewing the state of norm implementation are sometimes used to detail, refine or prioritise certain SSR/G norms for a given country or region. For example, the *EU Enlargement Strategy and Progress Report* (2006) on Turkey praises the progress made by Turkey in the field of civil-military relations, in particular in the revision of procedures for military courts, but at the same time notes that measures need to be taken to limit the role of the military in society. It must be noted, however, that SSR/G benchmarks developed so far tend to be incomprehensive and fragmented.

Many IGO documents setting out SSR/G norms, a list of which can be found in Annex 1, not only formulate standards of behaviour for security sector actors, but also reiterate norms and principles stemming from interna-

tional humanitarian law, human rights and international security behaviour. In this manner, SSR/G norms act to reinforce core values of the international system. For example, the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (OECD DAC) *Security System Reform and Governance* connects democratic and good governance norms with SSR/G norms. It holds that donor support for SSR '…seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law'.[11]

Some authors who have studied the process of norm emergence and erosion argue that norms have a life cycle that includes the following stages: emergence, cascade/diffusion, internalisation and erosion.[12] SSR/G norms follow a similar life cycle. At present, they find themselves mainly in the process of emergence/diffusion and partly in the internalisation phase. SSR/G norms can, however, evolve differently from country to country as a function of national conditions.[13]

As concerns norm development, NGOs also play an important role. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has, for example, been a leader in compiling information about SSR in different countries, enumerating best practices and making recommendations for future reform efforts.[14] Other examples include such reports as *Philosophy and Principles of Community-based Policing* (2003) by the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Saferworld,[15] *Good Practices in Reducing Pre-trial Detention* (2003) by the Penal Reform International[16] and *Civil Society Organisations and Security Sector Reform* (2005) by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform.[17]

Norm creation has also been undertaken by government departments. For example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has produced such documents as *Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice* (2002)[18] and the *Non-state Justice and Security Systems: A Guidance Note* (2004).[19] The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office published the Green Paper *Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 2001-2002* (2002).[20] Another example of norm setting is the *Code of Conduct and Ethics for the Private Security Sector* (2003), developed by the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) and the Union Network International, Europa (UNI-Europa).[21]

The comparative analysis of IGO norms carried out in the present chapter shows that there is an emerging system (regime) of international norms relating to SSR/G. This body of norms combines some features of

other systems of norms, in particular norms pertaining to human rights, international humanitarian law and international security. At the same time, it has evolved into a system of unique norms relating specifically to governance of the security sector. Annexes 2 and 3 provide comparative tables of norms and show that there is a great deal of convergence in SSR norms across the organisations in question; thus, it may be assumed that norm transfer and norm sharing is taking place among them. This point is well illustrated by the examples of the ECOWAS *Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa*, which has taken its inspiration from the OSCE Code of Conduct (CoC), and the EU's SSR concepts, which draw upon the OECD DAC Guidelines. The ECOWAS CoC has served as a model for the 'Sao Tome and Principe Initiative' adopted by the twenty-fifth ministerial meeting of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa held in May 2007 in Sao Tome. The initiative calls for a code of conduct for armed and security forces in the Central African sub-region.[22] It is important that this normative regime is created and sustained not only by such traditional norm entrepreneurs as IGOs, but also by individual governments, NGOs and other actors.

Shared norms allow IGOs to better coordinate and reinforce each other's activities.[23] Each IGO has developed norms in a given area that are recognised by other IGOs as areas of their comparative advantage: for example, OSCE norms on democratic elections; UN Security Council Resolutions on the international fight against terrorism; the OECD's economic standards; the recommendations of the WB and IMF on measures for advancing privatisation, combating corruption and increasing transparency in government procurement; and the CoE norms on freedom of speech and human rights. Similar 'specialisation', as we shall see below, is also emerging in the SSR/G area.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of the present volume, a number of factors can limit the scope of IGO activities. The same holds true of the norm-setting process, where varying *raisons d'être* and institutional architectures can cause the norm-setting procedure to differ across IGOs. Some organisations can more easily adjust to new challenges and develop the necessary norms in response; others are less flexible. In some instances, the process whereby norms are officially articulated fails to keep pace with new standards of behaviour emerging in field activities.[24]

Implementation is an integral part of the 'life' of norms. As one author argues, '[f]or international regimes to be effective, their injunctions must be obeyed'.[25] There are a number of obstacles standing in the way of the effective implementation of SSR/G norms. First, as yet there is no common ap-

proach to SSR/G at the international level. Secondly, some norms are vague (for example, the notion of a holistic approach) or even contested (for example, local ownership). In addition, SSR/G norms usually are not perceived as universally applicable but rather as having been developed for a certain country type or situation. Moreover, the legitimacy and credibility of IGOs as norm entrepreneurs are sometimes questioned. This is because Western democracies have pioneered the emergence and implementation of many norms relating to security sector governance in their own countries. Their experience has had an impact on the norms agreed upon later at the international level. Developing and post-conflict countries only take part in decision-making in the framework of ECOWAS and the UN; otherwise, all IGOs under investigation in this volume are associations dominated by developed countries. This can foster the perception on the part of transition and developing countries that SSR/G norms are imposed by the West.[26] Thus, the interests of norm diffusers and norm recipients may vary considerably. In order for 'Western' countries to avoid being perceived as dominant powers in the norm-setting process, local ownership norms need to be integrated into programme design and implementation.

Norm classification

International norms take different forms, including international agreements with legal force negotiated in the framework of IGOs, politically binding agreements and operational principles, guidelines, best practices and handbooks developed by IGOs for specific programme needs. They can also be classified in different ways. Norms can be universal or regional, constructive or regulative, binding (hard law) or non-binding (soft law), and country-type specific or universal.

Universal norms are ones to which most states subscribe. Usually, such norms are developed in the framework of the UN. An example of a treaty containing universal norms is the UN's *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* (1979). Regional norms are those developed by regional organisations such as the CoE, ECOWAS, EU, NATO and OSCE, and concern the member states and/or the partner states of these organisations. For the SSR/G agenda to move forward, it is important that SSR/G norms become 'universalised', that is, attain a significant threshold of acceptance among a greater number of states as well as other actors. By analogy, this has happened already with regard to norms on human rights and on the gen-

eral principles of democracy and democratisation, an area in which there is emerging agreement on norms developed by the UN[27] and by other IGOs.[28]

Peter Katzenstein argues that there are norms with 'constructive effects' and norms with 'regulative effects': '[n]orms…either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both'.[29] An example of a constructive norm in the SSR/G field is a norm that postulates that a parliament should have the necessary capacity to be able to effectively oversee the security sector. An example of a regulatory norm is one that postulates that a member of the armed forces may not violate international humanitarian law. The norm of democratic control of the armed forces is regarded as a constructive-regulatory norm: it both defines the nature of security sector actors (which should be democratic, accountable, transparent, etc.) and prescribes for them a certain form of behaviour (which should correspond to the principles of democratic governance of the security sector).

IGOs produce both binding and non-binding norms. For example, resolutions and declarations of the UN General Assembly are not legally binding. Conventions, agreements or treaties negotiated in the UN system can become legally binding if ratified by the required number of member states. Resolutions of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are binding. While the norms adopted by the EU under the first pillar, European Communities, are mostly binding EU regulations with direct effect, the norms adopted under the second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy (common positions, common actions and common strategies) are not.[30] The OSCE CoC is also an example of a politically-binding document. States tend to violate not only 'soft' norms, but also legally binding ones. As one author argues, 'states remain free to disregard, usually with impunity, even those rules by which they are formally bound'.[31] The number of international legally or politically binding agreements containing SSR/G norms is still very small, while the number of legally non-binding norms in the area of SSR/G has became quite substantial.

IGOs have also developed norms for specific types of countries. For example, NATO has elaborated norms for its new member states and candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU has specific norms and requirements for candidate and aspirant countries (the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993) or countries to which it provides development assistance (the Cotonou Agreement of 2000). For post-conflict countries, there are also emerging norms that concern such post-conflict challenges as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); child soldiers; small arms and light weapons (SALW); and non-state actors.

IGOs can also develop norms or guidelines for specific actions on the ground. Such norms are designed to take into account the particularities of the environment in which they are being implemented. For example, the provisions of the EU *Concept of Operations for the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan* (2007) include such tasks as the following: enhancement of 'links between the Afghan police and the wider criminal justice system', improvement of 'police managerial and operational capacities notably in areas such as criminal investigations [and] border policing' and 'putting in place an affordable structure taking into consideration the gender, ethnicity, administrative and economic situation of the country'.[32] Another example is NATO's involvement in Ukraine. The *NATO-Ukraine Action Plan* and *NATO-Ukraine Target Plans in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan* include such specific benchmarks for Ukraine as 'reforms in Defence Economics', strengthening of 'state interagency coordination among the MOD [Ministry of Defence], Ministry of Industrial Policy, the Border Guards, the Ministry of Emergencies, and the Ministry of Interior to better respond to consequence [*sic*] of man-made and natural disasters, including terrorists attacks' and increasing 'transparency in defence planning and budgeting procedures'.[33]

Comparison and Analysis of SSR/G norms

General SSR/G norms

In selecting the documents to be analysed and compared, we have been guided by the following criteria: documents that a) deal strictly with SSR/G[34] and b) are of an official character, i.e., explicitly elaborated and declared international norms agreed at the international or regional level. In some cases, IGO norms appear in a less formal format, such as statements by IGO officials, research papers or various types of reports. The latter are not taken into consideration in the present chapter. Given that the WB and IMF have not yet developed any explicit norms on SSR/G, they have not been included in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below or in the tables in Annexes 2 and 3.

The analysis has yielded both general overarching norms and specific norms, or prescriptions and proscriptions concerning the behaviour of individual security sector actors. General norms are more generic than sectorial norms and mostly concern the organisation of a general framework in which reforms of individual security sector actors are carried out. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that while IGOs like the OECD, NATO and the OSCE have fo-

cused on the elaboration of both general and specific norms, others such as the EU, UN and ECOWAS have instead concentrated solely on the development of general norms or, as is the case of the CoE, on sectorial norms.

Table 2.1   General SSR/G norms

	Holistic approach	Local ownership	Democratic control of armed forces	Accountability	Transparency	Professionalism	Resources	Duties	Rights	Compliance with international agreements	Cooperation
CoE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
ECOWAS			✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EU	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓
NATO	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
OECD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓
OSCE	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UN	✓	✓	✓								

Following a comparative analysis of the documents, the norms have been attributed to the following categories:
- a holistic approach to security;
- local (national) ownership;
- good governance of the security sector (consisting of the following sub-categories: democratic (civilian) control or oversight of the security sector; accountability of the security sector; and transparency of the security sector);
- professionalism of the security sector;
- right-sized resources for the security sector;
- rights and duties of security sector actors;
- compliance of security sector actors with internationally recognised values and standards;
- cooperation among security sector actors and cooperation among states in the security field.

The SSR concept was born out of the realisation that security and development are interdependent and that security needs to be understood in a holistic manner. IGOs define security in different ways, but the core idea uniting their understandings is that security should be approached in a comprehensive manner, that is, in a way that frames security as essential to the realisation of development, democracy and human rights. Hence, the CoE calls its approach 'security and human rights'; NATO and the OSCE pair 'security and democracy'; and the EU, OECD, OSCE, UN and WB link 'security' to 'development'.

Norms on local (national) ownership of the security sector have appeared only relatively recently. While the decolonisation and early post-Cold War periods were dominated by Western democracies 'dictating' rules to developing and transition countries, the paradigm started to change at the end of the 1990s as local ownership began to be seen as indispensable for the sustainability of reforms. The EU SSR concepts, *OECD DAC Guidelines*, and the concept paper prepared for the UN Security Council open debate on SSR in February 2007 all refer to the need for local ownership of the SSR/G process. However, recent field experience has shown that local ownership can be a controversial norm when it comes to its actual implementation.

Good governance of the security sector is an overarching concept that usually refers to democratic/civilian control or oversight, accountability and transparency of the security sector. Democratic control and accountability of the security sector have arguably been the *sine qua non* of SSR/G. Mentioned already in 1994 in the NATO PfP founding document and the OSCE CoC, the requirement for democratic control and accountability of the security sector was later reiterated by the EU in its *Agenda 2000* and the ESDP SSR Concept, and again by NATO in all recent documents relating to membership conditionality. Democratic control and accountability of the security sector is also the cornerstone of the ECOWAS Code of Conduct. Transparency of the security sector occupies an important place among norms. All IGOs refer to the need for transparency in decision-making in the security field and for transparency of information relating to the security sector.

Norms on professionalism call for security sector actors to be able to carry out their responsibilities efficiently. The *OECD DAC Guidelines*, for example, refer to this norm. Similarly, NATO has established rigorous requirements concerning the professionalism of candidate countries' security sectors. One of the most visible conditions for NATO membership is for an applicant country to bring its armed forces up to NATO standards. Norms concerning specific SSR sectors discussed below provide more detail on

how to enhance the professionalism and efficiency of individual security sector actors.

The rightsizing of resources allocated to the security sector means that the security sector should receive enough resources to be functional, as stipulated in the ECOWAS CoC and in the NATO MAP and Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institutions Building (PAP-DIB). However, rightsizing also means that the sector should not over-consume resources because this reduces the amount of funding available for other public sectors and for the overall development of the economy, as mentioned by the OSCE in its CoC.

Some IGO documents contain norms concerning the rights and duties of individual security sector actors, mainly members of the military, police and other law enforcement bodies. The ECOWAS and OSCE Codes of Conduct provide the most developed approaches to the rights and duties of the security forces.

Norms relating to security sector actors' compliance with internationally recognised values and standards have been developed by all the organisations under study in this volume. In this way, SSR/G norms are interconnected with the wider system of international norms.

Finally, cooperation among security sector actors and among states in the security field is another norm that has been dealt with by all organisations. Chapter 3 looks in more detail at various patterns of cooperation that have emerged among and between the SSR-relevant IGOs.

Specific SSR sectors

Concrete prescriptions for security sector actors' behaviour have proliferated in recent years. This section looks at the norms and operating principles developed by IGOs concerning the following security sector actors: the executive, legislature, judiciary, armed forces, police and law enforcement bodies, intelligence services, border guards, private military/security companies (PMCs/PSCs) and civil society.

Table 2.2   **IGOs' Involvement in Norm Formation Regarding the Role of Security Sector Actors**

	Executive	Legislature	Judiciary	Armed forces	Police and law enforce-	Intelligence services	Border guards	PMCs/PSCs	Civil society
CoE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ECOWAS	✓			✓	✓				✓
EU				✓	✓	✓	✓		
NATO	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓
OECD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
OSCE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
UN				✓	✓				

The degree of precision concerning the role of different security sector actors differs from organisation to organisation. The main conclusions to be drawn from our comparative study of IGO sectorial norms, as represented in Table 2.2 above, are the following:

- Only one of the IGOs has developed comprehensive norms dealing with each security sector actor and their functions.
- The OECD, CoE and OSCE have taken the most comprehensive approaches to norm development.
- The most detailed norms developed to date concern the military, police and law-enforcement bodies.
- Norms governing the behaviour of the executive, parliament, judiciary and civil society vis-à-vis the security sector remain underdeveloped.
- There are relatively few norms defining the role of intelligence services, border guards and PMCs/PSCs and other non-state groups within the security sector and regulating their behaviour.

- There are no norms in the SSR context concerning such security sector actors as political parties, the business community and non-state actors other than PMCs/PSCs.

Except for the ECOWAS Code of Conduct, norms concerning the executive are not very detailed. They specify only that the executive cannot use the internal security services for its own purposes (CoE), that the executive should cooperate with parliament and the armed forces (NATO) and that it should be effective in managing and overseeing the security sector (NATO, OECD and OSCE).

Norms pertaining to the legislature define a number of roles that parliament plays vis-à-vis the security sector. The parliament develops legislation that regulates the behaviour of security sector actors (CoE and NATO), approves defence expenditures (OSCE) and oversees the security sector (CoE, NATO, OECD and OSCE).

Norms on the judiciary prescribe the judiciary's role in the oversight of the security sector (CoE, NATO and OSCE) without providing much guidance on how this oversight is to be carried out.

Some IGOs documents contain quite detailed norms concerning the behaviour of the military. The ECOWAS CoC is especially important since its main goal is to 'establish common standards in the behaviour of the Armed Forces and Security Services'.[35] The Code also contains norms that regulate the behaviour of state management bodies vis-à-vis these forces.

Norms regulating police and law enforcement bodies are the most numerous. The UN's *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* (1979), the CoE's *Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics* (2001) and the OSCE's *Guidebook on Democratic Policing by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General* (2006) contain lengthy lists of norms for these bodies. There are also IGOs that have not yet developed any norms for the police (for example, NATO).[36]

Only the CoE has developed norms dealing with the behaviour of the intelligence services. Some other organisations, such as the EU, OSCE and UN, refer in general terms to the control and oversight of the intelligence services (sometimes referring to them as 'secret services') but have not developed any norms concerning their behaviour.

Norms regulating border management have become very important for the EU in the management of its external borders. The *Council Regulation (EC) establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European*

Union (2004) states the following: 'Community policy in the field of the EU external borders aims at an integrated management ensuring a uniform and high level of control and surveillance…To this end, the establishment of common rules on standards and procedures for the control of external borders is foreseen'.[37] Since then, the OSCE has adopted a *Border Security and Management Concept* (2005).[38]

Conclusions

Difficulties related to the implementation of SSR/G norms partially stem from the fact that overall agreement across IGOs on a uniform body of norms does not yet exist. Some norms are still vague and need to be further tested in the field; others even conflict with one another, e.g., local ownership and good governance. For the SSR agenda to move forward, a common set of standards and practices, to which the SSR-relevant IGOs and other actors subscribe, is indispensable. OECD DAC SSR principles already serve this purpose to a certain degree, but not all actors have embraced them and their application is intended mainly for developing and transition countries.

The results of our investigation have shown that while all the organisations under study in this volume have developed some prescriptions and proscriptions concerning the behaviour of security sector actors, there are underdeveloped areas in the existing SSR/G normative regime. On the one hand, individual organisations have developed 'areas of specialisation' – norms concerning a certain area or actor in the security sector. For example, the CoE has detailed norms concerning police and law enforcement organs (the European Code of Police Ethics) and refers to the 'legal regulation and oversight of private companies dealing with security and intelligence'. The ECOWAS CoC has established unique norms of behaviour for the armed forces and police. The EU is in the process of developing norms on border management, drawing upon its experience in this area. NATO has drawn up general norms on defence reform (defence-institution building) and reform of the armed forces, which it has been operationalising in its candidate countries. The OECD has elaborated overarching SSR/G norms and principles while the OSCE has developed a unique understanding of comprehensive security and expertise in dealing with police and law-enforcement bodies. As the universal gatekeeper of human rights, the rule of law and development, the UN has norms connecting security to many other issue areas. Finally, the WB occupies a niche with its principles on good governance of the public sector in general and of military spending in particular.

None of the organisations has, however, developed a comprehensive set of norms to cover all security sector actors. The roles of bodies that manage and oversee the security sector, along with those of civil society and of PMCs/PSCs, remain largely unaddressed. Furthermore, as we have seen, such actors as political parties, the business community and non-state actors other than PMCs/PSCs are not dealt with at all. Given such 'specialisation' and the gaps that have been identified, cooperation in the development, transfer and sharing of norms in areas of IGOs' respective comparative advantages is likely to be on the agenda into the foreseeable future.

As discussed in many of the chapters in the volume, the central challenge is the implementation of these norms. There remains a considerable gap between the declared norms and their integration into programme design and delivery. As relatively recent creations, the viability of SSR/G norms will depend on the way they are put into practice. Practical implementation will inevitably lead to the erosion of some norms and to the birth of new ones that will further guide the SSR process in various countries and contexts.

Notes

1   Such documents are marked in bold in the list of IGO documents that can be found at the end of this chapter.
2   A. Cortell and J. Davis Jr., 'Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda', *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 65-66.
3   For example, see A. Cortell and J. Davis Jr., 'How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms', *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1996): 451-478; Cortell and Davis (2000), *op. cit.*
4   In addition, Krasner defines 'principles', 'norms' and 'rules' as follows: 'Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action'. See S. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in *International Regimes*, ed. S. Krasner, 2 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
5   R. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly,* 32, no. 4 (1988): 381-2.
6   J. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-makers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), x.
7   Keohane, *op. cit.*, 386.
8   M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'*, International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 891.

9   Some norms relating to SSR/G were adopted as early as the 1980s, or even before. For example, the *Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials* was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979.

10   For example, EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, OSCE thematic missions, UN integrated missions and ECOWAS peacekeeping missions.

11   OECD DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance* (2005), 11.

12   For example, Finnemore and Sikkink. *op. cit.*, 887-917. See also Kümmel, G., 'Why engage in security sector reform abroad? International norms, external democratisation and the role of DCAF', in *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe. A Framework for Assessment*, eds. W. Germann and T. Edmunds (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), 76-82.

13   Ann Florini identifies three factors as explaining why norms of international behaviour change over time: their initial prominence, their coherence and the environmental conditions to which they are subject. To illustrate norm change, she argues that there is an emerging norm of transparency in international security. See A. Florini, 'The Evolution of International Norms', *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (1996): 363-389.

14   On 5-7 September 2002, DCAF organised a workshop entitled 'Criteria for Success and Failure in Security Sector Reform'. It was among the first comprehensive efforts to review existing international norms and standards relating to the democratic control of armed forces. This workshop resulted in the publication of the following volume: Germann and Edmunds, *op. cit.*

15   South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Community Policing Study* (Belgrade, 2003), available at http://www.sssr.undp.org.al/download/reports/cbp.pdf.

16   Penal Reform International, *Good Practices in Reducing Pre-trial Detention* (London, 2003).

17   Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR), 'Civil Society Organisations and Security Sector Reform', in *Compendium of Good Practices on Security Sector Reform* (2005), available at http://www.ssronline.org.

18   DFID, *Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice* (July 2002), available at http://gsdrc.ids.ac.uk/docs/open/SSAJ23.pdf.

19   DFID, *Non-state Justice and Security Systems: A Guidance Note*, DFID Briefing (May 2004), available at http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ101.pdf.

20   UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 12th February 2002 for a Paper: Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation 2001-2002', Green Paper (2002).

21   Confederation of European Security Services and Uni-Europa, *Code of Conduct and Ethics for the Private Security Sector* (2003), available at http://www.coess.org/documents/code_of_conduct.pdf. See also Confederation of European Security Services and Uni-Europa, *Selecting Best Value: A Manual for Organisations Awarding Contracts for Private Guarding Services* (1999), available at http://www.securebestvalue.org/ftp/man_en.pdf.

22   See UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, 'Central African States Agree on Elaboration of Legal Instrument to Control Small Arms, Code of Conduct for Security Services', Press Release AFR/1540 (23 May 2007).

23   For example, in NATO's action plan for Ukraine, in addition to setting up benchmarks in the defence and security fields, the alliance makes broader references to norms developed

by other IGOs in other areas. NATO, *NATO-Ukraine Action Plan* (22 November 2002), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm.

24 As, for example, has been the case with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Osland, K. 'The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (2004): 544–560.

25 Keohane, *op. cit.*, 387.

26 If norms are developed for a concrete group of countries, there is a danger of double standards and possible revisionism. As developing and transition countries increase their power at the international level, they tend to 'rectify' or even abolish the previously developed norms. For example, the Russian Federation under Putin has challenged the legitimacy of some IGOs' involvement in the domestic matters of states via their norms and rules, e.g., through the OSCE election monitoring missions. Another example is provided by states beginning to question the legitimacy of WB and IMF oversight of their economic and fiscal affairs.

27 See, most importantly: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (2002). Another example is the creation of the UN Democracy Fund in 2005.

28 Inter-Parliamentary Council, 'Universal Declaration on Democracy'*,* adopted without a vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 161st session, Cairo, 16 September 1997.

29 P. J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5.

30 V. Rittberger and B. Zangl, *International Organization: Policy, Politics and Policies* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006), 104-105.

31 Alvarez, *op. cit,*. 16.

32 EU, *Concept of Operations for the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan*, Factsheet (2007).

33 NATO, *NATO-Ukraine Action Plan* (2002); numerous NATO-Ukraine Target Plans in the Framework of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (2003-).

34 For this reason, such SSR/G-related areas as human rights, corruption, crime prevention, terrorism and overall frameworks for good governance are not considered here.

35 In the ECOWAS Code of Conduct, '"Armed Forces and Security services" [*sic*] refer to all those who, on behalf of the state, have a defence or security role. The "Armed Forces" include the Army, Air Force, Navy and Gendarmerie; "Security Forces" the Police, Gendarmerie, National Guards and other Forces assigned with security.'

36 This is notwithstanding the fact that forces participating in NATO missions have had to carry out some policing functions, for example, in Afghanistan. Since policing is not among NATO's core missions, the organisation has had to revert to the EU for help with civilian policing. The European Council approved a Crisis Management Concept for an ESDP mission to Afghanistan in the field of policing with linkages to wider rule of law issues in February 2007.

37 European Council, 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union', No 2007/2004 (2004), 1.

38 OSCE, 'Border Security and Management Concept', MC.DOC/2/05 (2005).

Chapter 3

Cooperation among SSR-relevant IGOs[1]

David M. Law

Why is effective cooperation among SSR-relevant IGOs so important?

As intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) play an ever more important role in global governance, increasing attention is directed to the question of whether, why and how they cooperate. There are several reasons for this. IGOs are in many respects like governmental institutions: national ministries should work together synergistically, so why should we not expect the same of organisations that in many areas vitally complement states or have even displaced them as the central actor? Much like national government ministries, IGOs tend to work within their own hierarchies, to the neglect of others or at cross-purposes with them. IGOs also invariably seek to expand their competences, which can provoke tension and rivalry among institutions. In addition, some new issue areas, including security sector reform (SSR), have emerged that exceed the mandates and competences of individual IGOs and require a multi-institutional interface to generate an effective intellectual and operational response. So cooperation raises crucial issues of efficiency, policy coherence and cost. But while much has been done in recent years to improve IGO interface, the prevailing culture of cooperation is still embryonic in nature. It is often less than a match for the challenges that come its way.

Cooperation is particularly important in the area of SSR, in view of the great many policy strands and perspectives it seeks to unite in common endeavour. SSR typically brings together development, security and governance concerns, as well as the various organisations that represent these concerns. SSR has to deal with a wide array of actors within the security sectors for which its programmes are designed, from security forces to parliamentarians to the media. SSR programmes may need to include policy areas as diverse as rule of law and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). In addition, it is not unusual for other policy communities to be associated with SSR efforts; for example, experts in public service manage-

ment and job-creation schemes are identified as being of key importance for Kosovo's future by the United Nations Programme on Development (UNDP)-sponsored team that carried out the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) in the enclave in 2005-2006.[2] Moreover, the efficiency of national security sectors invariably depends on the effectiveness of the interface and cooperation between national, provincial/state and local actors on one hand, and national, regional and international ones on the other.

The security environment of the first part of the twenty-first century demands a seamless perspective on the relationship between a country's internal and external security. To cite just a few examples, in West Africa, IGOs have had to work with national and regional actors to address the cross-border dimensions of insecurity. For many states of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the determination to integrate into such institutions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) has played a key role in ensuring their internal stability and prospects for development, as well as their external security. The security of the international community hinges to a significant extent on the outcomes of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SSR also involves different dynamics in different policy contexts. In post-authoritarian states unaffected by serious conflict, the security sector challenges of a given country will require different approaches depending on the nature of the authoritarian legacy, but typically the onus will be on rebuilding institutions and transforming states' criteria for making security-related decisions. In post-conflict environments, the primary challenge is to suffocate the violence and in parallel to construct anew the state security sector where it has collapsed, which often involves non-state actors. In a post-conflict enclave such as Kosovo, this process is complicated by questions of territorial status and the high politics that lie behind them. In developed democracies, the focus may shift to the need to reorganise the use of existing resources or to increase those available for the security sector, as well as the necessity of enhancing the accountability and transparency of security forces that have been given more intrusive powers to deal with strategic terrorism.

Finally, the meaning of cooperation for the different actors involved in SSR will vary in accordance with their role in a concrete set of circumstances. IGOs and other SSR actors can be temporary 'sovereigns', with all the problems that this entails for local ownership, in environments where governance structures have become dysfunctional through conflict. In non-conflictual environments in developing and transition countries, their role will be more that of a facilitator than an executor of SSR. In developed de-

mocracies, the role of IGOs will normally be to provide support for member states' security, which can also involve articulating pressures for local actors to carry out reform to enhance capacity or to take other measures to address changes in the strategic environment.

Dealing with the security sector will rarely require an approach that takes all these dimensions into consideration. But even in more limited circumstances, no one actor can possibly pretend to bring together the intellectual and material resources to address such diverse requirements. Cooperation is therefore an imperative for all those involved.

This is a particularly challenging requirement for IGOs. The obstacles to cooperation among the IGOs under study in this volume are substantial. They have memberships that can range, for example, from the nigh universal cast of the UN to the much more limited grouping of the 22 national actors in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC). Their core mandates vary and for some IGOs until very recently security issues were historically off limits, while for others development concerns were traditionally of only marginal interest. A further constraint on cooperation stems from the fact that the ministerial responsibility for a nation's relationships with IGOs varies according to mandate. As concerns SSR, the line-up can range from development and finance ministries to those for defence and foreign affairs. A 'joined up government' or a 'whole of government' approach has been put forward as way to address this issue, but this notion dating from the late 1990s has made little headway in most countries.[3] At the same time, the international counterparts of the national actors that ensure that the various components of their national government perform in a coherent fashion – the executive, parliament, the judiciary, the media and civil society – are weak in comparison. In general, the practice of IGO cooperation is sorely underdeveloped just as the demands for such cooperation have grown in leaps and bounds.

In the next section, we will comment on the main instruments that IGOs use to signal their interest in and commitment to cooperation. Then we will review the various challenges of IGO cooperation. The final section will offer some conclusions.

How do IGOs express their interest in cooperation and formalise their commitments?

As with many other actors, IGOs use official statements to articulate how they wish to cooperate with other IGOs or how they have agreed with another IGO or IGOs to do so. Such statements are also important vehicles for mobilising and focussing member-states' thinking on the critical issues of the day. They are often negotiated by subordinate bodies of an IGO in the lead-up to an important meeting, such as one at ministerial level or at that of heads of state and government, with all the concomitant pressure to demonstrate progress and cohesion to the outside world. This section looks at the main instruments that IGOs use to express their interest in cooperation with other IGOs and to formalise this interest. The main vehicles for this purpose are unilateral, bilateral and multilateral declarations and agreements. We look at each of these in turn.

Unilateral Declarations

IGOs often use unilateral declarations to signal their interest in cooperating in a certain area with other entities. These do not formally engage the other institutions thereby addressed, but the hope and expectation of all or most member states will be that the declaration will translate into results in terms of the way IGOs work together, perhaps acting as the precursor to the conclusion of a bilateral or multilateral arrangement with another IGO or IGOs. Of course, consensus on declarations can be extremely difficult to achieve, and the agreed result may conceal that some members in fact oppose parts or all of the declaration or only give it perfunctory support. A declaration can end up being a dead letter.

For a chronological overview of the most important unilateral declarations concerning cooperation among the eight IGOs under study here, see Annex 5. One of the first in this series is that agreed by NATO in 1991 when it launched the notion of *interlocking institutions*, which acknowledged that the new security environment required the expertise of various organisations and that the lead organisation would vary would vary according to the demands of the circumstances.[4] Unilateral declarations can also take the form of special studies such as the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace or the study on SSR that the current incumbent is expected to release in late 2007. Speeches by IGO chief executive officers (CEOs) constitute a less formal and normally less visible vehicle, and are sometimes designed to

stake out a position on cooperation in an effort to move member states in that direction.

Bilateral Agreements

One of the first examples of a bilateral cooperation agreement between the IGOs under study here was adopted by the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU in 1987. The two organisations agreed to work together on governance issues, especially those involving human rights and rule of law, in preparing post-communist countries and other potential EU members such as Turkey for EU membership.[5] Both of these institutions have also concluded agreements with the OSCE, and all three have made formal arrangements with the UN.

NATO, while it has cooperative relations with all three of these institutions, has only concluded formal agreements with the EU. This relationship is, however, arguably the furthest reaching one between any of the institutions under study here. In their 2002 agreement on the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDP), NATO and the EU agreed to secure the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members in ESDP, to give EU access to NATO planning capabilities and to encourage complementarity in the development of common capability requirements.[6] The following year, the NATO-EU Berlin Plus agreement gave EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO European command options, as well as use of NATO assets and capabilities.[7] This proved essential in ensuring that the EU could take over many of NATO's functions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and could be a model for cooperation in crisis management, peace support operations (PSOs) and stabilisation efforts in other theatres.

Formal bilateral agreements among the other IGOs under study here tend to be less frequent. Cooperation among the UNDP, the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and OECD tends to be project- or country-based and is usually multilateral in nature. An exception to this is the 2001 WB-EU Framework Agreement regulating such issues as joint project financing and contributions by the European Commission for WB projects, as well as policy dialogues on trade, debt relief, education, health and migration, mostly focused on the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.[8]

This also tends to be the case of the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) relationships with the other bodies in this study. Its links with the UN are governed by the various UN Security Council reso-

lutions mandating its role in conflict situations in West Africa. ECOWAS
and the UN are also involved in consultations under Chapter VIII of the UN
charter. ECOWAS has furthermore concluded bilateral cooperation agree-
ments with the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the Africa Un-
ion.[9]

Multilateral Arrangements

A third pattern is for three or more IGOs to work together in the area of SSR.
Formal, multilateral agreements setting out principles and areas of activity
are few and far between. One example is the accord reached in 1993 be-
tween the CoE, the OSCE and the United Nations Office in Geneva
(UNOG). This trilateral arrangement has led to consultations on such issues
as SALW, trafficking and migration policy, policy areas that have previously
been associated other IGOs such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).[10] For
West African issues, there is also a trilateral agreement among ECOWAS,
the EU and the UNOWA, which foresees cooperation in addressing the
causes of conflict, border issues and conflict management, as well as im-
proving governance and protecting human rights.[11] Also to be noted is that
the UN has been convening biannual meetings since 1994 with the twenty-
three organisations accredited to it under Chapter VIII of its Charter. These
include the following IGOs in our study: the EU, OSCE, CoE, NATO and
ECOWAS.[12]
      Another multilateral cooperation pattern of interest concerns caucus-
ing arrangements. EU and NATO members form caucuses in larger bodies
such as the OSCE. Sometimes such caucuses can have a decisive impact on
policy formation. Such was the case of the EU caucus in the creation of the
OSCE Code of Conduct in 1994, a ground-breaking document for SSR.[13]
      The experience of many of the IGOs under study here in the Western
Balkans has given risen to a number of interesting cooperation patterns. The
situation in Macedonia at the turn of the century brought forward two. The
Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001 has involved the EU, NATO, OSCE,
WB and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), as well as a country (the US), in DDR, refugee return, recon-
struction and police reform and training in Macedonia.[14] Another Ohrid
process focuses on the efforts of the EU, NATO, OSCE and the Stability
Pact to foster sound border management practices in the Western Balkans.[15]
      Perhaps one of the most important multilateral cooperation arrange-
ment to date with respect to SSR has been sparked by developments in Bos-

nia–Herzegovina. Depending on how the various UN agencies are counted, the Peace Implementation Council responsible for determining overall policy for Bosnia–Herzegovina counts 15-20 IGOs among its members in addition to 55 states. The much smaller Board of Principals, which meets weekly, groups together representatives of the EU, NATO, OSCE, WB, IMF and UNDP to decide overall policy for the protectorate as its post-conflict reconstruction continues.[16]

As we have seen from this survey, some forms of cooperation are limited to a specific situation. Some are sectoral, limited to specific actors within the security sector. Others aim to be comprehensive, encompassing several functions and sectors of relevance to the security sector, but rarely all of them. Generally, what we observe is a relatively high concentration of cooperation arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic area among security actors, but at the same time a relatively low quotient of cooperation among actors interested in development issues. The need for cooperation tends to be most often articulated unilaterally, followed in terms of frequency by bilateral agreements and then multilateral ones, which are comparatively rare.

What are the obstacles to cooperation among SSR-relevant IGOs?

This section expounds on some of the main obstacles to cooperation in the area of SSR: the limited historical experience of cooperation among the IGOs under study here, their heterogeneity, significant contrasts in the principles and techniques of cooperation that they have adopted and contradictions generated by the highly political nature of SSR.

A History of Cooperation – or a lack of it?

The story of cooperation among the eight institutions under consideration in this volume is too complex to be examined here in any detail, perhaps so complex that it may never be told comprehensively anywhere. Successful cooperation is unlikely to happen overnight. An interest in and a preparedness to cooperate need time and experience to mature. This section explores how relations among the IGOs in this study have evolved, underscoring that these are still early days for cooperation among the SSR-relevant IGOs.

Three approximate phases in the cooperation among the IGOs in this study can be discerned. The first spans the period roughly from the beginning to the end of the Cold War period. The second period is a transitional

phase that approximately coincides with the first post-Cold War decade. The third period runs from the late 1990s to the present.

The first period was a formative one for some of the institutions under consideration. For example, the OECD only received its current mandate and name in 1960, while the OSCE (then the CSCE) and ECOWAS were only founded in 1975. Other bodies such as the erstwhile European Communities and the Council of Europe had not yet matured into their current forms with their present functions. Cooperation was generally limited by the geopolitical circumstances of the Cold War. East-West rivalry militated against virtually any kind of robust intervention by Western-dominated institutions into the affairs of Eastern dominated states, and vice versa. Both East and West tended to be most interested in building military capacity in client states than in governance issues, except where this involved loyalty to their respective camps. Such constraints were felt both within the groupings of IGOs focussed on security, on one hand, and those focussed on development, on the other. On the security side, in the Western camp, NATO dominated. Cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU), the precursor of the EU as the main European security actor, was limited because of the strategic preoccupations of the Cold War; there were similar obstacles to NATO cooperation with the UN and the CSCE.[17] As concerns organisations interested in development, there were fewer political constraints on the inter-institutional interface but they were still felt. Cooperation tended to be unstructured in nature, with the exception of the IMF and WB as sister Bretton Woods institutions. This was not a period of flourishing inter-IGO cooperation, either among the IGOs primarily interested in security issues or their development counterparts.

The situation started to change with the end of the Cold War and the onset of the 1990s. Constraints on robust intervention disappeared. Institutions that had traditionally not played a security role started to develop one. NATO began to lose its dominant role in the security world, whilst other institutions sought to supplant its leadership. Many of the IGOs in this study found themselves engaged in ever more demanding conflict situations in a variety of theatres, from the former Yugoslavia and Haiti to Cambodia and several countries of Africa. Very often, it was in these conflict situations that they found themselves working shoulder to shoulder for the first time.

This early post-Cold War period was characterised by much competition among institutions and little cooperation. Several initiatives were, however, taken that pointed to the potential for the emergence of new cooperation paradigms. In 1992, NATO reached out to both the UN and the then CSCE by offering to place military assets under their direction if so re-

quested and subject to a NATO decision to this effect. As mentioned above, the same year saw the UN Secretary-General issuing his seminal *Agenda for Peace,* with its call for the international community to seize the new opportunities that had opened to realise the original promise of the UN, to face the new challenges that had emerged in the post-Cold War environment and to do so in the broadest possible spirit of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, such as had been foreseen by the San Francisco Charter in 1945. This was, *inter alia*, an appeal to regional organisations such as ECOWAS to support the Charter through regional action. And so it did, armed with a UN Security Council mandate, as the security situation in West Africa began to deteriorate, first in Liberia and then elsewhere. In the mid-1990s, in another significant development, OECD DAC consultations, involving the EU, UNDP, WB and IMF, began to focus on aid effectiveness. The notion of the interdependence of security and development IGOs and the concomitant need for cooperation among them was not yet manifest in these consultations, though their emergence was only a matter of time.

The third phase in this progression came towards the end of the decade. It was driven, as so often happens, by events on the ground. In 1999, after four years of stasis in the reconstruction process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, opportunities for moving forward with the creation of state-wide institutions began to emerge. A wide range of IGOs were involved in this effort and had a role in the Peace Implementation Committee that would steer the process. Around the same time, many of the IGOs in our sample found themselves also dealing with the situation in recently-liberated Kosovo and in even more troubled Sierra Leone.

It was against this backdrop that UK Development Minister Clare Short would coin the expression 'security sector reform', calling for an interdependent approach to development and security.[18] The stage was thus set for a new generation of cooperation initiatives among the leading institutions in these areas.

In 1999, the then 55 members of the OSCE agreed on a Platform for Co-operative Security for the twenty-first century, a second generation version of NATO's idea of interlocking institutions that sought to lay out a new pathway for inter-institutional interface in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian theatres.[19] In 2003, NATO and the EU devised what are arguably the most intricate arrangements to date for cooperation between two different institutions in their Berlin Plus agreement.[20] It was in 2004 that the OECD, with the involvement of UNDP, the WB, the IMF and the EU, elaborated its best practices for security sector reform.[21] Then, the following year, under the auspices of the OECD, the furthest reaching guidelines thus far for aid-

effectiveness were passed by the key institutions in the development area in the Paris Declaration, the culmination of a decade of consultations in this area.[22] In 2006, NATO recognised the importance of measures to spur development for the success of its security agenda in Afghanistan. In an unprecedented move, the WB attended a NATO Council meeting that had the reconstruction of Afghanistan as its central theme.[23]

While there has clearly been a progression in the relations among the IGOs in this study, this historical review demonstrates that the IGO interface is a recent phenomenon, with all the implications that these entail for the maturity and quality of inter-institutional cooperation.

Different Clusters of Cooperation

Compounding this history of a relative non-cooperation or only newly emerging cooperation among IGOs is the fact that the intensity of the interface among them varies significantly. Various clusters can be identified, within which cooperation can be relatively significant. One cluster system revolves around norm-setting, the other around PSOs.

As concerns norm-setting, the first cluster has the OECD as its centre. It mobilises other IGOs focused on standards for donor activity such as the UNDP, WB, IMF and EU, as well as the leading Western bilateral donors. Cooperation among these actors has resulted in the generation of the most advanced body of norms and standards for SSR produced to date.

The second grouping has the OSCE and the CoE at its centre. Under the leadership of these two institutions, norms have been developed for national security sectors in the Euro-Atlantic area that are also relevant elsewhere, such as the draft ECOWAS Code of Conduct. While ECOWAS at present has relatively limited opportunities to share its results with the other IGOs under study here, the potential for doing so is significant, both within Africa with other regional organisations, as well as on the international level. ECOWAS's norm production is locally steered and owned. It seems highly likely that this will eventually feed into the ongoing efforts in the UN Security Council to develop its own approach to SSR. For the time being, however, its interface with other norm-setting institutions remains limited.

The other major cluster system that has emerged revolves around IGO participation in PSOs and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Here, two sub-groups can be identified based on region. One is Euro-Atlantic, bringing together a wide range of institutions, from the EU, NATO, OSCE and CoE to the UN, WB and IMF. The other is African, bringing together such institutions as ECOWAS, UN, EU, WB and IMF. NATO, the OSCE and the CoE

do not participate in the latter. ECOWAS does not participate in the former. However, with troops from both NATO and ECOWAS countries already assigned to places such as Afghanistan, it would appear to be only a matter of time before, say, NATO could become involved in supporting PSO activity in West Africa, as it already has with respect to African Union activities in Darfur, or ECOWAS members could become involved in PSO activity in theatres on the periphery of Europe, as their capacity for participating in PSOs is augmented.

There are two institutions that act as connectors between these theatres: the UN, in view of its global mandating prerogatives for peace and security, and the EU, in view of its mandate to support development and its growing preparedness to undertake PSO missions and reconstruction responsibilities outside the European theatre, including in Africa.

### *Different Modalities of Cooperation*

In the documents described in Section 2 (and listed in Annexes 4, 5 and 6), the IGOs in this study set out a wide range of principles for their bilateral and multilateral cooperation and identify several techniques that are meant to support cooperation processes. These principles and techniques again underscore the great degree of heterogeneity that characterises this group of IGOs.

The following table catalogues fifteen principles of cooperation, clustered as to whether they represent general commitments or refer more specifically to the inter-institutional interface. It is based on a reading of the documents pertaining to the IGOs active in the security field in the Euro-Atlantic area, namely, the EU, NATO, CoE, OSCE and UN.

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main tools and methodologies that the IGOs in our study have adopted to support their cooperation. Again, the focus is on the IGOs active in the security field in the Euro-Atlantic area. The table identifies three levels of cooperation. The first five items in the list belong to what might be called first-order cooperation, whereby organisations undertake to exchange information and analyses, and allow or encourage their respective staff to meet with one another. However, there is no structural change in their relationship. Second-order cooperation points to a closer relationship, a more intrusive presence of one IGO in another's activities and even a possible dependence by one IGO on another, as for example in the case of certain organisations vis-à-vis the UN. The OSCE and the EU have indicated that they need a UN mandate to engage in peace operations. NATO, on the other hand, does not make this a precondition. Third-order cooperation techniques typically require the creation or reorganisation of

Illustration 3.1   Clusters within the Family of SSR-Relevant IGOs

N.b. – The CoE, OSCE and NATO only cooperate with one another in the Euro-Atlantic theatre. ECOWAS only cooperates with other IGOs in West Africa. The IGOS in diagonal shading work with other IGOS in both theatres.

resources, competences and instruments and the establishment of machinery that have the personnel of one IGO supervising those of another or personnel from one or more institution serving in some kind of joint hierarchy.

Three general observations can be made about the nature of the cooperation indicated by these principles and techniques. First, the principles and techniques are much more developed for the Euro-Atlantic security institutions (NATO, EU, OSCE, etc.) than for the IGOs interested in development issues (WB, IMF, etc.), and there are few that are shared by members of both these groupings. This likely reflects the relatively greater density of

Table 3.1   Main Principles of Cooperation for SSR-Relevant IGOs

Main Principles of Cooperation	Adopted by
General Commitments	
1. Respect for UN principles	UN, EU, NATO, OSCE
2. Respect for OSCE principles	OSCE
3. Comprehensive approach to security	OSCE, EU
4. Respect for treaty rights and obligations	NATO, EU
5. Respect for member states' interests	NATO, EU
6. Membership on the basis of free will	OSCE, NATO, EU
7. Importance of sub-regional cooperation	OSCE
8. No unilateral action by states	NATO, EU
Inter-institutional Modalities	
9. Respect for institutional autonomy	NATO, EU
10. No duplication by complementarity and comparative advantage	OSCE, EU, CoE, NATO
11. Transparency of and among institutions	OSCE, NATO, EU
12. Visibility of cooperating partners in activities	CoE, EU
13. Promotion of shared vision and aims	EU, CoE, NATO
14. Joint development of programmes	EU, CoE, OSCE
15. Mutually reinforcing development of assets	NATO, EU

interaction among the Euro-Atlantic security institutions and the novelty of interaction among these and the other IGOs in our study. In any event, it is yet another manifestation of the heterogeneity of our community of SSR-relevant IGOs and the underdevelopment of the security-development inter-face.

Second, the principles and techniques are not uniformly shared by the actors in our tables. For example, the OSCE, EU and NATO explicitly recognise the need for transparency of and among institutions but the CoE and the UN do not. Does this simply mean that this is an issue for the first three but not for the latter two, or does it suggest that there is a gap here that needs to be filled? Similarly, to take a technique from the category of third-order cooperation, why would organisations other the EU and WB not need to be open to the development of shared policy frameworks?

Table 3.2   IGO Cooperation Techniques
(table continues on p. 57)[24]

First-order cooperation	
1. Exchange of information and analysis	EU-OSCE-CoE, EU-UN, EU-OSCE, EU-OECD, NATO-UN, WB-EU, OSCE, UN-OSCE, EU-CoE, EU-NATO, OSCE-CoE
2. Dialogue and consultations	EU-NATO, EU-OSCE-CoE, EU-OSCE, EU-CoE, EU-UN, NATO-UN, OSCE, UN-OSCE, WB-EU, OSCE-CoE
3. Staff-level contacts at headquarters	NATO-UN, OSCE, EU-OSCE, EU-CoE, EU-NATO, UN-OSCE, OSCE-CoE, OSCE-NATO, WB-EU
4. Staff-level contacts in the field	EU-OSCE, NATO-UN, OSCE, EU-OSCE, WB-EU , EU-NATO
5. Exchange of visits and meetings on subjects of shared interest	OSCE, EU-OSCE, NATO-UN, UN-OSCE, NATO-OSCE

Second-order cooperation	
6. Cross-representation at meetings	OSCE
7. Acceptance of seconded experts	OSCE
8. Exchange of liaison officers/cells	EU-UN, NATO-UN, EU-NATO, OSCE
9. Coordination of member states in other IGOs	EU-OSCE
10. Accession to other IGOs' conventions	CoE-European Commission
11. Provision of enabling mandates	NATO-UN, NATO-OSCE, UN-EU

Third-order Cooperation	
12. Joint fact-finding missions	EU-OSCE, OSCE, EU-CoE
13. Development of shared policy frameworks	WB-EU (in poverty reduction strategy papers)
14. Joint planning	EU-NATO, UN-EU, EU-CoE, EU-OECD, EU-OSCE, OSCE
15. Programme co-development and management	EU-CoE, OSCE
16. Joint training of personnel	EU-CoE-OSCE, EU-UN, EU-OSCE, OSCE, EU
17. Coordination of diplomatic activity	EU-OSCE
18. Contribution of personnel and material resources to other IGOs' operations	EU-NATO, EU-OSCE, NATO-UN, WB-EU
19. Support to another IGO through funding	EU-OSCE
20. Joint funding	WB-EU, EU-CoE

Third, even after a cursory look at the principles and techniques, it is clear that they are not comprehensive, certainly for the purposes of SSR. In terms of principles, there is no recognition, for example, of the interdependent nature of IGO activity in the area of security and development. Nor is there any acknowledgement of the need for joint assessment mechanisms to monitor the way these principles and techniques are observed in both individual projects and more generally in inter-institutional relationships. Without such an assessment mechanism, it seems unlikely that IGOs will be able to identify gaps in the implementation of existing arrangements or gaps that need to be filled through the elaboration of new ones.

A Highly Political Process

SSR is a highly political process. IGO involvement in support for SSR in a recipient country inevitably leads to changes in local power relationships and can be extremely controversial as a result. But an SSR programme involving more than one IGO can also alter power relations among IGOs. Unless representatives of IGOs involved in such activities have been instructed to make

cooperation work, their working relations are likely to be competitive and not mutually supportive.

The range of strategies followed by IGOs in their relations with one another also underscores this point. These strategies fall into three broad categories: defensive, enhancive and transformative. With a defensive strategy, an IGO focuses on protecting established prerogatives. It may use its links with other IGOs to become more aware of their activities, or the links may be strictly declaratory without any practical impact. Another defensive stance is to simply ignore other actors. In following what we call an enhancive strategy, IGOs recognise that another IGO may be able to help it compensate for its own limitations, either because of its mandate, legitimacy or resources. This may also be a reciprocal process in which the other IGO may also profit. With a transformative strategy, an IGO aims to have an impact on another IGO. Here, IGO motivations can range from to usurping the functions of another IGO to absorbing it entirely. As with mergers and acquisitions in the business world, such takeover tactics can range from friendly or hostile. Table 3.3 attempts to capture these different aspects.

As this table suggests, IGOs can end up pursuing different and even opposing strategies and tactics in parallel. These are often lack transparency. The EU-NATO relationship is replete with examples of the simultaneous existence of both mutually supporting and adversarial actions. For example, the two organisations cooperated effectively in delivering security and SSR in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the last five years in particular, but their cooperation failed to be initiated in Afghanistan until 2007, five years after the initial involvement of NATO and EU member countries in this theatre. The differences between these two situations reflects the importance of individual member states in determining IGO strategies, as individual members states can pursue different and even contradictory strategies both within and across institutions.

Conclusions

This chapter has argued that while IGO cooperation is vital for SSR, it faces many obstacles and challenges. The IGOs in our sample have a relatively short history of cooperation and are still on a learning curve in this respect. The principles and techniques that IGOs have developed for cooperation are unevenly shared and underdeveloped relative to the intense and interdependent interaction required by SSR. We have also seen that inter-IGO relations are highly political, not the least because IGOs are competitors as often as

Table 3.3   IGO Strategies and Tactics

Strategy	Tactics	Examples
Defensive	1. Ignore other IGOs	NATO, EU and OSCE strategies used during the Cold War and early post-Cold War period vis-à-vis one another
	2. Gather intelligence on other IGOs	
	3. Privilege declaratory cooperation with IGOs	
Enhancive	4. Compensate for lack of policy tools, resources and relevance	ECOWAS vis-à-vis the EU and UN
	5. Secure legitimacy for international interventions	All IGOs vis-a-vis the UN
	6. Build alliances with like-minded actors	The OECD through relationships with other IGOs in the OECD DAC
	7. Create inter-institutional synergies	The EU and NATO in their Berlin Plus arrangements
	8. Provide services to other IGOs	The CoE through its support for EU enlargement strategies
Transformative	9. Colonise other IGO functions	The approach favoured by some EU members towards NATO
	10. Merge with/absorb another IGO	What happened with the transition from the ECSC, Erratum and the EEC to the European Community

they are co-operators, even though both competition and cooperation can co-exist. The ability of individual members states to block consensus or with-draw altogether complicates the picture still further. But just how much so is debatable. There have been no full and lasting expulsions from the IGOs in our study, nor have there been any full and lasting defections. Even if there

had been or were to be, we suspect that most IGOs would soldier on – unless, of course, the defector was the resident hegemony.

Our conclusions on cooperation are five-fold. First, as the research phase of this project has shown, we know relatively little of what is a very important subject, both in general among SSR actors and in particular with respect to SSR-relevant IGOs. Much more has to be done to ensure that we understand the subject adequately. Cooperation is clearly crucial but it has also to be efficient. Is there such a thing as too much cooperation? How to structure it so that it does not become stifling? We need to understand the phenomenon well enough to avoid the pitfalls of *cooperationist* and *coordinationitis,* where little or nothing productive occurs because actors are focused on relationships as an end rather than as a mean. Second, currently recognised principles of cooperation need to be more effectively applied. An example is the principle of transparency. While transparency is acknowledged as important by many IGOs in our study, it tends to be ignored in their public information activities, in particular as regards budgets and internal decisionmaking processes. Third, IGOs need to expand their range of cooperation modalities. For example, many of the overarching norms that have been developed for the good governance of the security sector can also be applied to IGO cooperation. We think, for example, of such norms as the need for accountability and democratic control, or for the judicious use of resources by IGOs and for security to be provided in a professional manner. Fourth, IGOs should strive to formalise their commitments to cooperation. Needed are cooperation guidelines for individual organisations and codes that govern the interaction among two or more organisations. An agreement by the gamut of SSR-relevant IGOs on general principles and techniques of cooperation would also be a welcome development. Finally, IGO CEOs and their member-state paymasters should feel themselves under an obligation to instil in their staff members an appreciation of the importance of cooperation for their IGO's fortunes and their staffers' careers. As we have seen, this can be as important for overcoming deficiencies in cooperation within an organisation as among organisations.

Notes

1   This chapter makes reference to several documents generated by one or more IGOs. For a complete list see Annex 4.
2   UNDP et. al., *Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review* (Pristina, 2006). The report can be accessed at http://www.issrkosovo.org.

3 Indeed, a recent article claimed that such an approach had failed in the United Kingdom, the country generally acknowledged as having inspired the joined-up approach. See Simon Caulkin, 'Why things fell apart for joined-up thinking', *The Observer*, 26 February 2006.

4 Interlocking institutions were introduced in NATO's 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, which stated: 'The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America'. They were later rebaptised 'mutually reinforcing' institutions when it became evident that the inter-institutional interface was more about rivalry than cooperation. The December 1992 Final Communiqué states: 'To meet the new risks and challenges, we will use Alliance resources and expertise in a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, while continuing to ensure an effective collective defence'.

5 A second EU-CoE agreement was concluded in 2001, as referenced in Annex 6. See European Commission, 'The EU's Relations with the Council of Europe' (December 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/coe/index.htm. A list of joint activities conducted by the EU and the CoE (including those focussed on Turkey) is available at http://www.jp.coe.int/CEAD/JP/.

6 NATO, 'EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP' (16 December 2002).

7 NATO, 'Berlin Plus agreement' (2002); NATO, 'NATO-EU: A strategic partnership' (19 July 2002), available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html.

8 See Annex 6.

9 Ibid.

10 Under the agreement concluded in July 1993, the organisations gather annually for 'Tripartite Meetings' in which other organisations also participate. For further information, see CoE et. al., 'Annual High-level meeting between the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, the United Nations and Partner Organizations in the "Tripartite-Plus" format: Joint Communiqué' (14 February 2007), available at http://www.coe.int.

11 United Nations Office for West Africa, 'ECOWAS-EU-UNOWA Framework of Action for Peace and Security' (no date), http://www.un.org/unowa/unowa/studies/eu-ecowas-unowa.pdf.

12 United Nations, 'Security Council to hold ministerial-level meeting on 20 September', Press Release Note No. 6032 (18 September 2006)*,* available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/note6032.doc.htm.

13 OSCE, Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (3 December 1994), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/1994/12/4270_en.pdf

14 Stability Pact, 'Ohrid Framework Agreement' (13 August 2001). The text of this agreement is available at http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf.

15 Stability Pact, 'Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management', available at http://www.stabilitypact.org/specials/030522-ohrid/index.asp.

16 Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'General Information', available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/.

17 For more on this, see David Law, 'Avec l'ONU à chaque fois que c'est possible – sans, quand il le faut?', in *La Paix a-t-elle un avenir?*, ed. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (L'Harmattan: Montréal, Paris, 2000); David Law, 'The OSCE & European Security Ar-

chitecture', in *Balancing Hegemony: The OSCE in the CIS*, eds. Neil S. MacFarlane and Oliver Thraenaert (Queen's Centre for International Relations: Kingston, 1997).

18 Clare Short, 'Security, Development and Conflict Prevention', Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies, London (May 13, 1998).

19 OSCE, 'Platform for Cooperative Security' (18 November 1999), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/ 11/17513_en.pdf.

20 See NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 'Berlin Plus agreement', information page (21 June 2006), available at http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/ shape_eu/se030822a.htm; see also NATO, 'NATO-EU: A strategic partnership', *op. cit.*

21 OECD, 'Security Sector Reform and Good Governance: Policy and Good Practice', Policy Brief (May 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf.

22 OECD, 'DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security Sector Reform and Governance' (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/ 31785288.pdf.

23 See World Bank, 'NATO Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Afghanistan, Statement by Praful Patel, Vice President for South Asia' (26 January 2007), available at http://www.worldbank.org.

24 Organisation titles appearing alone, rather than as part of a bilateral or tripartite arrangement, reflect a unilateral statement by that organisation. These cooperation techniques derive from the documents found in Annexes 5 and 6.

PART II

SSR IMPLEMENTATION

Chapter 4

From Policy to Practice:
Gauging the OECD's Evolving Role in
Security Sector Reform

Alan Bryden

Introduction[1]

Through its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation
(CPDC),[2] the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) seeks to better
coordinate development cooperation with conflict-prone and conflict-
affected countries. The central mechanism for this coordination has been the
development of a series of guidelines, first issued in 1997,[3] designed to
guide donors in their aid policies. At least as significant as the guidelines
themselves is the CPDC network comprising the major bilateral donors, the
European Commission, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).[4] The
convening role of the CPDC has proved critical to ensuring the broader dis-
semination and application of the DAC Guidelines. It also provides a vehicle
for improving the coherence and coordination of security sector reform
(SSR) interventions, two key preconditions for effective SSR implementa-
tion according to the OECD DAC. This evident strength also represents a
challenge since the 'Western' profile of the organisation poses actual and
perceived dilemmas in terms of balancing external support with the need for
local ownership of SSR processes, another core principle of the DAC Guide-
lines.

The OECD DAC has recently sought to address an acknowledged gap
between SSR policy and practice through the development of a *Handbook on
Security System Reform*.[5] Yet the OECD is not an implementing agency and
will need to find creative ways to support SSR if it is to achieve its goals.
Given its long association with the development of policy guidelines for SSR
and this more recent commitment to supporting the implementation of SSR

good practice, the OECD DAC has a challenging but potentially pivotal role to play in bringing SSR stakeholders closer together and bridging gaps between policy-making and programming.

This chapter traces the evolution of the OECD DAC's approach to SSR, reflected in the development of its policy guidelines and a major shift towards assisting DAC member states in their SSR implementation. It considers the orientation and membership of the organisation and how these factors affect adherence to and dissemination of OECD DAC policy provisions in this area. In order to better understand the strengths and limitations of the OECD DAC and thus to address the challenges for the organisation in the SSR field, this chapter focuses on two interrelated issues: the opportunities and constraints faced by the OECD DAC in promoting a holistic SSR agenda and process-based and substantive issues relating to how the organisation tries to achieve its objectives. The chapter concludes with a number of policy recommendations that are intended to reinforce the developing role of the OECD DAC in SSR.

The Development of the OECD DAC Policy Approach to SSR

The CPDC was formed in 1995 and thus pre-dated the emergence of the SSR concept. The development of guidelines to help shape policies towards conflict-affected states by OECD DAC member states was identified as a central objective of this body. The first set of guidelines, issued in 1997 – *Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*[6] – sketches out broad goals of fostering peace and stability, preventing and managing violent conflict, and assisting crisis relief and reconstruction. Key principles include an emphasis on the strong linkages between security and development, the need for donor coordination and, above all, the importance of shifting from an ethos of response to conflicts towards a policy of prevention. The 1997 Guidelines highlight the importance of democratic governance and a fair and effective justice system as a means of empowering institutions and individuals. Strengthening civil society is recognised as a means to further democratic governance in way that prevents conflict or its recurrence.

The 1997 Guidelines have a small sub-section including explicit SSR measures as part of the chapter on governance and civil society. These include training for civilian and military personnel in human rights as well as the need for democratic oversight and civilian control. Support for the institutions of security sector governance is also encouraged. More broadly, se-

curity and justice sector reform are regarded as parallel, mutually reinforcing processes.[7]

If the 1997 Guidelines present a vision of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction centred on security as a pre-condition for sustainable development, the 2001 supplement to these guidelines – *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*[8] – identifies more explicitly the political nature of security issues and the need for democratic oversight and accountability of the security sector. Human rights, security and development concerns are brought together under the overarching concept of human security.

Instead of situating SSR as a contributing factor to broader democratisation and good governance agendas, the 2001 Guidelines point to a central role for SSR in delivering security and justice. From a human security perspective, the range of actors involved in SSR is recognised as extending beyond the security forces and judicial and penal systems to include an array of stakeholders in government, the legislature, civil society, the media and the business community.[9] A holistic definition of SSR is set out that stresses the need for an effective, well-managed and democratically accountable security sector. The importance of limiting and controlling security spending also becomes an explicit rationale for reform.[10] Finally, the need for developing countries to apply principles of sound public sector management to the security sector is recognised while the problems faced by development donors in supporting security-related activities are acknowledged.[11]

The gap between the demand for SSR assistance and the capacity of donors to provide such support was confirmed in a survey on SSR implementation commissioned by the CPDC in 2002-2003.[12] In particular, a lack of conceptual clarity and coherence in programming was apparent in what tended to be an ad hoc approach to SSR implementation on the part of the donor community. At the same time, the 2004 DAC Issues Paper *The Security and Development Nexus: Challenges for Aid* proved influential in demonstrating to donors the importance of the link between security and development for aid effectiveness.[13] These findings generated a review of the 2001 Guidelines that resulted in a policy statement and paper endorsed by a ministerial meeting in late 2004 entitled *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice.*[14]

The 2004 Guidelines draw on donor countries' SSR experience to date by emphasising the importance of partner country participation in order to situate SSR within a broader national policy framework as well as to ensure buy-in across different levels of society. The need to understand the specific contexts – the political, economic and security framing conditions – that

shape the opportunities and entry points for SSR is recognised. In particular, the inherently political and thus sensitive nature of these activities for local stakeholders is flagged. The principles contained in these guidelines reflect an emerging donor consensus around a holistic definition of SSR that underlines the need to integrate partial reforms such as defence, intelligence, police and judicial reform that in the past were generally conducted as separate efforts. It also links measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of security forces to overriding concerns of democratic governance. Finally, this broad understanding of SSR recognises the reality that non-state actors, whether non-statutory security forces or civil society actors, are highly relevant for SSR. The importance of their role in delivering security and justice was further elaborated in a 2007 paper on *Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery.*[15]

The DAC is responsible for determining what constitutes official development assistance (ODA), that is, donor funding for 'the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries'. An 18-month process ending in 2005 clarified the definition of ODA to include programmes focussing on security expenditure management, the role of civil society in the security sector, legislation on child soldiers, SSR, civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and control of small arms and light weapons.[16] An agreement reached at the DAC to the effect that SSR 'to improve democratic governance and civilian control'[17] was ODA-eligible proved a key step in convincing donors that supporting such activities was a legitimate development activity.

These new developments and their implications for the design, implementation and evaluation of SSR programmes provide the rationale for the development of the 2007 OECD DAC Handbook. From the start, this process has been intended to support SSR implementation by operationalising the guidelines and insights developed to date. The evolution of OECD DAC norms and principles for SSR is summarised in Table 4.1 below.

From Policy to Practice: the OECD Handbook

Under strong leadership from the UK CPDC Chair and the DAC Secretariat, a process was initiated by the CPDC beginning in 2005 with the objective of distilling SSR good practices and lessons learned into a 'state of the art' guide that would provide practical guidance 'to ensure that donor support to SSR programmes is both effective and sustainable'.[18] The OECD

Table 4.1   The Evolution of OECD DAC Norms and Principles for SSR

DAC publication	Norms	Operating principles
1997: *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*	Nascent SSR concept based on good governance; Strong democratic accountability component; Security as precondition for development.	Understand security as element of justice reform; Emphasise training; Take a whole of government approach.
2001: *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*	SSR anchored in broad concept of human security; Key importance of security-development nexus; Emphasis on accountability and legitimacy more explicit.	Increase dialogue among broad range of stakeholders; Apply public sector management principles; Address SSR supply-demand gap; Improve ad hoc approaches to implementation; Link SSR to broader peacebuilding agenda.
2004: *Security System Reform and Governance*	People-centred security; Security-aid effectiveness link; Increased importance of non-state actors; SSR grounded in democracy/human rights; Effectiveness, management and democratic governance concerns intertwined.	Set partner-country participation within coherent framework; Understand local contexts and framing conditions; Be flexible in implementation; Coordinate through whole of government approaches; Undertake multi-sectoral programming.
2007: *Handbook on Security System Reform*	Local ownership as imperative; Non-state actors key to security and justice provision; Sustainability/long-termism essential	Close supply-demand gap; Address political nature of SSR; See SSR implementation as multi-layered service delivery; Coordinate donor support; Focus on outcomes, not outputs.

DAC Handbook that emerged from this process marks a clear shift from promoting guidelines to developing tools to facilitate better SSR implementation.

The IF-SSR process

The OECD DAC Handbook was developed as part of a process known as the Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR). Following a competitive tender, a consortium of policy research institutions was contracted to assist the CPDC in developing the IF-SSR.[19] The consortium produced an initial draft study report that was distributed to members of the CPDC Task team on SSR and provided the basis for discussion at an SSR practitioners' workshop held in Ghana in December 2005 that brought together security, development and diplomatic personnel from DAC members as well as partner countries. The draft was subsequently revised to take into account comments provided by CPDC members as well as feedback from the Ghana workshop.

At this stage, a change of approach was adopted. Acknowledging that the initial draft report was both lengthy and more theoretical than practical, a critical review panel (CRP) of SSR experts was convened to provide advice, review drafts and identify ways to develop a handbook that would provide a useful tool for practitioners. The CRP emphasised that developing a handbook required a different methodology, structure and approach from a mapping document. It also highlighted a need for clarity concerning the intended audience of the IF-SSR process, making explicit that the IF-SSR was primarily a tool for donors, not for development partners pursuing national SSR programmes. The CRP also deemed it essential to address head-on the tension between external imposition and local ownership of SSR, and the consequent need to find a balance between international good practice and the domestic political culture of reforming states. In most contexts, external security and development actors tend to initiate SSR programmes, fund them and provide the bulk of implementation expertise, often promoting their own (i.e., 'Western') reform models. The shortcomings of such an approach called for a clear statement that local ownership was not a 'tick in the box' but an admittedly difficult to achieve *conditio sine qua non* for successful SSR. A final point was the need to acknowledge the highly context-specific, politically sensitive nature of SSR processes in very different settings and for corresponding donor flexibility in SSR programme design, implementation and evaluation.

Having addressed major issues of audience, approach and objectives, SSR subject experts were mandated to draft specific inputs in the style of a field-level manual, using the draft IF-SSR study report as a point of depar-

ture. Aspects of the draft Handbook were tested through regional and national-level consultations.[20] Thematic workshops were also held on specific topics such as 'security and justice service delivery' and 'SSR monitoring and evaluation'. The editorial board guiding this process interweaved these diverse contributions from CPDC member states, academics, policy experts and practitioners, multilateral actors and development partners. Key policy and operational commitments emerging from the handbook were endorsed by DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency at the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2007. The Handbook was subsequently acknowledged at the June 2007 Heiligendamm Summit of the G8 as an important instrument for tackling security and development challenges in Africa.[21]

The IF-SSR process as output

By any standards, the IF-SSR process represents a major achievement. Completed in less than two years, the OECD DAC Handbook is the state of the art in terms of understanding SSR and laying down the key elements for the assessment, design and implementation of SSR programmes within a framework of security and justice service delivery. This section takes stock of key findings of the Handbook and then considers the intended outcomes of the IF-SSR process.

Section 1 of the Handbook sets out the key *principles of SSR* and traces the concept's emergence on the international agenda. It defines the central purpose of the Handbook – to narrow gaps between policy and practice – and identifies its core audience as SSR policy makers and practitioners.

Section 2, on *fostering a supportive political environment*, underscores that local actors have conflicting interests that are not necessarily aligned with those underpinning an SSR process. Spoilers may be opposed to reform for political reasons or out of personal interest, resisting measures that may jeopardise their influence and positions. In-depth knowledge of a given reform context is therefore vital if international actors are to avoid exacerbating domestic divisions and to capitalise on opportunities to put SSR on the domestic agenda. The Handbook provides a strong message that while external actors can only influence deeply engrained security, political and economic framing conditions to a certain extent, taking them into account is essential if appropriate entry points for SSR are to be identified.

Sections 3 and 4 focus on the assessment process and subsequent design of SSR programmes. In order to address the inadequacies of SSR programmes driven by external expertise and approaches, both sections again

reinforce the need for an appreciation of context that is based on solid research and consultation among a wide selection of local stakeholders. Local ownership, resting on a high level of meaningful participation by domestic stakeholders, is acknowledged as the bedrock of successful SSR. It also implies that resources provided to support SSR must be tailored to the capacities and budget limitations of national authorities. Section 4 acknowledges that in contexts where security and justice institutions are weak, a long-term approach is vital. A significant culture change in donor behaviour that moves away from narrow timeframes, tight budget cycles and the demand for short-term, output-driven results is therefore necessary. This section points to the importance of an 'inception phase' in which donors assess the local circumstances and build credibility through initial 'quick impact' projects, but set this within the framework of a long-term commitment. As elaborated in more detail in Section 5, building national capacities to manage and oversee security and justice provision must therefore be a major component of sustainable SSR programming.

A central goal of the IF-SSR process is to achieve greater coherence and coordination across the SSR donor community. Section 6 on *developing an integrated approach to SSR in post-conflict situations* provides guidance on the need to integrate SSR within the broader framework of post-conflict peacebuilding. This point was also highlighted by the Presidential Statement emerging from the 20 February 2007 Open Debate in the UN Security Council, which stresses the importance of the Security Council's recognition that 'the inter-linkages between security sector reform and other important factors of stabilisation and reconstruction, such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants, small arms and light weapons control, as well as gender equality, children and armed conflict and human rights issues'.[22]

Section 7 looks at *implementing SSR sector by sector*. Each subsection is structured according to a number of key issues: significance of the sector for SSR, linkages to wider SSR, conducting assessments, potential entry points for SSR, programme design issues, sequencing, lessons learned to guide implementation as well as challenges and particular features of post-conflict SSR. By adopting a common approach across different sectors such as defence, police and intelligence, these issues are framed in a way that is relevant to policy-makers and practitioners involved in project design and implementation while stressing the holistic nature of SSR. Emphasis on linkages not only reinforces the need to integrate reforms at the macro level but points to specific fields that need to be aligned such as justice and prisons reform. This section also recognises the growing profile in SSR of private

military and security companies (PMSCs). If these actors are to make a positive contribution as part of wider SSR efforts, then transparency, accountability and a commitment to key principles of security governance must characterise their role. Equally, it is the responsibility of SSR funders to ensure that all service providers live up to the principles and practices enshrined in the DAC Guidelines. As a related point, perhaps the only misleading feature of this section is the inclusion of 'democratic oversight and accountability' as an SSR 'sector'. This is not the case. Oversight and accountability are key principles of democratic security governance and must underpin all elements of SSR. However, the centrality of democratic governance concerns to the OECD DAC's SSR approach points to this being a fault in the way the Handbook has been structured, rather than a reflection of the organisation's policy prescriptions.[23]

Management, monitoring, review and evaluation are critical yet underexplored aspects of SSR programming. The issues involved are inherently complex and little tailored guidance exists that is directly linked to SSR. Section 8 focuses on this challenging topic. Given the potentially vast SSR agenda, the need for multidisciplinary skills sets is strongly emphasised. The growing use of flexible multi-donor trust funds, pooled resources (as in the UK and Netherlands) and 'whole of government' approaches represent a positive development that demonstrates a growing awareness of the need to coordinate financing as an essential element of overall coordination. The Handbook emphasises that review and evaluation of SSR programmes is not something that should occur at the end of an SSR process but must be a through-life activity. Reviews and evaluations should not be perceived as parachuted in from the exterior but must involve and build capacity among local stakeholders.

Challenges and Opportunities for Improved SSR Implementation

The international community is faced by a number of challenges in implementing an SSR agenda that realises the good practices identified in the OECD DAC Handbook. The ability of the OECD DAC to shape and influence this agenda is conditioned both by the tools created for this task but also by the nature of the organisation itself. This section explores these issues, addressing the challenges and opportunities of operationalising the work of the DAC in the context of SSR implementation.

From outputs to outcomes

Coherence will be greatly facilitated if different actors apply the same under-standings and approaches to SSR. Arguably, the DAC Guidelines and Hand-book have already had a positive impact by providing a base-line under-standing of SSR that has shaped broader processes of policy development. For example, the EU has stated that the work of the DAC 'provides an im-portant basis for EC engagement in this area in terms of norms, principles and operational guidance'.[24]

The UK has significant experience in designing and implementing SSR programmes. The Netherlands has followed the UK example in pooling resources from across different government departments that can be used for SSR, while Canada, Germany and Switzerland are at different stages of de-veloping policy frameworks and inter-agency approaches to their SSR com-mitments.[25] Beyond these examples, the capacity to support SSR among DAC members remains patchy. Yet CPDC member states were closely im-plicated in the development of the OECD DAC Handbook, and their Minis-ters signed off on its major findings. This implies both ownership of the product and a political commitment to ensure that it does not become a 'dead letter' in terms of implementation.

The convening power of the OECD DAC can help encourage this *lin-gua franca*, as exemplified by its promotion of 'whole of government' ap-proaches to SSR. This underlines the need to build bridges within donor governments across development, security and foreign affairs departments, *inter alia*. Even where inter-agency approaches are relatively mature, there are tensions between actors with different approaches and priorities. How-ever, addressing the perspectives and priorities of different national stake-holders provides a starting point for coherent SSR interventions. Common understandings also form the building blocks for coordination across differ-ent bilateral and multilateral actors engaged in SSR in a given theatre. This will not solve the inherently political problem of actors pursuing policies that reflect their own national interests but it may lower the transaction costs for coordination in SSR implementation. Certainly, arguments for greater coor-dination in order to support SSR on the basis of comparative advantage rather than pursuing stovepiped or competing activities remain compelling.

Although the OECD DAC handbook represents the main output of the IF-SSR process to date, there is a clear recognition within the CPDC of the need to implement the good practices of the OECD DAC Handbook. To this end, the OECD DAC has developed training modules to accompany the handbook, a potentially important tool to move beyond awareness-raising

and to assist members in applying good practices and lessons learned. This is significant since there is a real danger that ignorance or self-interest will lead certain actors to 'cherry-pick' aspects of the Handbook without subscribing to its fundamental principles. In particular, due attention must be paid not just to enhancing the effectiveness of security and justice providers but to national capacities to manage reform processes and to ensure democratic control and oversight of the security sector by parliaments as well as civil society. The Handbook emphasises this point by stressing that failure to ensure democratic governance of the security sector may have serious long-term effects on its development.[26]

A wide range of actors contribute to donor support for SSR. States and multilateral organisations often reinforce their capacities or execute specific projects through mandating private sector service providers. A growing number of consultants, research and policy organisations already play a prominent role in SSR while PMSCs are showing an increasing interest in this field. However, donors are frequently loyal to particular institutions – often with a national affiliation – while consultancy capacity for SSR remains confined to a relatively small group of 'usual suspects'. If the emphasis placed on service delivery in the OECD DAC Handbook is to be adequately addressed, then interaction among SSR actors must evolve. As long as there is a clear understanding of what different members of the SSR community have to offer, public and private actors can together round out the wide range of skills sets demanded by the SSR agenda. For example, PMSCs can enhance their role by clearly embracing the OECD DAC guidelines. But donors also need to be proactive in applying robust contracting procedures and effective oversight of all SSR service providers to ensure that their work is implemented in accordance with accepted norms and standards. The OECD DAC must be vigilant in monitoring how different actors identify themselves with the Guidelines and the Handbook. The DAC Peer Review Process is a tool for gauging donor implementation of agreed policy and to gauge its effectiveness against agreed criteria.[27] This process could provide useful insights with respect to the obligations assumed by DAC members as part of the IF-SSR process.

Clearly, donors are at very different stages in developing their SSR capacities. How support for implementation plays out in practice should therefore be flexible, depending on individual needs. It will remain important to continue to disseminate these key messages by continuing to present the handbook's main findings in international and regional fora. Assisting states and other actors in incorporating good practice into institutional frameworks may be a critical area of support. Providing 'train the trainer'

activities, assessment, evaluation and practical advice in other areas can also help shape the design, implementation and effectiveness of SSR interventions. In conducting these activities, it is particularly important that the Handbook remains a 'live' document. A mechanism should be developed to ensure that experience gained from using the Handbook is fed back into future iterations.

The OECD DAC has neither the mandate nor the capacity to conduct this work itself. But in committing itself to promote SSR implementation, it should provide direction as well as a means of highlighting how far its members meet their obligations. The CRP can provide the nucleus of a bespoke capacity to support implementation. But the IF-SSR process has itself been useful in highlighting the varied cast of individuals and organisations – both public and private – involved in SSR. As the Handbook makes clear, the skills required to support SSR go well beyond the sectoral elements of the SSR agenda. They include management, finance and human resources, as well as a range of support mechanisms to promote democratic governance of the security sector. The existing resource base should be harnessed, capacity gaps filled and creative solutions found to promote joined-up SSR implementation.

Fostering regional capacities to support SSR implementation would be a useful way to build and link capacities within the SSR community. The EU, with a policy framework shaped by the work of the DAC and a growing operational commitment to SSR, provides an obvious example. There are also emerging SSR networks in other world regions, most notably Africa,[28] whose expertise could be better used to promote SSR implementation. Facilitating the development of an international capacity to support DAC members through training, the provision of policy advice, assessment and evaluation or operational support could also be an important way to support good practice and harmonise approaches. A common funding mechanism for such an endeavour, eligible as ODA, may also prove a vehicle for effective coordination. Of course, while it is for its donors to develop and support such initiatives, the OECD DAC should assume a prominent role in identifying, promoting and, where appropriate, accrediting initiatives that will further the goals of the Handbook.

Preaching beyond the converted

A major challenge for the OECD DAC is to extend its influence on norm-setting and programming beyond those states and institutions already signed up to the SSR concept. For example, although sceptical due to the Anglo-

Saxon roots of the concept, France as a CPDC member has been part of the IF-SSR process. This has led to some initial discussions on SSR among French policy-makers.[29] An enhanced role for France could help build bridges to Francophone countries, where in large part the SSR concept has not taken root.[30] Moreover, although supporting SSR activities in a number of different contexts, the US policy community has not embraced the SSR discourse. Drawing the US into a comprehensive policy discussion on SSR clearly offers huge potential pay-offs in aligning the huge US commitment to security, development and democracy promotion with this agenda.

Even among those OECD DAC members that are already committed SSR supporters, it can be questioned whether some have fully digested the radical consequences for national policy and programming of implementing the Handbook. As discussed, implementing approaches where donors facilitate (rather than 'do') SSR through supporting locally-driven processes and building national capacities requires in many cases a sea change in behaviour. It means moving away from short-term projects and funding cycles to supporting longer-term SSR processes in which the involvement of national stakeholders may be more important than any visible 'output'. A further challenge is to align the approaches of development, diplomatic, defence and security actors involved in SSR and to ensure coherence in national approaches.

Building consensus among stakeholders will be of limited use if confined to capitals. If lessons are truly to be learned, policy decisions must reflect the experience of SSR programming staff rather than being imposed on them. Achieving buy-in from across different stakeholder groups will be challenging given that the impetus behind the IF-SSR process is most closely associated at national levels with development departments. Yet progress in this area will be a key litmus test for its implementation.

Within the UN system, a draft report on the UN's approach to SSR by the Secretary-General, currently under development, will provide the framework for the UN's future engagement in this field. The OECD DAC Guidelines and Handbook will certainly provide a key source for this work. However, although in substance there is much to be drawn from the DAC's work, it has been developed by an organisation regarded suspiciously by some states from the developing world. The Security Council debate on SSR in February 2007 was revealing in that it reflected both a widespread awareness of the need for more holistic approaches that integrate SSR with broader security and development concerns as well as a suspicion – which needs to be addressed – that SSR implies the imposition of Western methods and approaches.[31] This points to a key challenge for the OECD DAC to en-

courage member states to live up to policy statements by disproving the argument that 'local ownership is a rhetorical device rather than a guide to donor officials'.[32]

Ensuring due attention to local ownership in practice (as opposed to policy statements) has in many instances proved beyond the international community. Indeed, the cursory level and nature of consultation in the development of the IF-SSR was criticised by many African participants at the Ghana workshop. The difficulty of applying approaches that facilitate the design, management and implementation of reforms by national actors should not be underestimated since SSR, particularly in post-conflict contexts, generally takes place when national capacities are at their weakest and local actors lack both expertise and legitimacy. Yet this should not mask shortcomings in policy and practice that ignore local actors and demonstrate a lack of flexibility in programming and their financing or political agendas and timeframes which may be inappropriate to local realities, interests and priorities. In this respect, the recent *Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform* strongly underlines that 'there is no prospect of sustainable SSR unless domestic actors have the capacity to ensure sustainability'.[33]

It could be argued that a handbook developed by a Western intergovernmental organisation to support the SSR work of Western donors may be inimical to local ownership. If this is not to be the case, then the experience of local, national and regional, actors needs to be central to its implementation. Ideally, work across the programme cycle should be led by national actors with external assistance very much in the background. The Handbook can be useful in encouraging the clustering of SSR competences at national, regional and international levels. As discussed above, developing an independent international capacity to support the implementation of SSR good practice backed by donors (but with national flags kept furled) could play a significant role here. To be successful, it would have to enhance donors' ability to support SSR through applying the skills of SSR practitioners from beyond the donor community. This may also provide a means to dilute sensitivities over local ownership versus external imposition.

Donor support for SSR – and consequently a handbook that advises donors in this regard – will continue to raise tensions concerning the question of ownership. This tension is inherent to the relationship between external and national actors and can only be magnified by the sensitive nature of security and its governance. But this does not diminish the importance of keeping donors accountable as concerns applying good practice in their programming. The Handbook amply demonstrates that local ownership is not a matter of political correctness but is crucial to achieving sustainable results.

In parallel, the Handbook should be promoted as a tool for development partners to hold international actors accountable. The Handbook could not be more explicit in its requirement for locally-driven SSR processes that place strong emphasis on capacity-building and broad participation. Although in practice this may prove an inconvenient truth, enabling development partners to measure donors' programmes and support for national SSR processes in accordance with the good practices identified in the Handbook may be the most effective way to address concerns about external imposition of SSR. Only through such a dynamic process, requiring political will and practical commitment by donors and reforming states, will real progress be made.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The SSR discourse is currently undergoing a much-needed phase of consolidation in terms of policy formulation and programming. Through its policy guidelines, the OECD DAC has influenced this evolution as bilateral and multilateral donors have deepened their understanding of SSR and its relationship to broader security and development concerns. The DAC has promoted a governance-based approach to SSR that offers important opportunities to integrate activities and actors on the basis of common understandings and core principles. Promoting 'whole of government' agendas within DAC member states also promises to contribute to the realisation of at least a degree of consensus across interested ministries and departments.

This evolving understanding of SSR has made plain a number of factors that have contributed to a significant gap between SSR policy and its implementation. Major challenges include: a lack of capacity among donors to design, implement and evaluate SSR programmes; an absence of effective coordination both at headquarters and in the field; and a lack of meaningful local ownership in donor approaches to SSR. Addressing this gap was and remains the rationale behind the IF-SSR process and the development of the OECD DAC Handbook. The Handbook for the first time sets SSR firmly within a framework of security and justice service delivery. The political as well as the technical dimensions of SSR are clearly laid out as is the need for integrating SSR with related security and development concerns. If these practices are to take root and influence donor behaviour, then a sustained, targeted commitment to implementation is required. The DAC cannot and should not do this itself. However, it can enable implementation through exploiting its knowledge of SSR and networks – both of member states and

experts – in order to build new expertise and develop creative means to promote SSR implementation.

The following recommendations focus on the positive role that the OECD DAC can play in supporting SSR policy and programming:

- Greater coordination in the SSR field can be realised through the promotion of common understandings and approaches. The OECD DAC has already played a major role in dissemination but must continue efforts to promote SSR guidelines and good practices across the international community. Multilateral institutions and bilateral actors with a strong commitment to security, development and democracy promotion that have not bought into the SSR agenda represent a key target audience.

- By signing up to the key policy and operational commitments from the IF-SSR, OECD DAC members have a clear obligation to implement them at the national level. The OECD DAC must continue to act both as facilitator and as watchdog to monitor progress.

- The OECD DAC Handbook demonstrates the wide range of skills sets required across the SSR agenda. Significant further efforts should be undertaken to build national capacity and fill expertise gaps with 'train the trainer' and other SSR training activities. Security management, human resources and security budgeting all represent areas where current capacity is particularly weak.

- The OECD DAC Handbook aptly demonstrates the centrality of local ownership to sustainable, legitimate SSR processes. The major challenge remains to influence donor practice in this area. Promoting the Handbook as a tool for development partners to hold donors accountable would provide a powerful dynamic to bring different stakeholders closer together.

- The scope of the SSR agenda means that no single actor can do it all. As capacities for SSR implementation are developed, the OECD DAC should place strong emphasis on complementarity of efforts. The DAC should continue to encourage the development of SSR capacity by bringing together regional SSR communities to support policy discussions as a continuation of the IF-SSR process.

- The harmonisation of approaches and reinforcement of national capacities can be achieved through the development of national, regional and international capacities to assist SSR implementation. With support from the OECD DAC and interested members, expertise from

across the SSR spectrum could be clustered to provide tailor-made policy advice, training, operational support, assessment and evaluation according to the good practices developed in the OECD DAC handbook.

• Progress will only be made if policy makers and practitioners learn from their successes and failures. It is therefore particularly important that the Handbook remains a 'live' document. A mechanism should be developed to ensure that experience gained from using the Handbook to design and implement SSR programmes is fed back into future iterations.

This chapter has considered how the OECD DAC has contributed towards shaping the SSR discourse. It has highlighted the evolution of its holistic, governance-based approach to SSR and a growing recognition of the importance of effective delivery of security and justice to individuals and communities. But the key challenge is to shape behaviour. With the IF-SSR process and publication of the OECD DAC Handbook, important tools are now in place. By bridging gaps between SSR policy and practice the OECD DAC has a major role to play in taking forward this essential work.

Notes

1 Grateful thanks go to DCAF colleagues Fairlie Jensen and Heiner Hänggi as well as Mark Downes (DAC Secretariat) and Mark White (UK Department for International Development) for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

2 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict.

3 OECD DAC, 'Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century' in OECD DAC, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris: OECD DAC, 2001).

4 CPDC members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Commission, IMF, UN and WB.

5 OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007).

6 OECD DAC, *Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century* (Paris: OECD DAC, 1997).

7 OECD DAC, 'Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation', in *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 119 (Paris: OECD DAC, 2001).

8 OECD DAC, *The DAC Guidelines*, *op. cit*.

9 Ibid*.,* 38.

10 Ibid., 15.

11 Ibid., 19.

12 OECD DAC, 'A Survey of SSR and Donor Policy: Views from non-OECD Countries', DCD/DAC/CPDC(2004)4 (OECD DAC, 31 August 2004).

13 OECD DAC, 'The Security and Development Nexus: Challenges for Aid', DAC Issues Paper, DCD/DAC/(2004)9/REV2 (OECD DAC, 26 March 2004).

14 OECD DAC, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD DAC, 2004).

15 OECD DAC, *Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery* (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007).

16 OECD DAC, 'Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: What Counts as ODA?', OECD DAC, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/32/34535173.pdf.

17 Ibid.

18 OECD DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency, Ministerial Statement, 'Key Policy and Operational Commitments from the Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)', signed in Paris on 4 April 2007.

19 The consortium consisted of the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), Clingendael and Saferworld.

20 Consultations were held in Latin America and Africa as well as with Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, United Nations and United States.

21 G8 Summit 2007, 'Growth and Responsibility in Africa', in *Summit Declaration* (8 June 2007), 14, para. 43.

22 UNSC, 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', 5632nd meeting of the Security Council on 20 February 2007, S/PRST/2007/3.

23 The Ministerial Statement on key commitments from the IF-SSR signed by DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency in Paris on 4 April 2007 describes 'the establishment of an effective governance, oversight and accountability system as one of three major overarching objectives of donor engagement in SSR'. See OECD DAC, *Key Policy and Operational Commitments*, 10.

24 European Commission, 'A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform', Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (Brussels: European Commission, 2006), 6.

25 For an analysis of developments among OECD DAC member states see Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice and Research', paper prepared for the workshop 'New Directions in Security Sector Reform', Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative (International Development Research Centre: Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 November 2005, revised 27 January 2006).

26 OECD DAC, *OECD DAC Handbook*, *op. cit.,* 102.

27 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews.

28 For example, the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) seeks to harmonise the work of policy makers and practitioners from across Africa working in the SSR field. See http://www. africansecurity.org.

29 See Jean-Marc Chataigner, 'La réforme du secteur de sécurité dans les Etats et Sociétés fragiles. Préalable indispensable au développement, ou dernière des illusions néocoloniales?' *Afrique Contemporaine* 2, no. 218 (2006): 101-117.

30 For an analysis of security sector governance in each of the states in the West African sub-region see Alan Bryden et. al., *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2007).

31 UNSC, Transcript of 5632nd meeting, SC/8958, 20 February 2007. See in particular interventions by Egypt and Cuba.

32 Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake, 'Unknotting Local Ownership', in *After Intervention: Public Sector Management in Post-Conflict Societies: From Intervention to Sustainable Local Ownership*, eds. Anja H. Ebnöther and Philipp Fluri, 240 (Geneva: DCAF, 2005).

33 Laurie Nathan, *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*, paper commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2007), 39.

Chapter 5

Security Sector Reform and EU Norm Implementation

Andrew Sherriff

Introduction

Since the very first of its several phases of expansion, the European Union (EU) has demanded that certain criteria be met by states seeking membership. Good governance, democratic control, accountability, transparency and related reforms of the security sector have been a significant part of this process. In addition, a number of the EU's member states have been at the very forefront of developing and implementing the norms of security sector reform in external action, most notably the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands. Even relatively new members of the EU have been active proponents of SSR in international fora, such as Slovakia during its UN Security Council presidency in 2007.[1] In addition, both old and new EU member states have themselves experienced processes of SSR (if not always called that at the time). This experience provides a rich vein of expertise and moral authority in terms of the promotion of norms. However, while the two main arms of the EU institutions associated with SSR, the European Commission (Commission) and Council of the European Union (Council), have made progress with regard to the promotion of SSR in external action, their efforts lag behind the EU's most progressive member states in this area (such as the Netherlands and the UK). Yet, in general, the EU institutions are actually ahead of the vast majority of its member states and many other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) when it comes to SSR.

In 2003, the EU agreed on its first security strategy, which was a response to the US National Security Strategy and the events of 11 September 2001. It is notable that in the *European Security Strategy*, SSR is namechecked, an indication that the concept was moving more to the mainstream of EU external action thinking and attracting attention within the EU highest policy circles. This chapter will focus on EU external action in what is

known as Pillar 1, the actions of the European Community, and Pillar 2, the actions of the Council associated with the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).[2] In particular, it will lay out the various EU agendas impacting SSR 'hard' and 'soft' norms and explore institutional dilemmas that influence them. It will then provide an overview of how these norms have been implemented in various EU experiences with SSR. The final section will discuss the unresolved challenges before the EU in ensuring that the norms it has embraced on a declaratory level are translated into practice.

EU Agendas and SSR norms

Chapter 2 of this Yearbook identified norms in IGO SSR that can be usefully grouped and understood as: a holistic approach (security-development nexus), good governance, democratic oversight, accountability, transparency and professionalism. All these are represented to varying degrees among the EU's 'hard norms' and 'soft norms' of SSR. In addition, the call for a long-term approach and local ownership are common SSR-related norms in relevant EU policy pronouncements.

The development of 'hard' and 'soft' norms' within the EU in relation to SSR and their implementation has been shaped by four agendas: conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance and enlargement, the latter being outside the scope of this chapter. This process has been going on for several years, long before the Council and the Commission developed their respective SSR concepts in 2005 and 2006. These frequently overlapping agendas have proven complementary in some cases and counter-productive in others, but all have had a significant influence over the development and implementation of EU SSR norms.

Conflict Prevention Agenda

In recent years the EU has undergone a considerable evolution with regard to conflict prevention. Indeed, such tragedies in the 1990s as the Balkan wars and the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda gave the EU ample reason to improve its institutions and policies for conflict prevention. In the EU context, the concept of conflict prevention only emerged in 1998. It was not, however, until 2001 during the Swedish Presidency of the EU that a coherent joint policy commitment to conflict prevention was made at the highest level.[3] The resulting *EU Programme of Action on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* committed the EU to develop

its overall institutional capacity for conflict prevention and encouraged future EU Presidencies to report on progress. While the Programme of Action does not use the term SSR, it has been influential in setting the policy environment in which EU SSR would evolve.[4] The Programme of Action was preceded by the European Commission's 2001 *Communication on Conflict Prevention*. It is something of a watershed document in that it makes explicit reference to SSR as well as noting the norms of democratic control, human rights and professionalism.[5]

The Council itself acknowledges that while crisis management is supported by 'clearly implementable strategies', conflict prevention does not have such a clear policy framework or specific budget lines.[6] Those concerned with EU conflict prevention have been at pains to point out that despite specific EU policy commitments, including those in the Communication and Programme of Action, progress in 'mainstreaming' conflict prevention in all areas of EU external action has been limited.[7] The conflict prevention agenda within the EU has, however, had some influential proponents and has certainly assisted in placing SSR on the EU agenda. It has also been instrumental in ensuring that norms associated with long-term holistic approaches, good governance and accountability underpin EU policy and action in this area. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that proponents of the conflict prevention agenda tend to see EU SSR as best embedded within a strategic, coordinated, multifaceted and context-specific approach, rather than as an end in itself.[8]

The Crisis Management Agenda

This agenda arises out of traditional security concerns coupled with a desire to develop an EU approach to both civilian and military crisis management. It is closely related to the CFSP and its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) component, which came into force with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 and form the second pillar of EU action. The so-called St Petersburg tasks of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, and crisis management, including potential peace enforcement (which dates from 1993), are a key component of ESDP. Since 2003, ESDP has evolved rapidly, developing specific targets for capacity and becoming operational with the launching of several in-country missions, many of which have an SSR dimension.[9] Despite ESDP having both a military and civilian crisis management capability, it is the harder military security mindset and approach that dominates the EU crisis management perspective.

ESDP execution is characterised by a transparency gap and a lack of effective mechanisms for engaging civil society, which could provide useful expertise and insight. While there have been some recent moves to improve this, it is too soon to evaluate their effectiveness in doing do.

In addition, the mindset dominating ESDP actions is short-term. This pervades the parameters of action, with ESDP missions rarely authorised for longer than 12 months in the first instance. Therefore, ESDP falls well short of the long-term approach required for ESDP missions. Furthermore, these missions are currently subject to relatively unstable and limited funding. Because of these structural weaknesses, more effort is being devoted to ensuring that ESDP actions are complementary and planned with links to longer-term prevention in mind. Those concerned with the EU's crisis management agenda tend to see SSR as a tool that can be used to promote the emergence of a professional security sector. This gives rise to concern that SSR actions driven by the EU crisis management agenda alone run the risk of downplaying norms that require a longer-term development perspective consistent with human rights, democratic oversight, good governance, accountability and transparency.

Despite deficiencies in norm implementation, the crisis management agenda for SSR is important because specifically named SSR missions, such as EUSEC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), have been mounted under the ESDP mechanism and will continue to be so in the future.

Good governance agenda

SSR norms promoted within the good governance agenda are the norms of professionalism, transparency, accountability, human rights and democratic oversight. Those concerned with this agenda see SSR and aspects of SSR as one of several components of this agenda, rather than vice-versa.

Good governance has enjoyed a rapid ascent in recent years as a policy priority for EU external assistance, particularly as concerns development cooperation and the EU's 'near neighbourhood'. The agenda has moved from a technical approach focussing on corruption and a limited understanding of the promotion of the rule of law to a holistic approach positing that good governance impacts almost all aspects of EU action in any third country. This shift is not surprising given the role that good governance has played in driving the global development agenda, in particular with regard to the UN Millennium Declaration agreed in 2000.[10]

The centrality of the good governance agenda is evidenced by recent policy developments such as the cross-cutting 2005 *European Consensus on*

Development adopted by the European Parliament, Council, Commission and member states. The Consensus clearly embraces such norms as the rule of law, democratic oversight, human rights, accountability and transparency, without making specific reference to SSR.[11] The agenda is further reflected in the *Communication from the Commission on Governance* of 2006, which identifies such norms as good governance, accountability and democratic oversight.[12] This document is, however, less explicit on SSR issues and SSR norms than the 2003 *Communication from the Commission on Governance and Development.*[13] Good governance is also clearly pointed to as a central component in the *European Neighbourhood Policy* and the *EU Strategy for Africa,* which *inter alia* calls for an appropriate role for parliaments in SSR.[14] At the same time, the EU has followed up its rhetoric on good governance by earmarking EUR 3 billion for programming in this area under the EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) partnership. Some have criticised the EU approach to governance for focussing on short-term institution-building rather than long-term behavioural change.[15] Indeed, a similar criticism is often made of international donor approaches to SSR more widely.

While it may be tempting to conclude that SSR would comfortably sit within the good governance agenda, it would be politically and institutionally difficult to integrate the more military aspects of SSR in a policy framework that is essentially developmental in its outlook.

EU Experience with SSR Implementation in Relation to Norms

Institutional Issues and the Cross-Pillar Challenge

EU institutional issues often have a more significant impact on EU SSR norms than any other factor, both in policy development and in implementation. While the EU may be perceived as a unitary actor, its different institutional components act quite differently. The agendas laid out above have varying degrees of impact on the priorities and methods of EU institutions charged with funding, implementing programmes or providing political incentives for SSR. The crisis management agenda is most often expressed in the Council Secretariat while conflict prevention, enlargement and good governance rest with the European Commission (the latter agenda particularly with the Directorate-General for Development). Yet it would be a gross oversimplification to think that these agendas are manifest only in the structures identified above.

The EU is more than a mere intergovernmental organisation. It is a supranational political entity and is therefore even more significantly guided in its choices by its most powerful member states than are most IGOs. While it is true that an EU 'common approach' to external action is often held hostage to wider high politics, it is also the ramshackle institutional machinery that limits the EU's ability to respond in an effective and coherent manner. The European Council *Concept for European Security and Defence Policy Support to SSR* agreed in 2005 and the Commission *Concept for European Community Support for SSR* agreed in 2006 were brought together under the umbrella of an EU policy framework for SSR at a 2006 meeting of the European Council in 2006. Yet the Commission and Council documents remain unmerged, reflecting the somewhat separate identities of the institutions behind them.

One analysis is that the Council and Commission took until 2005 and 2006 respectively to articulate their own approaches to SSR because of their divergent views on what it constituted. In this interpretation, the Council had a narrow understanding associated with the crisis management agenda focussing on physical security, while the Commission saw SSR as part of the broader good governance and conflict prevention agendas.[16] Not surprisingly, the EU, through the Commission, the Council and its member states, has developed several overlapping approaches to SSR. Each approach reflects the actors' different traditions as well as their distinct policy focuses and often contrasting interests. Indeed, different parts of the EU machinery have tended to seek to protect institutional interests and resources, rather than thinking about effective overall outcomes in EU external action. At times, these tendencies have even led to what some have referred to as 'institutional guerrilla actions' in which the bureaucracies of the Council and the Commission clash over competencies in the external action field. For example, a confrontation developed between the Council and the Commission over competency for small arms and light weapons, which in 2005 landed in the European Court of Justice.[17] Such institutional issues have real 'trickle-down' impact on effective implementation of holistic approaches to SSR on the ground. There is rarely an analysis, conference or paper that does not conclude that greater coordination, coherence and complementarity are needed in the EU's external action field. While on paper European institutions and member states are always keen to commit themselves to greater coordination, collaboration and coherence in external action, implementation lags significantly behind rhetoric. Informed observers continue to see the biggest challenge to effective EU engagement in SSR as the 'cross-pillar

challenge' and the competing interests, institutional mechanisms and methods of engagement across EU institutions and member states.[18]

Clearly, if the EU was to gather under its umbrella not only Council and Commission SSR actions, but also those of its member states' bilateral agencies (who at least share basic norms in policy), the combined approach would be a powerful vehicle for change. It has been said that the EU aspires to this approach in its action in the police sector in Afghanistan.[19] In regard to the ESDP policing programme in Afghanistan and its linkages to the wider rule of law, the Council has noted that 'attention should be paid to ensuring complementarity and mutual reinforcement with actions of the European Community, especially its proposed engagement with reform of the justice sector'.[20] Evidence from the ground would seem to indicate that the lack of 'cross-pillar coordination', combined with unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in a short period of time, have hampered effective EU SSR in Afghanistan.[21] Indeed, coordinated, coherent and joined-up EU action across pillars that involves member states' bilateral agencies is notoriously difficult in any area of engagement. No single entity has the mandate to coordinate all EU SSR actions in any one country or region and there are no real functional 'cross-pillar', on-the-ground mechanisms to plan, align or correct EU actions. The exception is Macedonia, where the EU Special Representative (a CFSP Pillar 2 mechanism) is 'double-hatted' as the Head of Delegation for the European Commission (Pillar 1).

The building of bridges between Commission-supported SSR-related activities (Pillar 1) and those supported under ESDP (Pillar 2) has been under consideration for some time. This is the case in Georgia, for example, where there is both Commission and ESDP action in the SSR sphere.[22] Yet coordination and collaboration are no substitute for genuine cross-pillar joint strategising, joint planning, joint implementation and joint evaluation of EU SSR-related actions. There are apparently joint plans being developed for integrated action in Guinea Bissau, Togo and Central African Republic, which would indicate a significant move forward, at least in the area of planning.[23] To be effective these plans must be placed within a more comprehensive geographic strategic approach to EU external action. Moreover, the EU needs to coordinate with the multiplicity of other actors engaged in SSR. Without a comprehensive approach there is the very real danger, as identified in the guidelines developed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC), that under-coordinated actions will work at cross-purposes.

A great deal of the institutional untidiness described above was to have been cleared up by a new EU Constitution. It remains to be seen whether the emergence of the new EU Treaty during 2007 will adequately address these issues.

Implementation and Learning Modalities

The EU has many modalities for the implementation of SSR at its disposal. By assessing some of them, it is possible to gain insight into the practical challenges faced when implementing EU SSR norms.

First, the European Commission Delegations in third countries could be a powerful vehicle for the promotion of EU SSR. EC Delegations could contextualise, promote local ownership of and integrate norms and best practices in SSR programmes for host countries. This may be facilitated in future by the Commission's new policy of deconcentration whereby the EC Delegations have more power to develop strategy and initiate programming rather than being mere implementers of Brussels-based plans. Yet it would seem that knowledge of recent EU policy developments regarding SSR remains limited in EC Delegations.[24] A survey of EC Delegations found that very few had staff that were capable of addressing security sector-related issues.[25]

Observers have noted that in some instances there has been progress in terms of staffing. For example, SSR capacity in the EU Delegation in the DRC has increased its capacity markedly.[26] However, this is most likely the exception rather than the rule. While it does seem that this issue is now in Brussels's sights, there will be no 'quick fix' ensuring that delegations have staff qualified to devise, plan and monitor SSR.

Second, on a related personnel issue, EU SSR activities generally, and ESDP SSR-related missions in particular, rely on a technical assistance model of cooperation that has somewhat gone out of fashion in the wider field of development. Technical assistance is an approach whereby expatriate expert personnel are used to provide the necessary specialist human resource capacity to implement a programme, often working within host government departments. There have been concerns that the technical assistance model generally fails to provide for capacity building, sustainability and local ownership. In addition, it is comparatively expensive and has misplaced accountability (implementers are accountable to the donor rather than to the host government). Indeed, ESDP missions have been criticised for using short-term expatriate staff who often fail to ensure that fundamental democratic principles are implemented, particularly in those countries in which they have no experience.[27] Alternative models are, however, much

longer-term in nature, as well as less task- and output-focussed. As such, it is unlikely that that in the short term they will find favour within the EU.

Third, there is very little EU SSR institutional memory. While there is now broader SSR experience within European institutions than there was five years ago, there does not seem to be an institutional home for collecting lesson and best practices in this field, or, for that matter, for wider issues of conflict prevention, crisis management and good governance. Lesson learning remains scattered and institutional memory vague across the EU's first and second pillar institutions, which is unsurprising given the cross-cutting nature of SSR. In view of the limited number of permanent staff in EU institutions working long-term on SSR, and the fact that many working on SSR in the area are seconded from member states (particularly in the case of the Council), it may be difficult for the EU to develop and truly embed its own specific cross-cutting norms for SSR.

Fourth, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), a treaty signed in 2000 by EU member states, the Commission and 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific provides some innovative features that, if applied, could greatly assist the EU in implementing its SSR 'norms' in collaboration with non-EU countries. Norms of good governance, human rights, accountability, transparency, democratic principles, ownership and a holistic approach pervade the CPA. While it has been somewhat surpassed by the new *EU Strategy for Africa*, the CPA remains an agreed treaty between the EU and ACP countries detailing 'hard norms'. Undertaking EU SSR within the CPA framework could also provide for a greater level of transparency than other EU mechanisms allow. There is a provision for civil society consultation (Article 7) as well as an innovative and wide-ranging approach to conflict-related issues (Article 11) and good governance. In addition, there is a provision for political dialogue (Article 8) that could be used for a robust exchange on SSR between the EU and individual ACP states. Yet, these well-intentioned provisions have often failed to be implemented in practice.

Fifth, a useful implementation modality is the development of EC Country Strategy Papers, which analyse the context and then outline programming priorities in a single document. These documents are developed by the European Commission and are negotiated with host governments as well as EU member states. This approach could assist in developing a holistic approach, setting clear benchmarks and ensuring that SSR measures are appropriately linked to wider actions in the field concerning governance reform or economic development. Indeed, the 2001 *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention* deems this approach appropriate for SSR.[28] Furthermore, the European Commission's inter-service Quality Sup-

port Group (iQSG) Fiche on Conflict Prevention, which provides guidance for Country Strategy Papers, includes 'actions in the field of security sector reform (including reform of police, border control, justice reform, parliamentary and civilian control over the security services, etc.)'.[29] As yet, however, these strategy papers have for the most part focussed on traditional areas of EC development cooperation and very rarely include a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention.[30]

To conclude, any process of 'mainstreaming' SSR reform within EU external action requires more than just a new policy framework and some individual actions. It requires leadership, incentives and disincentives, an institutional cross-pillar plan with benchmarks, clear qualitative and, where appropriate, quantitative indicators for success, training, good operational guidance, new partnerships with specialist institutions and country-specific strategies. This is a daunting to-do list. However, staff within EU institutions are currently suffering from 'mainstreaming' fatigue as they have had a vast number of cross-cutting issues to consider in strategy and programming. [31]

Specific Missions and Engagements

The range of activities that are relevant to SSR-related norms can be indicated with a number of examples. In 2006 the European Commission claimed to be undertaking SSR-related support in over 70 countries in almost every region: Eastern Europe, North and South Caucasus and Central Asia, the Western Balkans, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the South Mediterranean and the Middle East, Latin America and Asia.[32] However, on closer inspection, it would seem that the Commission includes almost all activities within the field of democratic governance and human rights, many of which may have only a tangential relationship to even an expansive definition of SSR and very few that would live up to the 'holistic approach' norm.

The European Commission (Pillar 1) engaged in supporting police reform in Central America as far back as 1998. In the Commission's own analysis, it helped the police in Guatemala and El Salvador to become 'more professional and more impartial'.[33] Indeed, police reform seems to be one of the most popular areas of engagement for the European Commission. A critique of the EU's approach to SSR is that certain actions, while being named 'security reform', are light on the reform aspect in the sense that they are more about narrow capacity building in law-and-order tasks than about good governance or democratic governance norms. This has certainly been a claim levelled at international and EU action in the Southern Caucasus.[34] A similar

concern arose regarding European Commission-supported police reform in South Africa and the EU's actions in the Western Balkans. There are distinct dangers in simply having a more technically proficient security sector without placing this within a wider framework of democratic governance or at least better governance.

EU SSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The first ESDP (Pillar 2) mission related to SSR was the replacement of a UN police mission with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This has been a high-profile issue for several reasons. The EU has made progress on police reform a pre-condition of its Stability and Association Agreements with BiH, as with other Balkan countries. The Office of the High Representative in BiH (which became the Office of the EU Special Representative) and various EU member states have placed considerable political pressure on local politicians to support police reform. The international community has seen a unitary command structure for the police in BiH as a key component of future conflict prevention.

Despite the interest in the mission, how EUPM was to be involved was unclear. The uncertainty over the initial mission and subsequent mandate did not help improve EUPM effectiveness on the ground. EUPM clearly had an SSR mandate (if not expressed in those terms) but was heavily criticised in its first deployment for being relatively toothless and ineffective in terms of promoting genuine reform. The impact of EUPM on the quality of rank-and-file police has also been questioned, though it did play a role in the development of the State Border Service and the specialist elite State Investigation and Protection Agency.[35] Other Commission-funded police reform activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina supported under the CARDS programme coordinated activities with EUPM and were judged successful, at least partially because of this coordination.

Ultimately, however, it is EU political pressure at the very highest levels and the promise of association with the EU that has driven SSR in the Balkans, rather than technical assistance or specific SSR funding streams. In BiH, the EU is fortunate to have the additional lever of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement to cajole local politicians into accepting different aspects of police reform. Certain Bosnian-Serb politicians in BiH have consistently charged that the EU and the international community have approached the issue of local ownership in the area of police reform only on the terms of the international community and the EU. While few independent observers would dispute that the creation of a unified police command in

BiH has been positive for stability and reform, the norm of local ownership has come into conflict with other norms, in particular accepted best practice and 'international wisdom' in SSR.

Related Examples in Other Theatres

EU SSR interventions will always be subject to wider political considerations. It is not surprising that when faced with a conflict between ownership and democratic oversight in SSR and wider EU foreign policy goals in the Middle East, other foreign policy considerations come into play. The impact of wider foreign policy concerns was underscored by the virtual suspension of the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL-COPPS) mission focussing on police reform as part of a wider EU and international suspension of support to the Palestinian Authority when Hamas became part of the government after prevailing in an election which was by almost all accounts a democratic one – a rare occurrence in this part of the world. EUPOL-COPPS had originally been lauded for focussing on civilian democratic control and creating a civilian police force. [36] Yet, on closer inspection it has been noted that the reform elements have been limited, with funding focussing on anti-riot equipment and other material. A further charge is that after Hamas became part of the government, there was a change of SSR focus by EU member states in the Palestinian Territory. Rather than bringing security forces under the control of the Prime Minister's office (now under the control of Hamas), they were transferred to the control of President Mahmoud Abbas in an effort to bolster his authority. One experienced analyst noted that this 'makes the European approach to security reform look as if it is governed by short-term expediency rather than a well thought-out approach to enhancing democratic accountability over the security forces'. [37]

A similar claim has been made about EU support to police reform in Algeria. Some believe it is more about stopping illegal immigration to Europe than ensuring democratic control over the police. [38] The EU has also supported in Central Asia what it refers to as SSR in policy areas related to terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and border management. [39] As long as the EU emphasises these areas of support rather than (or even in addition to) norms of democratic accountability, professionalism, good governance, accountability and human rights, there certainly will be some justification for suspicion of the EU's motives for embracing SSR policy frameworks. Indeed, there has been a disagreement between the Commission and the European Parliament over the potential use of development funds for supporting counter-terrorism as advocated in the Commission's draft Coun-

try Strategy Papers for Malaysia, Pakistan, Colombia and Indonesia. Significant EU support for counter-terrorism measures under the umbrella of SSR would alarm the influential EU development and conflict prevention communities, which are deeply concerned about the use of EU development resources for offensive security measures.

EU SSR in the DRC

Despite a clearly articulated need for managing the ongoing crisis and preventing a return to large-scale violence in future, the EU was slow to mount a coordinated mission for SSR in the DRC. Precious time was lost due to plodding EU bureaucratic machinery and divergent views amongst member states. Also contributing to delays were the slow response of the Congolese authorities and the fact that ESDP SSR crisis management missions were in the process of being 'road tested'. That said, the EU's response was no slower or less coordinated than any other donor (or collection of donors) with regard to SSR in the DRC in the period of 2001-2005.[40]

In May 2005 the EU established EUSEC DR Congo as an ESDP measure with the goal of

> 'contributing to a successful integration of the national army. The mission is to provide the Congolese authorities responsible for security with advice and assistance while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency, and respect for the rule of law'.[41]

Despite the initial slow response to the DRC crisis, EUSEC is particularly important for understanding EU SSR. Firstly, the mission was explicitly framed, conceptualised, planned and primarily implemented as an SSR mission. This places it in stark contrast to other EU engagements that, while addressing various aspects of SSR, are framed more as wider crisis management, conflict prevention, good governance or enlargement activities. Second, even independent observers comment that a more holistic Council and Commission approach to SSR is actually being implemented in the DRC.[42] Before EUSEC, there was little to support the notion that the EU SSR action in the DRC (including that undertaken by EU member states Belgium and France) was anything but limited and piecemeal in nature. Third, despite an extremely challenging and rapidly evolving environment, the mission and overall EU approach to SSR seem to be enjoying some modest success. Those that have come into contact with EUSEC staff are

generally impressed with their knowledge and expertise.[43] Yet the overall assessment of this mission will have to be judged by what it delivers over the long term.

Challenges for the Implementation of Norms

In an ideal world, there would be little difference between declared norms, implemented norms and any wider wisdom on norms gained from experience in the EU approach to SSR. In reality, there seems to be a significant disjuncture between these. It is still too soon, however, to assess the progress of the various EU bodies regarding SSR norms. Generally, aspirations about what SSR can achieve and how SSR norms contribute to this also may have to be revised. It may be that the expectations of SSR norms are simply set unrealistically high, leading to an unfair assessment of progress. In addition, as yet there is little SSR implementation experience that has been subject to independent third-party assessment. That which does exist has usually been undertaken by those without specialist knowledge of SSR. Moreover, as the EU joint policy framework only originates from 2006, it would be rather harsh to judge SSR performance prior to this date against its stated standards and norms. There is also the highly controversial issue of how any international SSR actor, including the EU, can actually transfer norms to local institutions, actors and wider society in a way that is genuinely locally owned and that does not have undertones of imposing values.

Some EU member states are committed, on paper at least, to seeing a cross-pillar mechanism for planning that would utilise the *Implementation Framework for Security System Reform* developed by the OECD DAC as a model.[44] However, it is likely that the EU's approach to SSR will continue to remain somewhat institutionally fragmented until there are some major revisions to the way the EU is governed. The Commission and the Council currently lack operational guidance in the field of conceptualising, planning, implementing and evaluating SSR activities. Operational guidance clearly linked to EU norms and supported by good examples would certainly provide non-specialists with a better idea of how to implement what is a relatively new area for the EU. Once guidance is forthcoming, there will be a better basis for ensuring that norms inform specific geographic strategies and their implementation. Operational guidance and frameworks for implementation would also help prevent SSR from being ghettoised rather than mainstreamed and ensuring that SSR does not become the preserve of a small

group of specialists (such as within the Civil-Military Unit of the Council Secretariat).

The key to making progress in EU norm implementation is a greater understanding and awareness of its importance, built on conceptual clarity. Conflict prevention, which has an older policy legacy within the EU than SSR, remains generally poorly understood with limited implementation across the range of EU instruments and in the many geographic environments that it is relevant. It would be unfortunate if EU SSR were to suffer a similar fate. Unless there is more awareness across EU institutions and staff are better informed and receive access to evidence-based guidance on SSR, one of two things is likely to happen: either SSR will be implemented in a way actually at odds with stated international and EU norms or it will be ignored except for a few relatively isolated instances. Given the experience, resources and political leverage that the EU has to offer, this would not only be a missed opportunity, but significantly at odds with the EU's own enlightened self-interest.

Notes

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Chapter 6

From USSR to SSR:
The Rise and (Partial) Demise of NATO
in Security Sector Reform

David G. Haglund

Introduction: The Alliance and the Concept

At first glance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would seem to be the 'poster' organisation of security sector reform (SSR). After all, what has been NATO's core mandate ever since its inception in 1949 if not security, an omnibus term embracing territorial defence and a congeries of other related dimensions of public safety?[1] Moreover, what other intergovernmental organisation (IGO) can match the material assets NATO has at its disposal – assets that can be, and have been, mustered on behalf of the alliance's core mandate of providing security? Yet notwithstanding both its *raison d'être* and its resources, NATO displays an SSR-related record that is mixed at best and sometimes falls far short of expectations. Nor is this all: it seems that NATO's trajectory is a declining one, and that its best SSR days are behind it. Such an assertion might strike some as puzzling, even provocative, and they would be prompted to retort by demanding to know just which IGO has done better than NATO in the past, and which is likely to do better in future, when it comes to promoting SSR?

The argument I will make in this chapter is not so much that any other IGO has done it better in the past; rather, it is that there are important internal and external constraints upon NATO's ability to continue to serve as the premier vehicle of SSR in the world, or at least the Euro-Atlantic world.[2] Part of the problem inheres in the cluster of norms[3] of greatest salience to NATO's and other IGOs' work in SSR, for there exists no natural fit, to put it mildly, between those norms and NATO's original purpose. Nevertheless, as I will show below, mismatches between original mandates and evolving norms can be overcome, if but for a time and even then only to a certain extent. That said, we can expect to observe in future a downward sloping

line on NATO's SSR 'performance chart' as a result of a) dwindling enlargement prospects in the Euro-Atlantic area, and b) increasing prospects of NATO's military involvement in parts of the world once regarded as definitely 'out of area' to it. The former will lead to a diminution of much of NATO's initial comparative advantage in SSR, while the latter will necessarily dilute some of the alliance's SSR-related energies, as well as engender debates among the allies that will sap their ability to work together even, especially in undertakings identified as central to SSR.

As for the SSR norms outlined in this volume's Chapter 2, it needs to be recognised at the outset that there never was any particularly close fit between most of them and NATO's historical function as a provider of regional security. Those norms, illustratively, lay emphasis upon NATO (and other IGOs) adopting a holistic approach to their security endeavours (i.e., they anticipate that IGOs will pay heed to the nexus between security and development). Whatever else it was, the Cold War alliance was not a development agency, and this despite the inclusion in the Washington Treaty of Article Two, the so-called 'Canadian article', seemingly committing the allies to abide by principled economic behaviour that looked, to some, geared toward the stimulation of economic growth.[4] The other core norms listed in this book's second chapter establish policy objectives less tightly bound to economic development: good governance, democratic oversight of state (including and especially military) activities, accountability, transparency and professionalism.

How does NATO stack up against these other norms? Despite its being endowed with a charter mandate virtually riveted upon security, there was actually little in NATO's Cold War experience that could or did prepare the organisation to serve as an exemplar across this entire normative range. For sure, in respect of at least two of these norms, democratic oversight and professionalism, NATO would have acquitted itself well in the Cold War had anyone ever bothered at that time to invoke the concept of SSR and ask how the alliance fared therewith, given that the Cold War alliance had, in the main, solved the problem of civilian control of the military while also managing to professionalise the latter (though not without the occasional glitch, such as the Greek coup of 1967, to say nothing of the ubiquitous hovering of the Turkish armed forces above the centre of power in Ankara). Regarding the rest of the norms, it can simply be observed that during the Cold War – i.e., for the greater part of its existence as an IGO – NATO actually had little to do with their promotion. In fact, it had little to do, period, in an era when wags could insist the organisation's acronym stood for 'no action, talk only'.

In the words of Josef Joffe, the Cold War alliance was primarily a 'negative', or reactive, organisation.

> 'It was "negative" in the sense that NATO was designed to *prevent* something: an attack on its members. It was "passive" in the sense that the alliance – like Mount Everest – merely had to *be* there.' The member-states had a simple and easily comprehended task at hand, to 'preserve the status quo, and the means was deterrence rather than compellence. The name of the game was *having* military power, not using it.'[5]

Now, it has to be said that NATO did manage, withal, to overcome the handicap of its Cold War heritage and, for reasons I will relate below, to position itself to become a paramount actor, for a time, in SSR. But it has recently begun to encounter a new drawback, one related to expansion – partly of its own membership but mainly an expansion of the very meaning of the SSR concept. SSR has been following the familiar path taken by almost all political concepts, in that as time progresses two things occur. Initially, the concept gets a label attached to it that sticks, so that we now count on a word (or set of words) to express what had been a pre-existing problem, or opportunity as the case may be, but one that had been hitherto rendered in a variety of different ways. Then, the new label begins to get stretched, and in so broadening, touches off a debate as to whether it can possibly retain analytical utility, in terms either of its descriptive or its normative attributes. It is a law of conceptual analysis in the policy sciences that concepts *grow*. Indeed, how could they do otherwise, since in the realm of policy all our interesting concepts tend to be what the British philosopher, W. B. Gallie, once so aptly termed 'essentially contested' ones – i.e., concepts that are both appraisive and complex, such that the 'proper use of [them] inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users'?[6]

They grow, therefore, both because their controversial nature encourages expansion and because the conditions extant when they first came into use have changed. T. D. Weldon wrote of the effect that a change in conditions can have on a concept, and though he was a political philosopher rather than an expert on SSR, his words are apposite. Facts change, he wrote, and this requires that adjustments be made in the way we express them. The adjustments can be of two kinds: we can invent a new technical word or concept to reflect the change, or we can expand a familiar word or concept. 'Usually the second method is preferred, partly because it avoids more confusion than it creates, indeed it seldom confuses anybody but political phi-

losophers, and partly because the extended use has often come to be adopted uncritically in the natural course of events'.[7]

We certainly can see this tendency toward conceptual 'stretching'[8] on display in the field of international security, where states often do things before anyone knows what to call their actions, but where once a label has been settled upon, it gets employed in a variety of novel and ambitious fashions. One such example, though far from the only one, is 'human security', which evolved into a term of art applicable to the enhanced, expanded, notion of security that emerged from the 1980s on, with specific reference to non-state actors as the repository of security needs and entitlements. In this manner, a noun (security) that hitherto had almost always found employment in respect of *national* (i.e., state-level) safety came increasingly to be regarded as applicable to the individual lives of individual human beings. Thus while the label itself may have first been coined by a Western public official back in the late 1930s, it only began to stick during the past twenty or so years, during which time it has continued to expand.[9]

Much the same can be said of SSR. It may have taken until 1998 for a Western leader publicly to utter the words, 'security sector reform', but the practice itself was becoming ever more widespread during the early post-Cold War period.[10] If it did not invent the practice, Romania was certainly one of SSR's pioneers, when it began speedily to remove military officers who had been compromised by their involvement with the Ceausescu regime, under the prodding of the newly created Committee of Action to Democratise the Army (CADA).[11] It was in the early years of SSR, when SSR was basically just another way of saying 'civil-military relations', that NATO's star shone most brightly. The alliance became, in SSR's Euro-Atlantic heartland, the promoter par excellence of the concept. There was no great surprise, here, for at a time when the objective of reformers was to inject greater civilian competency in defence decision-making, who better than NATO to accomplish it? However, as we headed into the era of 'second-generation' SSR, the nature of the enterprise would change, the emphasis becoming much less that of civilianising defence establishments in 'transition' countries of Central and Eastern Europe (with the 'transition' being either from Soviet-style governance, as in the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) states, or from conflict, as in the collapsed Yugoslavia), and much more that of assuring effectiveness in 'governance' across a wide variety of sectors that might bear little relation to the military, but assuredly could and did have a link with security broadly understood (e.g., the judiciary).[12]

This meant that NATO was bound to become, over time, less central (though still important) to SSR, even in the Euro-Atlantic area in which it had achieved such early dominance. To understand how it first came to enjoy that dominance, in view of the above-mentioned mismatch between what it stood for and SSR's constitutive and regulatory norms, we need to examine the unique context of the 'post-Cold War era' – i.e., that relatively brief span of time covering the period between the demise of the Soviet threat and the onset of the 'Long War' (formerly known to some as the GWOT, or 'global war on terror').[13] For NATO, much more so than for any other IGO that has a profile in the matter, the question of SSR really starts, though it does not end, with 'the case of the missing letter' – U. Had it not been for the termination of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it is certain that NATO would have figured less centrally as a player in SSR assuming that SSR could even have become a theme in a Europe still riven by Cold War geopolitical and ideological antagonisms.

SSR as NATO's 'New Frontier'

In his inaugural address of 20 January 1961, newly elected President John F. Kennedy challenged his fellow Americans to 'ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country'. We might paraphrase this enjoinment and apply it to NATO's entry into what we would subsequently know as the SSR arena, for the latter would very much appear to the alliance as a means to sustain ongoing relevance at a moment when many were quick to prophesy its impending end. Many theorists and policymakers alike began to ask of the yet-to-be-labelled notion of SSR, what can it do for NATO?

The moment of their curiosity was the very early post-Cold War period, a time when the alliance was casting about for new roles to replace a collective-defence mandate whose salience was rapidly diminishing. Into the yawning conceptual void would appear a new mandate of a sort, taking shape around the growing recognition that NATO might find a vocation – and an impressive one, at that – in ensuring the spread of democratic practices throughout a part of Europe that had heretofore been considered 'outside' of its area of interest and operations. In fairly quick order, the alliance would evolve a set of SSR norms that would manifest themselves as key guidelines for its partnership and enlargement programmes. I address those programmes in the following section; here, I wish to revisit the theoretical and policy debates that were triggered over the issue of whether NATO

could be expected to have much of a future once the Soviet Union had become a thing of the past. Those debates really did expose a cruel, for a time even existential, dilemma confronting an alliance that would soon find its *deus ex machina* in SSR. As a result, over the course of the 1990s, and largely due to its increasing involvement in Central and Eastern European political and military affairs, NATO established itself as the central cog in Euro-Atlantic SSR initiatives. In so doing, it benefited SSR, just as SSR benefited it.

Quite a few pundits failed to foresee such a beneficial harvest in NATO's short- to medium-term future in the early part of the 1990s. Indeed, some very well-known theoreticians of International Relations (IR) were effectively pronouncing NATO as dead as its quondam WTO adversary, with the only difference being that the leaders of the Atlantic alliance did not yet realise it. For in the trenchant words of Josef Joffe, an alliance without an enemy quickly begins to resemble 'a plant without water'.[14] In the realm of theory, none played the part of Cassandra better than adherents to a school known as 'structural realism.' And among their ranks, no one sounded as much doom and gloom for the alliance as Kenneth Waltz, who so memorably characterised the future in a 1993 quip to the effect that 'NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are'.[15] For sure, the manner in which he descried that future did leave Waltz with some wiggle room, in that he never did specify the number of years he expected it to take for NATO to disappear. This epistemological shortcoming he later sought to remedy, when in 2000 he announced that, in reality, NATO had died as a multilateral collective-defence institution, and was merely surviving as an adjunct to American grand strategy; henceforth it would exist 'mainly as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states'.[16] In fact, Waltz was only partly correct: NATO might have ceased being an effective institutional provider of what none of the original European member-states thought they still needed by the 1990s, namely American protection against a great power threat, but it had not ceded pride of place in Euro-Atlantic security. Instead, it loomed as *the* indispensable institution for the provision of a variety of other public goods in the area of security, which would be subsumed under the SSR rubric.

If Waltz might be taken to represent the dominant tendency within structural realism to minimise the significance that institutions *qua* institutions can have in transatlantic security relations,[17] it should not be imagined that all IR theorists were soaking in the same pessimistic bathwater. In fact, there appeared, as a foil of the structural realists, a group of 'institutionalist' theoreticians who evinced much optimism about NATO's future during

these same years, and their ebullience would help provide the intellectual buttress for NATO's subsequent embrace of SSR, enabling both alliance and member-state policymakers to understand and contextualise the institution's new role as professor in the SSR classroom.

'Institutionalism' is a term that covers a variety of theoretical approaches, and I employ it here primarily to refer to the *neoliberal institutionalists*, who vigorously dissented from structural-realism's pessimism about NATO's future, and instead stressed the various ways institutions could and did affect the manner in which member-states perceived their own interests. Like the structural-realists, these theoreticians were 'rationalist', in the sense that they too assumed actors to be utility maximisers, and they showed themselves to be just as committed as the realists to the 'positivist' pursuit of generating predictions based on knowledge of past behaviour.[18] But the institutionalists turned value-maximizing assumptions against the structural realists, and argued the ease, not the impossibility, of the alliance's making the transition from collective-defence to some other mandate. They did so because they held states to be well-suited, on rational grounds, toward cooperation, so long as institutional conditions were right. The neoliberals cherish institutions (including 'regimes') as the devices by and through which obstacles to cooperation get reduced, maybe eliminated altogether. In this formulation, NATO plays a key role in inducing cooperation by increasing *everyone's* incentive to abide by the rules.

If the neoliberal institutionalists are correct, then it follows that worries about NATO's survivability were misplaced all along. And certainly neoliberal predictions regarding that question, made in the early years of the post-Cold War decade, have stood up better than structural-realist ones did. But to address the specific topic of NATO's involvement in SSR, we must bring into the analysis a second theoretical school, for we need to know not only *that* states might cooperate, we also need to know what it is they choose to cooperate on, and why. Presumably, the institutional inertia foreseen by the neoliberals could have taken the cooperating partners in any number of directions. Why, then, did those cooperating partners within NATO settle upon SSR as a primary function? To answer this, we have to introduce a second major group of optimistic theorists, the *social constructivists*.

In many ways, this second group of optimists differed profoundly from the first, nowhere more than on their rejection of the objectivity of interests and the 'primacy of material factors over ideational factors'.[19] Rather than seeing states as utility-maximisers, social constructivists maintained that 'international actors are committed in their decisions to values and norms and choose the appropriate instead of the efficient behavioural op-

tion'. But even though they parted company from the institutionalists on value-maximization, the constructivists were every bit as committed (some say, even *more* committed) to the idea that institutions have the power to influence outcomes and affect the preferences of states; in their view, organisations such as NATO are nothing less than 'constitutive institutions that contribute to shaping actors' identities, values and interests'.[20]

Perhaps the most optimistic of all the NATO theoreticians has been Thomas Risse, whose liberal perspective on the alliance is sufficiently constructivist to warrant his inclusion in this discussion. To Risse, the impact upon NATO of its having lost its great Soviet adversary was hardly a profound one. In fact, he says, those such as Joffe who rely upon the plant-without-water simile come close to missing the point altogether, namely that the Cold War's ending, far from signalling the end of the alliance, actually constituted an occasion for it to express its true nature and vocation, as an alliance of liberal democracies with a bright future ahead of it as the primary agent in expanding the transatlantic zone of peace. 'The end of the Cold War', Risse asserted in the mid-1990s, 'does not terminate the Western community of values, but potentially extends it into Eastern Europe and maybe into the successor states of the Soviet Union, creating a '"pacific federation" of liberal democracies'.[21]

And while it would be mistaken to assume that all NATO watchers were motivated by a desire to enlarge the liberal-democratic zone of peace, there can be no minimising the degree to which pursuit of that aim would lead the alliance into the area of SSR, even if when it began to embrace the latter it did so in the manner of Molière's M. Jourdain, speaking the prose of SSR without actually realizing it. But alliance leaders did understand what they were trying to achieve, namely the 'reinvention' of their organisation, and they began early in the 1990s to develop the programmes that would enable them to fulfil their aims and that would eventually come to characterise NATO's SSR profile.

Origins of NATO's SSR Initiatives

It is hardly possible to overstate the manner in which NATO enlargement inspired the development of first-generation SSR. There is absolutely nothing hyperbolic in the observation made recently by two students of the concept that 'in many countries security sector reform processes *are NATO or NATO Enlargement related*'.[22] In this section my task is to review how enlargement provided the alliance with a set of policy levers with which it

was able to make its important early inroads in SSR. In particular, notwith-standing that they would evolve somewhat between the initial and the most recent rounds of enlargement, these SSR norms not only figured centrally in the alliance's declaratory policy governing its own growth, but also estab-lished the parameters of first-generation SSR. It is not very easy to imagine how SSR would have appeared in the Euro-Atlantic region absent the enlargement of the alliance from its late Cold War membership of sixteen to its current one of twenty-six.

NATO's quest for transformation began in earnest when it became ob-vious, certainly by 1990, that the Cold War truly was at an end. As we saw previously, the transformative energies ultimately found their source in a refusal by policymakers and (some) theoreticians alike to accept that the demise of the foe to which it owed its existence need render the alliance irrelevant. Soon the search was on for ways in which NATO might reconfig-ure itself. Quite accurately, one scholar observed that with the end of the Cold War, '[f]inding something for NATO to do has become a cottage in-dustry in its own right'.[23]

For NATO to *do* was for it to continue to *be*. The existential itch was being scratched as early as the alliance's London Summit of July 1990, which resulted in what at the time looked to be an extraordinary declaration of intent to reach out to the recent adversaries of the WTO, and in so doing transform NATO from a predominantly military to an increasingly political organization, whose new 'cooperation' mantra and mandate would clear the epistemic track for the alliance to become the powerful locomotive of SSR. The process received a boost toward the close of 1991, both with the Rome Summit in November and the following month's inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).[24]

Although the NACC sought to foster dialogue and cooperation with recent adversaries in the vanished WTO, this objective proved less easy than might have originally seemed. Reflecting this difficulty was the adoption, at the Rome Summit, of a new 'strategic concept', emphasizing the twin goals of dialogue and crisis management.[25] Within a half-year of that meeting, the alliance would embark on a tentative journey into the world of peacekeep-ing. Alliance foreign ministers, meeting in ministerial session in early June 1992 in Oslo, announced their conditional willingness to assume peacekeep-ing assignments, on a case-by-case basis, under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. A year and a half later, dialogue would be given firmer institutional meaning through the launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The two undertakings would embroil NATO in a new set of challenges and opportunities as well as contribute, in

their own way, to the gathering momentum of 1994 on the alliance's enlargement, the means by which NATO was eventually to establish its credentials in SSR.

There had been nothing in the first three years of the alliance's transformation that dictated that either dialogue or crisis management need result in, or even require, an expansion of its membership. Indeed, when the PfP was announced by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at Travemünde in October 1993 and even when it was officially embraced by the alliance at the Brussels Summit of January 1994, it was widely (and not incorrectly) regarded as a means of putting off the issue of enlargement rather than making it an inevitability. More generally, there was nothing in the alliance's entire transformative quest that obliged it to take the decision to enlarge to the eastward.

To understand why enlargement would become, by early 1995, *the* issue within alliance councils would require more space than I have available here. Briefly, the expansion agenda was largely driven by two member-states, each of which came to understand that it had an abiding 'national interest' in NATO's growth. Those two countries were Germany and the United States. They were not the only states to urge NATO to resume a pattern of expansion well established during the Cold War, but they were clearly out in front of the rest in shaping an alliance consensus on the issue, one that, as we saw earlier, was nourished by the contributions of theorists. It was easy enough to understand why the Germans should desire an alliance presence in the former communist countries lying to the east of the Federal Republic's own 'Río Oder'[26] – a presence called for in the spring of 1993 by Defence Minister Volker Rühe in an important address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and reiterated the following winter by the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who pithily declared that the 'eastern border of Germany cannot forever remain the eastern border of NATO'.[27]

And what of the American interest in expanding NATO? We might almost say that the American interest in NATO's enlarging was 'overdetermined', in the sense that numerous factors could and did account for the decision of the Clinton administration to push ahead with the project. There were, to be sure, domestic ethnic interests to be considered, but their influence has been overstated, given the broader geopolitical and ideological stakes involved. For the US did want to preserve NATO as the premier institutional embodiment of its commitment to multilateralism; it did want to bow in the direction of German preferences at a time when it seemed the Federal Republic was going to remain America's principal security partner;

and it did feel an ideological commitment to the newly democratising countries of Central and Eastern Europe, whose incorporation into the transatlantic community of liberal democracies would do so much for spreading the Western 'zone of peace'.

Ensuring NATO could secure these geopolitical and ideological objectives during the enlargement process required careful consideration to conditions to be imposed on the aspirant membership of the alliance. It would be in the context of that consideration that the regulatory norms of SSR would first see the light of day. The principle itself, of conditionality, was easy enough to grasp: there were going to be some club dues extracted from the aspirants to membership, which in the first flush of enthusiasm about enlargement was a large group indeed, extending virtually to any 'European' state that sought to join, including for a time even Russia. As Charles Pentland wrote apropos conditionality, '[n]otwithstanding the aura of technical novelty surrounding the term, …the idea it expresses is as old as politics itself. It captures a bargaining relationship in which one party is in a position consistently to extract disproportionate concessions from another', resulting in the aspirants being given an offer they 'cannot refuse'.[28]

The alliance's terms, which in retrospect we now understand to have been the first elaboration of its SSR norms, appeared in the 'enlargement study' that was launched in late 1994, nearly a year after the decision had been taken by NATO leaders to embark on expansion. Between December 1994 and September 1995, NATO officials pondered how the alliance might increase its membership without at the same time decreasing its effectiveness as a regional security entity. How to do so without weakening the alliance? And how to ensure that in enlarging, NATO contributed to unifying not dividing Europe? The study's six chapters contained guidelines that, by necessity, were rather general, meaning that there could be no specific thresholds or criteria presented to potential members; this was to be a reality not only of the first post-Cold War round of enlargement, in which Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined, but also of the subsequent round, which brought into the alliance fold Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Still, the study dropped some broad hints as to what NATO expected from any new member. At the very minimum, its military would have to be 'interoperable' with that of existing members, which in view of the legendary problems the original allies have had trying to become more interoperable, would turn out not to be very much of a hurdle. Much more important was a political condition imposed upon aspirants to membership: that they settle any ethnic, external territorial, or internal jurisdictional disputes in which they might be involved by peaceful means in

accordance with principles established by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The study's authors hinted, none too subtly, that '[r]esolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance'.[29]

Although the political condition (to wit: resolve your squabbles before trying to join the alliance) was objectively the more important of the two above, the interoperability criterion, tempered as it was in the study, would end up generating an intriguing yield of its own, because it was going to engage the allies with the aspirants in an ongoing dialogue within the context of the 1994 PfP. It was an issue largely if not entirely military in nature, and naturally the uniformed side of the NATO house would take a lead role in 'working' it. As a result of a growing culture of dialogue between NATO and aspirant country military officials, initially constructed around the interoperability issue, it became easier for the alliance to make inroads under the broader rubric of civil-military relations, which as noted earlier effectively *was* SSR during the concept's first-generation stage. Thus while enlargement of NATO provided the context for the alliance's early successes in SSR, the partnership corollary of expansion itself played a key role. As John Barrett explains,

> 'In fact, an important element in new members' military contributions will be a commitment in good faith to pursue the objectives of standardization that are essential to alliance strategy and to achieve the minimum level of interoperability required for operational effectiveness. The study advises that new members should concentrate, in the first instance, on interoperability and accept NATO standardization doctrine and policies to help attain this goal. These standards will be based in part on conclusions reached through the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). The importance of these points is that they underscore both that the level of interoperability will be particularly relevant in demonstrating preparedness to join NATO and that the PARP will identify and effectively set the criteria in this regard. This is despite the fact that in all other areas the study resists defining fixed criteria. Thus, there is a fairly clear indication that interoperability will be an important first step in a country's advance preparations – at least on the military-technical level.'[30]

This is an important observation, because it is sometimes argued that NATO's continued involvement in SSR, including and especially second-generation reform, will depend significantly upon its enhancing and expanding its web of partnerships and other cooperative programmes. Can it do this, though?

NATO's Partnership Initiatives and Second-Generation SSR

One of the more pointed barbs ever unleashed in a long career of verbal political sallies by Theodore Roosevelt's eldest daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, was aimed at New York's Republican governor, Thomas Dewey, upon the occasion of his second try for the White House in 1948: 'you can't make a soufflé rise twice'. We may well say the same in respect of NATO's ability to continue to make SSR inroads via its divers partnership initiatives. This might seem to be a harsh, even mean, observation, for it is widely, and accurately, acknowledged that the alliance's partnerships have been of inestimable value to it in the realm of SSR. As we have seen in the preceding section, while NATO enlargement was indispensable for the alliance's SSR activities, it took the military-to-military cooperation made possible by the PfP to assure the viability of the enlargement project in the first place.

NATO currently has a variety of partnership ventures on the books.[31] Without doubt, the most important of these has been and remains the PfP, which has had thirty-three countries join since its inception in 1994, now down to twenty-three, since ten have been elevated to the status of alliance members since 1999.[32] One of the principal functions of PfP has been to promote democratic reform efforts in the security sector, conducted under the umbrella of the 1994 framework document, fleshed out by a great number of à la carte initiatives undertaken within the rubric of an individual partnership programme that generates for cooperating countries such vehicles as an individual partnership action plan (IPAP) and in some cases a membership action plan (MAP).

A second partnership, also dating from 1994 but much less successful, has been the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). Originally extended to five countries (Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), it added another member in both 1995 and 2000 (respectively, Jordan and Algeria). Like PfP, one of its primary functions has been to encourage military cooperation, and through this, SSR. Unlike PfP, there is little likelihood of eventual membership in the alliance at the end of the cooperative road, though occasionally one encounters arguments to the effect the Israel should be admitted to NATO.[33]

The alliance's most important bilateral partnership is with Russia, forged in 1997 with the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation'. The original intent was to achieve lasting security in the Euro-Atlantic area, to which effect a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was created with a view to enabling regular

consultations between the two sides. This more or less fell apart as a result of squabbling related to the 1999 Kosovo war and has been superseded by the 2002 NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which as with the other partnerships has an interest in fomenting military-to-military ties and enhancing SSR, along with other objectives.

A subsequent bilateral partnership was forged with Ukraine, predicated as well upon a 1997 document, the 'NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership', which led to the setting up of a NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) whose role is to oversee efforts directed toward more or less the same range of activities as those discussed above. A slight, and perhaps disappearing, difference between this bilateral partnership and those with Russia and the multi-partner MD is that some believe that Ukraine might eventually join NATO, though chances of this happening have been dwindling rapidly due to growing domestic opposition to the idea at a time when Ukraine's political scene is more chaotic than usual.

Another partnership of note is the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), formed in 2004 with four countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates). Here the aim is similar to that of the MD, with the ICI expanding the alliance's cooperative reach to the broader Middle East in the areas of SSR and counter-terrorism.

One could list other arrangements of a cooperative nature reached by NATO with various countries, but the points to stress in concluding this section are twofold. First, far and away the most fruitful generator of SSR returns has been PfP, so rightly dubbed by a former secretary-general of the alliance (Lord Robertson) as 'one of NATO's gold dust assets'.[34] To compare PfP's accomplishments, above all in the area of SSR, with those of the other partnerships discussed in this section is to compare an elephant with a gnat. This gets us to the second point. Cooperating countries do not willingly or easily entertain the reform of their security sector, even if only in the relatively 'simple' aspect of civilianising their defence ministries and professionalising their armed forces (viz., first-generation SSR) – unless there is some tangible reason for doing so. To be sure, 'cooperation' in and of itself might appear as such a reason, but much more powerful as a stimulant to compliance has been the perspective of eventual membership in the alliance. And what Henning Riecke observes regarding the MD can be generalised to the other partnerships, not even excluding today's PfP: the 'classical carrot'[35] of a chance of membership simply does not exist, save for a tiny minority of partner states (Croatia, Macedonia and Albania being sometimes cited in this regard).

All of this is *not* to claim that NATO's current partnership initiatives are without effect; rather, it is merely to note that for the Alliance there has been an unavoidable phenomenon of diminishing marginal returns detectable in the past few years. Nevertheless, much good and worthwhile activity continues under the partnership umbrella, including and especially the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), another outcome of the Istanbul Summit. This initiative is aimed at fostering the reform and restructuring of defence institutions in member-states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council who are not under consideration to become full allies in the near- to medium-term future.

Conclusions

It is difficult to resist concluding that as a result of its achievements in first-generation SSR, NATO has given itself a tough act to follow. It would be hard enough for it to retain pride of place among IGOs involved in SSR, and this because of its *own* expansion: quite literally, it has been running out of candidates for new membership. As a result, it is running out of carrots to enable it to promote SSR. Moreover, as NATO increasingly involves itself in war (or 'conflict resolution' if one prefers a milder appellation) it runs the risk of diverting its energies away from SSR and toward the more immediate concern of battlefield dominance. To be sure, fighting a war requires attention to post-conflict reconstruction, with all that this must logically imply for SSR,[36] but at the moment, if the debate in Canada can be taken as any example, it is a question of 'first things first'. And for countries like Canada, deployed in the most dangerous part of Afghanistan, first things first tends to mean either winning decisively against the Taliban or getting out of harm's way altogether, with all that *that* must logically imply for future alliance harmony and effectiveness. For if countries deployed to Afghanistan who are currently taking a disproportionate number of combat casualties were to turn against the fighting, it would likely mean they would wash their hands of such SSR-related activities as provincial reconstruction teams as well, on the good basis that a Kabul presided over by the Taliban would be most unlikely to be a capital city very much interested in SSR. This is what is at stake in intra-alliance squabbling over burden-sharing in Afghanistan: failure to resolve the issue of who should be able to claim exemption (via 'caveats') from hefting a more equitable part of the load combating the Taliban is bound to erode the very principle of an allied *Schicksalgemeinschaft* in the embattled country, rendering the task of SSR well-nigh impossible.

Finally, there is the expansion of the SSR concept itself. If second-generation SSR is now taken to be nothing less than 'a globally applied concept calling for the enforcement of good governance norms in all aspects of security policy making and implementation (i.e., not just military defence activities),[37] then it is far from easy to see how the task of disseminating it can ever be accomplished. Not only would it take some state or group of states to make a credible case that they have already attained the nirvana of 'good governance',[38] but it would require the far more demanding commitment of those fortunate states to allocate much of their blood and treasure to spreading those governance norms. In such an environment, could it be imagined that NATO would be able to replicate in SSR what it accomplished during the far more modest era of the 1990s?

So does Alice Roosevelt Longworth's acerbic judgement on Thomas Dewey constitute the last word on NATO as an agent of SSR? Probably, it does. Still, given what the structural realists and other nay-sayers were professing at the start of the 1990s, it is highly significant that the soufflé did rise once, and managed to do so in a region, Europe, that had for so long time figured as the cockpit of global geopolitical strife.

Notes

1   As one very eminent scholar of international relations once put it, '[s]ecurity in international politics means no more than safety: either objective safety, safety which actually exists, or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced'. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 18. Also see, for an analysis of the concept, Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983).

2   Two students of the alliance's SSR involvement in Central and Eastern Europe noted that 'NATO has been the driving force in the promotion of security sector governance, with a clear emphasis on democratic control of armed forces and defence reform'. Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, *Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU's Neighbourhood*, Chaillot Paper No. 80 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, July 2005), 81.

3   Norms establish 'collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity'. They consist in norms that define the identity itself ('constitutive norms') and those that regulate the entity's behaviour ('regulatory norms'). See P.J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. P.J. Katzenstein, 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

4   Actually, the article's intent was not so much to develop anyone's economy as it was to remove trade friction as a cause of political conflict within the transatlantic world. Thus the signatories pledged, through this article, to 'seek to eliminate conflict in their interna-

tional economic policies and [to] encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them'. See NATO, *The NATO Handbook: 50th Anniversary Edition, 1949-1999* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 395.

5   Joseph Joffe, 'NATO After Victory: New Products, New Markets, and the Microeconomics of Alliance', in *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund, 59 (Kingston, ON: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1996).

6   W.B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', in *The Importance of Language*, ed. Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 123. Also see William E. Connolly, 'Essentially Contested Concepts in Politics', in *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

7   T.D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1953), 26-27.

8   So labelled by a critic of the practice, Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (December 1970): 1033-53.

9   Often said to be a Canadian conceptual innovation, and a fairly recent one at that, 'human security' actually appeared in *American* policy discussions prior to the Second World War. The earliest documented usage of the term I have seen dates from 31 January 1938, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed a group of Protestant missionaries at the White House, telling them that while he had once been sceptical of those, such as his audience, who promoted the 'Social Gospel', he now knew better. Indeed, their work reminded him of his own administration's social agenda: 'We call what we have been doing "human security" and "social justice".' Quoted in James A. Morone, *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 354-55. For overviews of the concept, see Jean-François Rioux, ed., *La Sécurité humaine: Une nouvelle conception des relations internationales* (Paris: Harmattan, 2002); S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

10 Clare Short, at the time development minister in the government of Tony Blair, was apparently the first Western official to employ the concept 'security sector reform', in an address at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 13 May 1998; see David Law, 'Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Unfinished Business', in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004), 21-45.

11 See Islam Yusufi, 'Security Governance: Security Sector Reform in Southeast Europe', IPF Research Report (Budapest: Center for Policy Studies, 2004), 16.

12 For the distinction between first- and second-generation SSR, see Timothy Edmunds, *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*, Working Paper No. 86 (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, October 2002).

13 Though if top-ranking generals in America's Central Command have their way, the 'Long War' catchphrase will soon follow the GWOT into oblivion; see Michael R. Gordon, 'U.S. Command Shortens Life of "Long War" as a Reference', *New York Times*, 24 April 2007, A10.

14 Joseph Joffe, 'Die NATO und Nostradamus', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 6 February 1995, 4.

15 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 76.

16 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 18.

17 Other structural-realists who deemphasised NATO's institutional role included Stephen M. Walt, 'NATO's Fragile Future', in *What NATO for Canada?*, Martello Papers vol. 23, ed. David G. Haglund, 71-85 (Kingston, ON: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000); and John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 5-49.

18 See on this point, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, 'Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO', *Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 3-43.

19 Luca Ratti, 'Post-Cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case for Neo-Classical Realism', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 4, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 90.

20 Frank Schimmelfennig, 'NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation', *Security Studies*, no. 8 (Winter-Spring 1998/99): 210-11.

21 Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 223.

22 *Italics added*. Willem Matser and Christopher Donnelly, 'Security Sector Reform and NATO Enlargement: Success through Standardisation of Standards?' in *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment*, eds. Wilhelm N. German and Timothy Edmunds (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), 134.

23 Jonathan G. Clarke, 'Beckoning Quagmires: NATO in Eastern Europe', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 17, no. 4 (December 1994): 42.

24 William Yerex, 'The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: NATO's *Ostpolitik* for Post-Cold War Europe', in *NATO's Eastern Dilemmas*, eds. David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane and Joel J. Sokolsky (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 181-194.

25 NATO, 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991', reproduced as Appendix IX, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 235-48.

26 This image à la mexicaine comes from Czeslaw Mesjasz, *Assistance for the East in 1989-1993 as Western Security Expenditure,* Working Papers 3/1994 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1993), 32.

27 Kohl's statement was made during an address to the 31st Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, 5 February 1994 (author's notes); Rühe's speech was reprinted under the title, 'Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era', *Survival* 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 129-37.

28 Charles C. Pentland, 'Enlarging the Security Community: NATO, the EU, and the Uses of Political Conditionality', in *New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. David G. Haglund, 64 (Kingston, ON: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 2000).

29 NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: NATO, September 1995), para. 6.

30 John Barrett, 'NATO's Year of Study: Results and Policy Implications', in Haglund, *Will NATO Go East?*, 98. Barrett headed the policy planning section on the international staff at NATO headquarters during the time the study was being undertaken.

31 Unless otherwise noted, material in this section is based on Carlo Masala and Katarina Saariluoma, *Renewing NATO's Partnerships: Towards a Coherent and Efficient Framework*, Forum Paper No. 1 (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2006).

32 PfP members today are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

33 See Richard Rupp, 'Israel in NATO? A Second Look', *National Interest*, no. 86 (November/December 2006): 50-61.

34 Farewell speech to the Alliance, Brussels, 17 December 2003, quoted in Masala and Saariluoma, 25.

35 Henning Riecke, 'NATO's Roles in the Greater Middle East', Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, posted 28 January 2005 at http://www.ataedu.org.

36 On this connection, see Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, eds., *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005).

37 SIPRI Website Press Release, 'Chapter Summary', 17 June 2003, summarising Marina Caparini, 'Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargements', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

38 For if they had, there would be no need for anyone to discuss 'democratic deficits' within the liberal-democratic zone of peace. For the challenge, 'physician heal thyself', directed at the original members of NATO, chided for being unwilling to practice what they preach in the field of SSR, see Matser and Donnelly. For the challenge directed specifically at the two North American members of NATO, see David M. Law, 'Democratic Deficits and North American Security', in *Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability*, ed. David G. Haglund, 209-229 (Kingston, ON: Queen's Quarterly, 2001).

Chapter 7

The OSCE's SSR Operational Activities: A Piecemeal Approach with Limited Results

Victor-Yves Ghebali

Introduction

As in the case of other security organisations operating in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is currently engaged in activities addressing the various facets of security sector reform (SSR). Due to the lack of an integrated SSR concept, it does not formally acknowledge these activities as formal SSR undertakings.1 Be that as it may, its involvement in this field presents three main features.

First, there are operational projects addressing SSR issues within the three security dimensions of the OSCE: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. These projects consist of conflict management (preventative action and post-conflict rehabilitation), border and security management, policing and democratic governance. As such, they are aimed at armed forces and law enforcement agencies, civil management and oversight bodies, and non-statutory civil society groups – in other words, all the major actors in the security sector except paramilitary forces, intelligence and security services, and (unsurprisingly) private military and security companies.

Second, given their cross-dimensional nature and cross-cutting objectives, the OSCE's SSR-related activities are undertaken through the instrumentality of Long-Term Missions (LTMs) (also referred to as Field Missions or Field Operations), the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).2 These bodies often perform in tandem with the Secretariat's Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Through Field Missions, the CPC and/or the ODIHR, the OSCE

helps participating states to reform military legislation and provides training on the rights of service members. Under the guidance of the FSC, it assists with the disposal of stockpiles of obsolete and dangerously deteriorating surplus weapons and munitions (as in Georgia and Tajikistan) as well as highly toxic rocket fuel (in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Armenia). Most of the services delivered by ODIHR in its rule of law programmes – the corner-stone of the OSCE's human rights activities – aim at strengthening the security sector in specific areas. These include support for the establishment of impartial judiciaries, parliamentary reform, prison reform, law enforcement strategies, anti-corruption measures and anti-trafficking policies. The strengthening and/or creation of democratic institutions based on the rule of law is also a common concern of the OSCE Field Missions, whether or not they have been mandated for conflict management purposes. Third, OSCE's SSR projects have been exclusively designed to assist states in democratic transition, including both post-conflict and non-conflict states. At the geopolitical level, they target states and regions in South Eastern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo) and in the former Soviet Union, in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). Significantly, they also concern states enmeshed in 'frozen conflicts'. At the OSCE, this concept refers to the low-intensity armed conflicts in Moldova (Transniestria), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Georgia (South Ossetia). In military terms, each of them has been 'frozen' following a Russian-sponsored cease-fire. Although the OSCE has succeeded in establishing an ongoing dialogue between each of the secessionist authorities and the central state, it has not succeeded in achieving a mutually acceptable compromise among the parties and, as a consequence, a political 'freeze' has ensued. Therefore, in Transniestria and the South Caucasus, the OSCE's SSR-related projects are unusual in that they take place within peace-building efforts undertaken prior to the achievement of any final peace arrangement.

This chapter will provide a bird's eye view of the OSCE's SSR-related operational activities, with particular focus on those undertaken in the former Soviet Republics. Due to a lack of space, the analysis will be limited to the fields of border management and policing, thus excluding democratic governance activities.

OSCE's Border Management Activities

Border management encompasses the facilitation of the legitimate cross-border movement of persons, goods, services and investments, as well as the combating of the range of illegal activities linked to terrorism and organised crime. The ODIHR, in cooperation with Field Missions and the International Organisation for Migration, executed between 1998 and 2003 a number of assistance projects in several countries of the former USSR in which, due to the Soviet legacy, border services were still often run by non-professional officers, viz., military draftees and non-commissioned personnel. Such projects aimed, through training courses conducted at the domestic level or abroad, at promoting the demilitarisation and the professionalisation of the border service, as well as the introduction of humane practices of border management in the South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and Eastern Europe (Ukraine).[3] In parallel, OSCE's Field Missions monitored operations along Albania's border during the Kosovo crisis (1998-1999), Macedonia's northern border during and after ethnic unrest (2001-2002), as well as the Chechen, Ingush and Dagestan border segments of Georgia's border with the Russian Federation (2000-2005). Furthermore, with respect to the frozen conflict of Transdniestria, a 2002 OSCE Border Assessment Mission examined the problems of border and customs control along the Moldovan-Ukrainian land border, including the part located in the breakaway Transdniestrian entity.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks dramatically increased the relevance of border security and management issues within the OSCE. Thus, the *Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century*, adopted at the Maastricht Ministerial Council Meeting in 2003, acknowledged the need for an OSCE border security and management concept'.[4] After protracted discussions among participating states, a document based on the lowest common denominator came to light in 2005.[5] A framework for national policies and international cooperation formulated in general terms, the *OSCE Border Security and Management Concept* recommends that participating states promote 'open and secure borders in a free, democratic and more integrated OSCE area without dividing lines' (§ 1.1) in view of several cross-dimensional objectives: the development of a free, secure and lawful movement of persons, goods, services and investments across borders (§ 4.1); the reduction of the threat of terrorism (§ 4.2); the prevention and repression of transnational organised crime, illegal migration, corruption, smuggling and trafficking in weapons, drugs and human beings (§ 4.3); the creation of

beneficial conditions for social and economic development in border territories, as well as for the prosperity and cultural development of persons belonging to all communities residing in border areas (§ 4.6). In order to ensure dignified treatment of all individuals wanting to cross borders, the Concept prescribes that border security and management policies should respect international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law as well as OSCE norms, principles, commitments and values (§ 2.1 and 2.2). It also encourages direct cooperation between border services and other competent national structures, especially as regards issues of a regulatory nature arising at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels (§ 6). Such cooperation must be based on the principles of international law, mutual confidence, equal partnership, transparency and predictability, and friendly and good neighbourly relations between states (§ 1 and 2.4).

The Concept also addresses the question as to how the OSCE can most appropriately contribute to border-related cooperation. It prescribes a facilitation role, including the use of good offices between governments, the promotion of confidence-building measures in border areas and the coordination of exchange of information, experience and best practices. It also envisages the provision of technical assistance in such policy areas as anti-terrorism, transnational organised crime, illegal migration and illicit trafficking (in weapons, drugs and human beings), free and secure movement of persons (with specific reference to national minorities, migrants and asylum seekers), and economic and environmental cross-border co-operation having an impact on local community development (in an annex).

In 2006, as a follow-up to the Concept, the Permanent Council decided to establish a National Focal Point (NFP) network consisting of NFPs in the participating States and a contact point in the OSCE Vienna Secretariat.[6] The Secretariat's CPC was tasked with managing the network, which includes regularly updating the list of NFPs, amalgamating data and centralising requests from and between the network's members, and issuing a quarterly newsletter providing information on relevant activities undertaken by the OSCE as well as by other international or regional bodies that contribute to the network. Within the CPC, a small sub-unit (Operations Service) helps put the Concept into practice, especially in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, in conjunction with the OSCE Field Missions and external partners institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Before and since the adoption of the Concept, the CPC has been active in the area of border management in several ways.[7] It established a training programme for border guards and customs officials to counter cross-border SALW trafficking at the Termez-Hayraton checkpoint shared by Uzbekistan

and Afghanistan (2002-2003); this programme was extended in 2004 to other check-points along the Uzbek-Turkmen, Uzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders (at Khorezm, Samarkand and Fergana). In cooperation with bilateral donors and the EU's Borders Management in Central Asia programme, the CPC supported Tajikistan's efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and to develop a National Border Management Strategy and immigration control procedures on the Tajik/Chinese border. In the framework of the follow-up to the Ohrid Process for Border Security and Management in South Eastern Europe, it provided training to the EU Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) beneficiary countries in the development of risk analysis and threat assessments.[8] The CPC also assisted the OSCE Project Coordinator's Office in Ukraine and the Office in Belarus for their respective efforts to provide the local border police with a capacity to analyse cross-border traffic flows. Finally, it gave support to the Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities for the purpose of harmonising border controls on goods and to the Action Against Terrorism Unit in its fight against false travel documents.

Some OSCE Field Missions are at present running projects based on the Border Security and Management Concept.[9] Thus, the OSCE Presence in Albania contributes to the effectiveness of the Albanian Border and Migration Police in dealing with cross-border and organised crime by means of training courses (within the EU CARDS programme) and the facilitation of regular joint border cooperation meetings with neighbouring states. The Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje supports the establishment of a modern border police in the FYROM. Since the deployment by the European Union of a proper Border Assistance Mission to the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in 2005, the OSCE Mission to Moldova has been coordinating its activities with it. As to the mission to Georgia, it is assisting the border police with the establishment and operationalisation of an effective training system.[10]

In sum, border management projects have become a feature of the OSCE's operational activities. While the trend has certainly been encouraged by the adoption of the 2005 OSCE Border Security and Management Concept, the importance of the latter should not be overestimated. The document has established an embryonic regime whose provisions are vague and which does not contain any formal reference to the security sector or even to good governance.[11]

OSCE's Policing Activities

Good policing is crucial for maintaining political, economic and social peace and for restoring stability in crisis periods and post-conflict situations. Law enforcement institutions, in particular the police, need to have the necessary capacity and to enjoy public confidence if they are to be able to play their indispensable role in upholding the rule of law and safeguarding democracy.

The involvement of the OSCE in policing activities has taken shape gradually through its Field Missions in South Eastern Europe (Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia), whose mandates have included a police-related component. In October 1998, the OSCE agreed to take over the monitoring of police activities in the Danube area of Croatia hitherto administered by the United Nations Temporary Administration in Eastern Slavonia.[12] Accordingly, it began to assist the Ministry of the Interior on issues related to police recruitment, cross-border cooperation, witness protection, management of ethnic incidents and hate crime, as well as community policing. In the following year in Kosovo, it contributed to the creation of a police service school and the introduction of international professional police standards.

Taking stock of the importance of monitoring local police activities in the framework of conflict management, in particular at the stage of post-conflict rehabilitation, the OSCE participating states agreed in the *Istanbul Charter for European Security* (1999) to involve the organisation in civilian police monitoring, police training (including for anti-trafficking purposes), community policing and the formation of a multi-ethnic police force. They also acknowledged that the development of accountable and professional police forces could not take place in the absence of political and legal frameworks within which the police could perform their tasks in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law – that is to say, independent judicial systems able to deal with human rights violations as well as provide advice and assistance on prison system reforms.[13]

From 2001, the OSCE thus assisted Serbia and Montenegro in developing professional police services and creating a multi-ethnic police force in the southern municipalities of Presovo, Medvedja and Bujanovac. Following the *Ohrid Framework Agreement* concluded in August 2001 between the main political parties of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje helped recruit and train new police cadets selected from the ethnic Albanian minority and supported the police in the exercise of their authority in regions which had formerly been in crisis.[14] Finally, following Montenegro's independence in 2006, the OSCE was

involved in programmes to reform the police and institute community policing and assisted with the implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan for Against Corruption and Organised Crime as well as with the preparation of the National Integrated Border Management Strategy and Action Plan.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bucharest Ministerial Council Meeting (2001) decided to strengthen the OSCE's ability to provide assistance on police matters upon the request of its participating states. It also recommended the holding of regular meetings of police experts from national agencies and specialised universal and regional organisations. Finally, it tasked the Permanent Council to conduct an annual review of OSCE police-related activities and to have the Secretary-General submit these findings in a special report.[15]

In 2002, a senior police adviser to the OSCE Secretariat was designated and assigned the small Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU). The Unit delivers three main categories of services. First, it provides advice and assistance for projects concerning comprehensive or partial police reform. Assistance is generally preceded by a needs assessment exercise that includes identifiable objectives and benchmarks for measuring progress, and is complemented by inspections to gauge the efficiency of assistance programmes. Second, the Unit contributes to capacity-building through the setting up of infrastructure or communication systems that contribute to the development of local ownership; occasionally, capacity-building also includes the provision of basic equipment. Third, the Unit organises or facilitates training courses on policing concepts and methods, as well as specialised courses on criminal investigation, forensics, police ethics, human rights, domestic violence, drug investigation, border and boundary policing, penal and procedural law, civil disorder, interrogation techniques, community policing and hostage negotiation. Particular importance is attached to multi-ethnic police training, border policing and community policing. Multi-ethnic police training aims at establishing an indigenous police force in which ethnic communities are proportionally represented and therefore able to enhance confidence and cooperation in conflict-prone multi-ethnic areas. Distinct from border security, border policing essentially concerns the fight against transnational criminality. The objective of the community policing approach is to ensure that the police are seen as a provider of public services rather than as a repressive agent. Community policing gives members of the community the opportunity to take a direct and active part in the work of the police by developing formal and informal relationship with them.[16] Assistance programmes for police reform are not undertaken solely to improve the

technical competencies, professional standards and efficiency of police forces. Their ultimate aim is to promote a culture of democratic policing based on police accountability to citizens and non-discriminatory practices (especially as regards national minorities and vulnerable population groups) that is in full accordance with human rights and the rule of law.

SPMU experts are now active in 11 of the 19 OSCE Field Missions that run policing projects. They provide policy advice and support through initial needs assessment exercises, information gathering, programme development and the establishment of twinning partnerships or regional and cross-regional contacts among police training institutions.[17] The main projects or programmes implemented by the Field Missions with the collaboration of the SPMU generally include police education and training, community policing and administrative and structural reforms. Outside South Eastern Europe, such programmes have mainly been implemented, as shown in Table 7.1, in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[18]

Two other institutions also contribute to OSCE policing activities: the ODIHR and the HCNM. Each of them submits specialised annual reports (since 2002 for the former and 2004 for the latter) appended to the OSCE Secretary-General's own annual report on police-related activities.[19] ODIHR provides participating states with assistance on the development of police legislation in cooperation with the SPMU and OSCE Field Missions. It also has developed the Law Enforcement Officer Programme on Combating Hate Crime (LEOP) to increase the capacity of law enforcement officials to respond to hate-motivated crimes and provide proper assistance to victims. Based on direct contacts between foreign police forces and cooperation with civil society organisations, the LEOP was fully implemented in Croatia (2006) after pilot testing in Spain and Hungary.

The HCNM's contribution has concerned Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. Within the context of a pilot project on multi-ethnic policing in Kyrgyzstan launched in 2005, the HCNM has provided training, advice and equipment to the 'minority focal points' established by the Ministry of Interior in three ethnically-sensitive regions of the country (Osh, Jalal-Abad and Chui). In an effort to ease inter-ethnic tensions in Georgia, the HCNM has also conducted linguistic and professional training courses that have been tailor-made for civil servants of Armenian origin in the Armenian-speaking region of Samtskhe-Javakheti.[20]

The OSCE's best practices and lessons learned are now accessible through the multi-lingual Policing OnLine Information System (POLIS). This includes the Policing Experts' Database, Digital Library of Policing

Table 7.1   SSR-related police activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia

Caucasus	Central Asia
Armenia: Creation of a police emergency response system in Yerevan. Implementation of a community policing model in a district of Yerevan. Refurbishment of the Police Training Centre for new police recruits.	**Kazakhstan**: Support of law enforcement reforms.
Azerbaijan: Twinning with the Czech Republic for the development of a modern introductory training course for police recruits. Implementation of a pilot project introducing community policing in a rural town in north-western Azerbaijan (Mingechevir).	**Kyrgyzstan**: Introduction of community policing in Bishkek and at the regional level. Setting up of a national criminal information analysis system and a radio communication system for crime investigation. Creation of the specialised Public Order Management Unit in the south of Kyrgyzstan (Osh city). Assistance programme for improving the quality of police investigations and police capacity for combating drug trafficking.
Georgia: Elaboration of a concept for a Ministry of the Interior reform plan, including the development of its law enforcement capacity for combating terrorism and organised crime. Provision of basic equipment to the Development Unit within the Ministry of the Interior. Introduction of community policing in the Armenian-speaking region of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Promotion of a modern human resource management system for recruitment and remuneration. Public opinion polling on relations between the police and the population in selected districts in Tbilisi.	**Uzbekistan**: Training in investigation techniques and related criminal procedures and legislation.

Resources and OnLine Donor Co-ordination Mechanism for International Police Assistance. In 2006, the senior police adviser also produced a compendium of existing standards, principles and practices under the title

Guidebook on Democratic Policing.[21] In the same year, the HCNM issued the complementary *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* – an important topic underscored by the *Istanbul Charter for European Security* and subsequent Ministerial Council decisions.[22]

OSCE's police-related activities suffer from two shortcomings: short-falls in funding and a lack of consistency in design. Since its establishment, the SPMU has contributed in cooperation with the Field Missions to over 20 police assistance projects on the basis of voluntary (extra-budgetary) financing. While police assistance activities undertaken directly by Field Missions (as in South Eastern Europe) are funded through the OSCE regular budget, assistance programmes for the states of the Caucasus and Central Asian rely on voluntary funding.[23] In 2005, the SPMU warned that this practice was becoming 'unsustainable' because it made programme implementation 'fragmented, rushed or non-sequential'.[24] At the same time, the SPMU has realised that 'isolated assistance measures…are much more likely to make a country assistance-dependent than to lead to self-sustainable development of the justice and security sector'.[25] Actually, it is not uncommon for police assistance to be undertaken in areas selected because of political considerations, but where the conditions for the effective delivery of criminal justice do not exist.[26] In any case, the establishment of the rule of law requires not just law enforcement capacity and institution building, but 'comparable and synchronised improvements across the entire criminal justice sector'.[27]

Conclusion

The OSCE has accumulated impressive knowledge and experience in many areas of SSR. However, while its approach to security is global and cross-dimensional, it persists in addressing security sector-related issues in a piecemeal manner, lacking even a coherent understanding of 'good governance'. Since 9/11, some partial references to that concept have been made in OSCE texts. Thus, the *Bucharest Action Plan on Combating Terrorism* (2001) referred to the economic and environmental issues that undermine security, namely, 'poor governance' in parallel with corruption, illegal economic activity and unsustainable use of natural resources.[28] In the *Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century* (2003), the participating States confirmed that 'weak governance, and a failure by States to secure adequate and functioning democratic institutions that can promote stability, may in themselves constitute a breeding ground for a range of threats'.[29] More to the point, the *Strategy Document for the Economic and*

Environmental Dimension (2003) stated that 'good governance at all levels contributes to prosperity, stability and security' (2.2.1) and hence was of critical importance for all the participating states.[30] This led the participating states to agree 'to work on a national basis, with the support of relevant international institutions, to strengthen good governance in all its aspects and to develop methods of cooperation to assist each other in achieving it' (2.2.2).[31] Conducted on a case-by-case basis with no overall design, the OSCE's assistance projects do not target the security sector as whole. As a consequence, their effectiveness can be considered limited in both scope and impact.

The OSCE obviously requires an SSR agenda based on an overarching framework complemented by operational guidelines. Awareness of the need for such an approach at both the institutional and political level has occasionally been evident. In 2004-2005, the SPMU called for the elaboration of an 'OSCE doctrine of security sector reform' that would fully assess the interrelationship between legislative, executive and judicial reform.[32] The SPMU considered that such a doctrine should include all the elements required for an effectively functioning criminal justice system and stressed the need for country- and culture-specific strategies that would reflect full ownership by the beneficiary country. In the following year, the Belgian Chairmanship tabled, to no avail, a draft proposal on an 'OSCE concept on security sector governance'.[33] The rejection of the text was particularly regrettable as the proposal called for the establishment of an overarching framework that would enhance implementation of existing OSCE commitments in the security sector, strengthen the OSCE's role as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and ensure better interaction and complementarity with partner international organisations in the Euro-Atlantic area. Indeed, the advantages of a doctrine or concept would be threefold: more coherence in the design and implementation of assistance programmes, improvement of cost-efficiency and furtherance of inter-institutional coordination. In order to optimise effectiveness and avoid the pitfalls of compartmentalisation, OSCE assistance programmes should be conceived and achieved in a comprehensive manner. Practical experience has clearly demonstrated to what extent, for instance, police, judicial and defence reform intersect with DDR. Given their cross-cutting nature, assistance programmes require integrated, multi-sectoral strategies and coordination with external partners. This is a challenging prospect. However, at the end of the day, such an approach would be less costly and more effective than the current one, dominated as it is by isolated and uncoordinated, one-off projects.

Notes

1	In fact, in the Euro-Atlantic area, the only major institutions with a clearly defined SSR concept are the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

2	The LTMs, whatever their formal denomination ('Mission', 'Presence', 'Assistance Group', 'Advisory and Monitoring Group', 'Office', 'Centre'), consist of two categories: 1) those specifically established for conflict management purposes and hence empowered to intervene in any phase of the conflict management cycle (prevention, peace-making and peacebuilding) and 2) those created outside any formal conflict situation to provide support to the host state in the transition to democracy and to assist it in improving compliance with its range of OSCE commitments. For more details on LTMs, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, 'The OSCE Long-Term Missions: A Creative Tool Under Challenge', *Helsinki Monitor* 15, no. 3 (2004): 202-219.

3	See ODIHR, 'ODIHR Projects on Border-related Issues in 2000-2003' (ODIHR.GAL/30/04). See also Annex A of OSCE Secretariat's paper on OSCE border-related activities (PC.DEL/134/04).

4	OSCE, 'Decision No. 2/03: Combating Trafficking in Human Beings', MC.DEC/2/03 (2 December 2003), para. 35.

5	OSCE, 'Border Security and Management Concept', MC.DOC/2/05 (6 December 2005). As explained by Ambassador Marianne Berecz, present Head of the Hungarian Mission, 'borders in the OSCE area present a widely diverse picture. Some borders are fading away, remaining only on paper, or imprinted in the memories of aging parents and grandparents. Several are not even regulated or delineated. Others merely exist in history books, their lines traced according to the authors' nationality. And then here are those that continue to be reinforced by killing minefields. These are just some of the reasons why it took the OSCE two years to draw up its Border Security Concept'. Marianne Berecz, 'Open, Safe and Secure: Managing Borders in the OSCE Area', *OSCE Magazine* (July 2007), 6.

6	OSCE, 'Decision No. 757: Terms of Reference for the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Point Network', PC.DEC/757 (5 December 2006).

7	OSCE, 'Report of the Director of the CPC to the Permanent Council', SEC.GAL/30/07 (15 February 2007).

8	CARDS is the EU's program for the Western Balkans; see EU, 'Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000', *Official Journal of the European Communities* (5 December 2000). The Ohrid Process is a joint effort initiated in May 2003 by South Eastern European countries, the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the Stability Pact. The OSCE contributes to it through the Cross-border Co-operation Programme (OSCCP), which has established objectives and deadlines for national legislative reform and cross-border cooperation.

9	'OSCE Border Assistance: Tailoring Responses to Individual Needs', *OSCE Magazine*, July 2007, 12-13.

10	On the Program for Georgian Border Police for 2006-2007, see OSCE, 'Capacity-Building Programme for the Georgian Border Police', CIO.GAL/94/06 (2 June 2006). The Programme includes three components: training for operational planning, training of trainers and rapid reaction training.

11 Actually, it contains an oblique allusion to good governance through a provision calling for 'high standards in border services and competent national structures' (para. 4.4).

12 OSCE, 'Decision No. 239', PC.DEC/239 (25 June 1998). Within the OSCE Mission to Croatia, a Police Monitoring Group assumed the follow-on responsibilities from the UN Police Support Group in Eastern Slavonia.

13 OSCE, 'Istanbul Charter for European Security', PCOEW389 (Istanbul: OSCE, 1999), para. 44 and 45.

14 Furthermore, the OSCE Presence in Albania initiated the reform of the laws regulating Albanian State Police and contributed to the revision of the Police Academy curriculum to bring it in line with European standards while also assisting in the formulation and implementation of an Albanian Integrated Border Management Strategy and Action Plan.

15 See OSCE, 'Decision on Police-Related Activities', MC(9).DEC/9 (4 December 2001). See also the OSCE 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities' of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006: SEC.DOC/2/02/Rev.2 (12 December 2002); SEC.DOC/2/04/Rev.1 (11 June 2004); SEC.DOC/2/05 (29 June 2005); SEC.DOC/2/06 (2 November 2006); SEC.DOC/2/07 (16 July 2007). For more details on OSCE Policing Activities, see PC.DEL/359/06 (12 April 2006).

16 For more details, see OSCE, 'Food for thought paper on developing an OSCE Concept of Community policing', PC.DEL/982/06 (24 October 2006) and OSCE, *The Role of Community Policing in Building Confidence in Minority*, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting Final Report (Vienna: OSCE, 28-29 October 2002).

17 Coordination has further been improved by means of Regional Liaison Police Affairs Officers for South East Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. See OSCE, SEC.DOC/2/07 (16 July 2007), para. 3.3.

18 In addition, in 2006 the OSCE Office in Minsk initiated a program aimed at improving the conduct of Belarusian police. See OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2006', SEC.DOC/2/07 (16 July 2007), para. 2.65.

19 All of these reports are submitted in accordance with para. 6 of the Bucharest Ministerial Council Meeting's 'Decision on police-related activities', *op. cit.*

20 See OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2004', SEC.DOC/2/05 (29 June 2005), Annex by the HCNM; 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2005', SEC. DOC/2/06 (2 November 2006), 32-33.

21 Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary-General, *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (Vienna: OSCE, December 2006).

22 OSCE, *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (The Hague: OSCE Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, February 2006). The Recommendations on policing were presented and commented by the HCNM at the 592nd Plenary Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council (see HCNM.GAL/2/06, 9 February 2006).

23 OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2004', *op. cit.,* para. 6.17.

24 OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2005', *op. cit.,* para. 5.6.

25 Ibid., para. 1.8.

26 OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2004', *op. cit.,* para. 6.1.

27 OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2005', *op. cit.,* para. 1.7.
28 OSCE, 'Decision on police-related activities', *op. cit.,* para. 13. See also para. 10 on the prevention of terrorism, through which the participating states pledged *inter alia*, to develop projects for enhancing 'good governance' as well as democratic institutions and civil society.
29 Ibid., para. 4. See also para. 14.
30 'Another component of good governance is the effective management of public resources by strong and well-functioning institutions, a professional and effective civil service and sound budgetary processes. Good management of public resources, including revenue collection, budget formation and execution and public procurement, is particularly important in order to provide the best possible public and social services. We will seek to provide a solid financial basis for our public administration systems and to further strengthen their effectiveness and efficiency at all levels.' In OSCE, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, MC(11).JOUR/2 (2 December 2003), Annex 2 , para. 2.2.8.
31 'Achieving good governance requires a comprehensive and long-term strategic approach, so that successes in one area are not undermined by weaknesses in others. We will cooperate in the development of our strategies for good governance and will share experience regarding best practices' (Ibid., para. 2.2.3). See also para. 2.2.13.
32 The SPMU drafted an internal food-for-thought paper, which was summarized in OSCE, 'Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2005', para. 1.5.
33 See the following OSCE documents: PC.DEL/859/06 (13 September 2006); PC.DEL/999/06 (27 October 2006), Rev. 1 (15 November 2006) and Rev.2 (23 November 2006); MC.DD/30/06 (28 November 2006) and Rev. 1 (30 November 2006).

Chapter 8

World Bank/IMF: Financial and Programme Support for SSR

Nicole Ball

The World Bank, the IMF and the Changing Agenda

With the endorsement of *The DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member governments in 2007, the centrality of governance to the security sector reform (SSR) agenda was clearly established within the development community (Box 8.1). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) hold observer status in the Development Assistance Community (DAC) and participated in the meetings of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), which oversaw the development of the SSR handbook. Aspects of security-related governance work are well within the mandates and core competencies of the two organisations. While the Bank and the Fund are unlikely first choices for providing technical assistance to a member country's military forces to improve their capacity to manage financial resources accountably, they can work with the civil authorities that manage and oversee the security services to strengthen their capacity for transparency, accountability and oversight. In principle, this could include ministries of defence, as well as ministries of finance and interior, as well as central audit offices and parliaments.

Furthermore, since security has been increasingly recognised as essential for sustainable development, one can expect that governments receiving World Bank financing will incorporate security needs into their development plans. One can also expect the Bank to encourage this outcome, as it has a major role to play in the development and implementation of such plans, especially Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS). It also makes sense that IMF negotiations regarding debt forgiveness through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative would take the provision of security into account.

Box 8.1   Ministerial Statement on SSR Principles

1. Donors should engage in SSR with three major overarching objectives: i) the improvement of basic security and justice service delivery, ii) the establishment of an effective governance, oversight and accountability system; and iii) the development of local leadership and ownership of a reform process to review the capacity and technical needs of the security system'.

Source: 'Ministerial Statement. Key Policy and Operational Commitments from the Implementation Framework for Security System Reform: Signed by OECD DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency', Paris, 4 April 2007, in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf, 10.

To date, however, the World Bank and the IMF have engaged only sporadically in such activities, although the Bank is becoming increasingly active in security-related work. This chapter begins by describing briefly the main objectives of the World Bank and the IMF. It then examines how the Bank and the Fund have been involved in security-related issues to date. It summarises the degree to which the norms underpinning SSR are currently incorporated into Bank and Fund activities relating to the security sector. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on how to deepen Bank and Fund security-related engagement.

Main Objectives of the World Bank and the IMF

World Bank

The World Bank group was created in 1944 with the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to promote 'a smooth transition from a wartime- to a peacetime-economy'. It was mandated to support post-war reconstruction and development by facilitating capital investment for 'productive purposes' and promoting balance-of-payments stability and the balanced growth of international trade.[1]

In common with other development assistance agencies, the Bank has revised its approach to development several times since 1944. Following an initial focus on projects, which often did not produce their intended outcomes, the Bank introduced adjustment lending in the 1980s to encourage the adoption of policies that supported equitable economic growth and development. In the 1990s, poverty reduction and good governance became central objectives of the Bank's activities. In the late 1990s, the Bank came to appreciate that an effective state was at least as important as a strong private sector in promoting growth and development.[2] This signalled the realisation that effective policy implementation is as crucial as developing the 'right' policies. More recently, the Bank has faced increased demands to respond rapidly and effectively to emergencies, particularly in conflict-affected countries.

In order to achieve these objectives, the Bank provides member governments with lending and non-lending services, including loans at near market rate, concessional loans, grants, analytic and advisory services, and capacity building.[3]

IMF

The IMF was established to 'promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment'.[4] It advances these objectives through surveillance of members' policies, financial assistance and technical assistance.[5] As the international economy has evolved and the needs of its members changed, the IMF has adjusted its practices to the new conditions.

Since the late 1990s, the IMF has counted poverty reduction as one of its main objectives. In 1996, the IMF and the World Bank established the HIPC Initiative and since 2005 the Fund has participated in the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.[6] Since the late 1990s, the Fund has placed greater emphasis on ensuring that member governments follow economic policies consistent with monetary and fiscal stability through its surveillance activities, and it has developed a new lending instrument to provide concessional finance over the longer term, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). While overall Fund lending has decreased in recent years, the PRGF has accounted for the majority of IMF loans by 2007.[7] The Fund works with the Bank to support member country Poverty Reduction Strate-

gies. The Fund has also become concerned with strengthening the transparency and accountability of financial institutions.

<center>*   *   *</center>

As middle-income countries have developed alternative options for financing and have sought to establish their independence from the IMF and World Bank, both the Bank and the Fund have increasingly concentrated on fragile and conflict-affected states. Some Bank officials are of the opinion that the Bank and the Fund need their clients more than the clients need them, giving the borrowing countries a degree of leverage, especially in sensitive areas such as security.

Engagement in SSR

Within the international development community, as well as among a number of reforming countries, there is an expectation that the World Bank and the IMF will play an important role in supporting SSR, specifically its governance-related aspects and in particular public financial management. Additionally, the Bank's support for member governments in developing PRSs is a logical entry point for linking security and development needs.

To date, however, the World Bank and the IMF have had relatively limited engagement in security-related issues. Both have long interpreted restrictions on political activities in their Articles of Agreement as constraining their involvement in security-related issues.[8] In the early 1990s, there was a sense among many development actors that development assistance had been 'liberated' from the political constraints of the Cold War that had allowed security services in borrowing countries to act with political and fiscal impunity.[9] In consequence, the Bank, the Fund and other donors began to focus on restraining defence expenditure (termed 'unproductive expenditures') in order to prevent the 'crowding out' of development-related resources.[10] Some countries had to agree to limit their military expenditure to a specific share of gross domestic product (GDP).

While it is true that money spent in the security sector cannot be spent improving education or maternal/child health care, security is a public good and in order to provide it, governments have to allocate adequate resources to the security sector. They also need to spend these resources effectively and efficiently, subject them to democratic oversight and recognise that trade-offs are necessary. However, largely because governance was not yet

established as a core part of the development agenda in the early to mid-1990s, issues such as accountability of the security services to democratic, civil authorities, strengthening systems for resource management in the security sector or broadening the policy debate on identifying and meeting security needs were overlooked. This allowed systems for allocating and managing resources in the security sector to continue to deviate, often in significant respects, from the principles of sound public financial management. Similarly, the democratic accountability of the security sector has improved only slowly, if at all, in many countries.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of changes occurred in the development agenda, as well as in the engagement of the IMF and, in particular, the World Bank in issues that had previously been seen as outside their main areas of competence, especially in conflict-affected countries. This has opened the way for a different type of engagement with security-related issues.

The New Agenda

The break-up of the bipolar world created space for issues such as governance, poverty reduction and conflict prevention to enter both the development and the security assistance agendas of OECD countries and multilateral institutions. By the end of the 1990s, governance had become a legitimate subject of discourse for the development donors. This opened the door for discussions of security sector governance and how to work with security actors.

Participatory poverty assessments have consistently identified the lack of security as a major concern for poor people, especially a) crime and violence, b) civil conflict and war, c) persecution by the police and d) lack of justice.[11] The World Bank 'Voices of the Poor' research programme was particularly influential in helping donors understand that a lack of physical security was a major impediment to poverty reduction.[12] This implied a need for effective security services, which in turn requires a certain outlay of state resources.

Many donors have become deeply involved in peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries and have gradually realised that conflict prevention is less expensive than recovery. The conflict focus provided a major incentive for beginning to tackle the problem of unaccountable and ineffective security services. This in turn enabled development donors to begin to discuss the linkages between security and development and the appropriate role of development assistance in strengthening accountable, affordable and

accessible security in developing and transition countries. This enabled some modification in security assistance policies and the beginning of a dialogue between development and security donors.[13]

Perhaps most important, the end of the Cold War created space for a discussion on the quality of development, governance and security among local actors in the non-OECD countries themselves and for the emergence of civil society organisations and coalitions to press for people-centred approaches to security and the application of democratic governance principles. The World Bank in particular is responsive to requests from member governments, and growing pressure on member governments for democratic control over the security services from their own populations will contribute to greater Bank engagement in this area.

World Bank

Military expenditure focus. World Bank President Barber Conable was the first head of a major development assistance agency to speak about the importance of no longer neglecting 'a sensitive component of the fiscal problem: military spending'. Addressing the World Bank's Board of Governors at the Annual Meeting in September 1989, Conable noted that '[i]t is important to place military spending decisions on the same footing as other fiscal decisions, to examine possible tradeoffs more systematically, and to explore ways to bring military spending into better balance with development priorities'.[14]

In the early 1990s, the Bank addressed military spending by raising the issue at seminars, developing staff guidelines and responding to borrowing country requests.[15] By 1991, military expenditure issues had featured in Bank dialogue with nearly 30 countries, and Argentina had requested the inclusion of the defence sector in a public expenditure review (PER). The Argentina PER focused exclusively on the fiscal impact of military spending and did not look at either budget formulation or execution or at broader governance issues.

By the mid-1990s, the flurry of donor interest in military spending was replaced by a growing interest in supporting demobilisation and reintegration programmes for ex-combatants. Governments in member countries emerging from civil war and in countries under pressure to reduce the level of military spending began to approach the World Bank and other donor agencies for assistance in downsizing their armed forces. Over time, the Bank emerged as a major administrator of demobilisation and reintegration trust funds despite concerns about the ability of the Bank to engage effec-

tively in post-conflict environments, particularly with activities involving uniformed military personnel. To a large extent, the Bank's heavy engagement in demobilisation and reintegration work is based on its reputation for fiduciary probity and proven ability to administer large sums of money.[16]

By the beginning of the 2000s, attention turned once again toward military spending. Many bilateral donors – who were also some of the Bank's major shareholders – were providing an increased amount of financing in the form of budget support. This led to a heightened concern about the lack of transparency in public expenditure in general and the defence sector in particular, especially in countries engaged in or emerging from armed conflict. The Bank's own lending to conflict-affected countries increased 800 per cent between 1980 and 1997. Between fiscal years 1993 and 1998, just over 15 per cent of the Bank's lending commitments were, on average, absorbed by countries emerging from conflict.[17]

One manifestation of this concern was specific reference to military spending in the agreement governing the twelfth replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) resources in 1998. IDA funding, which is directed toward the poorest of the Bank's member states, is most likely to be used by conflict-affected countries where, it was thought, the biggest trade-offs between military spending and social expenditure/productive expenditure were likely to occur. IDA was instructed to use Bank public expenditure work to 'consider the role of non-development expenditures – including military expenditures…and whether reallocations of some of these could enhance the development impact of public spending, especially for human resource development'.[18]

US legislation requiring the US Treasury to instruct US executive directors in all international financial institutions (IFIs) to vote against loans to countries with no functioning system of reporting audited military expenditure to civil authorities or whose governments had declined to provide information about their audit processes after 1 October 1999 heightened the renewed interest in military spending.[19] Passed in 1996, no one in the Bank appears to have paid much attention to this legislation until shortly before it was to go into effect. It prompted an unsuccessful attempt to update the Bank's 1991 guidelines on military expenditure. While the legislation does not seem to have had much, if any, impact on US votes in the Executive Boards of any of the IFIs, the Fund did include military audits in its reviews of and manual on fiscal transparency. (See the discussion on standards and codes below.)

Security and development focus. As the Bank became more involved in international efforts to support post-conflict recovery, its rhetoric began to shift from a focus on military spending and trade-offs between 'development' and 'unproductive' expenditure to a broader recognition that security is essential for development.

> People need a secure environment to go about their daily lives and improve their lot. Security services must serve the interests of the communities within which they work without consuming disproportionate shares of national resources, and fair and non-violent means must be available for the resolution of disputes. IDA supports countries in their efforts to establish a safe environment for all members of society, especially the poorest.[20]

This shift has been manifest in three separate but inter-related areas: a) the Bank's new emergency response policy, b) its increasing emphasis on governance and c) its evolving approach to incorporating conflict into PRSs.

As part of the process of developing a new operational policy on a rapid Bank response to crises and emergencies, known as OP 8.00, the Bank's General Counsel issued an opinion on peacebuilding, security and relief activities.[21] The General Counsel stressed the importance of focussing on the Bank's 'core development and economic competence', namely support for infrastructure, public financial management and capacity building. The General Council also recognised the need to support 'an integrated emergency recovery programme that includes activities in areas outside its traditional core competencies, such as peace-building, security, and relief' in collaboration with other actors. This would include the preparation, appraisal and supervision of relief, security and peace-building activities.[22]

This opinion essentially codifies earlier work on good practices in fragile states. Although it applies only to 'crisis and emergency countries', at least some Bank staff members believe that this is a first step toward a more comprehensive approach to the inclusion of security in Bank work. Indeed, this opinion demonstrates a new flexibility in the Bank's approach to non-traditional activities. The General Counsel also held that '[t]he Bank's Articles, including its purposes, must be interpreted in a dynamic, reasonable, and responsible way that takes into account the changing nature of development and the interests of the Bank's membership'.[23]

The growing acceptance of governance as a legitimate activity for the World Bank has been reflected in its approach to military spending and in its work on the legal sector. Military spending is increasingly seen in the context of public financial management, one of the Bank's 'core competencies'. There is growing recognition that in most respects the military sector should

be subject to the same general principles of public financial management as other parts of the public sector. The sectoral study of security carried out as part of the Afghanistan public finance management (PFM) review of 2004/2005 demonstrated both the desirability and feasibility of Bank engagement in this type of work (Box 8.2).[24] The legitimacy of Bank involvement in this area was strengthened by the governance and anti-corruption (GAC) strategy that it adopted in March 2007. The GAC strategy identifies 'reforms to improve the capacity, transparency, and accountability of state institutions' – including public financial management – as one of the main entry points for the Bank's governance work.

Box 8.2   Lessons from the Afghanistan PFM Review of the Security Sector

- 'PFM practices can take into consideration the most complex and confidential issues without undermining the application of fundamental principles of accountability to elected civil authorities'.
- 'There is no justification for treating the security sector as separate or sacrosanct, and not subjecting it to budgetary and fiduciary processes'.
- 'There is a strong justification for analytical work in the security sector from development and PFM perspectives'.

Source: World Bank, 'Post-Conflict Security Sector and Public Finance Management: Lessons from Afghanistan', *Social Development Notes/Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, no. 24* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 2006).

World Bank work on the legal sector initially focused on legal frameworks and institutions necessary for effective private sector development. Over time, broader issues of justice sector reform have become a part of the Bank's agenda on 'law and development'. In 2007, the Bank identified four major entry points for law and justice reform: 1) improving access to justice for the poor, 2) private sector development, 3) anti-corruption efforts and 4) justice reform in fragile states.[25]

Finally, the Bank has recently recognised the need to strengthen its capacity to support national stakeholders in integrating security into the PRS process where security has been identified as a national priority. In the context of developing operational guidance on PRSs in conflict-affected countries, the Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit and its Fragile States Unit prepared an issues paper on the security sector and PRSs in mid-2007. The decision to prepare this paper reflects the growing number of ex-

periences that the World Bank and others have had in encouraging govern-
ments to incorporate security considerations into their PRSs.[26]

The World Bank and the IMF introduced the PRS process in 2000. In
principle, low-income countries develop these strategies in a participatory
manner, with support and guidance from the Bank and the Fund, as a pre-
condition for access to debt relief and concessional financing from the two
funding institutions. The resulting strategy then becomes a framework for
aligning the programmes of assistance offered by other donors. PRSs are
intended 'to be poverty-focused, country-driven, results-oriented, and com-
prehensive'.[27]

In practice, there are a range of factors that constrain both national ac-
tors and their international partners in achieving the objectives of the PRS
process. From the perspective of security, PRSs increasingly mention secu-
rity, but they do not fully recognise the role that security and access to jus-
tice play in reducing poverty. As such, they are not comprehensive; nor do
they necessarily fully reflect national priorities. The purpose of the issues
paper is to assist Bank staff to overcome these problems. There are plans to
disseminate the paper widely. It may be followed by operational guidance.

IMF

The Fund has long collected data on defence spending through confidential
Article IV consultations with member governments and through voluntary
reporting to the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY).[28] In 1989
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus became one of the first members
of the international development community to speak out on high levels of
military spending.[29]

From the start, the Fund's official position has been that performance
criteria or other conditions on the level of military expenditure are not ap-
plied to its lending and that decisions about a country's security environment
and the amount of military spending are the prerogative of member govern-
ments. Nonetheless, Fund staff has at times clearly made their own decisions
about the appropriateness of levels and categories of expenditure without
analysing a country's security environment or needs. The IMF may not im-
pose sanctions on the level or composition of military spending, but it has
instituted terms that are intended to limit overall defence spending or a cer-
tain portion of it.[30]

Related to this, the IMF has played an important role in donor efforts
to limit the amount that governments are 'allowed' to spend on their militar-
ies. While these ceilings have ostensibly been agreed with governments, it is

evident that the governments in question have acquiesced only under the pressure of major donors. Uganda, for example, has clearly chaffed under the two-per-cent-of-GDP limits imposed by donors in the 1990s and has sought various ways around this ceiling, including passing military expenditure through other budget lines and developing off-budget sources of revenue.

In the late 1990s, the crises in emerging market countries prompted the IMF and the World Bank to endorse standards and codes in twelve areas to assist countries to strengthen their economic institutions, promote more effective market discipline and provide information for IMF surveillance and the World Bank's country assistance strategies. The IMF is responsible for reviewing adherence to the standards and codes for data, fiscal transparency, and monetary and financial policy transparency. Although the IMF codes are voluntary, member governments are encouraged to comply with them.

The Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency identifies four main areas of interest: 1) clarity of roles and responsibilities; 2) public availability of information; 3) open budget preparation, execution and reporting; and 4) assurances of integrity of data.[31] To implement the Code, IMF staff has developed a manual on fiscal transparency and a related questionnaire. The questionnaire includes two questions about military expenditure:

> 20. Are any elements of the central government…given special treatment or excluded in part or whole from the budget documents? Please explain any special treatment (for example, for military spending, or spending related to national security)…
>
> 72. Are all reports of the national audit body published and made available to the public? Please list any exceptions (such as military or national security spending) and describe briefly how these are treated.[32]

The manual contains instructions concerning full reporting of military expenditure and publication of security audits:

> 115. It is important that all military spending is recorded and reported under the defense function, including that which is financed by off-budget or commercial revenue sources. While national security considerations are often used to argue against transparency in this area, a multilateral approach to greater openness could reduce security risks. Security considerations may, however, warrant a somewhat different approach to auditing the details of military spending…
>
> 170. One area where external audit reports are often not published is the area of military or security spending. National security considerations may warrant special provisions limiting publication of audit reports. In these situa-

tions it is important, however, that all military spending be audited by a non-military authority, and that the results of the audit be presented to a legislative body, such as a public accounts committee.[33]

Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) are useful for identifying general weaknesses in systems of accountability and transparency but only infrequently single out the security sector, most often the defence sector. Still, if the Fund determines that a government does not regularly report budget information to the parliament, it is unlikely to be reporting security-related expenditure that provides information on both transparency and accountability. At the same time, even when the security sector is mentioned specifically, there is little, if any, follow up. While ROSCs are available on the IMF website, full reviews are undertaken only every five years. The Fund is beginning to issue shorter updates for some ROSCs, but the value of these reports is primarily to identify aggregate problems and to encourage member governments to continue progress toward greater transparency and accountability.[34] ROSCs can also be followed up through the Fund's Article IV surveillance, which takes place annually.

Current IMF operating procedures limit the Fund's ability to address off-budget expenditure in the security sector. Unless the Fund has an active programme in a country which will be placed at risk by the medium term macroeconomic effects of off-budget spending for security, Fund officials are likely to do no more than note the problem in a report. In Indonesia, where well over half the military budget was financed through off-budget mechanisms in the early 2000s, the IMF sought to bring the revenue from various military-owned funds and foundations on budget, with mixed results (Box 8.3).[35]

Bank-Fund Division of Labour

The broadening of IMF responsibilities has blurred the lines between the World Bank and the Fund. There has been considerable debate about the IMF's capacity to undertake some of the new tasks it has assumed relating to development and poverty reduction. Since the departure of Managing Director Michel Camdessus in early 2000, there has been agreement that the Fund should focus more on its original functions, which requires a clearer demarcation between World Bank and IMF functions and improved Bank-Fund cooperation.[36] While consensus is emerging on how best to achieve these objectives, they have at the time of this writing only been partially achieved.

Box 8.3   Promoting Greater Transparency and Accountability in the Indonesian Military Budget

Indonesia has historically had a small military budget, relying instead on off-budget revenue from a range of sources to finance the bulk of the Indonesian Armed Forces' (TNI) needs, as well as resources from local and regional governments and international military assistance.

In 2000, the IMF played a central role in gaining agreement to a limited audit of military-owned foundations that had initially been set up to raise money for the welfare of troops. The audit demonstrated that foundation revenues were used to finance military spending as well. The IMF then encouraged the passage of legislation to allow the Supreme Auditing Board to audit the foundations on a regular basis. When this legislation emerged from the Parliament, however, it was significantly watered down, and the TNI argued successfully that its foundations were exempt from this legislation because of a provision in the law for auditing by private auditors. The Supreme Auditing Board took the position that it had the right to audit state assets held by foundations – and was supported by the IMF in this effort – but it did not succeed. By this point, the IMF had lost leverage with the government due to the termination of its programme with Indonesia.

For a recent report on military business in Indonesia, see Human Rights Watch, *Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities* (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2006)

A recent external review on Bank-Fund collaboration identified IMF work on low-income countries, where security-related issues are most likely to surface at present, as 'an area where pressures, including pressures from shareholders, have led it to move beyond its core responsibilities into the work of the Bank'. The report recommends focussing IMF work in these countries on the areas 'where it has the greatest comparative advantage – providing macroeconomic assessments and policy advice, as well as 'sign-off' on Bank programme lending, technical assistance and short-term balance of payments support'.[37]

This means that the Bank would have the responsibility of carrying out sectoral work relating to security and that the Fund should include the findings of such work in its macroeconomic analyses. It also means that the Fund's PRGF should be greatly reduced in size, with the World Bank picking up the slack.

Adherence to Norms Guiding International Organisation Approaches to SSR

Table 8.1 summarises the degree to which the IMF and the World Bank currently adhere to the norms discussed in Chapter 2.

Conclusion

The World Bank increasingly views its public financial management work and its support to the PRS process in conflict-affected countries as legitimate areas for addressing security issues. It is important that this work is expanded to all Bank clients and institutionalised. The issues paper on security and the PRS process is an important first step in terms of institutionalisation and should be followed by operational guidance. It would be desirable for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, the institutional home for public financial management work, to develop a similar issues paper for PFM and security as well as operational guidance for staff as soon as possible.

In the context of security budgeting, it is essential for the Bank to resist the temptation to focus on the level or composition of security expenditure and instead to concentrate on improving public financial management in the security sector. It is also essential that the Bank resist the temptation to follow the line of least resistance and turn the 'security is a public good and essential for development' argument on its head by uncritically accepting a host government's contention that the country's security situation requires substantial expenditure on the security forces without adequate accountability or transparency.

In this regard, there are several specific activities that the Bank can promote:

- Policy development and strategic planning, which are essential for affordable, appropriate and accountable security budgeting.

Table 8.1   Bank and Fund Adherence to SSR Norms[38]
(table continues on p. 152-153)

Norm	World Bank	IMF
Holistic approach (security-development nexus)	The Bank increasingly accepts that poverty reduction requires adequate physical security. The Bank is currently seeking ways of operationalising that understanding, for example through OP 8.00 and the issues paper on security and the PRS process. At present, however, there is no formal institutionalisation of the security-development nexus and individuals are largely responsible for taking this agenda forward. The General Counsel's *Legal Opinion on Peace-building, Security and Relief Issues* of 22 March 2007 is an important step in institutionalising this linkage.	The Fund does not appear to have fully internalised the security and development linkage. While it accepts that governments have the right to allocate resources to the security sector, the Fund gives only limited attention to the process by which these resources are allocated and its impact on poverty. In contrast to Bank documents, the security-development nexus is rarely, if ever, mentioned.
Democratic oversight	The Bank increasingly recognises the need to engage with civil society and to ensure that legislatures are adequately informed and part of the development process.	*The Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Accountability* notes that there should be regular fiscal reporting to the legislature and the public. To the extent that the IMF's current surveillance work promotes such reporting in general, it helps develop the overall environment in which democratic oversight in the security sector can be developed. Similarly, if it shines a spotlight on the security sector in a country where observance is otherwise in conformity with the Code, that can help place pressure on a government to reform.

Accountability	All Bank work on public sector development is based on the need to focus more on building efficient and accountable public sector institutions. The Bank now recognises that it cannot afford to ignore deeply dysfunctional public institutions that limit accountability and set perverse rules of the game, and are therefore incapable of sustaining development. The Bank has begun to include the security sector in public financial management. Accountability is a key principle underlying PFM work. In theory, the Bank could also integrate the security sector into other parts of its public sector work, notably administrative and civil service reform, decentralisation and anti-corruption efforts. The PRS process has the potential to integrate security into the Bank's work on financial management, service delivery, corruption and the like. The Bank's work on law and development has the potential to promote accountability.	*The Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Accountability and the associated work in monitoring its application helps develop the overall environment in which fiscal accountability in the security sector can be developed.*
Transparency	As with accountability, Bank work in the areas of PFM and other elements of public sector reform, especially anticorruption work, the PRS process, and law and development have the potential to promote transparency. One of the key principles of PFM is transparency.	The Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Accountability and the associated work in monitoring its application helps develop the overall environment in which fiscal transparency in the security sector can be developed. The effort to bring some off-budget security revenue and expenditure on budget in Indonesia appears to have been an isolated example and due in part to pressure on the IMF from key bilateral donors in Jakarta.

| **Professionalism** | The Bank is unlikely to engage as strengthening professionalism of security bodies is outside its core competency. However, the General Counsel's 22 April 2007 legal opinion, which allows the Bank to 'extend its assistance within the areas of its core competencies (e.g. support for infrastructure, public financial management, and capacity building)' to 'all borrower agencies and institutions' involved in the emergency recovery effort may in fact allow for budget formulation and execution assistance to security services. | The Fund is unlikely to engage as strengthening professionalism of security bodies is outside its core competency. |

- A political forum within which all sectors compete for priority and funding, and trade-offs between sectors and within the security sector become clear to all.
- Partnerships with other international actors, including those delivering security assistance, to support development of security-related policies and strategies and the development and execution of budgets according to good public financial management practice and to strengthen the capacity of oversight actors (including legislatures) and civil society.[39]

The IMF also must avoid the temptation to focus on the level or composition of security expenditure and to use the tools at its disposal to help identify deficiencies in budget development and execution. Like the Bank, the IMF should resist the temptation to follow the line of least resistance and turn the 'security is a public good and essential for development' argument on its head by uncritically accepting a host government's contention that the country's security situation requires substantial expenditure on the security forces without adequate accountability or transparency. The Fund needs to move beyond giving significant attention to security issues only when the level of security expenditure is jeopardising a program. It must begin supporting the World Bank and other donors in analysing the PFM system of borrowing countries and helping governments overcome deficiencies in the management of security expenditures.

Notes

1   IBRD, 'Articles of Agreement (as amended effective 16 February 1989)', Article 1. The World Bank consists of two institutions: the IBRD and the IDA. The IBRD lends to countries able to pay near market interest rates. IDA, created in 1960, provides concessional rates.
2   World Bank, *The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1997).
3   World Bank, 'About Us – Operations', World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/1YXPMBNDO0.
4   IMF, 'Articles of Agreement: Article I: Purposes'.
5   IMF, External Relations Department, 'A Factsheet: IMF Surveillance', July 2007; IMF, External Relations Department, 'A Factsheet: IMF Lending', September 2006; IMF, External Relations Department, 'A Factsheet: Technical Assistance', April 2007.
6   IMF, External Relations Department, 'A Factsheet: Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative', April 2007; IMF, External Relations Department, 'A Factsheet: The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative', May 2007.
7   The PRGF replaced the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which had itself replaced the Fund's first longer-term financing mechanism, the Structural Adjustment Facility. IMF, 'A Factsheet: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)', August 2006.
8   IBRD, 'Articles of Agreement: Article IV: Section 10'; IDA, 'Articles of Agreement: Article V: Section 6'; IMF, 'Articles of Agreement: Article IV: Section 3(b): Surveillance over exchange arrangements'.
9   Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, 'Trends in Security Sector Reform: Policy, Practice and Research', paper prepared for the workshop 'New Directions in Security Sector Reform', Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, 3-4 November 2005 (revised 27 January 2006).
10 IMF, 'Articles of Agreement: Article I(ii)'; IBRD, 'Articles of Agreement: Article I(i-iii).' See also Nicole Ball, 'Transforming Security Sectors: The IMF and World Bank Approaches', *Conflict, Security & Development* 1, no. 1 (April 2001): 45-66.
11 Deepa Narayan et. al., *Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000), 155.
12 World Bank, 'Voices of the Poor', information at go.worldbank.org/H1N8746X10.
13 OECD DAC, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States* (OECD: Paris, 2006).
14 World Bank President Barber B. Conable, 'Address to the Board of Governors', Washington, DC, 26 September 1989. Published by World Bank, 1990, unknown binding.
15 Jonathan Sanford, *Multilateral Development Banks: Issues for Congress*, CRS Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 13 March 1992), 13.
16 The largest of these demobilisation and reintegration trust funds supported the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP). See the MDRP website: www.mdrp.org. See also Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, *Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*, Phase 2 Report to Working Group 2 of the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (Stockholm: Government of Sweden, 26 September 2005).

17 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, *The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), 12, 81.

18 IDA, *Additions to IDA Resources: Twelfth Replenishment. A Partnership for Poverty Reduction* (Washington, DC: IDA, 23 December 1998), para. 73.

19 United States, 'Transparency of Budgets (Military Expenditures) Law', Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, P.L. 105-118, section 572.

20 IDA, *Additions to IDA Resources: Fourteenth Replenishment. Working Together to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals* (Washington, DC: IDA, 10 March 2005), para. 27.

21 World Bank Senior Vice President and Group General Counsel, 'Legal Opinion on Peace-building, Security and Relief Issues under the Bank's Policy Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies', Annex I in *Toward a New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies*, World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services (Washington, DC: World Bank, 12 January 2007, revised March 2007). See also World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, *Toward a New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 12 January 2007, revised March 2007); World Bank, 'Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies', in *The World Bank Operational Manual: Operational Policies*, OP 8.00 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 2007).

22 World Bank, 'Legal Opinion on Peace-building, Security and Relief Issues', para. 15. See also para. 20. The General Counsel also identified 'some noteworthy examples of support for programs that include peace-building and security dimensions, such as reintegration of disarmed ex-combatants, de-mining operations, and capacity building for the overall public sector including parliamentary and security sector institutions in matters of fiscal and financial management. In each of these cases, a careful assessment is made of the various legal and reputational aspects before the Bank lends support' (para. 22).

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24 World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, *Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development. Volume V: Improving Public Financial Management in the Security Sector* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 22 December 2005).

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27 The World Bank and the IMF, *2005 Review of the PRS Approach: Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling up Results* (Washington, DC: World Bank and the IMF, September 2005), 1.

28 Because the Article IV and *GFSY* data are collected at the aggregate level, it is impossible to determine the degree to which they accord with this definition and the degree to which they are incomplete. Of course, completeness is important for the quality of Fund assessments, a country's macroeconomic environment and development priorities. Comments

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36 John Williamson, *The Role of the IMF: A Guide to the Reports*, International Economics Policy Briefs (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, May 2000).

37 World Bank, *Report of the External Review Committee on Bank-Fund Collaboration*, Final Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, February 2007), 43-44.

38 The World Bank and the IMF have not developed yet any explicit norms on security sector reform and governance. This table reflects only a general understanding that has emerged within the organisations in connection with each of the norms identified in Chapter 2 of the present volume. However, this understanding may lead to the development of explicit security sector reform and governance norms in the future.

39 As recent experience in Afghanistan demonstrates, Bank staff can deploy many of their financial management diagnostic tools to support such work. World Bank, *Post-Conflict Security Sector and Public Finance Management: Lessons from Afghanistan*, Social Development Notes/Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction no. 24 (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2006).

Chapter 9

Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Governance: Towards a Common ECOWAS Agenda

Adedeji Ebo

Introduction

Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are essentially reflections and products of their constituent members, and thus manifest the trends, contradictions, challenges and opportunities within and between various clusters of states in the global system. IGOs composed of developed countries, such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) dominate the agenda of multilateral security cooperation, including the conceptualisation and delivery of security sector reform (SSR). They are indeed the prime sources of the prevalent SSR paradigm of democratic control of security forces and services, increasingly an essential element in post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, it has been widely acknowledged that SSR is donor-driven.[1] IGOs composed of less developed states, on the other hand, are often recipients of programmatic and 'technical support' for SSR. There is a need therefore to differentiate between various IGOs in terms of their membership, levels of development, individual interests and resources as well as the power relations within and between individual organisations. As we shall see, the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[2] in security sector governance differs substantially from other IGOs covered in this book, all of which may be described as 'donor IGOs'. Donor IGOs are outward-looking, typically focussing on the delivery of SSR support not to their members, but to other states, mainly in post-conflict environments. Recipient IGOs, such as ECOWAS, are in contrast inward-looking, as they focus primarily on their member states as the target of multilateral security cooperation.

In several West African states, particularly post-conflict countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire, an array of SSR missionaries (composed of various teams of development agency staffers and their security and diplomatic counterparts from developed countries, private security companies, independent consultants and international organisations) is actively engaged in the conceptualisation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities that fall under the rubric of SSR.[3] Indeed, note has repeatedly been made of the lack of coherence, coordination and cooperation in SSR delivery.[4] From the perspective of the recipient states, however, the most important shortcoming in their efforts is the lack of local ownership and accountability deficits in their programmes.[5]

This paper considers the role of ECOWAS in security governance, in particular in developing a common SSR agenda that includes a common SSR concept. Within the context of West Africa's security dynamics, the paper discusses the rationale for as well as the opportunities and challenges involved in moving towards an ECOWAS SSR agenda. In the ensuing discussion, it is argued that this is imperative for the organisation as it would address such central issues as donor coherence and coordination, and recipient state ownership and accountability. Even though ECOWAS has been engaged in several activities falling under the umbrella of security sector governance, there remains a wide gap between the organisation's normative prescriptions, which are underpinned by the norm of democratic control, and the actual practice of public security provision in member states, which is characterised by a series of operational and governance deficits.

This chapter has four parts. The first provides an overview of the security environment in West Africa and identifies the elements of the ECOWAS peace and security architecture around which a normative framework has developed. The second part of the discussion addresses the justification for a common ECOWAS SSR concept and puts forward the preconditions (signposts) for its realisation. In the third section, the paper discusses the opportunities and challenges raised by a common concept. The chapter concludes with a number of policy recommendations.

West African Security Challenges and the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture

Far from being a homogenous zone, West Africa is composed of states that differ considerably in territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion and external linkages. It is made up of nine Francophone,

five Anglophone and two Lusophone states with a rich mixture of colonial experiences. The region includes countries at different stages of democratisation, from consolidating democracies such as Senegal and Ghana to post-conflict societies such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as states transitioning from military rule such as Nigeria and the Gambia.

Jane's Sentinel describes West Africa as 'among the world's poorest and most conflict-afflicted regions, home to several 'failed' states and four UN peacekeeping or peace-building missions'.[6] But there is a wide range of economic fortunes in this sub-region. With a gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 78 billion, Nigeria's economy is larger than the combined GDP of all other ECOWAS countries and represents some 56 per cent of the sub-regional aggregate.[7] Despite Nigeria's oil wealth, however, the country remains troubled by poverty and economic exclusion, not least in the Niger Delta where a resilient and restless militancy has developed among the youth.[8] Nigeria's status as the world's sixth largest producer of crude oil contrasts sharply with that of its neighbour, Niger, which is reputed to be the poorest country in the world. Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone hold the bottom four places in the UNDP 2005 Human Development Index. Liberia and Guinea Bissau each have GDPs of less than a billion dollars and Sierra Leone's hovers around that amount.

A defining feature of security governance in the sub-region has been the characteristic failure of the state to provide and/or guarantee public security. Cote d'Ivoire, historically a citadel of political stability, has been in political turmoil for the past few years. Guinea has borne the impact of the prolonged internecine wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and is itself now caught in the politics of a murky political succession. Those states which have not themselves been theatres of outright war have experienced their own security challenges, particularly armed criminality and sporadic violence. Within the first three years of its emergence from protracted military rule, Nigeria suffered over 100,000 deaths as a result of more than 50 ethno-religious conflicts. Ghana, reputed to be an oasis of peace in a troubled sub-region, has itself suffered ethnic violence in the north, with over 1,000 killed in 1994.[9] Other West African states have acquired the reputation of 'narco-states' at the crossroads of the illicit global drug trade. Trans-border crime, including drug trafficking, advance fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms, armed robbery and the theft and smuggling of oil, is rampant in the sub-region.[10]

While West African states differ in terms of size and natural endowments, what they have in common are multiple layers of insecurity associ-

ated with conflicts and crime at community and national levels, often with cross-border and regional ramifications. Protracted military and authoritarian rule and the crisis of the 'disarticulated state' – one that is post-colonial in character and without an organic link to society – have produced predatory statutory security institutions and informal security structures often beyond the reach and control of the state. These non-state actors either oppose the state and seek its elimination (e.g., the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy in Liberia, etc.) or they may operate in alliance with the state (such as the Kamajors of Sierra Leone and the Bakkasi Boys of Nigeria). Indeed, the starting point for understanding security in West Africa is to recognise that the state has at no point in time had a monopoly on legitimate force. Just as West African societies have traditionally had both formal and informal economies, the security sector has typically been characterised by both formal and informal sectors. Statutory security institutions have been primarily active in securing the state and its institutions, while large sections of the population have relied on parallel, less formal security structures for their safety.

The increasing inability of West African states to safeguard their populations' security has resulted in a vacuum that is being filled by an array of non- and anti-state actors engaged in a dynamic process that increasingly underpins security governance in the sub-region, and thus defines the context and limits of intergovernmental security cooperation. Apart from ECOWAS and its member-states, other security actors active in West Africa include the United Nations; intergovernmental donor organisations such as the OECD and the EU; international NGOs; foreign private security companies; national and regional civil society networks; national, sub-regional and global criminal networks; and mercenaries and other armed non-state groups. All these actors have an impact on the push-and-pull of security governance in West Africa.

Responding largely to 'lessons learned' from collective security activities undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS responded to the need for a coherent and institutionalised sub-regional framework for security cooperation within West Africa by adopting the *ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* (hereafter the Mechanism) in 1999. The Mechanism has served as the pivot for the evolution of a related body of normative instruments and confidence-building measures that have come to form the core of regional security cooperation in West Africa. Previously, the security governance agenda was primarily defined by the imperatives of the Cold War during which West

African states were mainly proxies in the struggle of rival foreign ideologies. ECOWAS security cooperation during the Cold War was defined by two overriding factors: first, the trivialisation of security as an exclusive attribute and responsibility of the state and second, the assumption that security threats only came from across the border. The implosion of Liberia in late 1989, its complex regional ramifications and the failure and/or reluctance of the erstwhile Cold War warriors to address the conflict brought a tragic end to these fallacies.

Against this background, the Mechanism has emerged as the main instrument for conflict management in West Africa and the nucleus of the sub-region's emerging peace and security architecture.[11] The Mechanism has been supported by the introduction of new institutions for conflict management, principally the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which has ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the Mechanism, as well as for peace and security in West Africa, thus playing a role corresponding to that of the UN Security Council.[12] The MSC convenes at three levels: heads of states, who meet at least twice annually; ministers, who meet four times annually; and ECOWAS ambassadors accredited to Abuja, Nigeria, the seat of ECOWAS. The MSC is also supported by a Defence and Security Commission comprising Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Council of the Wise, which consists of eminent personalities with experience in mediation and peacebuilding who enjoy credibility within the sub-region. The Mechanism established the ECOMOG intervention force, which later became the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), by virtue of Articles 21, 22 and 28 of the Mechanism. To enhance conflict prevention, an early warning system has been introduced with four observation zones and a central monitoring unit at ECOWAS HQ in Abuja (see Chapter IV of the Mechanism).

A defining feature of the Mechanism is the principle of supra-nationalism, which goes beyond the emphasis on 'sovereign equality of states' and 'non-intervention in the internal affairs of states that characterised earlier cooperation efforts in the sub-region.[13] Accordingly, Article 25 specifies that the Mechanism shall be applied 'in the case of internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region'. The December 2001 Supplementary Protocol to the Mechanism, also known as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, was introduced to provide the normative basis for the

**Table 9.1   Normative Basis for ECOWAS Democratic Security
               Governance: The Protocol on Democracy and
               Good Governance**

Norm	Sources	Provision/Features
Constitutional principles shared by all member states	Article 1	• Separation of Powers • Elections as the only legitimate way to power • Popular participation in decision-making and decentralisation of power • Apolitical armed forces under legally constituted political authority • Secularism • Freedom of association and peaceful demonstrations • Freedom of the press
Democratic control of forces	Article 19	• Armed forces and the police to be non-partisan and loyal to the nation
Citizens in uniform	Article 21	• Armed forces and security forces personnel to be entitled to all the rights set out in the constitution, except as stated otherwise in their service regulations
Civilian control	Article 20	• Armed forces, the police and other security agencies to be under the authority of legally constituted civilian authorities • Civilian authorities to respect the apolitical nature of the armed forces and police
Regional peace support operations	Article 28	• Armed forces, the police and other security forces to participate in ECOMOG missions

Mechanism. Table 9.1 details the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol relating to democratic security governance.

The normative framework defined by the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance affirms the constitutional and democratic basis of not only the security sector but of the entire ambit of governance. The Protocol addresses the essential norms and principles of accountability, transparency and professionalism as critical elements of the democratic governance of the security sector. In 2003, two years after the adoption of the Protocol, ECOWAS Heads of State took the process an important step further by underscoring the importance of a regional path to peace in their *Declaration on a Sub-Regional Approach to Peace and Security*.

The process of developing a West African Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services is also contributing to the emergence of

regional normative standards on democratic security governance. The Code of Conduct is a confidence-building measure for enhanced civil-security relations and security cooperation in the West African sub-region. It seeks to establish common standards in the conduct and democratic governance of West African uniformed personnel, with the aim of improving relations both among them and between them and the civilian population. Supported with the assistance of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Code of Conduct was adopted by the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission (now known as the ECOWAS Committee of Experts on Peace and Security) in November 2006.[14] As soon as possible, the document is expected to be submitted for approval by the relevant ECOWAS Ministers and eventually by their Heads of State.

Towards a Common ECOWAS SSR Agenda

The Rationale for a Common ECOWAS SSR Concept

In the implementation of the ECOWAS Mechanism and the associated normative framework that has been derived from it, there remains a wide gap between normative provisions and actual practice. Several studies have noted the non-observance by West African states of the rich ECOWAS compendium of normative documents.[15]

Conflict may have subsided in West Africa but crime, particularly trans-border crime, is on the increase. There is a protocol on free movement[16] but obstacles to intra-West African movement of goods and persons remain substantial;[17] the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance advocates the democratic control of armed forces but many uniformed personnel continue to act above the law, often abusing and brutalising the very citizens whom they are sworn to protect. What purpose, then, would a common ECOWAS SSR concept serve, and what difference would it make in terms of peace and security in the sub-region? First, a common ECOWAS SSR concept would help regional and local actors to address issues of donor coherence and coordination. Second, and perhaps more importantly, a common SSR concept would foster a common vision of security sector governance among ECOWAS states and provide the necessary conceptual clarity.

This would represent an invaluable contribution to the on-going IGO policy dialogue on a SSR concept. An Implementation Framework for Security Sector Reform (IF-SSR) has been articulated (and further developed into a *Handbook on Security System Reform*) by the Development Assistance

Committee of the OECD (OECD DAC) with the objective of assisting donors in bridging the gap between policy guidelines and actual implementation on the ground. The EU has also adopted an SSR concept.[18] With regard to the United Nations system, there is increasing interest at headquarters and loudening calls from the field for a UN-wide SSR concept that would overcome the currently prevailing absence of a 'comprehensive, coherent and coordinated UN approach to SSR'.[19]

Even though regional approaches and recipient perspectives to SSR are considered crucial, SSR retains its external origins. There remains a yawning gap between SSR as a normative framework and the reality of security governance in specific contexts. The ECOWAS contribution to the on-going global debate on SSR has been marginal, despite West Africa's rich experience in post-conflict reconstruction and in addressing the transition from military to civil rule. There is an urgent need for West Africa and other Southern (recipient) voices to be heard in these on-going debates. A common ECOWAS SSR concept would enhance West African participation in the making of global public policy on post-conflict reconstruction generally and on SSR in particular.

Beyond broad normative principles, there is currently no yardstick for measuring donor support for SSR, no policy guidelines demarcating the boundaries of what is acceptable, what is desirable, what is not desirable and the form in which ECOWAS states would wish to be supported on SSR. This lack of clarity on what SSR means for ECOWAS members encourages incoherence in donor support, as each donor is virtually free to determine the elements and contours of its own SSR intervention and support. Moreover, experience has so far shown that donors, given their often disparate interests, are either unwilling or unable to coordinate their SSR activities, despite a litany of policy statements to the contrary. A common ECOWAS understanding would oblige donors to address both these issues.

Articulating a common ECOWAS SSR concept is a useful starting point for matching security aspirations with security provision in West Africa. It would contribute to exposing the gaps in the current security cooperation regime in West Africa in terms of relations among ECOWAS members and between ECOWAS and other IGOs. Clarity on what SSR denotes for the constituent members of ECOWAS and for the organization collectively is the necessary starting point for the evolution of a regional security policy upon which all peace and security initiatives would eventually need to be anchored. But while a common ECOWAS SSR concept is necessary, it is by no means sufficient. There is also a need for an implementation framework that would translate a common SSR concept into practice.

It is also essential to integrate national SSR programmes into the West African regional security architecture and vice versa. The need for a sub-regional mechanism to address SSR becomes evident if one considers the benefits of an integrated approach to joint regional peace operations and the arrangements agreed within the framework of the African Standby Force. This kind of cooperation necessitates common standard operating procedures. Cross-border threats such as SALW proliferation, illegal trade in natural resources, human trafficking and cross-border criminal groupings are all examples of security challenges that fall beyond the reach of an individual state and which can only be resolved through a collective regional approach.

In addition, a common SSR agenda would reflect West Africa's dynamism in responding to the changing strategic environment for SSR. Globally, there is an increasing reluctance on the part of donor states to engage their troops in external conflicts. The outsourcing of SSR support is an emerging phenomenon to which ECOWAS needs to articulate a collective response. In Nigeria, for example, Military Professional Resources International (MPRI), a consulting firm on contract with the US government, carried out a retraining and restructuring programme as part of the Nigerian government's plans to reform the army.[20] MPRI also assisted the Nigerian government and military in developing institutional knowledge of civil-military relations, how to formulate and present a budget to the National Assembly, and performance of basic administrative tasks related to an efficient military.[21]

Significant local ownership deficits have been noted in the restructuring of the Liberian national army, which was outsourced to DynCorp, an American private security company (PSC).[22] In addition, Pacific Architects and Engineers was contracted to provide logistical support to ECOWAS and the American forces on the occasion of the intervention in Liberia in 2003.[23] There is thus a need for ECOWAS to refine its peace and security agenda to respond to the changing strategic environment, including the trend towards the increasing privatisation of SSR support.

The need to enhance West African ownership of SSR programmes remains compelling in view of the fact that SSR 'delivery' in West Africa has often been led by external actors on the basis of externally driven and inspired visions of security. Local ownership entails donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors, rather than local support for donor programmes and projects. Too often, the latter has been the case. Yet the significance of local ownership can hardly be over-emphasised.

By specifying a common vision of security sector reform and governance, an ECOWAS SSR concept would help bridge the asymmetry in which

reforming states and societies are encouraged to 'buy-in' to the security vision of donors, rather than the other way round. It would also provide operational guidance to all actors interested in SSR implementation in West Africa. This would go a long way in addressing the legitimacy deficits that characterise various SSR initiatives in the sub-region. In the case of Liberia, for example, it has been noted that the outsourcing of SSR support to a PSC had created additional ownership deficits with regard to the oversight role of parliament and civil society. A common ECOWAS SSR agenda would need to debate and define the organisation's position on the role of PSCs in SSR, including the relationship between private companies and local and regional oversight structures.

The Sierra Leonean post-conflict reconstruction process, particularly as concerns the security sector, is widely presented as one of the more successful external interventions.[24] The reform of the security sector in Sierra Leone has helped restore public safety. The reform process has identified SSR as the first pillar of the country's poverty reduction strategy and essential for the decentralisation of the security apparatus. It has introduced several positive aspects in terms of local ownership of the reform process. The methodology for conducting security sector reviews has provided ample opportunities for a wide community of Sierra Leoneans to contribute. Of particular significance have been were the country-wide consultative workshops organised by the SSR Secretariat. The involvement of civil society groups in the process has been highly significant. Consultative workshops have included religious groups, the press, serving and retired security personnel, ex-combatants and traditional chiefs.[25] One defining feature of the Sierra Leone SSR process is the strong long-term bilateral backing it has received from Her Majesty's Government.[26] Significant gaps remain, however. The challenges of donor dependency, youth unemployment and governance and oversight deficits remain daunting.

Key Features of a Common ECOWAS SSR Concept

This section considers the direction that a common ECOWAS SSR agenda should take. The agenda should feature three aspects in particular:

- *Beyond the state:* In view of the intergovernmental nature of ECOWAS, there is a risk that state security priorities will overshadow the needs of other actors. A common SSR concept would therefore need to incorporate the interests and perspectives of such groups as local communities (particularly border communities), civil society,

youth (as the largest and most volatile demographic grouping), women and a wide spectrum of sub-state actors.

- *From conflict management to peace consolidation*: For much of the 1990s West Africa was infamous for being a 'war zone', with the hub of conflict located in Liberia and along the wider Mano River axis. However, the guns have gone silent in most of the region. According to the 2006 Edition of *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment,* since the end of the Liberian civil war in mid-2003 the ECOWAS region has been 'characterised by increased economic growth, greater peace and physical security and gradually improving standards of governance in many member states'.[27] While the basis of insecurity in West Africa continues to be located in conflict and criminality, the fulcrum is increasingly shifting from the former to the latter. In the peace consolidation task that ensues from the end of large-scale conflicts in the subregion, a common understanding of SSR would help address the root causes of conflict and help lay the basis for a robust conflict prevention strategic framework.

- *Building blocks approach:* ECOWAS member states are also key members of the African Union. Indeed, ECOWAS is one of the five regional blocs that constitute the African Standby Force Arrangement and ECOWAS is the designated New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) focal point for West Africa. Thus, it is essential that major ECOWAS concepts that speak to conflict prevention, resolution and peace-building broadly reflect and feed directly into such continental frameworks as the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda.

Opportunities and Challenges for an ECOWAS Security Governance Agenda

Opportunities

The operational environments of UN peace missions (such as Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire) offer fertile opportunities for the development of an ECOWAS common SSR agenda and implementation strategy that would serve as a reference point for donors. In view of the ongoing dialogues within the UN on a common SSR concept and of current UN peace missions, ECOWAS has an opportunity, and indeed a duty, to table its own perspec-

tives. Indeed, the contours of a common SSR concept can now be discerned and possible entry points for the elaboration of this agenda identified.

The ECOWAS experience of peacekeeping and peace-building, particularly the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, have clearly demonstrated to member states the benefits of having recourse to effective security institutions that are responsive to human security needs and under democratic control. One of the first indications of this attitude came with the Abuja Peace Accord, which led to the end of fighting in Liberia in 1996 and elections in 1997. The Accord had stipulated that ECOMOG would retrain a new national army based on fair ethnic and geographical representation. Even though Charles Taylor later frustrated the ECOWAS restructuring plans, and the extent to which the plan represented comprehensive SSR is debatable, it attested to marked awareness in ECOWAS circles of the link between SSR and post-conflict reconstruction. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003 was to contain detailed provisions on SSR. In the case of Sierra Leone, while the short-lived Lome Agreement of 1999 only contains a vague reference to SSR, the country was later to develop a comprehensive security sector review. SSR has suffered false starts in Guinea Bissau. In West African states where there has been no large-scale armed conflict, most SSR initiatives 'have been largely ad hoc, accidental by-products of broader reform agenda, or reforms by stealth'.[28] However, the need for a comprehensive approach remains acknowledged by all major stakeholders.

Though ECOWAS had already been engaged in propagating certain aspects of security governance, a conceptual appreciation of SSR at the subregional level initially emerged as a result of the trilateral cooperation between ECOWAS, the UN and the European Union. Their activities have provided several entry points for SSR into the agenda of peace and security in West Africa, including the Report of the EU-UN Joint Assessment Mission to ECOWAS (March 2004), the Report of the UN Security Council Mission to West Africa (July 2004) and the Report of the UN Secretary General on Ways to Combat Sub-regional and Cross-border Threats in West Africa (February 2005). The 6th ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting of 8 November 2004 noted that 'SSR is an essential element of any stabilisation process'.[29] Later in November, the United Nations Office in West Africa (UNOWA), based in Dakar, organised a major conference on 'SSR and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Challenges and Opportunities'. The Background Paper for the conference noted that:

as a whole, the security sector remains a major concern in many West African states….Today, the increasing deterioration of state institutions, the continuous weakening of political authority and the consequent dereliction of military power, are progressively transforming some West African security forces into one of the greatest factors of insecurity for states and people.[30]

In the Report of the UN Secretary-General on Ways to Combat Sub-regional and Cross border Threats in West Africa, an even louder call was made to ECOWAS member states regarding the relevance and urgency of SSR. The UN Secretary-General emphasised that 'security sector reform is an especially pressing priority for West Africa, and one which ECOWAS member states ought to address, with support from the international community, as a key tool for conflict prevention'.[31] Subsequently at the 7th EU-ECOWAS Ministerial Troika, SSR featured prominently as one of the main components of an ECOWAS-EU-UNOWA Framework of Action for Peace and Security. Echoing earlier statements from the Troika and the UN Secretary-General, the Framework noted that:

> security sector reform is a vital challenge facing West Africa and a priority for ECOWAS, given that security forces have often proved a cause of instability. The EU, ECOWAS and UNOWA will work on the development of feasible programmes on reform of the security sector.[32]

In policy statements and peace and security initiatives within the ECOWAS Secretariat (renamed the ECOWAS Commission in January 2007), there has been an increasing focus on SSR as an area of engagement. In this regard, in his statement to the UN Security Council in August 2006, the President of the ECOWAS Commission noted that SSR is one of the four main components of the ECOWAS peace consolidation strategy.[33]

Beyond policy proclamations, the beginnings of a common ECOWAS SSR concept are fast emerging through the on-going process of articulating an *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework* (ECPF).[34] Intended to function as an operational tool for the implementation of ECOWAS protocols and mechanisms on peace and security, the process was initiated in January 2006. The draft ECPF identifies eleven broad components, of which security sector governance is one. The other components are early warning, preventive diplomacy, democracy and political governance, natural resource governance, cross-border initiatives, security, women in peace and security, micro-disarmament, tackling the youth crisis, the media in a democracy and in transition, and peace education. These components are elucidated in terms

of objectives, envisaged activities, benchmarks and capacity requirements. According to the draft ECPF,

> The cardinal objective of the Security Sector Governance component of ECPF shall be to provide a human security roof over the population, particularly the vulnerable, using security institutions which are responsive and responsible to democratic control and basic human rights. In essence, therefore, security sector governance in West Africa must be accountable, and as much as possible transparent and participatory.[35]

As Box 9.1 below indicates, the draft ECPF contains what is so far the most advanced and coherent common conceptualisation of SSR within ECOWAS.

With regard to the on-going dialogue on a common UN SSR concept, four aspects of the security sector governance component of the draft ECPF stand out. The first is the affirmation that the conceptual work undertaken for the ECPF is intended in part as an input into the ongoing UN dialogue on a common SSR concept (see Table 9.1). This reflects not only ECOWAS's protracted collaboration with the UN as detailed above, but also its involvement in the UN process of evolving an SSR concept from its early stages. For example, ECOWAS has been a participant in the Slovak-initiated UN process since its initiation on July 2007, when an 'Expert Workshop on Developing a Security Sector Reform Concept for the UN' was held in Bratislava. ECOWAS was again a participant at the UN Security Council Roundtable on 'Multilateral and Regional Approaches to SSR: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept' that was held in New York on 8 December 2006.[36]

Secondly, it is noteworthy that the emphasis of the draft ECOWAS concept is on security sector *governance* rather than *reform*. This is a significant departure from the assumption underlying the term 'reform', namely an undesirable condition that needs to be altered. For ECOWAS states it would therefore appear that while reform of the security sector is not unwelcome, such reform should be the result of applying democratic governance benchmarks of accountability, transparency and professionalism. The use of the term governance furthermore underscores the difference of emphasis between the *delivery* of SSR programmes by donors, on the one hand, and the *implementation* by recipient states, on the other. For recipient states such as those in ECOWAS, beginning security sector governance with reform as a necessary point of departure accentuates the shortcomings of the security sector of member states while downplaying their more positive attributes.

Box 9.1   SSR Activities in the Draft ECPF

To enhance security sector governance, the following activities shall be undertaken:

a. Create an ECOWAS security governance framework that feeds into United Nations and continental processes on SSR and takes into account peculiarities of the sub-region. Towards this objective, an expert group composed of relevant ECOWAS departments, experts and NGOs shall be established by the Commission.

b. Encourage the establishment and engage the services of indigenous private security agencies composed of West African security personnel as a response to the outsourcing of SSR in the sub-region.

c. Conduct a SSR needs analysis for West Africa to identify and define areas of intervention.

d. Develop and adopt an ECOWAS regulatory policy and sanctions regime on non-statutory armed groups, including militias, vigilantes, private security outfits, mercenaries and terrorist groups.

e. Develop and adopt confidence-building measures such as the West African Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services.

f. Develop and adopt an ECOWAS policy on prison reforms; spell out minimal conditions for prisons and rehabilitation regimes, gender sensitivity in prisons and the rights of prisoners.

g. Organise workshops for security forces in member-states on themes relating to the rights and responsibilities of the security services.

h. Organise capacity-building workshops on the command structure, military ethics and the functioning of the security apparatuses for oversight bodies, including the parliamentary committees on security and defence budgeting, justice and security-related ministries by Member-States.

i. Develop training packages on civil-security collaboration, community policing and micro-disarmament for community leaders and the police by member-states.

j. Member-States shall develop – with the assistance of the private sector and civil society – youth empowerment schemes designed to involve the youth in national development.

Thirdly, it is striking that the foundations of the ECOWAS concept lie in human security. In the section on 'ECOWAS Mandate and Legitimacy for Conflict Prevention', the draft ECPF (paragraph 27) defines its human security bias as follows:

> '…ECOWAS is imbued with the necessary supranational powers (acting on behalf of and in conjunction with the AU [African Union] and

the UN), as well as the legal and moral justification to intervene to protect human security in three distinct ways: the responsibility to protect, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.'[37]

This raises the much-debated issue of the scope of human security, in particular, whether it is focused on 'freedom from fear' or extends to 'freedom from want'.[38] From the draft ECPF, for example, the emphasis on 'youth empowerment' and economic opportunities, it is evident that the ECOWAS concept of human security relates to freedom from both fear and want. As widely acknowledged, human security is highly desirable but its operationalisation is problematic. In concluding the SSR component of the *ECPF*, elucidating what constitutes a 'human security roof' remains therefore a challenge.

Fourthly, the reference to the need to 'develop and adopt an ECOWAS regulatory policy and sanctions regime' for PSCs is a direct response to the emerging challenge of regulating the role of security contractors in the implementation of SSR programmes, especially when this role is part of a bilateral agreement. The importance of providing policy guidance for the participation of commercial actors in SSR implementation has been underscored by the experience of Liberia, where the training of armed and security forces was outsourced to security companies and ECOWAS had only a marginal role.

As a whole, the section underscores that while the basic elements of an ECOWAS SSR concept have developed autonomously, the overall process has benefited significantly from the organisation's 'strategic partnership' with other IGOs, particularly the UN and the EU.

Challenges and Constraints

There are numerous challenges and constraints involved in elaborating a common ECOWAS SSR agenda:

Strategic environment and external pressures: SSR is predicated on power relationships and is therefore intensely political. The evolution of a common ECOWAS SSR agenda will in other words have to contend with the reality of the asymmetry of power relations in West Africa, particularly those characterising the relationship between ECOWAS states and their 'development partners'. The viability of a common ECOWAS SSR concept and implementation framework, and the extent to which this will shape the current dialogue on a common UN SSR concept, is therefore necessarily condi-

tioned by the global strategic environment and, in particular, the strategic interests of the donor countries. Yet, if a human security approach to SSR is to make a difference, the ECOWAS security sector governance agenda will need to be home-grown. The War on Terror and 'homeland' security, the growing strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea to American interests and Euro-Atlantic immigration politics are just some of the major external factors that influence the direction and viability of a home-grown SSR concept and agenda.

Critical mass of reforming states: Recognising the need for a common ECOWAS SSR concept is only the beginning of a process whose eventual outcome cannot be taken for granted and therefore needs to be nurtured. The prospects of a common ECOWAS SSR agenda would be enhanced by, and perhaps ultimately dependent on, the existence of a coalition of reform-minded states that would act as sponsors of a common SSR concept and work to maintain it on the ECOWAS agenda, playing a role similar to that of the group of like-minded states that have been driving the UN process for a common SSR agenda.[39] So far, however, the ECOWAS record in this regard has not been encouraging, and donor IGOs have often taken the lead in the articulation of norms and concepts despite the organisation's rich experience in security cooperation.

Entrenched mindsets: Security thinking among security sector elites in several states continues to reflect a narrow and state-centric approach to security. Ordinary citizens are often in awe of the uniformed personnel who are salaried to protect them. As Nnoli has aptly noted, 'as a concept, security seems to have acquired a mystique. In the minds of most people, it has become mystical, mythical, even mysterious.'[40] Given the characteristic lack of an organic link between state and society, a human security-based ECOWAS common SSR concept would necessitate a change in mindsets both within the regional security community and among West African populations at large.

Rule of Law vs. Rule of Laws: A common ECOWAS security sector governance agenda also has to contend with different legislative and administrative traditions and systems in member states, often based on different judicial systems. Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone colonial superstructures live on in contrasting approaches to overseeing and managing the security sector. The lack of cohesion is compounded by the disparate levels of development among ECOWAS states. If the future ECOWAS SSR agenda is to have a meaningful 'human security roof', harmonisation of security legislation in critical areas will therefore be necessary within the region.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

There are four policy recommendations of cardinal importance for ECOWAS efforts to establish a regional SSR agenda:

- The ECOWAS Commission should take steps to include civil society and the media in the negotiation of a common SSR agenda, particularly in view of the importance it attaches to human security as its core. This would help ensure that the ECOWAS SSR agenda emanates from and reflects local concerns rather than the external strategic interests of donor IGOs.
- ECOWAS should take steps to clarify and operationalise its perspective on 'human security', a concept which, while appealing in theory, has left much to be desired in implementation.
- In view of the highly political nature of SSR, ECOWAS should focus initially on seeking broad agreement on confidence-building measures, such as its draft regional *Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services*. This is a relatively uncontroversial project. Its completion would help encourage the spirit of regional cooperation that will be necessary for dealing with the more challenging aspects of regional security cooperation that will need to be addressed as the common SSR concept is developed.
- The harmonisation of security sector legislation within the region should be embarked upon as one of the starting points for a common SSR agenda.

Intergovernmental organisations, including ECOWAS, are not, per se, autonomous actors capable of any extraordinary feat defying the parameters set by their members. ECOWAS mirrors the concerns of its member states and the challenges they face. The organisation is a reflection of the individual and collective reality of its aggregate membership. This is what gives it direction and sets its parameters for action. Although ECOWAS was created as an instrument for economic integration of the West African sub-region, a succession of internecine conflicts with sub-regional ramifications has redefined ECOWAS priorities. In response, ECOWAS has established a peace and security architecture around which a wealth of normative instruments and provisions has crystallised. However, there remains a gap between the organisation's normative aspirations and the reality on the ground in its re-

gion. A common ECOWAS SSR concept would help bridge this gap. In addition, it would enhance coherence among donors as well as West African ownership of SSR.

Notes

1   See for example, Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 4 (Geneva: DCAF, 2003); Nicole Ball, *Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP* (UNDP, 2002); Nicole Ball, 'Transforming Security Sectors: the IMF and World Bank Approaches', *Conflict Security and Development* 1, no. 1 (April 2001): 45-66.

2   ECOWAS was created in 1975 and includes all states geographically located in Western Africa, with the exception of Mauritania. Its membership therefore include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

3   Many of such activities are not located within comprehensive reform programmes but address aspects of security institutional building and/or restructuring.

4   OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, (Paris: OECD, 2007). The Handbook was written to fill this gap. See Edward Rees, *Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: 'Improvisation and Confusion' from the Field* (UNDP, March 2006).

5   Adedeji Ebo, 'The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges', *Conflict Security and Development* 7, no. 1 (April 2007): 27-60.

6   Jane's Information Group, 'Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: West Africa', Issue 11 (Surrey, UK, 2006), 9.

7   U.S. Energy Information Administration, 'Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, West Africa Background', Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ECOWAS/Background.html.

8   Violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly dominated and complicated by hostage taking, particularly of foreign workers. Some 1,000 people die each year in violence between rival militia groups. In the whole of 2006, a total of 70 foreign workers were kidnapped, compared to 50 in January 2007 alone. See IRIN News, 24 July 2007 and 05 February 2007, available at www.irinnews.org.

9   See Homepage Ghana, 'Ethnic Groups' (n.d.), available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes/.

10 United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs, *Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region*, Executive Summary (New York: UN Office on Crime and Drugs, 2005); UNSC, 'Progress Report of the Secretary General on Ways To Combat Subregional and Cross-Border Problems in West Africa', S/2005/86 (11 February 2005). According to the report, such challenges include, *inter alia*, the use of child combatants and mercenaries, small arms and light weapons proliferation, impunity for perpetrators of human rights abuses, youth unemployment and corruption.

11 The Mechanism supersedes and borrows from two previous regional security arrangements. These are the 1978 *Protocol on Non-Aggression* and the 1981 *Protocol on Mutual*

Assistance in Defence. While the 1978 Protocol merely called for peaceful settlement of disputes, the 1981 Protocol went further to provide for mutual assistance against external aggression and the formation of standby forces.

12 For details of the ECOWAS Mechanism, see ECOWAS Website, http://www.ecowas.int.

13 Supranationalism refers to the creation of institutions having independent decision-making authority and thus the ability to impose certain decisions and rules on member-states. It denotes the by-passing or transferring of member states' decision-making authority and functions traditionally exercised by the government.

14 The draft West African Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security services is available at http://www.dcaf.ch/awg/WestAfrica_CoC.pdf.

15 These include the *Non-Aggression Protocol* (1978); *Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance* (1981); the Declaration of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States (1991); *Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters* (1991); *Declaration by ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Child Soldiers* (1999); *ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* (1999); *Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance* (2001); and *Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Material* (2006).

16 The ECOWAS *Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment* was signed by the Heads of State and Government in 1979 and provides for the abolition of the visa and entry permit, right of residence and right of establishment within the ECOWAS region. According to the Protocol, all ECOWAS citizens, excluding those defined by law as undesirable aliens, may enter without a visa and reside in any Member State for a maximum of 90 days.

17 See Ousmane Badiane, 'National Policies as Impediments to Regional Economic Integration' in *Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa*, ed. Réal Lavergne (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1997). For more information on cross-border issues, see UNOWA, *Integrated Strategies for Sensitive Border Areas in West Africa*, Background paper (UNOWA, September 2004); UNOWA, *ECOWAS-EU-UNOWA Framework of Action for Peace and Security* (UNOWA, May 2005); UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on cross-border issues in West Africa', S/2007/143 (13 March 2007). On roadblocks in particular, see ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, 'Achievements of ECOWAS', ECOWAS, http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/achievements-1.htm#1.

18 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 'A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform', SEC(2006)658 (25 May 2006).

19 Annex to the letter dated 8 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General: *Maintenance of international peace and security: the role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform*, S/2007/72 (9 February 2007), 2.

20 Human Rights Watch, *Rapport Mondial 2002: Nigeria* (Human Rights Watch, January 2002).

21 See African Unification Front, 'The Structure of the African Military', available at http://www.africanfront.com/defense/defense5.php. For background on MPRI, see the Center for Public Integrity, 'Windfalls of War: Military Professional Resources, Inc.', updated May 20, 2004, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org.

22 Festus B. Aboagye and Martin R. Rupiya, 'Enhancing post-Conflict Democratic Govern-ance through effective Security Sector Reform in Liberia' in *A Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*, eds. Festus Aboagye and Alhaji Bah (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1 May 2005), available at http://www.iss.co.za/.

23 Robert Esposti, 'Les compagnies privées de sécurité américaines en Afrique', *Revue Défense Nationale*, no. 3 (2005), available at http://www.defnat.com/.

24 Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 16; Mark Malan, 'Security and Mili-tary Reform' in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, eds. Mark Malan and oth-ers (Institute for Security Studies, March 2003), available at: http://www.iss.co.za/.

25 Office of National Security of Sierra Leone, 'Sierra Leone Security Sector Review Re-port' (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2005). For a detailed list of members of the Working Group and participants at the Consultative Workshops, see respectively Annexes D and E of the Report.

26 Adedeji Ebo, 'The Challenges and Lessons of Security Sector Reform in Post Conflict Sierra Leone', *Conflict Security and Development* 6, no. 4 (2006): 481-501.

27 Jane's Information Group, 9.

28 J. 'Kayode Fayemi, 'Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia' in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, eds. Alan Bry-den and Heiner Hänggi, 179 (Geneva: DCAF, 2004).

29 Council of the European Union, 'Communiqué of the 6th ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting', Council of the European Union, 13296/04 (Presse 291), available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/82581.pdf.

30 UNOWA, Background paper prepared for the workshop 'Security Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention in West Africa: Challenges and Opportunities', http://www.un.org/ unowa/unowa/studies/ssrbkgd.pdf.

31 Ibid., 12.

32 UNOWA, *ECOWAS-EU-UNOWA Framework of Action for Peace and Security*, Item III.

33 The other components are rebuilding of democratic institutions; enhancing economic capacity of the government to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and deliver social services; and private sector development to create jobs and economic opportunities for the large army of unemployed people, especially the youth. See UNSC, Mohammed Ibn Chambas' Statement to 5509th Meeting of the UNSC, 'Peace Consolidation in West Africa', S/PV.5509 (9 August 2006).

34 The need for a 'conflict prevention strategy' had become a recurring issue on the ECOWAS peace and security agenda since the EU-UN Joint Assessment Mission to ECOWAS of February 2004 and was later reiterated in various UN reports on West Af-rica.

35 ECOWAS Commission, *Draft ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework*, revised at the Experts' Meeting on the ECPF in Banjul, Gambia, 24-28 June 2007, para. 55.

36 See Colonel Mahamane Toure, 'The Role and Experiences of ECOWAS in Security Sector Reform', presentation by ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary of Political Affairs, De-fence and Security at the UNSC Roundtable on 'Multilateral and Regional Approaches to SSR: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept', New York, 8 December 2006.

37 ECOWAS Commission, *Draft Conflict Prevention Draft Strategic Framework (ECPF)*, (Abuja, May 2007).

38 Heiner Hänggi, 'Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction', in *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva: DCAF, 2004).
39 This refers to the Group of 4+1 states on UN SSR: Canada, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK + South Africa.
40 O. Nnoli, *Security of Africa in the Emerging Global Environment: What Role for the Military?*, Graduation Lecture Series No. 8 (Abuja: National War College, 29 July 2003), 4-5.

PART III

PATTERNS OF
IGO COOPERATION

Chapter 10

Challenges of Integration: Cooperation on SSR within the UN System and Beyond

Vincenza Scherrer

Introduction[1]

In post-conflict contexts, security sector reform (SSR) tends to be led by external actors. More often than not, bilateral donors and international organisations, particularly the United Nations (UN), initiate SSR programmes, fund them to a large extent and often provide the bulk of expertise needed for implementing SSR programmes. The UN is only one of a number of international actors involved in SSR. However, by virtue of its near-universal membership and broad experience in peacekeeping and in peace support missions, the UN plays a crucial role in supporting SSR. This is particularly the case when UN peacekeeping operations are deployed as part of a comprehensive and multidimensional endeavour that includes humanitarian, development, political and security components, and integrates all UN actors on the ground in a coordinated approach.

UN peacekeeping operations are routinely mandated to support different aspects of SSR, in particular the strengthening of security and justice institutions. This can be done by providing policy and legal advice to the national security services as well as technical advice or training. For example, reforming or restructuring the police is one of the roles most consistently assumed by UN peace operations. The current United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assists in restructuring the Haitian National Police, including the vetting and certification of its personnel. The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is also responsible for rebuilding a civilian police presence in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as advising the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of other internal security services. Few mission mandates make specific mention of governance-related SSR activities that are aimed at enhancing the capacity for civilian control and democratic accountability.[2] All UN peace operations focus on one form or

another of SSR-related activities aimed at addressing the specific post-conflict legacies. This most often takes the form of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) or support to small arms control, mine action or transitional justice initiatives.

The need for coherence in SSR programme design and delivery is widely recognised. SSR involves programmes covering numerous actors whose activities are interdependent. SSR is linked to other activities such as the rule of law, transitional justice and DDR.[3] Without effective cooperation among actors carrying out these programmes, their activities will not be suitably integrated. Integration is also necessary to link measures designed to increase the efficiency of the security sector with those aimed at supporting the democratic oversight and accountability of the security sector.

In recent years, the UN has firmly acknowledged the necessity of effective cooperation in SSR activities, both in general and in particular those involving the UN. In July 2005, the Security Council Presidency recognised 'that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments' and highlighted the need for more coherent approaches by the UN and the international community.[4] In the statement made by the President of the Security Council after the first Security Council open debate on SSR in February 2007 under the Slovak Presidency, it was underlined that the UN 'has a crucial role to play in promoting comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated international support to nationally-owned security sector reform programmes'.[5]

This chapter will concentrate on the challenges of cooperation within the UN family and with other actors that are associated with missions in which the UN is involved. It will not focus on the issue of how local actors interact with the UN in the delivery of SSR, an issue of crucial importance for the success of SSR. Local ownership is an essential condition for the development of effective and accountable security and justice institutions.[6] However, the interface between UN and local actors is outside the scope of this volume.

While cooperation within and beyond the UN system is essential to the conduct of efficient SSR, this chapter will show that coordination within the UN can represent as great a challenge as coordination between it and other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). This chapter will examine the factors that affect the quality of cooperation in three settings. The first is UN system-wide cooperation, which addresses cooperation at headquarters (HQs). The second setting concerns cooperation among different UN bodies in peacekeeping missions, with a particular focus on the missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti and Kosovo. The

third setting involves cooperation between the UN and other actors beyond the UN system. The final part of this chapter will identify the main challenges existing across these three settings and discuss ways of enhancing cooperation patterns in SSR programmes involving the UN.

UN system-wide cooperation

SSR activities involve a large number of UN specialised agencies and associated organisations. For example, the Security Council defines the SSR component of mission mandates, the General Assembly addresses SSR in various policy forums (most notably in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) and the Secretary-General (and the Secretariat) sets the agenda of particular missions and the work of its various departments (e.g., Department of Political Affairs and Department for Disarmament Affairs). There are also numerous departments and specialised agencies that have an impact on SSR. The Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory identifies a total of twelve entities that play a substantial role in at least one area of SSR (as shown in Table 10.1).[7]

Challenges to cooperation

There are three main factors that affect the nature of cooperation at headquarters level. The first is the large number of actors engaged in SSR, which naturally makes it more difficult for entities to agree on a common approach and strategy for SSR on which to base their cooperation. This is demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in establishing a common UN definition of SSR: the UN Development Programme (UNDP), for example, embraces the broad definition put forward by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC) whilst the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is less inclined to adopt this vision, viewing it as a donor-driven instrument. Instead, DPKO's understanding of SSR mainly encompasses defence and police reform, the latter being one of its areas of expertise. DPKO's understanding of SSR is thus narrower than that of UNDP. These institutional differences are further complicated by the fact that UNDP is more likely to take a long-term development perspective on SSR, whilst DPKO perceives SSR in the context of the short time-frame needed to meet urgent requirements on the ground.[8] These perspectives are both crucial, but

Table 10.1   UN Capacity for Post-Conflict SSR[9]

	General focus of work	**Support provided to SSR**
DPA	Acts as focal point for post-conflict peacebuilding within the UN.	Provides policy advice and assistance for the establishment of governance institutions; prepares civilian police components of field missions; undertakes studies on DDR and SALW; supports national strategies on transitional justice.
DPKO	Plans and administers peacekeeping operations; provides situation analyses and needs assessments.	Acts as locus of most operational planning capacity in police and military divisions. Designs and implements rule of law programmes; conducts and coordinates DDR in peacekeeping operations; coordinates mine action; supports transitional justice initiatives.
OHCHR	Serves as the UN focal point for system-wide coordination of human rights, democracy and rule of law.	Provides technical advice on rule of law and human rights. Supports inclusion of human rights in law enforcement agencies; provides advice and training for law enforcement and corrections personnel; promotes good governance; supports activities promoting the independence of judges; assists in drafting truth and reconciliation laws.
OLA	Acts as the UN legal service.	Provides legal advice on the establishment of UN-based judicial accountability mechanisms.
UNDP	Provides financial, technical and implementation support and drafts project proposals; can rapidly deploy staff to field; has capacity at HQ, regional centres and country offices.	Provides advice and capacity development for police, defence and justice providers; encourages good governance and rule of law, *inter alia* through JSSR; provides assistance to parliaments; strengthens accountability mechanisms; promotes legal frameworks for the military. Works on SALW, DDR and mine action; has a programming capacity in transitional justice.
UNFPA	Focuses on women, vulnerable groups and refugees.	Contributes to dialogue on gender-sensitive legal reform amongst parliamentarians and civil society. Contributes to the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR.
UNHCR	Mandated to protect refugees.	Supports DDR when related to refugee protection and IDPs.

UNIFEM	Provides technical and financial support to initiatives that promote gender equality and women's empowerment in fragile and stable states with a focus on improving accountability of institutions and advancing the rule of law.	Supports gender-sensitive police reform, provides training on women's human rights; supports women's participation in peacebuilding and governance reform with the objective of increasing gender justice in governance in stable and fragile states. Provides technical support in DDR and gender mainstreaming; has programming capacity in transitional justice.
UNLIREC	Provides implementation support in the Latin American Region.	Develops training courses for MPs on firearms advocacy and legislation; drafts guidelines for the development of Defence White Books; gives support to SALW programmes.
UNODC	Focuses on international crime and drug trafficking prevention.	Undertakes needs assessments to identify equipment and training needs; carries out needs assessments in law enforcement; supports anti-corruption legislation; has created a Handbook on police oversight and integrity.
UNOPS	Acts as service provider for clients within and beyond the UN; gives financial support and implements projects.	Develops reintegration strategies; deals with mine risk education.

they need to be linked in terms of practical policy. The necessity of doing so was highlighted by the President of the General Assembly during the Security Council debate in February 2007, when she underlined the 'need for a common policy within the framework of the Assembly to…coordinate…efforts across the Organisation'.[10]

The second factor is the capacity in terms of both human and financial resources available to support coordination mechanisms at HQs level. Sufficient capacity is needed not only to carry out SSR activities, but also to staff coordination mechanisms and to provide the financial resources to sustain cooperation. According to a recent report,

> the overall UN capacity in SSR, understood as support both to governance and to the development of national capacity in core security operational tasks, remains limited, when not practically non-existent, as in the case of specialised defence reform capacity. What capacity exists is dispersed and poorly coordinated.[11]

SSR has tended to be only one of a diverse range of activities for which HQ is responsible. DPKO has no centralised standing capacity for SSR, and it has thus proved difficult for staff members in the field to collaborate on SSR issues with staff at HQs.

Finally, effective coordination at the UN hinges on achieving an efficient vertical and horizontal flow of information throughout the UN system. In particular, this means that strategies and plans developed at HQs are transmitted down to the field level, and that field level perspectives on programme implementation also reach HQs. This is not always the case: field staff sometimes find that they are not aware of processes taking place at HQs.[12]

Despite these difficulties, some progress has been made in improving the coordination of SSR activities within the UN system. The annual report of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, adopted in February 2006, recognised the importance of SSR in peacekeeping and called for 'a process of joint policymaking on security sector reform best practices'.[13] This resulted in the establishment by the Secretariat of an Inter-Agency Working Group on Security Sector Reform in late 2006, which in early 2007 was turned into a UN Task Force on SSR. The functions of this body, which is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP, include facilitating intra-agency consultation and coordination on SSR related issues.[14] In addition, capacity for SSR is to be increased at HQs with the creation of an inter-agency SSR Support Unit within DPKO that will provide technical resources and policy guidance.

Cooperation in UN peacekeeping missions

This section outlines the role of the UN in SSR and the techniques and challenges of cooperation in the context of four peacekeeping missions: the now-completed *Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi* (ONUB) and the ongoing UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), MINUSTAH and UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

These are often referred to as integrated missions in the sense that they are multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions in which UN actors share a broad understanding of mission responsibilities that goes further than the need to enforce peace accords. The concept of integration was originally developed for the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo in order to resolve '"technical" issues of day-to-day coordination and policy differences'.[15] UN peacekeeping missions now use integration as a tool for increasing coopera-

tion among UN-system actors and optimising the efficiency and impact of their activities. Cooperation amongst UN entities in the field is important in order to bridge the gap, as discussed above, between the short-term goals of some actors (for example, DPKO) and the longer-term development goals of other actors (for example, UNDP).

Integration can also be effective in managing the interface with what is invariably a diverse group of non-UN actors. To this effect, coordination amongst UN entities is important in ensuring that the UN acts in a coherent and unified way in its relations with other actors. This has not always been the case. For example, in Burundi, national stakeholders expressed frustration at the need to hold multiple meetings on the same issues with various parties. This was because sufficient efforts had not been made to coordinate efforts between UN bodies so that they could speak as a single interlocutor.

Techniques of cooperation

Within peacekeeping missions, techniques for cooperation can range from consultations and staff-level contacts among the relevant UN entities on the ground to the development of shared policy frameworks. Within DPKO-led peacekeeping missions, cooperation often takes place between separate sections. In Burundi, the DDR/SSR unit cooperated with the Human Rights division of ONUB to provide training to the Burundian intelligence service. The gender unit was also present at the meetings of the DDR/SSR unit, and a regular and permanent exchange of information was established between the sections. Cooperation between the sections of the peacekeeping missions and other agencies on the ground also led to the joint undertaking of SSR activities, such as a workshop on gender issues and DDR, organised by ONUB's gender unit, with the support of UNIFEM and the National DDR Commission.[16]

The most common form of interaction between members of the UN family involves coordination of their different activities. It can, however, also encompass their integration through the reorganisation of resources and capabilities in order to draw on the comparative advantages of each UN entity. This can take the form of joint fact-finding missions or common planning. In the DRC, the DPKO Police Division and the MONUC Police carried a joint post-elections planning exercise. This two-week exercise had the purpose of creating a coordinated post-elections strategy for MONUC Police. Joint planning was also conducted in preparation for the establishment of the *Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi* (BINUB). Staff from

separate UN entities came together to prepare for BINUB's SSR section by developing a staffing structure and transition plan.

Challenges to cooperation

A number of factors hinder cooperation among different UN agencies. The first is the lack of a strategic UN vision for SSR, which may exacerbate existing rivalries and tensions. This was the case in Haiti, where institutional mistrust hampered the establishment of a viable working relationship between UNDP and MINUSTAH. The cooperation problems between the two were visible in the area of judicial reform. The justice section of MINUSTAH supported a judicial reform plan that had been drafted by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MOJPS), which tabled both short-term (2006-2007) and long term (2007-2009)[17] plans for addressing the needs of the country. UNDP also drafted a judicial reform project document (yet to be signed) that duplicates some of the undertakings of the MOJPS document.

The lack of a strategic vision for SSR is also linked to the absence of a UN-wide definition of SSR. As noted above, different UN entities have distinct perspectives on what activities SSR should encompass. While UNDP perceives justice reform as an integral part of SSR,[18] DPKO-led missions often tend to treat it as an activity that is distinct from SSR. Various UN agencies may work on the same topic without attempting to integrate their separate but related programmes. This was the case in Burundi, where ONUB, UNDP and OHCHR all worked on justice reform but failed to integrate their efforts in a common SSR framework.

Second, there are other institutional differences, such as budgeting procedures and other organisational processes that can further hamper integration. This was true in the case of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission in Haiti. The DDR unit attempted to integrate the work plans of DPKO and UNDP, but partly owing to difficulties in reconciling budgetary and working methods, the two entities resorted to dividing the labour so that DPKO focused on DDR whilst UNDP addressed violence reduction. Although this appears to have resulted in an efficient division of labour on paper, integration was not achieved in practice.

Finally, even when cooperation exists, it will only remain superficial or *ad hoc* if there is no political will to actively engage in furthering the agenda. There is at times a disinclination to make use of available cooperation mechanisms. This may be because UN practitioners are not always aware of the existence of such mechanisms, which can perhaps be considered as symptomatic of the broader problem that coordination mechanisms

are perceived as only moderately useful and oftentimes even a danger to autonomy. In Haiti, a senior representative of MINUSTAH was unaware of the existence of the mission's Rule of Law Working Group. Moreover, on a visit to Haiti at the end of 2006, some senior DPKO officials were surprised to learn that MINUSTAH's Rule of Law Working Group was only meeting on an irregular basis, thus underscoring the communication gap existing between headquarters (DPKO) and the field (MINUSTAH).

Furthermore, even when awareness of such mechanisms exists, the will to cooperate may at times still be lacking. In the DRC, MONUC's Rule of Law Unit was not able to achieve its objective of participating in the *Groupe de Réflexion sur la Réforme de la Police Nationale Congolaise* in order to provide input on vetting and other legal matters concerning the structure of the police because the Unit was not granted access to the Group.[19] This lack of will to be inclusive and to engage with all actors constitutes a prime example of the cooperation deficits that may exist.

The UN system and beyond

There are a number of actors and IGOs outside the UN system that are active in the area of SSR in the field. In the DRC, various missions and operations distinct from MONUC have played roles in the stabilisation of the country. These include the Third Party Verification Mechanism, consisting of UN and African Union officials; EU-led operations including Artemis, the ESDP peace enforcement mission to the city of Bunia (June-September 2003);[20] the police mission EUPOL Kinshasa (since January 2005); the SSR mission EUSEC DR Congo (since June 2005), which is assisting with the financial management of the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC); and more recently, the EUFOR RD Congo military mission, which was deployed to assist MONUC in the preparation of the country's first multiparty elections since 1960. In the DRC and Burundi, the World Bank has also had a strong presence, particularly in the form of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), which has contributed substantially to the DDR process in the Great Lakes region. Finally, in Kosovo, a number of other international actors have been involved alongside the UN, such as the EU, the OSCE and NATO.

This enumeration of non-UN actors active in SSR field activities underscores the importance of cooperation and coordination. The divergent approaches of different actors allow local authorities to play external actors off against each other. The large number of actors engaged in SSR also

compounds the difficulties involved in achieving the effective coordination of activities.

Integration within the UN system may be challenging, but cooperation beyond the UN system is further complicated by the need to interact with other actors, which may reduce the UN's margin for manoeuvre. Several peace agreements call for the UN's implementation of SSR in cooperation with a regional organisation, such as with the African Union in Côte d'Ivoire. This means that the UN is not always free to support SSR in the manner of its choosing, but rather in a way that draws on the comparative advantages of the regional organisation. Moreover, SSR activities are increasingly sub-contracted out to private contractors, as in the case of Liberia. This poses the challenge of how an intergovernmental institution such as the UN can engage with private actors of a profit-oriented nature.

Factors affecting cooperation

The mandate of the mission is likely to have an impact on the quality of co-operation. The SSR tasks should be delineated in the mandate, the lead actor designated and the role and responsibilities of the UN clearly outlined. These conditions have largely been met in Kosovo.

Due to the political sensitivities concerning the enclave's final status, Security Council Resolution 1244 established UNMIK and placed Kosovo under its authority. UNMIK is headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo (SRSG). Under the overall authority of UNMIK, the mission was originally structured around four pillars, one for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, Pillar I), one for the DPKO (Pillar II), one for the OSCE (Pillar III) and another for the EU (Pillar IV). To achieve cooperation, the respective responsibilities of these organisations were outlined in their mandates. UNMIK was made responsible for a number of SSR-related tasks, including the creation of an ethnically-balanced local police force trained in democratic policing.[21] UNMIK was also entrusted with far-reaching executive powers with the aim of enabling it to establish interim institutions of democratic self-government. SSR-related activities such as law enforcement and judicial affairs were merged into departments under the SRSG.

Despite the large number of actors involved and the challenging nature of the mission owing to the absence of an agreement on Kosovo's status, coordination amongst external actors has not proved to be a major difficulty. This suggests that the delineation of responsibilities in a mandate and the establishment of a coherent organisational structure may encourage

cooperation and coordination. In Kosovo, an Advisory Unit on Security provided policy advice on security issues and ensured coordination between the SRSG and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The structure of the IGO presence in Kosovo will change when, as presently foreseen, the EU takes over from the UN and all government functions are transferred to local authority under its supervision. Nonetheless, the Transition Working Groups now in place, which include a working group on security, should help maintain the current spirit of cooperation among actors. These working groups are inclusive and comprised of such actors such as the UN, the OSCE, the EU, KFOR and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PSIG).[22]

Another factor that affects the quality of cooperation is whether or not the coordination mechanisms established have clear terms of reference, specifying the identity and responsibility of members, as well as detailing the conditions and timelines targeted for the handover of responsibilities to local actors. A related factor is whether the body leading the mission takes a pro-active approach to coordination and strives to develop tools that encourage the identification of gaps and overlaps in SSR programming. This was the case in Burundi, where ONUB's DDR/SSR unit supported the establishment of an International Coordination Group that included UN agencies, members of the donor community and representatives of the wider international community. ONUB developed a tool to map the SSR activities carried out by different international actors. This tool listed the current and future SSR activities of the UN and other actors on the ground. Thus, all partners were aware, for example, of the support that the EU was providing to the National Police of Burundi by rehabilitating or constructing offices for the communal police, and of the human rights training that the ICRC was providing to the Penitentiary Police.[23]

Clearly, SSR cooperation will only work where there is sufficient political will. In the DRC, several coordination mechanisms existed for SSR, such as the SSR Joint Commission, the Contact Group, the *Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme de la Police* and the *Comité sur la Justice*; however, their workings were undermined by inconsistency in the policies of bilateral partners.

This highlights the significant impact of the relationship between the UN and bilateral donors on SSR programme delivery. As major contributors of resources, donors are key players. However, their political agendas may be in conflict with one another or with that of UN bodies. When donors disagree on the SSR objectives to be pursued in a specific theatre, the practice of attributing to donors the lead for different areas of SSR may further complicate coordination and cooperation by making it difficult to take into ac-

count linkages between different areas of SSR or by contributing to the duplication of efforts. The latter was the case in Haiti, where separate reform plans for the police were developed in parallel by MINUSTAH and the Canadian International Development Agency.

In a system such as the UN where the disconnect between the centre of ultimate responsibility (HQ) and the locus of direct implementation (the field) is potentially large, leadership plays a crucial role in ensuring the overall coherence of the SSR effort. In fact, effective leadership may be the only way to overcome the lack of will to coordinate. The case of UNMIK and ONUB suggests that when the UN is in the lead, or strives to take the lead, it is easier to introduce elements of responsibility, accountability and ownership into SSR programme activities. For this reason, a hierarchical arrangement that clearly designates the lead actor may be the best way of ensuring necessary cooperation and coordination, both within the UN system and when UN actors work together with bilateral and multilateral partners. The table below summarises the UN's three different SSR cooperation and coordination patterns and provides examples of each.

Conclusions

Enhancing cooperation with other actors is essential in the area of SSR where no universal guidelines are applicable and where divergent approaches to SSR risk generating duplication and contradictions in the efforts of different actors. On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to identify three main ways in which cooperation on SSR can be improved: 1) through the development of a common UN vision for SSR; 2) by strengthening existing coordination mechanisms and policy tools; 3) through enhanced leadership structures to encourage and support coordination.

First, the development of a common UN vision for SSR is essential if UN actors are to cooperate in achieving shared goals and reducing competing priorities as far as possible. There is an urgent need for an integrated strategy based on a common UN definition of SSR. This strategy should take into account the comparative advantages of each UN entity and what this should mean in terms of SSR implementation and management structures. In particular, it should determine where the UN has a comparative advantage over other actors and under which circumstances its role in SSR should not be a leading, but a supporting one.

Table 10.2 Typology of cooperation/coordination patterns

Pattern	Mission
UN is in the lead	UNMIK In Kosovo, the UN has clearly been in the lead on SSR. Despite the number of actors present on the ground – NATO, the EU and the OSCE – coordination with international actors has not been identified as a major obstacle in undertaking SSR in Kosovo. This is possibly because the mission has a hierarchical structure and the responsibilities of different actors are clearly attributed and defined.
Co-leadership	MONUC In the DRC, the EU and the UN share leadership. Both actors are heavily involved in SSR. MONUC has an SSR unit whilst the EU has an SSR mission on the ground. Several coordination mechanisms exist; however, coordination is generally seen as a major challenge for this mission.
UN is one of several actors	ONUB In Burundi, the UN is only one of several actors on the ground and has no formal leadership role. However, owing to the UN's pro-active efforts, coordination works relatively well. Moreover, the efforts are generally welcomed by other actors that lack the UN's capacity. MINUSTAH In Haiti, the UN is one of several actors and does not attempt to take a pro-active lead in the coordination of SSR activities. Coordination is therefore often lacking and the duplication of SSR initiatives has been a problem.

Second, there need to be continued efforts to bundle and streamline presently unconnected UN planning, including budgetary and overall working processes. Coordination mechanisms can also be enhanced by developing precise terms of reference for SSR project delivery, both for those that are strictly UN activities and those that engage a larger community of actors.

The third factor concerns the need to enhance the political will for cooperation within the UN system, both at headquarters and in the field. This a daunting task. However, within the UN system, it can be encouraged to some extent by strengthening or creating leadership and management structures capable of taking the lead in designing, planning and integrating SSR efforts within a single strategic framework. The UN needs a dedicated structure for SSR at HQs. The recent creation of the SSR Support Unit within DPKO marks an important step in this direction. It is too early, however, to assess

the contribution of this unit or of other new UN bodies such as the Peace-building Commission. To the extent that the UN can put its SSR house in order, the prospects for improving its cooperation in the area of SSR with non-UN actors should correspondingly improve.

Notes

1   This chapter is based on the findings of a DPKO- and UNDP-initiated project supported by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Entitled 'The UN approach to security sector/system reform in post-conflict peacebuilding: Review of recent experience of UN integrated missions in SSR activities', the project was implemented by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The findings are based on extensive interviews carried out at UN headquarters and in the field. The four draft case studies undertaken in the framework of this project, Burundi, DRC, Haiti and Kosovo, were selected on the basis of the peacekeeping missions' active involvement in SSR (only ongoing missions were considered). The draft case studies were prepared by: Laurent Banal and Vincenza Scherrer (Burundi); Nicola Dahrendorf (DRC); Eirin Mobekk (Haiti); and Eric Scheye (Kosovo). For project details, see http://www.dcaf.ch and the forthcoming DCAF publication. The author would like to thank DCAF colleagues Heiner Hänggi and Fairlie Jensen for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
2   A notable exception is the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone's mandate in Sierra Leone, which calls for 'enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability of public institutions, including through anti-corruption measures and improved fiscal management'. See UNSC Resolution 1620, SC/1620 (31 August 2005).
3   See UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2005/30 (12 July 2005).
4   Ibid.
5   UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2007/3 (21 February 2007).
6   For more information on the issue of local ownership and SSR, see Laurie Nathan, *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors* (London: Crisis States Research Centre, September 2006).
7   The table draws on the Peacebuilding Inventory and its Annex No. 4, as well as the relevant websites of UN entities. See Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, *Inventory: United Nations Capacity in Peacebuilding* (Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 2006).
8   This was a recurring theme in interviews with UN staff at headquarters and in the field.
9   The enumeration of the UN entities involved in SSR does not mean that other UN entities do not have capacity in these activities. For instance, the ILO has been closely involved in the establishment of the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and the WHO has a joint programme with UNDP on Armed Violence Prevention in relation to SALW; however, the activities of these actors have not been included in the table as they are not considered to be major UN players in SSR.

10 See UNSC, 'Security Sector Reform In Post-Conflict States Critical To Consolidating Peace: Report Needed Aimed At Improving Un Effectiveness, Security Council Says', UN Doc. SC/8958 (20 February 2007).
11 Executive Office of the Secretary-General, *op. cit.*, 22.
12 For this reason, UN staff in Burundi suggested that SSR staff in the field should be kept abreast of developments and should be included in training sessions on SSR at HQs.
13 UNGA, Report of the Secretary-General, 'Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations', A/61/668/Add.1 (22 December 2006).
14 Information received through consultations with UN staff. The Task Force is specifically requested to consult and liaise with the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group.
15 Espen Barth Eide et. al., *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group (OCHA, May 2005), 12.
16 Members of the DDR/SSR unit and of the gender unit of ONUB, interviews by author, Burundi (December 2006).
17 Plan d'action du Ministère de la Justice de la Securité Publique dans le Cadre de la Réforme Judiciaire.
18 See UNDP, *Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR's Programmatic Approach* (UNDP, November 2002).
19 See internal document of the MONUC Rule of Law Unit, *Strategic Objectives Implementation Report* (2007).
20 EU Artemis has been authorised by UNSC Res. 1484, S/RES/1484 (30 May 2003).
21 UNSC, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Kosovo', S/1999/779 (12 July 1999), para. 64.
22 Kosovo Programme Coordinator, interview by author, Geneva, July 2007.
23 ONUB DDR-SSR Section, *Summary overview of current and planned support* (ONUB, October 2006).

Chapter 11

Between Conflict and Cooperation: International Police Reform Efforts in South Eastern Europe

Ursula C. Schroeder[1]

Introduction

Multiple international actors pursue internal security sector reform (SSR) initiatives in South Eastern Europe. In effect, a confusing number of judicial, penal and police reform projects have been active in the Western Balkans at any given time during the last decade. Focussing on the international community's regional police reform activities, this chapter outlines the scope and focus of these different projects and traces emerging patterns of cooperation between international actors in South Eastern Europe.

Even at first glance, we can see that ongoing police reform projects in the region are taking place in a crowded field. Nearly every single large international or regional organisation has civilian SSR missions and projects on the ground in the Western Balkans. These include the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Stability Pact and the European Union (EU), which are all involved in reforming police institutions and in building up police capacity. In addition, there are numerous bilateral assistance arrangements taking place in parallel. One example is the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which assists Balkan states in creating modern and democratic police institutions.

With so many different national and international actors with sometimes rather similar mandates, operating in close proximity, coordination is essential if assistance efforts are not to be duplicated. Particularly in view of the new complexity of civilian and military peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts,[2] the need to coordinate activities across departmental and organisational divides is a matter of urgency. Failure to do so will have

an adverse effect on the prospects for creating stable, democratic and sustainable security institutions in South Eastern Europe.

This chapter introduces four ideal-types of interactions between intergovernmental organisations (IGOs): *cooperation*, *coordination*, *non-interaction* and *competition*.

Table 11.1 Typology of Organisational Interaction

Cooperation	Joint strategies and programmes
Coordination	Negative (non-intrusion) and positive (problem-solving)
Non-Interaction	Parallel programmes, high potential for occupational overlap
Competition	Infringements, 'turf wars' over competences

The first, *cooperation*, refers to the strongest and most substantive form of inter-organisational interaction and concerns activities and policy programmes implemented jointly by two or more entities. Cooperation typically includes the joint drafting of political strategies and the integration of the responsibility for both planning and operations into a single joint chain of command. For such types of concerted actions, stable inter-organisational cooperation arrangements are therefore needed. Mostly, a joint hierarchy or a dual political superstructure has control of the cooperative policy or operation. The establishment of common headquarters in the field points to close cooperation, although 'lead agency' concepts can also involve strong forms of cooperative arrangements between different actors.

Coordination, in contrast to the joint implementation of policies in cooperative endeavours, refers to measures undertaken with a view to separating the work of actors, while keeping everyone in the loop about ongoing projects to avoid duplication. 'Positive coordination' involves the active search for common solutions to problems. It builds on trust among the actors and, in contrast to negative coordination, actors may agree to accept short-term disadvantages in view of possible longer-term positive outcomes. Indicators for positive coordination are, for instance, the establishment of inter- or intra-departmental taskforces with a problem-solving mandate that does not exclusively focus on the protection of vested rights. In contrast to 'nega-

tive' forms of coordination, this variant tends to be very rare.[3] In negative coordination, actors coordinate their work in order to make sure that others do not violate their individual competences and interests. This form of cooperation aims to protect the interests of all actors involved. Examples of indicators for negative coordination are policies of information exchange, e.g., the exchange of strategic information with the intent of establishing joint assessments or the exchange of work plans and details of 'who does what' within each organisation.

In the sphere of SSR, negative forms of policy coordination are very prominent and focus on dividing the competences of actors into different *functions, territories or phases*. In the first instance, security assistance programmes are compartmentalised by an agreement on which actor fulfils what aspect of a comprehensive task. The second approach is to establish fixed regional or local competences for different actors. The third divides security assistance into several consecutive phases of engagement by different actors.

In contrast to these active efforts to engage with other organisations in the first two types of interaction, the third type – *non-interaction* – refers to a failure to coordinate work across departmental or organisational divisions, often resulting from a disinterest in doing so. Non-interaction refers to cases where several actors pursue similar security assistance policies in a region or state in parallel without institutionalising information exchange or cooperation with each other. *Competition*, the fourth type, is often driven by unclear divisions of competence between agencies or, alternatively, of the intrusion by one agency into another's domain. Such occupational overlaps between different agencies, and accompanying conflicts over resources and competences, can lead to competitive and antagonistic behaviour among the organisations involved.

Drawing on this typology, this chapter assesses the current patterns of organisational interaction in the area of police reform in South Eastern Europe. It discusses whether and to what extent organisations have started to coordinate their work and assesses how well these new forms of coordination and cooperation work in practice. The chapter first summarises existing international involvement and IGO competences for police reform in the Balkans. Second, it compares the nature of formal cooperation agreements between different international organisations on the ground. Third, the chapter offers a preliminary assessment of how well these coordination endeavours have worked in practice and comments on the implementation of EU, UN and OSCE projects and missions in the cases of Bosnia and Macedonia. In the last section, it draws some initial conclusions on the patterns of inter-

action between international actors in the region and formulates recommendations on how to improve cooperation on the ground.

International Police Reform Efforts in South Eastern Europe

Who is involved in police reform activities in South Eastern Europe and what types of assistance policies do these actors implement? The following overview addresses the competences and activities of the UN, EU, OSCE, CoE and Stability Pact (see Table 11.2). It compares their individual programmatic focus and policy tools as well as the scope of their involvement in the region.

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

For some years now, the OSCE has focused part of its activity in the region on addressing the challenges to stability and security posed by organised crime and weak criminal justice systems. The Istanbul European Charter for Security (1999), the Maastricht Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2003) and the decisions taken at the Ljubljana Ministerial Council (2005) are examples of the OSCE's proactive approach towards internal security challenges.[4] In the Balkans, the OSCE has played a consistent role in police reform and other civilian security sector assistance activities. In 2007, the OSCE has seven field missions on the ground in South Eastern Europe alone.

In Albania, the OSCE presence has concentrated on anti-trafficking and anti-corruption activities, and has provided police training assistance. The Mission to Bosnia has focused on monitoring criminal law reforms and war crimes cases, and additionally provided technical and legal support in the fight against human trafficking. The Mission to Croatia fulfilled its mandate in the area of police reform in 2006. Aimed at supporting the establishment of an accountable and democratic police service, the Mission's Police Affairs Unit gradually moved from monitoring tasks to advising the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. The OSCE's Kovoso Mission continues its specialised police training and rule of law monitoring activities. The Missions to Serbia and Montenegro similarly had a police reform component that specialised in providing assistance in the fight against organised crime and enhancing the border management capacities of both entities. Lastly, the OSCE's Spillover Mission to Skopje initially conducted basic training for

Table 11.2   Who does what

	Programme Focus	Instruments	Geographical Scope
OSCE	• police training in the fight against organ-ised crime, traffick-ing, corruption • border management training • community policing	• long-term field missions with advisory roles • institution- and capacity-building • institution monitoring	• South-Eastern Europe (currently seven field missions in the region)
EU	• democratic policing • fight against organised crime, corruption, trafficking, money laundering • improving the security of citizens	• short- to med-ium-term ESDP mis-sions, mostly capacity-building • longer-term EC projects and missions, mostly institu-tion building	• ESDP police missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo (planned) • EC projects in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, FYROM, Croatia, Bosnia and Albania
UN	• community policing • human rights and rule of law training • executive police functions (maintain-ing law and order, countering crime)	• executive police missions • technical assistance and capacity-building	• Kosovo (UNMIK, UNDP) • Bosnia (UNMIBH) • Albania (UNDP)
Council of Europe	• consolidation of democratic stability • strengthening of police capacities for dealing with serious crime, trafficking	• technical assistance • training, seminars and study visits	• regional police reform programme for SEE (CARPO) • Moldova (anti-corruption) • Serbia (economic crime)
Stability Pact	• promotion of regional cooperation in fighting organised crime • anti-corruption projects	• different training activities	• regional in scope

border police officers. Today, it also provides training to police officers in the area of organised crime.

European Union

The EU is heavily involved in police reform activities both through its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and through the Commission's long-term assistance and accession policies in the region. As for the first, the EU has deployed several ESDP police missions to Macedonia and Bosnia in recent years and will in the near future send a large police mission to Kosovo. As the latest addition to the IGO scene in the Balkans, these missions provide short-term assistance in the fields of police training and capacity building. The EU police mission to Bosnia (EUPM), for example, seeks to create sustainable policing structures under Bosnian ownership through training, mentoring and monitoring activities. Its recently refocused mandate supports police reform specifically in the field of organised crime. Similarly, the already completed ESDP police missions to Macedonia – Proxima and EUPAT – were mandated to consolidate law and order and to support the fight against organised crime by advising and training the Macedonian police.

Yet, despite the substantial public attention paid to these ESDP missions, the EU exerts its greatest leverage over the Western Balkans through its long-term association and accession strategies. The EU's Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) form the overarching political framework for its relations with most states in the region and are supposed to lead to their EU membership. And since progress in the areas of police restructuring, establishing the rule of law and fighting organised crime are preconditions for the eventual accession of South Eastern European states to the European Union, the Stabilisation and Association Process is possibly the most powerful policy tool the EU currently has at its disposal. In terms of funding, EU regional and national assistance have until now been supported by the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. As of 2007, the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) replaces CARDS. Further, the majority of European Community assistance projects – i.e., in Serbia (including Kosovo), Montenegro and Macedonia – are managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), an independent EU agency that will gradually phase out its activities in 2008.

In the EU's current regional assistance programmes, support to police reform and the rule of law plays a key role. For instance, the EAR has invested in police capacity in several states through the provision of new

hardware as well as a series of specialised training courses in the judicial and law enforcement fields.[5] EU instruments also include the establishment of member states-led twinning projects aimed at police reform in Macedonia and Serbia. Overall, the European Community supports the fight against organised crime and the creation of police services that operate in accordance with recognised international standards through the implementation of reform, reorganisation and retraining projects across South Eastern Europe.[6]

United Nations

The United Nations family has extensive capabilities and experience in the area of police reform. UNDP and UNDPKO deploy civilian police missions and pursue police reform projects worldwide. In the Western Balkans, UN civilian police missions have been active in several states. Already completed civilian police missions include the UN mission to Croatia in 1998 that monitored police performance in the Danube region. A larger police mission, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, 1995-2002) and its International Police Task Force (IPTF), was authorised to monitor, inspect, train and advise local law enforcement forces. UNSC Resolution 1088 expanded the IPTF's mandate, allowing it to investigate police misconduct and charging UNMIBH with assisting in the setting up of effective police institutions. In addition, UNDP has emerged as a strong player in the field of civilian SSR. The agency has, for instance, been involved in implementing a comprehensive approach to Albanian community-based policing since 2004.

     In police reform and policing support in Kosovo, UN involvement is particularly strong. Effectively, Kosovo has been under UN administration since 1999, with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in charge of law enforcement functions. UNMIK, through Security Council Resolution 1244, is mandated to maintain civil law and order through the establishment of local police forces and the deployment of international police personnel to Kosovo. UN civilian police carry out normal police duties and have executive law enforcement authority until the newly established Kosovo Police Force (KPS) can take over full law and order functions. UNDP, in close cooperation and dialogue with UNMIK, supports capacity building within the KPS and provides immediate administrative support and technical assistance.

Council of Europe

The CoE's assistance programmes in the region fall under its general mandate of consolidating democratic stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform. Its Programme against Corruption and Organisation Crime in South-eastern Europe (PACO) and Lara Project target the South Eastern European region and offer technical and legal assistance to police and justice bodies involved in the fight against organised crime, corruption, human trafficking and money laundering. A joint regional project with the European Commission, the CARDS Regional Police Project (CARPO, 2004-2007), aims to strengthen police capacities for dealing with serious crime in South Eastern Europe.[7] This project uses training, seminars, mentoring and visits to foster regional cooperation in criminal matters, develop a regional strategy on serious crime and enhance local actors' competence in handling human trafficking and smuggling.

Stability Pact

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SEESP) – established in 1999 as a framework agreement on international cooperation in the region – aims to create stability and growth. Its aims are complementary to the EU's SAP and accession processes, but it is neither a new international organisation nor does it have any independent financial resources or implementing structures. One of its working tables – Table III on 'Security Issues' – is concerned with internal security issues and aims to establish a stable security environment in the region, *inter alia* through the promotion of regional cooperation in the fight against organised crime and corruption.[8] Three projects are particularly relevant in this context. First, there is the 'Police Forum' initiative, which provides regional police training modules for senior police officers. Second, the Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI) provides support to the development and implementation of national anti-corruption plans; it aims to strengthen specialised anti-corruption services and engages in the building of regional anti-corruption networks. Third, the Stability Pact Initiative against Organised Crime (SPOC) facilitates dialogue among regional and international stakeholders in the law enforcement field and is involved in advocating policy and developing strategies for the struggle against organised crime in the SEE region. In February 2008, the Stability Pact will be transformed into an organisational body, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Aimed at fostering regional cooperation, the RCC will serve as a common framework

for the involvement of international donors in SEE after the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process phases out its activities in 2007.

Formal Coordination and Cooperation Agreements

As we have seen, several international organisations pursue parallel police reform projects in South Eastern Europe. The following section outlines the adoption of formal coordination and cooperation agreements between the different actors on the ground and assesses the substance of these arrangements. I will use the typology developed in the introduction to classify these formal agreements.

Cooperation

Formal arrangements to cooperate exist above all as a series of bilateral agreements concluded, for example, between the UN and the EU, between the OSCE and the Council of Europe, between the OSCE and the UN, and between the EU and the Council of Europe.

EU-UN interactions in civilian police reform missions build on the Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management (2003). In order to implement this declaration, the two organisations established a consultative committee – the Steering Committee – and developed a system of regular EU-UN staff meetings. EU-UN crisis management cooperation mainly concerns agreements about cooperation in peacekeeping operations and addresses the question of whether the EU is able to supply the UN with additional troops and integrated civilian force packages for its missions.[9] Operational cooperation in the policing field in the Balkans was initiated in early 2003 with the handover of the UN's IPTF police reform mission in Bosnia to the European Union's first ever police mission (EUPM). As of January 2003, both the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Council's General Secretariat had established task forces for liaison purposes.[10] In the case of Bosnian police reform, EU-UN cooperation primarily took place through inter-institutional interaction in the planning phase and in the first six months of the EU police mission, during which EU and UN planning teams were co-located in Sarajevo and served under a double-hatted IPTF Commissioner/Head of the EUPM planning team.[11] Direct co-operation of the EUPM with the UN liquidation team ended in June 2003, although the Security Council invited the EU to keep it regularly informed on the activities of the EUPM.[12] In June 2007, a second 'Declaration on Co-

operation' emphasised the increasing scope of EU-UN cooperation, particularly in the Balkans, Africa and Middle East, and called for its intensification.

In the Balkans, the UN has also cooperated closely with the OSCE. In particular, the OSCE Mission deployed to Kosovo in 1999 represented a new step in bilateral relations between the two organisations. For the first time, an OSCE Mission became an integral part of an operation led by the United Nations.[13] The Kosovo OSCE mission forms a distinct component of the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) and is mandated to carry out institution- and democracy-building tasks and to foster the rule of law. The two organisations have a division of labour in the area of police reform that gives UNMIK police the task of providing temporary law enforcement and assisting with police administration, while the OSCE trains police officers on international human rights and community-based policing standards.

Further instances of cooperation are joint programmes established by the European Commission and the Council of Europe. Since 1993, shared general aims have led the CoE and the EU to establish a tight network of relations, including the implementation of joint EU/CoE programmes. The Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership (April 2001) between the CoE and the European Commission pointed to a more systematic approach to joint programming and priority setting. As a result, the Commission's Directorate General for External Relations and the CoE's Directorate of Strategic Planning began to come together to set and match priorities for the conduct of joint programmes. In South Eastern Europe, joint programmes have been established in Albania, Moldova, Serbia, BiH and Macedonia. Aimed at facilitating and supporting legal and institutional reform, programmes are in most cases co-financed by both organisations. Cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs is particularly advanced; a recent example in the field of police reform is the CARDS Regional Police Project (CARPO), a Council of Europe/European Commission regional project aimed at assisting the fight against serious crime in South Eastern Europe. Launched in March 2004, CARPO is mandated to provide the participating states with tools and comprehensive training for dealing with trafficking, smuggling, illegal migration and economic and organised crime. It will be completed in summer 2007.

Coordination

In contrast to inter-organisational *cooperation* in joint programmes and missions, the *coordination* of different organisations' mandates in the field is a less ambitious endeavour. Coordination mostly entails exchanging information between organisations and dividing up the work of organisations on the ground into separate tasks, phases or territories.

The linkages between the OSCE and other actors working in the same field are typical for formal interagency coordination arrangements. As one example, interactions between the OSCE and the EU have increased in importance in recent years. Since the launch of the EU's first crisis management mission, OSCE and EU activities in the fields of judicial and police reform have converged and to some extent overlap. Unlike the close EU-CoE cooperation in joint missions, OSCE and EU interactions have remained limited to classical forms of interagency coordination. The formal framework stresses the relevance of a series of consultations between the political leaderships of both organisations, as well as ongoing staff-level talks on issues of common interest.[14] In the field, Heads of OSCE field missions regularly liaise with the Heads of EU delegations or the EU Special Representative. Fact-finding missions by either organisation often include representatives from both organisations. Formally, EU-OSCE relations are built on the notion of a 'complementary relationship', rather than close cooperation. Yet, this goal has proven to be elusive on the ground, since actual interactions in the field have been characterised as competitive. For instance, the activities of the EU police mission in Bosnia have led to 'a feeling of competition rather than cooperation' between the two organisations.[15]

As a second example of formal coordination agreements, OSCE-CoE relations are based on the 'Common Catalogue of Cooperation Modalities', signed in 2000 between the respective Secretaries-General, and on the subsequent 'Declaration on Cooperation' of April 2005. The formal structure of interactions is outlined in the 'Common Catalogue' as a series of high-level and work-level institutional contacts, including annual meetings and visits of the Secretaries General and the Chairmanships to sessions of the governing bodies of the two organisations. The 2005 'Declaration' stressed the need for both organisations to work more closely together in identifying effective coordinated responses to the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century 'on the basis of complementarity, transparency and democratic accountability, while respecting the autonomy, different membership and distinctive tasks of each organisation'.[16] Clearly a case of coordination between the functionally separated work of different agencies, OSCE-CoE interaction is

based on their common interest in promoting democracy and stability through complementary activities using different working methods. Recently, interaction in the field has moved towards closer cooperation. In particular, the 2005 'Co-operation Agreement on Local Government Assistance in South Eastern Europe'[17] committed both organisations to developing joint actions in support of democracy and good governance. The joint actions are implemented through enhanced consultation procedures in the early planning stages of relevant programmes and through yearly inter-organisational meetings. These evaluate joint actions and consider opportunities for synergies and potential future joint operations. Today, many OSCE field missions have established close contacts with the CoE, for instance in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Skopje and Kosovo. Over the past years, OSCE-CoE interactions have thus clearly moved away from the mere exchange of information and cross-representation at specific events towards the planning and implementation of joint activities.

In the past decade, and particularly within the last five years, formal and mostly bilateral arrangements between international organisations have mushroomed. The previous section gave examples of the trend towards establishing coordination and cooperation agreements between international organisations active in civilian SSR. Yet, although we find a dense web of formal bilateral relations between several organisations at the political level, the question is what impact this development has had on the relationship of actors in the field. A closer look at the actual substance of formal coordination arrangements reveals that they are mostly focused on enhancing interaction at headquarters level and remain limited to annual meetings and staff visits. In contrast to some of the stronger cooperation agreements, the former arrangements can be characterised as mainly symbolic politics unlikely to have much impact on day-to-day interactions in the field. However, to assess whether the new formal coordination and cooperation arrangements have been able to supersede 'non-interactive' and 'competitive' types of inter-organisational relations, we need to take a look at organisational activities on the ground. Have the outlined declarations of intent been able to deliver on the goal of better coordination in practice, or do we find a gap between formal agreements to cooperate and coordinate and activities in the field?

Assessing International Coordination in the Field

In their approach to the Western Balkans region, international organisations have in the past routinely called for more effective donor coordination. An EU 'Action Oriented Paper' on improving cooperation on internal security issues with Western Balkan states argued that EU delegations and member states 'should strengthen donor coordination relating to institution and capacity building in the Western Balkans'.[18] The following section sketches donor coordination efforts in Bosnia and Macedonia and discusses the main trends and patterns of cooperation, coordination, non-interaction and competition among the various donors active on the ground.[19]

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia, due to the sheer number of actors on the ground, the coordination of donor activities is a particularly salient problem. The overall organisational framework for policy coordination among all international actors in Bosnia is the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Dayton peace accords. Following on from the first Common Security Policy Working Group (CSPWG) established in 1999 by the High Representative, SFOR and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia,[20] the PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies. Its Steering Board provides political guidance to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia. The main coordination structure for day-to-day activities in the field is the Board of Principles, whose membership includes *inter alia* NATO, OSCE, EUPM, UNDP, EUFOR, the Office of the High Representative, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Commission. Yet, despite the existence of high level coordination fora, practitioners often assess organisational interactions on the ground as being weak or even outright competitive. How does this gap between political coordination fora and work-level relations play out in the field of police reform in Bosnia?

As an integral part of the Dayton Peace Accords, the reform of the police forces in Bosnia is a priority for the international community, not the least because it is a prerequisite for Bosnia entering stabilisation and association negotiations with the European Union. The reform of the Bosnian police force pursues three aims: the centralisation of competences at the state level, consolidating the thirteen original fragmented services; the cessation of political interference in policing; and the designation of police districts to follow policing requirements rather than political entity divisions.[21] Of the many international actors in Bosnia, the United Nations and the European

Union are the leading actors in police reform activities.[22] The OSCE, as the third largest organisation on the ground, pursues a defence reform agenda aimed at developing a state-level defence architecture and at establishing better democratic control of the Bosnian armed forces.

In the area of police reform, the UN's Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, 1995-2002) started out with the implementation of reform goals to meet the Dayton Accords by creating the IPTF. The IPTF downsized the bloated wartime Bosnian police forces and was mandated to assist in the creation of multi-ethnic, professional and effective police forces.[23] Through monitoring and inspection of law enforcement activities as well as training and advice to law enforcement personnel and governmental authorities, IPTF sought to raise the professional skills of the police force and ensure that police officers met international standards of professional and personal integrity. In 2003, the EU took over these police reform tasks from the UN. Deployed as its first ever ESDP crisis management mission, the objective of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia (EUPM) is to establish a sustainable and accountable police structure in Bosnia that follows a 'European model' of policing.

EUPM-UNMIBH cooperation in the transition period was the first real test case of EU-UN cooperation in the field. In order to ensure a 'smooth transition' between operations, the former IPTF Commissioner became the first EUPM Commissioner. Also, a relatively high number of IPTF staff (approximately 120) were retained in central positions and transferred to EUPM command. In the transition period, the EU deployed an 'EU Planning Team' to BiH (August-December 2002), while the United Nations kept a liaison team on the ground in 2003 to assist EUPM during its first six months of deployment. Overall, the cooperation experience has been widely hailed as a positive example of inter-organisational cooperation and most observers agree that the hand-over from the UN to the EU has been 'seamless'[24] and 'successful'[25]. Inter-institutional cooperation during the planning phase and the collocation of the EUPM Planning Team within the UNMIBH headquarters were among the measures credited with the smooth transition from one organisation to the next.

Nevertheless, an EU 'lessons learned'-paper dealing with the initial planning stages of EUPM raised two challenges to successful cooperation: on the one hand, the double-hatting of the IPTF Commissioner and the Head of the future EUPM created too high a workload for the IPTF Commander, preventing him 'from consistent engagement with the EUPM PT [Planning Team] and its work'.[26] On the other hand, the overlap of the missions as well as the high number of retained personnel left the strong impression that the

EU follow-on mission was not an independent entity, but completely de-pendent on UN strategies for police reform.[27] Hence, while coordination in the six-month hand-over phase seems to have been relatively efficient, the question is whether the continuation of the original UN mission mandate and infrastructure under a new structure was the best policy option.

A further, and at least initially less positive, example of inter-organisational relations in Bosnia is the interaction between different EU actors active in the field. At the most general level, the Office of the High Representative/EU Special Representative (EUSR) is tasked with ensuring a coordinated and coherent EU approach to building self-sustaining peace and stability in Bosnia. In practice, this coordinating function depends very much on the role each EUSR chooses to play. The EUSR is not always successful in preventing turf wars among different EU bodies and missions. The most public and prominent conflicts have traditionally taken place between the European Council's second-pillar ESDP missions and the European Com-mission's first-pillar association and development policies. In this context, police reform is a clear case of a less than optimally coordinated EU strat-egy. As one observer has noted, the EU did not have a unified political strat-egy for assistance in BiH in 2005, because the OHR/EUSR, the EC Delega-tion and EUPM all 'had varying degrees of involvement, influence and in-terests'.[28] Neither did the EU pursue a comprehensive counter-crime strategy until 2006, although most of its agencies on the ground have a mandate to assist in the fight against organised crime in Bosnia. Yet the case of coordi-nating the fight against crime has had an unexpected twist, since relations between the deployed EU police (EUPM II) and military (EUFOR Althea) missions were found to be worse than between the Council and the Commis-sion, while cooperation between EUPM and the EC Delegation apparently worked quite well.[29]

In the light of these examples, inter-organisational interactions in Bosnia can be said to be characterised by both competitive dynamics as well as attempts to coordinate activities in the field. While high-level multilateral fora – such as the Peace Implementation Council and its Board of Principals – have remained limited to information exchange and some negative coordi-nation functions, the relationship between the EU and the UN can be classi-fied as a cooperative one. In the transition period between IPTF and EUPM operations, the co-location of staff as well the double-hatting of the Com-missioner pointed towards substantive cooperation beyond negative coordi-nation and information exchange. Yet beyond this instance, relations among international actors on the ground can mostly be described in terms of non-interaction, conflict and competition. An early assessment of international

assistance to Bosnia found fault with the lack of a common strategy for re-construction and argued that a 'segmented, almost a-strategic approach'[30] characterised early implementation endeavours despite the considerable re-sources that international implementers possessed. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) later assessed international cooperation in the Western Balkans in a similar manner: 'Despite the relatively large amounts of international assistance flowing into the region, coordination between donors tends to be weak'.[31] Overall, international donors in Bosnia have found it difficult to coordinate their work, not least because of their different and often incompatible mandates, operating procedures, timelines and funding sources.

Macedonia

Police reform in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia poses coordi-nation problems that are similar to the Bosnian case. The international com-munity's activities follow the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed in 2001 by the Republic of Macedonia and Albanian representatives with the objec-tive of securing a sustainable peace in Macedonia. In the field of police re-form, the Framework Agreement invites the OSCE, the European Union and the United States to increase training activities and assistance programmes for the police. As a result, a variety of police reform programmes have been implemented in Macedonia in recent years.

For instance the EU's activities in Macedonia encompass both long-term institution-building projects and short-term police reform missions. The latter ESDP police missions – EUPOL Proxima[32] and the smaller follow-up EU police advisory team EUPAT – were deployed between 2003 and 2006 with the mandate to assist the Macedonian police forces in their reform ef-forts. Proxima monitored, mentored and advised the Macedonian police, but had no executive mandate of its own. The European Commission's longer-term projects, on the other hand, pursue the goal of bringing Macedonia closer to EU membership. As a member of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), Macedonia has received European Community (EC) police reform assistance since 2002. Through its 'EC Justice and Home Affairs Project' (ECJHAT), the 'EC Police Reform Project' (PRP) and a series of bilateral twinning arrangements with EU Member States, the European Commission has continuously advised Macedonia on issues of police strat-egy development, integrated border management and the fight against crime.[33] These activities have been funded through the EU's CARDS pro-gramme while implementation has been managed by the EAR.

As a result of the two distinct approaches to police reform within the European Union, coordination agreements in the field have not only been relevant for the interactions between different organisations, but, similar to the case of Bosnia, also for intra-EU relations. Informal coordination meetings of all involved EU agencies – the EU Presidency, the Commission Delegation, the EAR, Proxima, the EU Monitoring Mission, the ECJHAT coordinator – have taken place weekly. Yet, these EU inter-institutional relations have been marred by infighting and competition.[34]

Cooperation among the international organisations active in Macedonia has proved to be equally difficult. Particularly in the case of EU-OSCE relations, tensions have been presumably unavoidable since both actors have pursued very similar aims. In April 2003, a Police Experts Group was created in Skopje to facilitate operational coordination among the different actors involved in police reform.[35] Despite the establishment of this new forum, inter-organisational tensions have persisted. One example of this is provided by the relationship between the OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje – on the ground since 1992 – with other actors in the field. This mission, originally established to avoid conflict spillover from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has long-standing capacities in police reform. Its 'Police Development Unit' has assisted the government in developing and implementing a national police reform strategy and trained the Macedonian police forces. With the mandate of EU Proxima following similar aims, the OSCE mission felt that it had been marginalised by the EU's ESDP mission.[36] In addition, the European Commission's police reform projects also clashed with those of the OSCE mission established earlier. An EU implementation report dealing with the coordination of EU and OSCE law enforcement activities outlined that despite a memorandum of understanding signed by both parties and notwithstanding the deployment of EU liaison personnel to the OSCE mission, cooperation had at times been less than optimal. It found that 'the inherent difficulties in co-ordinating policy-inputs from different international actors has on occasion weakened the effectiveness of efforts to make progress in the reforms'.[37] In this case, political coordination agreements did not trickle down to the level of in-country organisational relations. Although it is difficult to extrapolate general lessons from this example, the case of EU-OSCE relations points to the difficulties that can arise when tasks are not clearly divided among the multiple actors on the ground.

Conclusions

International organisations active in internal security reform projects in South Eastern Europe have come to accept the need for enhanced donor co-ordination in the field. As a result, a series of coordination and cooperation agreements between different international organisations have been adopted in recent years. These have increased the prospects for interagency interaction in the field of police reform. Some bilateral cooperation agreements – for instance, the OSCE/CoE, OSCE/UN and CoE/EC agreements – have even led to the planning and implementation of joint and co-financed missions. Nevertheless, the trend towards establishing high-level political agreements on coordination has not always led to increased coordination on the ground. In some cases, organisational coordination in the field has lagged behind high-level political emphasis on donor coordination. EU-OSCE relations, for example, have been described as competitive.[38] Due to the relative novelty of some coordination arrangements, it is too soon to tell whether formal commitments to strengthen donor coordination will eventually be implemented in the field.

Drawing on the experience of donor coordination in the Balkans, there are four challenges to effective coordination and cooperation arrangements. As the first and most general challenge, different organisations may entertain a variety of understandings of what their SSR activities set out to achieve. Often, a single overarching SSR strategy for assistance to the recipient state are lacking. As a result, different security sector reform assistance projects risk duplication, conflict and inefficiency in their work. The challenge of devising comprehensive political strategies for complex reconstruction and reform efforts has been assessed by the recent Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding. The study came to the conclusion that 55 per cent of assessed peacebuilding projects conducted by the UK, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany 'do not show any link to a broader strategy for the country in which they are implemented'.[39] The brief overview of international activities in South Eastern Europe given in this chapter points to the existence of similar strategic deficits in the police reform area.

The second challenge concerns the inadequate separation of tasks between international actors. If different police missions or projects are too close in their purposes, they risk duplicating efforts. Internal security reform efforts can overlap with regard to their geographical scope, specific functional tasks or their timing. Some examples of coordination arrangements in South Eastern Europe point to imperfect forms of negative coordination that have made occupational overlaps and competition between organisations

likely challenges. The third challenge to coordination and cooperation derives from international actors' different standard operational procedures and routines that result in different ways of implementing reform projects. Lastly, actors may be willing to coordinate their work but simply do not have the infrastructure in place or the resources needed to build up cooperation mechanisms capable of ensuring the adoption of effective agreements in the field.

Strategies designed to address the challenges of donor coordination should above all focus on reducing the complexity of inter-organisational interaction in the field. At the most general level, donors need to devise a single overarching national strategy to drive the work of all agencies in a particular country. As concerns operational coordination, complexity can be reduced by augmenting the number of joint activities, as the example of the co-financed EU/CoE-programmes has showed. If project alignment through cooperation agreements proves to be impossible, 'negative coordination' solutions should be devised.

In order to achieve mutual agreement on 'who does what, where and how', actors need first of all to share information about completed and existing donor operations on the ground.[40] Then, arrangements for optimising a division of labour between intergovernmental actors and appropriate techniques for inter-agency coordination must follow. In conclusion, although donor coordination in South Eastern Europe has moved towards the formalisation of inter-organisational agreements, there remain serious obstacles to effective cooperation in their operational activity.

Notes

1   The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation's European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme.
2   See for instance Cedric de Coning, 'Coherence and Integration in the Planning, Implementation and Evaluation of Complex Peacebuilding Operations', *Conflict Trends*, no. 1 (2004).
3   Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Games Real Actors Could Play. Positive and Negative Coordination in Embedded Negotiations', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6, no. 1 (1994): 38-9; see also Ted A. van Baarda, 'A Legal Perspective of Cooperation between Military and Humanitarian Organizations in Peace Support Operations', *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 1 (2001).
4   OSCE, *Annual Report 2006* (Vienna: OSCE, 23 April 2007).
5   European Agency for Reconstruction, *Annual Report to the European Parliament and the Council. January to December 2005* (Thessaloniki: EAR, 12 June 2006).

6 Further examples can be found in: European Council, 'Action Oriented Paper on Improving Cooperation, on Organized Crime, Corruption, Illegal Immigration and Counter-Terrorism, between the EU, Western Balkans and relevant ENP Countries', Doc. No. 9272/06 (12 May 2006); European Council, 'Report on the State of Implementation by Member States and EU Bodies of Action Oriented Paper on Improving Cooperation on Organised Crime, Corruption, Illegal Immigration and Counter-terrorism, between the EU, the Western Balkans and relevant ENP countries', Doc. No. 15013/1/06 (21 November 2006).

7 See http://www.coe.int/carpo.

8 See Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Annual Report 2006* (Brussels: 2007).

9 See Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *The Emerging EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacity – A 'real added value' for the UN?*, Background paper for The Copenhagen Seminar on Civilian Crisis Management (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004); Thierry Tardy, 'EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment', in *The European Union and the United Nations – Partners in Effective Multilateralism*, ed. Martin Ortega, Chaillot Paper No. 78 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005).

10 Alexandra Novosseloff, *EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2004).

11 Tardy, *op. cit.*, 55.

12 See UNSC, 'Letter dated 17 July 2003 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council', UN Doc. S/2003/732, 21 July 2003.

13 OSCE, *OSCE Handbook*, Third Edition (Vienna: July 2002).

14 See OSCE Secretariat, 'External Co-operation – the European Union', OSCE, available at http://www.osce. org/ec/13066.html.

15 Fraser Cameron, *The EU and International Organisations: Partners in Crisis Management*, EPC Issue Paper No. 41 (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2005).

16 OSCE Permanent Council, 'Decision No. 670 on Co-operation between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe', PC.DEC/670 (28 April 2005).

17 'Co-operation Agreement on Local Government Assistance in South Eastern Europe between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe', signed in Strasbourg, 17 November 2005.

18 Council of the European Union, 'Action Oriented Paper', *op. cit.*, 11.

19 The case selection followed pragmatic considerations: Bosnia and Macedonia are good examples for the analysis of IGO cooperation, since both states have a long track record of international involvement in their SSR processes.

20 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, 'Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community', *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006): 35.

21 International Crisis Group, *Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU*, Europe Report No. 164 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), 5.

22 See Gemma Collantes Celador, 'Police Reform: Peacebuilding through "Democratic Policing"?' *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (2005) and International Crisis Group, *op. cit.*, for assessments of their work.

23 See UNDPKO, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina – UNMIBH – Background', UNDPKO, accessed 4 September 2007, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/ unmibh/background.html.

24 Tardy, *op. cit.*, 55.

25 European Council, 'Lessons from the Planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Autumn 2001 – December 2002: Joint Paper of the Council General Secretariat and the European Commission', Doc. No. 1206/03 (Brussels: 29 April 2003), 20.

26 European Council, 'Lessons from the Planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)', *op. cit.*, 21.

27 See Jakobsen, *op. cit.*, 11 for a similar assessment.

28 Susan E. Penksa, *Policing Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003-05. Issues of Mandates and Management in ESDP Missions,* CEPS Working Document No. 255 (Brussels: CEPS, December 2006), 18.

29 Penksa, *op. cit.*, 19.

30 Elizabeth M. Cousens, 'From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia' in *Ending Civil Wars, Volume II: Evaluating Implementation of Peace*, eds. Stephen Stedman et. al., 531 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); See also Bruce D. Jones, *The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*, IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001).

31 Department for International Development, *Regional Assistance Plan for the Western Balkans 2004/05 to 2008/09* (London: DFID, 24 August 2004), 7.

32 See Council of the European Council, 'Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 on the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL "Proxima")', *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 249 (Brussels: 1 October 2003).

33 European Agency for Reconstruction, *EU support to the Police and Border Management sectors in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Projects managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction*, Fact Sheet (Thessaloniki: March 2007).

34 For a discussion of intra-EU coordination difficulties, see Isabelle Ioannides, 'Police Mission in Macedonia', in *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, eds. Michael Emerson and Eva Gross, 97f (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007).

35 OSCE, *Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003. Security and Co-operation for Europe* (Vienna: 1 October 2004), 173.

36 Ioannides, *op. cit.*, 108.

37 European Commission*, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (Brussels: November 2003), 11.

38 While it would have been interesting to assess more examples of IGO coordination in the field, the limited scope of this chapter did not allow for a more extended analysis.

39 Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, 2004 Overview Report of the Joint *Utstein* Study of Peacebuilding (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), 10.

40 One example of such a stocktaking exercise of donor activities is the donor mapping project of the Donor Coordination Forum in Bosnia. See http://www.donormapping.ba.

Chapter 12

NATO, SSR and Afghanistan

Candace Karp and Richard Ponzio

Introduction

War, criminality, accusations of corruption in government, and extremist ideologies have dominated headlines about Afghanistan. Since the completion of the Bonn Agreement implementation period in December 2005, negative perceptions of this conflict-affected society have only intensified. In 2006 alone, more than 4,400 Afghans – including 1000 civilians – were killed in 'conflict-related violence', twice as many as in 2005 and more than any year since the Taliban regime was toppled in 2001.[1] Some 1,800 'illegal armed groups', of which the Taliban is only the main anti-government element, threaten stability across the country and are linked to illicit commercial activities and the misuse of public resources.[2] Afghanistan now produces over 90 per cent of the world's opium and poppy, with the total area under poppy cultivation increasing 61 per cent in 2006 to 172,000 hectares (424,840 acres) from 107,400 in 2005.[3] There are rising concerns about the ability of Afghan security forces to confront the increasingly brazen enemies of the Afghan state. Moreover, the limited reach of formal state institutions in those areas where the majority of Afghans reside requires innovative solutions if the multiple problems that threaten the expansion of the rule of law in Afghanistan are to be overcome.[4]

Despite these trends, significant progress has been made in reforming parts of Afghanistan's security sector since 2001, including steps that are vital to combat violence, terrorism and crime, and provide for the political space to build viable and inclusive national institutions of governance. Under a 'lead nation' approach structured along the five sectors of the army; police; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); counter-narcotics and justice; major donor countries, with significant technical and political inputs from the United Nations system, have demonstrated a high level of commitment and willingness to expend significant resources towards building sustainable local ownership of Afghanistan's public security institutions. For

example, by the first part of 2007, the Afghan National Army (ANA) reached more than 37,000 in troop strength, with an additional 12,000 in training, and the original ceiling of 62,000 police officers has nearly been reached.[5] Over 63,000 former combatants were demobilised by the summer of 2005.

At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has assumed growing responsibilities in support of security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan. As a direct extension of its stabilisation and peacekeeping mandate, beginning in August 2003, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has engaged in a number of SSR-related activities at the strategic and operational levels. This has included such areas as policy development, advising the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) on the coordination of foreign security sector assistance providers, ensuring the interoperability of Afghan security forces with NATO force contingents, individual mentoring of Afghan counter-parts and general information exchange. This trend accelerated in early 2006, with the expansion of ISAF into southern and eastern regions of the country.

After providing an overview of the key actors involved in SSR in Afghanistan, this chapter considers the evolving leadership role of NATO towards its objective of building 'transparent, effective, and democratically controlled Afghan national defence and appropriate security institutions'. While underscoring the various facets of NATO security sector cooperation in Afghanistan, the possibilities and limitations related to future NATO engagement are noted, giving attention to the adoption of specific principles and mechanisms for reform.

Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: Key Actors and Benchmarks

Following the adoption of the peacebuilding and political transition roadmap known as the Bonn Agreement in late 2001, donor meetings were convened in Berlin and Geneva in early 2002 to discuss international support for a comprehensive security sector plan.[6] 'Lead nations' were designated from among major donor countries in the following areas to provide and coordinate the bulk of foreign aid required:

- Army: United States
- Police: Germany
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Japan
- Counter-Narcotics: United Kingdom

- Justice: Italy

All countries, except for Japan, were (and remain) major troop contributors to NATO's ISAF.[7] In addition, the United Nations – in particular through the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime (UNODC) – provided technical, financial and administrative support to four of the five security sector priority areas (DDR, police, counter-narcotics and justice).

In the eyes of many international actors operating in Afghanistan, 'lead nations' have since been replaced by 'key nations,' which have since been joined by other international actors prepared to assist in the reform and reconstruction of various dimensions of the security sector. Police sector reform has since been brought under the umbrella of the United States-led Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which builds capacity and trains Afghan security institutions. The European Union has assumed control over the German Government's German Police Project Office (GPPO) whose objectives have been to mentor ANP officers at the provincial level and train Afghan police and prosecutors in investigative techniques.[8] DDR programmes have been succeeded by those targeting the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG), itself undertaken within a partnership between UNDP and Japan. Judicial reform is conducted by numerous international actors, which explains in part the chaotic nature of the justice sector, often considered to be the least successful of the SSR pillars. As for counter-narcotics, the United Kingdom remains a key player, although the influence of the United States should not be underestimated.[9] With its significant investments in the ANA, the United States remains the dominant actor in this SSR pillar.

SSR in Afghanistan is further operationalised by the *Afghanistan Compact*, which comprises forty-two benchmarks outlining reconstruction and development goals in three security-related areas (governance, rule of law and human rights) as well as economic and social development. The benchmarks covering the ANA decree a ceiling of 70,000 personnel by 2010; the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Border Police (ABP) are expected to have a combined force of up to 62,000 by this time, although a temporary ceiling of 84,000 was recently instituted to respond to the growing insurgency in the south and south-east of Afghanistan. DIAG was slated for completion by March 2008, although this has now been deemed unrealistic; a new completion date will be established in the coming months. Counter-narcotics involves a 'substantial annual increase' in drug

seizures and destruction, the dismantling of processing facilities and measures contributing to the elimination of poppy cultivation. Regional cooperation is also envisaged as a mechanism to counter the narcotics trade and includes intelligence sharing, coordinated seizures and destruction of drugs, and effective action against traffickers. Justice reform is addressed by several benchmarks of the Compact's Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights Pillar. In particular, Afghanistan is to have a legal framework by the end of 2010, in addition to functioning institutions of justice in each province of Afghanistan.[10]

This framework is linked to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy to be finalised in mid-2008, whose sector strategies will form the nuts and bolts of Afghanistan's reconstruction and development. SSR will be stretched across three separate sector strategies: defence, internal security and law enforcement, and justice and the rule of law.

NATO's SSR Role in Afghanistan

Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001, ISAF was established. Until it was placed under NATO leadership in August 2003, ISAF's troop contributing countries were reluctant to extend its reach far beyond Kabul, given the large increase in the size of the force this would entail coupled with the United States' particular reluctance to expand ISAF before its 'war on terror' objectives were met.

While NATO's ISAF expansion across Afghanistan was undertaken on the basis of a consensus decision within NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 2004, individual member nations ultimately determine the nature and quantity of resources contributed to the mission. This has entailed the use of national caveats to set limits on the deployment and engagement of participating countries' forces. The varied nature of contributions in both type and quantity and the use of caveats by ISAF contributing nations are unsurprising, given that ISAF members are unable to agree on a uniform approach to delivering ISAF's mission in Afghanistan. While some ISAF contributors, particularly the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, perceive the mission primarily as a counter-insurgency operation, others such as Germany and Sweden view the ISAF mission as a peacekeeping effort designed to provide for and support reconstruction and stability.

NATO's presence throughout Afghanistan is focused on supporting the security and stability of the government by strengthening Afghan institutions in a manner that is also fiscally sustainable for the country's long-term

security and defence requirements. The *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, signed in September 2006, seeks to promote 'interoperability with NATO member states' forces, as well as activities supporting defence reform, defence institution building and military aspects of security sector reform as well as other areas mutually agreed'. The underlying objective here is to enable the Afghan Government to contribute to the security and stability agenda by participating in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. NATO's programme is also predicated upon a 'realistic' approach, 'both in terms of substance and available resources'. The declaration lists fifteen 'main areas of cooperation', with most falling within the scope of SSR. This includes the development of a 'transparent, effective and democratically controlled Afghan national defence and appropriate security institutions' that are 'consistent with best practices and international norms'. Creating a 'conceptual foundation of security and defence', including national security and military strategies, and developing planning and budgeting processes under democratic control are additional areas of engagement, as is supporting the Afghan Government's counter-narcotics efforts, in conformity with ISAF's *Operations Plan*.[11]

Strategically, NATO's primary interest remains the traditional security institutions, such as the National Security Council, the Ministry of Defence ANA, and the Ministry of Interior and ANP. Operationally, ISAF works in partnership with the United States' *Operation Enduring Freedom* and other nations conducting SSR activities, as well as within the five pillar 'lead nation' framework, although the organisation views the latter as a less than optimal process which has undermined SSR activities due to lack of coordination across SSR pillars. But ISAF is not mandated to lead the operational aspects of SSR in Afghanistan, instead maintaining awareness, exercising influence and becoming involved where appropriate.

Defence and Police Reform – Ministry of Defence/ANA and Ministry of Interior/ANP[12]

At the strategic level, NATO's 2006 agreement with the Afghan Government committed Kabul to defence and police sector planning and reform with NATO assistance. In May 2007, NATO dispatched a team of advisors to the Ministries of Defence and Interior to commence planning and the design of the future force structure for Afghanistan's security forces in a manner sensitive to fiscal constraints.[13] As part of this exercise, NATO's advisory team is to ensure that Afghanistan's security institutions prioritise the capabilities required by the ANA, ANP, ABP, Counter Narcotics Police

Force (CNPF) and Afghan customs authorities. NATO is encouraging the Afghan Government to assume an inter-agency approach to this issue. To this end, Afghan representatives from the National Security Council and Ministries of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs were invited to Brussels in December 2006 to discuss prioritisation and planning activities.[14]

At the operational level, Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams have been institutionalised to mentor and train ANA battalions. NATO alliance members have deployed thirty-five teams to date, well short of the target number of sixty-four that was to have been achieved by July 2007. CSTC-A officially has the authority to coordinate with ISAF, although the initiative is conducted under the umbrella of the United States Government, not the NATO alliance. Nevertheless, NATO is tasked with seeking out nations willing to staff mentor and liaison teams. The initiative constitutes an example of direct support to military reform in Afghanistan.

Partnering arrangements between ISAF units and ANA formations represent a major ISAF initiative to build planning and operational capacity within the ANA and place an Afghan face on individual combat missions. An example of this was operation Achilles, conducted in late March 2007, which enabled the ANA to conduct individual combat operations, reportedly to a high standard. The limited number of ISAF troops and ANA forces present for duty, however, places limitations on partnering arrangements. One alternative is triangular partnering relationships between Quick Reaction Forces attached to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ANA units and special operations forces.[15]

NATO's role in building ANP operational capacity centres upon the Alliance as a device to mobilise the contributions of police trainers by member nations. Operationally, ISAF's involvement with the ANP differs considerably from its involvement in ANA development and reform. Theoretically, ISAF is permitted to develop arrangements between ISAF and the ANP units at the local level for conducting joint patrols and to mentor and build non-police specific skills of the ANP units. Civilian police advisors and military police belonging to PRTs are also perceived as possible assets for partnering arrangements between ISAF and the ANP, although nations operating PRTs are not obliged to staff PRTs in a uniform manner. In the area of border security, ISAF is prepared to support the ABP in a similar fashion.

In practice, ISAF has no operational role in police reform, even though it possesses 'coordinating authority' with the Combined Security Transition Command and the EU/ German Police Project Office. Operationally, police reform is undertaken by CSTC-A and European Union mentors

based in Kabul's Ministry of Interior and at the sub-national level. US involvement in police sector reform was undertaken in response to the perceived failings of the German Government's Police Project Office programme to build rank and file capacity. The EU's police training project, commanded by a German Brigadier-General, has decided to focus on training and mentoring the officer corps.[16]

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)[17]

As the successor to Afghanistan's DDR programme, DIAG is currently hindered by the Afghan Government's reluctance to disband influential power-brokers that threaten a 'second front' of instability and even conflict across Afghanistan. DIAG implementation is also dependent on functioning security and rule of law institutions and parallel efforts to stem the drug trade.

At the strategic level, NATO's Office of the Senior Civilian Representative (OSCR) participates in DIAG policy discussions with stakeholders, although it refrains from assuming a leading role on the specifics of DIAG. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the OSCR has recognised overarching political constraints facing the DIAG program, including the possibility of instability in the north should influential power-brokers be disarmed. The OSCR has assigned DIAG duties to a member of NATO's Political Committee – a Political Advisor (POLAD) whose responsibilities encompass monitoring and reporting.[18]

In operational terms, ISAF does not possess a formal mandate to pursue DIAG activities. Its mandate is sufficiently broad, however, to undertake operations in response to instability threatening the Afghan Government. ISAF forces may deploy to support Afghan security operations, but deployment must first be approved by NATO on a case-by-case basis. ISAF's commanding general must strategically employ and deploy his forces given his political and resource limitations, one as a function of the other. A military operation with DIAG overtones too great for the sensibilities of some ISAF troop contributors may backfire politically, with unfortunate ramifications in the NAC. Nonetheless, the EU's Special Representative to Afghanistan recently voiced his opinion that DIAG requires a greater operational role by ISAF and suggested that stakeholders seek 'modalities' that would enable greater ISAF involvement.[19]

ISAF has also tasked itself with sharing intelligence and information with the DIAG programme and influencing illegal armed group commanders. ISAF is to liaise with relevant stakeholders, including the United Nations, to engage in policy development at the national and provincial levels.

It further sees its role as helping to identify local development priorities to lessen the prospect of insecurity, particularly in the aftermath of DIAG operations.

A more aggressive NATO/ISAF position on DIAG would require a decision by the NAC, in addition to the commitment of additional resources by member nations. It would also require Afghan political will to pursue illegal armed groups attached to influential power-brokers.

Counter-Narcotics[20]

As in the case of DIAG, the OSCR possesses no formal role on this issue, although the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) participates in policy discussions in various forums including the Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board's (JCMB) Security Consultative Group and the Counter-Narcotics Synchronization Group. Most recently, in April 2007, the SCR hinted at the linkage between institutional corruption in the Afghan Government and the trade in narcotics by publicly questioning whether the Ministry of Interior was doing all it could to prevent the 'leakage' of seized quantities of narcotics.[21] Additionally, the OSCR has a designated POLAD to monitor and report on counter-narcotics issues. Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether the Afghan Government would like an enhanced NATO mandate for counter-narcotics.[22]

Operationally for ISAF, counter-narcotics remains a sensitive issue. Of the thirty-seven ISAF members operating throughout Afghanistan currently, thirteen have instituted counter-narcotics caveats that preclude ISAF's commanding general from deploying their forces on certain missions without exemptions. Five of these nations currently operate in the south to varying degrees, where poppy cultivation and its manufacturing into opium and heroin continue.

Due to the presence of counter narcotics caveats by a large number of NATO member nations, the NAC is unable to forge operational consensus on this issue. Consequently, ISAF has no formal counter-narcotics mandate. ISAF is able to disseminate passive intelligence to interested stakeholders, however, in addition to deploying in support of the Counter Narcotics Police Force although national caveats ensure that ISAF's support is not as robust as it could be. Similar to supporting Afghan Government security operations towards DIAG implementation, deployment in support of the CNPF must first be approved by NATO on a case-by-case basis.

Nonetheless, ISAF is increasingly worried by the linkage between insurgents and the drug trade. Responding to this phenomenon, in mid-2007,

ISAF's commanding general stated in the Policy Action Group – created in 2006 to deal with Afghanistan's insurgency – that ISAF's activities in the security sector will count for very little if the drug trade is not curbed.

Judicial Reform

Judicial reform is absent from the September 2006 NATO-Afghan Government declaration; as one NATO staffer has pointed out, NATO remains a security alliance without justice and rule of law expertise. Instead, the OSCR 'pushes the process', with the SCR meeting on a regular basis with the GoA's Attorney-General's Office, Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice, in addition to representatives from the Italian Government to discuss pertinent issues and to seek policy prescriptions where necessary. The OSCR also tasks one POLAD with monitoring and liaising on justice and rule of law issues for NATO.[23]

While judicial reform does not constitute a mission objective for ISAF, the Office of the Legal Advisor, HQ ISAF, provides assistance in a discreet fashion at the invitation of pillar stakeholders, including the GoA. ISAF also undertakes sub-national needs assessments through its Regional Commands and PRTs. Both are currently conducting a survey of rule of law institutions at the sub-national level to identify shortfalls for partner nations also undertaking judicial reform. Finally, the Office of the Legal Advisor at ISAF HQ is to make an officer available to the US Embassy to support rule of law initiatives.[24]

Facets of Cooperation – Who, How, When, What's Missing?

SSR cooperation on strategic-level issues is somewhat difficult to discern given the opaque nature of diplomacy conducted in Afghanistan. International actors are not willing to document their activities, nor see them documented for others. A number of factors can be put forward to explain the particularities of NATO cooperation in the area of SSR with other actors.

Cooperation is firstly undertaken with various principles in mind, including recognition that a comprehensive approach to security should include the five pillars of SSR. 'Afghanisation' of the security sector is also pursued by international actors who endorse the creation of competent, democratically controlled Afghan security institutions that will counter internal and external threats in the absence of international security forces.

Nonetheless, cooperation is tempered by the existence of one dominant actor – the United States – whose budget for Afghanistan's reconstruction and development far outstrips the contributions of other nations. Washington's primary interlocutor is the Afghan Government. This bilateral relationship determines spending priorities for US budgets, currently estimated at around USD 11 billion. Agreement between the two nations ultimately constitutes Afghan Government policy, to which all international actors operating in Afghanistan are expected to adhere. In this context, therefore, 'cooperation' is too generous a term to describe the process behind the formulation of SSR policy in Afghanistan.

Cooperation is also undermined by national caveats and reluctance by ISAF contributing nations to engage on sensitive facets of SSR. As was documented in the previous section, caveats have markedly affected the operational ability of ISAF to undertake theatre operations in support of contentious issues.

The NATO mandate in the area of SSR reflects the political reality in which the alliance currently operates in Afghanistan. The OSCR possesses a less than robust mandate, one that focuses his attention on facilitating communication between the operational theatre, NATO HQ and the NAC. He provides advice to the NAC, liaises with senior members of the Afghan Government and coordinates with the international community, in particular the EU and UN. Finally, he maintains contacts with regional and local stakeholders including representatives from neighbouring countries, Afghan political actors, and international NGO and Afghan civil society representatives.[25]

ISAF's operational mandate is equally non-committal. As has already been pointed out, the mandate recognises that ISAF does not possess a specific responsibility to lead in any SSR pillar. Instead, ISAF is permitted to maintain awareness, exercise influence and, where appropriate, become involved in SSR. ISAF's commanding general possesses some latitude when deploying his forces to pursue sensitive agendas, but national caveats and the possibility of dissention in the NAC limit his activities.

It is within this restrictive context that NATO has addressed SSR cooperation. Utilisation of the NATO alliance in this manner is an interesting facet of international cooperation, and one which may reflect the parallel between NATO's ISAF expansion across Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006 to include political and technical assistance, in addition to a counter-insurgency role, and the weakening of the US position in Iraq. As a result of ongoing Iraqi hostility towards the United States as an occupying power and the resource drain that operations in Iraq continue to place on Washington, the

Bush administration has sought greater NATO involvement in an effort to reduce the pressure on its national budget and to prevent the deterioration of its position in the 'war on terror.'

At the operational level, NATO's NAC has been utilised to endorse the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team concept. The growing linkage between narcotics and the insurgency has necessitated greater NATO involvement in strategic level policy debates. Recognizing this, dialogue is currently underway in the NAC to assess whether current approaches to counter-narcotics, including poppy eradication and alternative livelihoods, remain appropriate. Ministry of Interior and ANP reform continues to be plagued by institutional corruption and poor capacity.[26] In response, CSTC-A's commanding general recently made appeals via the NAC for greater numbers of police mentors. Thus far, the NAC's permanent observers have not formally committed to specific numbers of additional mentors, although the EU has since assumed a greater role to provide police trainers.[27]

SSR cooperation is also pursued in the strategic-level Policy Action Group, a crisis management body created in mid-2006 in response to the insurgency. Police reform featured prominently in Policy Action Group discussions throughout the latter half of 2006, and both NATO and ISAF, along with other members of the international community and Afghan Government, agreed to the creation of the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) to end insecurity in Afghanistan's south and south-east.

Cooperative techniques at the strategic level, therefore, centre upon dialogue and consultations, as well as exchanges of information and analysis in multilateral environments. At the operational level, ISAF is permitted to address ANA development using triangular arrangements with US Special Operations Forces. Police training at the provincial level is undertaken in partnership between ISAF PRTs and EU trainers, although no ratified agreement between the two entitles exists at present. ISAF can also engage its SSR counterparts in information exchanges in effort to counter narcotics and disband illegal armed groups. Details of information exchanges remain confidential due to the extreme sensitivities involved.

Future Cooperation SSR Programmes for Afghanistan

Lack of transparency and numerous sensitivities need not preclude a more robust cooperation agenda among international organisations. The most obvious shortcoming of international organisations undertaking SSR in Afghanistan is the absence of a coordinated diplomatic approach vis-à-vis the

Afghan Government. As demonstrated in this chapter, NATO was late to make a serious contribution to SSR in Afghanistan. Leading NATO member countries, including the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, along with the United Nations, have spearheaded foreign support activities since 2002 for Afghanistan's security and justice institutions. The experience of the Bonn period (2001-2005) and that of the subsequent period suggest the following possibilities and limitations for future cooperation in SSR in Afghanistan:

- *An enhanced NATO role will require increased political will.* There is a growing sense that the international community is punching beneath its collective weight on certain issues, particularly the trade in narcotics and the links between government actors and institutions and major traffickers. NATO is an alliance operates on the basis of consensus; any enhancement of its role and activities in SSR will require the collective agreement of Alliance members. Similarly, the GoA must provide a similar commitment towards SSR. Unless these enabling conditions are satisfied, NATO will lack a credible mandate to pursue its SSR agenda.

- *A UN SRSG also operating as the NATO SCR would ensure that both positions have real clout to effect reform in SSR-related areas.* As co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the 'dual-hatted' SRSG could direct attention and resources to areas requiring it most to a far greater degree than exists at present. As the NATO SCR, he or she could be an advocate for similar issues in the NAC. Such an arrangement would not require a new UNAMA mandate.

- *The US Government's CSTC-A should operate under the NATO/ISAF command structure to ensure that all SSR activities in Afghanistan are conducted under a single umbrella.* CSTC-A trains personnel working in GoA institutions and builds their capacity; it does not possess a mandate to conduct security operations. Its inclusion in the NATO/ISAF structure would therefore complement existing NATO/ISAF SSR activities, which would enable NATO to operate with maximum coherence.

- *It is important for NATO to operate within the Afghanistan National Development Strategy framework.* NATO's involvement in defence and police sector planning and reform should be conducted in tandem with the formulation of defence, as well as internal security and law enforcement, sector strategies currently under preparation for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. This would ensure uni-

formity of strategy and purpose, in addition to ensuring Afghan ownership of the country's reconstruction and development.

- *National caveats must be limited as much as possible, especially with regards to counter-narcotics.* While ultimately a political decision by ISAF member nations, there can be no doubt that national caveats undermine the GoA's security and stability – the very rationale for the international presence in Afghanistan.

- *A single 'Terms of Reference' guiding PRT activities must be formulated to ensure uniformity and standardisation of objectives and actions across all PRTs.* PRTs comprise an important mechanism for ISAF to operationalise the NATO SSR strategy. Nevertheless, the PRT concept will remain less than optimal should nations continue to exercise 'sovereignty' over the nature and rationale of their particular PRT. All PRTs, for example, should possess civilian police advisors to facilitate sub-national mentoring programmes for the ANP.

- *Coordinating foreign assistance to the security sector in a coherent and strategic manner will remain a challenge.* Even with increased NATO leadership, coordination of the various donors will remain difficult given their sometimes competing agendas and sets of priorities. For example, all donors in Afghanistan belong to the United Nations, and yet the UN had often limited leverage during the Bonn period in coordinating even members with shared goals. The re-constituted Consultative Groups on Security and on Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights should continue to play a central role in the coordination of foreign assistance, but NATO, other intergovernmental organisations and bilateral donors will need to better develop national capacity to facilitate and track foreign contributions to the security sector.

- *Accelerating local management of Afghan public security institutions is a time-consuming, costly and complicated endeavour.* Unlike anything resembling its involvement in NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, NATO must recognise that Afghanistan represents a far more challenging set of circumstances in terms of the technical, financial, human and political resources required to build local ownership of the security sector. As the lynchpin to efforts to defeat the Taliban and other anti-government groups on the battlefield, NATO should be under no illusion as to the long-term commitment and significant investments still needed to complete the job. Part of the transformation in NATO's role must be to bridge the disparity between the levels of resources and attention dedicated to 'hard' security programmes and

'soft' security initiatives aimed at entrenching the rule of law and fostering democratic principles of good governance.[28] Over the medium-term, when one considers the billions spent every year to sustain ISAF military operations, the gradual 'Afghanisation' of security can be expected to lead to a reduced reliance on NATO forces and, hence, a peace dividend for NATO countries.

Additional principles, mechanisms and policy reform recommendations

Some approaches that NATO might consider to enhance SSR cooperation in Afghanistan include:

- Reconcile competing forms of authority to ensure stability by, for example, encouraging traditional local justice bodies such as *jirgas* and *shuras* to operate alongside state courts for at least a transitional period (especially since it is estimated that over 80 per cent of disputes in Afghanistan continue to be settled outside of state courts).
- Community policing, including citizens 'Nightwatch Programs', is needed to improve relations and build trust between local populations and public security institutions.
- Fostering regional peace and security through political dialogue and development can be an essential ingredient for establishing domestic peace and security.

In response to the possibilities and limitations for further NATO cooperation in the Afghan security sector articulated in the previous section, the following new mechanisms and policy reforms are recommended:

- *Mentoring*: NATO should provide a team of mentors to provide one-on-one coaching, preferably in Dari and Pashtu where possible, with key GoA counterparts in the Office of the National Security Adviser, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and Ministry of Justice. Special emphasis should be placed on developing strategic planning and monitoring skills, as well as facilitating the work of the Security Consultative Group and the Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights Consultative Group.
- *Data Gathering and Analysis*: In most sectors, Afghanistan suffers from an information gap, and when data is available few government officials are trained in the skills of analysis and report writing. Beginning with the integration of ISAF's Afghanistan's Country Stability

Picture (ACSP) into the work of the Security and Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights Consultative Groups, NATO has much to contribute to building national capacity in the areas of data collection and analysis.

- *The violence will only conclude through political solutions*: Just as the coalition forces for Afghanistan have played a behind-the-scenes role in supporting political activities to reduce the influence of anti-government forces and help to end the fighting, NATO must begin to assert itself more politically by, for example: a) facilitating increased collaboration between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan through the Tripartite Commission in which NATO is also a member; b) supporting the Independent National Commission on Strengthening Peace, which allows honourable combatants who renounce violence to rejoin their communities; and c) encouraging efforts to convene a Regional Peace *Jirga* involving traditional leaders from within Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss and arrive at commonly acceptable approaches to ending the violence in their communities.

Despite the well-intentioned, technically and politically skilful, and highly resourced efforts of NATO, other intergovernmental organisations and bilateral donors, the key to the development of a professional, multi-ethnic and financially sustainable security sector in Afghanistan rests with Afghan leadership. Only a few years ago, it would have been inconceivable to predict the type and level of engagement NATO is currently undertaking in this conflict-affected society that continues to be afflicted by war, criminality and extremist ideologies. Today's new security paradigm means that the security of countries viewed previously to be on 'the periphery' can directly impact the security of people and states far removed from them. To be sure, the involvement of NATO and countless other foreign actors in the inter-related areas of security, governance and development remains welcomed by most Afghans. But the only sure indicator of progress will be the steady assertion of national Afghan leadership and the gradual decline in the need for outside assistance.

Notes

1   Human Rights Watch, quoted by BBC, 'Afghan Civilian Deaths Criticised', *BBC News*, January 30, 2007.

2   IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 'UN calls for strengthening of disarmament process following deadly clashes', IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 27 October 2006, available at at http://www. irinnews.org/.

3   UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Afghanistan, *Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2006* (Kabul: UNODC, 2006). This trend has already been shown to persist in the first half of 2007.

4   See the Centre for Policy and Human Development, *Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice* (Kabul: Centre for Policy and Human Development, 2007).

5   Government of Afghanistan and United Nations, *Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Annual Report* (Kabul: Government of Afghanistan and UNAMA, 1 May 2007).

6   'Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions', signed on 5 December 2001 in Bonn, Germany.

7   The United States began to contribute actively to the NATO-led ISAF force when its Regional Command – East was placed under the ISAF umbrella in October 2006.

8   Police reform includes reform and development of the national police, border police, auxiliary police and civil order police.

9   The United States Government has long endorsed aerial spraying as a component of US policy, a strategy which is opposed by several NATO members, including the United Kingdom and Germany. Guy Dinmore and Rachel Morarjee, 'US Under Fire Over Afghan Poppy Plan', *Financial Times*, 25 May 2007.

10 The Afghanistan Compact was signed on 31 January-1 February 2006 in London. With regards to the DIAG benchmark, the international community has transposed the Compact deadlines to the Afghan calendar. Therefore, while the Compact specifies an end-2007 date, the transposed date is end-1386 AP or end-March 2008. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the GoA and UNAMA, monitors progress towards achievement of the *Compact* benchmarks.

11 *Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan*, signed in Brussels, Belgium, 6 September 2006.

12 Authors' field notes.

13 In fiscal year 2004-05, expenditure in the security sector equalled 494 per cent of Afghanistan's domestic revenues and 17 per cent of GDP. World Bank, *Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development – Improving Public Finance Management in the Security Sector* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 43. The US is currently financing the ANA, and has pledged an additional USD 2 billion for equipment. Declan Walsh, 'Thirsty to Fight, Hard to Wake Up – That's the New Afghan Army', *Guardian Weekly*, 4 May 2007.

14 Tom Middendorp, Senior Political Advisor to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, interview by authors, Kabul, 17 May 2007. Representatives from the National Directorate of Security (NDS) were not invited to attend the December 2006 meeting, even though NDS participation is sought throughout the prioritisation exercise.

15 All PRTs in Afghanistan now operate under the ISAF umbrella; while the ANA remains the most positive element of SSR in Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi of the London School of Economics points out that 'desertions and absenteeism mean that less than half of the 46,000 [ANA] soldiers are available for active duty at any one time'. See Walsh, *op. cit.*

16 Authors' field notes.

17 Authors' field notes.

18 Tom Middendorp, interview by authors, *op. cit.*

19 Minutes of the Fifth Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board Meeting, Kabul, 1 May 2007; authors' field notes.

20 Authors' field notes.

21 Minutes of the Security Consultative Group, Kabul, 9 April 2007; authors' field notes.

22 One NATO staffer spoke of mixed messages received from Government representatives regarding a more active NATO role. Tom Middendorp, interview by authors, *op. cit.*

23 Tom Middendorp, interview by authors, *op. cit.*

24 Office of the Legal Advisor, HQ ISAF, interview by authors, Kabul, 8 May 2007.

25 NATO, 'NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan', NATO, http://www.nato.int/ issues/scr_afghanistan/index.html.

26 Successive Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board reports have highlighted the need for robust reform efforts within the Ministry of Interior and ANP. See, for example, *Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact: Bi-Annual JCMB Report* (Kabul: JCMB, November 2006) and *Status Update on Short-life Benchmarks and Follow-up Action Points: Report to JCMB IV* (Kabul: JCMB, 30-31 January 2007).

27 Like NATO, the EU is also seeking greater member contributions. At the outset of the EU police training mission in Afghanistan, EU Special Representative Francesc Vendrell commented, 'I think that the EU has decided to play as big a role as possible, unfortunately not as big as I would have liked'. *Associated Press,* 'EU Envoy Says Police Training Mission in Afghanistan Should Be Bigger', 29 May 2007.

28 Mark Sedra, 'European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends through the Lens of Afghanistan', *European Security* 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 330. Between fiscal years 2002-03 and 2004-05, 88 per cent of all funding to the security sector (including justice and counter-narcotics) was channelled to military and police reform programmes. World Bank, *op. cit.*, 43.

PART IV

CONCLUSIONS AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking Stock, Moving Forward

David M. Law

Introduction

Any assessment of intergovernmental organisation (IGO) performance in the area of security sector reform (SSR) must take into account three attenuating factors. The first is that while SSR concerns have been around for a long time, the term itself is less than ten years old. Indeed, as the author of Chapter Four has suggested, after having developed quickly in a short span of time, SSR seems ripe for a period of consolidation that will allow for the theory and doctrine of SSR to be translated more rigorously and effectively into practice.

Second, as we have seen, there is an enormous range of diversity in even the limited number of IGOs that are addressed in this volume. Some have development as their leitmotif, others security, and another still, governance. There are great variations in the extent to which SSR has been mainstreamed within individual IGOs, with only two thus far having developed their own SSR concepts. Some IGOs focus on reconstructing security sectors in SSR post-conflict settings; others are just as much or more involved in ensuring that the security sectors of potential members operate in a functional way. IGOs also tend to concentrate their SSR efforts on certain components of the security sector, rather than the security sector in its entirety. For example, IGOs have paid a great deal of attention to police and justice issues, as well as to military reform, but relatively little to the judicial and civil society institutions that play an important role in overseeing, monitoring and advising governments, and in educating the general public about security issues. The geographical scope of IGO SSR programmes also tends to differ significantly from organisation to organisation, as do the relationships among them at headquarters level and in the field. While the diverse nature of the IGOS has had an impact on the evolution of the SSR paradigm, it also means that caution should be employed in the making of generalisations.

Third, techniques for assessing individual SSR programmes and comparing outcomes across them are sorely underdeveloped. There are as yet no overarching systems of performance measurement for SSR. Moreover, information on the intended objectives of SSR programmes can be difficult to come by, an obvious complication when it comes to monitoring outcomes.

Against this background of cautiousness, this concluding chapter will attempt to formulate some recommendations for enhancing the way IGOs design and deliver programmes. It will proceed in the following way. The next section will review the main findings of the case studies in this volume. Then, we will present an overview of the key challenges for SSR that our contributors and other experts have identified for the short to medium term. The conclusions of this concluding chapter will lay out some strategies for moving forward.

Key Findings

This section summarises the key findings of our contributors. We begin with the main points emerging from the nine case studies contained in this volume, six examining how the SSR roles of individual IGOs in the study have evolved and three focussing on how IGOs have cooperated on SSR. This section then goes on to make some more general observations about the IGOs' record on norm implementation and cooperation.

Case studies on IGOs' SSR Role

OECD DAC. The chapter on the OECD DAC reviews the evolution of the organisation's role in SSR, in particular its groundbreaking work in developing a coherent body of SSR norms and principles in the *DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform* (2005) and its recently completed *Handbook on SSR* (2007), which provides guidance to operationalise these guidelines. Three overriding challenges are identified for the DAC over the short to medium term: helping to enhance donor capacity to carry out SSR, *inter alia* by making the *Handbook* fully operational; encouraging more effective cooperation among the various actors involved in SSR; and working with donors to ensure that their approach to local ownership is viable.

EU. This chapter explains that these are still early days for the EU when it comes to SSR. As the Commission and Council only developed their respective concepts in 2005-2006, it is too soon to attempt an overall assessment of the EU's role in SSR. The author stresses that a central problem

for the EU is the lack of coherence in the SSR approach of the Council and the Commission but observes that this is more a reflection of overall EU governance than a phenomenon specific to SSR. The author also warns of the need for the EU to ensure conceptual clarity in the way it addresses SSR, noting several instances where capacity-building programmes for security forces have proceeded without any obvious concern about the implications for security sector governance.

NATO. This chapter explains that NATO's role in SSR has been driven by the process of preparing countries for membership and, once they are members, integrating them into Alliance structures. With the number of potential new member countries dwindling, the author questions whether the NATO SSR dynamic can be sustained. At the same time, it is clear that NATO needs a more robust and comprehensive approach to SSR in post-conflict and conflict settings, where its military needs to work with other security forces, in particular the police, if it is to be successful in its stabilisation role and if reconstruction is to proceed.

OSCE. With its comprehensive and cross-dimensional approach to security, its broad range of SSR-related activities and its pioneering Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Relations, the OSCE should be a natural leader on SSR in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian area. However, the organisation has no SSR concept and its approach to SSR-related activities is, according to the author, 'piecemeal', with adverse repercussions for their coherence and effectiveness, as well as for the OSCE's ability to work with other actors on SSR.

WB and IMF. The author sees the work being done by these Bretton Woods institutions on public financial management and poverty reduction in conflict-affected areas as offering greater scope for them to address security issues. The focus of the institutions needs to shift, however, from concern about levels of security expenditure to improving the public financial management of the security sector. The author suggests that in countries where it is active, the WB could encourage the creation of political fora for debate on budgeting and expenditure issues by interested parties, and calls for the Bank to be more active in seeking partnerships with other actors involved in SSR.

ECOWAS. This chapter calls for the development of an ECOWAS SSR agenda, involving civil society and media representatives of the region, in order to bridge the gap between the IGO's normative aspirations and the reality on the ground. This would include an effort to clarify the ECOWAS perspective on human security. Other initiatives recommended include the operationalisation of the draft ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed Forces

and Security and the harmonisation of legislation relating to the security sector among member states.

Case studies on IGO Cooperation

The three chapters on cooperation in this study illuminate different facets of the cooperation challenge.

Cooperation in the delivery of public security reform in Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter contrasts the richness of IGO involvement in police, justice and rule of law activities with the poorness of communication, coordination and cooperation among the organisations delivering them. It cautions that high-level accords on coordination are often not followed up on the ground. It highlights the need for IGOs and other actors delivering SSR programmes in a specific theatre or supporting their delivery to have an overarching SSR agenda to guide their activities, ensure an adequate division of labour among actors and provide for the overall coherence of the SSR effort. An additional problem highlighted here is the fact that the different operating rules and procedures practiced by IGOs can undermine the effective implementation of projects. Finally, we are advised that that in some instances the problem is not the lack of willingness to coordinate but a lack of resources to do so.

Cooperation within the UN system and beyond. This chapter exposes two sides to the cooperation issue. The first is a lack of a culture of cooperation among the UN's various actors, not at all surprising in view of their contrasting mandates and funding mechanisms. The second is the cooperation deficits that exist between UN bodies and other actors, a process that is not encouraged by the lack of internal coherence in the work of the UN. To address this, the author calls for the following measures: the elaboration of a common UN SSR vision; the streamlining and rebundling in an SSR-user friendly format of UN bodies' SSR-relevant planning, budgetary and working procedures; and the creation of a dedicated structure for SSR at UN Headquarters in New York.

Cooperation between NATO and other actors in Afghanistan. This chapter highlights a set of issues affecting the quality of IGO cooperation in a specific country context. The stabilisation and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan has suffered from a series of problems, not the least of which has been the impact on Afghanistan of the deteriorating strategic situation in Iraq and the failure of Western actors involved in Afghanistan to see the growing interdependence of developments in these two theatres. From its outset, however, the reconstruction effort has suffered from a lack of capacity,

which has in turn been worsened by shortcomings in the area of cooperation. NATO, the leading IGO on the stabilisation side, has not succeeded in acting as a platform for ensuring effective burden-sharing and cooperation among its members. But even if it had proved more effective in this regard, there would still have been limits on what it could do as an institution by and of its own efforts. NATO has no expertise in two areas that are critical for the stabilisation of Afghanistan: policing programmes, which aim to produce a sufficient number of well-trained and capable policing elements that can move into an area once the military have stabilised it, and reconstruction programmes, vitally necessary to accomplish a host of tasks related to domestic stability, such as repairing infrastructure, relaunching rural development and returning children to classrooms. It is only in 2007, more than five years into the campaign against the Taliban, that the EU, UN and NATO have started working together on police training programmes with the creation of an International Police Coordination Board Secretariat and a plan to standardise hitherto disparate approaches to police training.[1] At the same time, NATO has not been involved in the leading multilateral reconstruction effort, namely, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by the World Bank, which has been in operation now since 2002.[2] This is despite the fact that in the twenty-odd Provincial Reconstruction Teams operating in Afghanistan, NATO member states play a dominant role.[3]

Norm Development and Implementation

From our study of norm development and implementation, the following observations have emerged.

First, norms for SSR are unevenly developed. No organisation has a comprehensive set of norms encompassing the entire security sector. The OECD, NATO and OSCE have focused on the elaboration of both general and specific norms while the EU, UN and ECOWAS have concentrated solely on the development of general norms or, as is the case of the CoE, on sectorial norms. The WB and the IMF, on the other hand, have faced constraints on intervening in the political affairs of borrowing countries because of norms at work in these institutions that flow, or that are perceived to flow, from the mandate of these institutions. Norms for certain dimensions of the security sector, for example, those pertaining to the executive, parliament, judiciary and civil society, are underdeveloped, and there are no norms in the SSR context concerning the security sector role of such actors as political parties, the business community and non-state actors other than private military companies. Some organisations, in particular the OSCE, have a broad

body of norms relevant to the security sector, but the norms are not consistently developed across the security sector and do not encompass the entire range of OSCE security sector activities.

A second point is that some norms are vague and therefore difficult to implement. For example, there is general agreement in SSR circles to the effect that securing local ownership is essential if SSR is to be successful. It is less clear how this is to be put into effect in conflict environments where some or all of the elite has been decimated or discredited among part or all of the population.

A third feature relates to the capacity for effective norm implementation. This is a problem for all the IGOs in this sample but it is a particularly chronic one for ECOWAS, as we have seen, because there is a general shortage of resources in the region, as well as significant differences in economic capacity from country to country. The ECOWAS dilemma would seem to be typical of other SSR-recipient IGOs such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Fourth, there is no mechanism for synchronising these norms. This acts a serious obstacle to IGO cooperation. The lack of a common SSR language, or perhaps more accurately the lack of *translatability* across organisational cultures, is the IGO equivalent of the non-interoperability of communications systems of security forces.

Fifth, norms can raise contradictions or be subject to contradictory handling. As mentioned above, the EU has been criticised for focussing too much on capacity-building in its partnership and neighbourhood programmes and not enough on enhancing the governance framework that determines how this capacity is used. Another example of a contradictory approach is provided by the OECD. Its seminal work on norms and implementation guidelines for SSR was produced by members of the donor community without the involvement of SSR recipient countries, notwithstanding the fact that local ownership ranks as a top concern of the organisation. In addition, while the OECD has advocated a whole-of-government approach to SSR, most of its donors appear to be incapable of implementing it in their own SSR practice. As a result, national development agencies continue to dominate SSR and marginalise non-development actors in their work. This makes cooperation with actors such as NATO or the OSCE problematical, to say the least.

A related issue is that norm implementers sometimes fail to practice what they preach, and in the process lose the credibility they need to ensure effective implementation. In their own domestic affairs, some NATO mem-

bers neglect to show the appropriate respect for the oversight norms that the organisation demands of would-be members and partners. In the process, these failures likely undermine the observance of these norms across the entire NATO and PfP community. Other IGOs where developed countries predominate have been accused of similar failings.

These last points suggest that the challenge with norms may be as much or more about how existing norms are integrated into programmes and implemented in practice as it is about the quality of the norms themselves. This demonstrates the importance of the nuts and bolts of SSR planning and execution, as well as the currently limited capacity of IGOs to perform these tasks adequately. Generally recognised SSR problems such as inadequate funding, insufficient numbers of competent staff and user-unfriendly access to programme resources may be just as important in determining outcomes as the quality of the norms themselves. That said, SSR norms represent agreed standards of behaviour for states. If they did not exist, they would have to be invented.

Cooperation Modalities

The case studies on IGO cooperation underscore three points in particular. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the policy breadth of SSR requires a degree of coordination and connectivity among bodies that were inexperienced in this domain. Our case studies have confirmed that an IGO culture of cooperation is dramatically underdeveloped. In addition, the case studies have underlined that the lack of a culture of cooperation is as much about intra-IGO as about inter-IGO relationships. Our contributors have described these intra-IGO problems at the EU, UN and OSCE. There is a similar problem at NATO between divisions that are mainly politically oriented and take their guidance from departments of foreign affairs and those that focus on defence issues and work with their defence ministries. The third point that emerges from this study, highlighted by the situation in Afghanistan, is that cooperation is not a policy option but a life-and-death issue, both for SSR providers and those to whom their efforts are directed.

IGO Strong and Weak Points

Table 13.1 summarises the strong and weak points of the IGOs in our study as concerns their activity in the area of SSR.

Table 13.1   IGO Strong and Weak Points

IGO	Strong point(s)	Weak point(s)
OECD	Acts as a framework for consultation among main bilateral and multilateral development actors; leader in norm development	Recipient countries not involved in norm-setting; security sector performance of OECD members not a subject of discussion
EU	Relatively 'complete' organisation in SSR terms; world's most prominent development donor with emerging security capacity; has developed own SSR concepts	Lack of coherence between SSR activities of Council (mainly ESDP) and Commission (mainly development); lack of wherewithal for remote and robust security contingencies
UN	Also, relatively 'complete' organisation in SSR terms; possesses (sometimes questioned) global authority for third-party interventions, decisive for SSR in post-conflict environments	Lack of coherence between its main SSR actors (UNDP and UNDPKO); lack of support for SSR among permanent UNSC members; uncertain prospects for developing SSR concept acceptable to all members
NATO	Only multilateral organisation capable of protecting actors delivering SSR in hostile environments; experience with successive generations of defence reform	Some members' resistance to developing concept for SSR (i.e., for defence reform and its implications for the rest of the security sector); weakening transatlantic solidarity in sharing security burden and inadequate capacity of several members

IGO	Strong point(s)	Weak point(s)
OCSE	With its Code of Conduct, articulated the first comprehensive approach to the security sector, which was developed by both transitioning and developed democracies; comprehensive approach to security; almost one-third of world's states are members	No consensus to update Code of Conduct norms to correct shortcomings and integrate innovations provided by SSR; threats to OSCE *acquis* and questioning of its relevance by some members
CoE	Strong norm-setting capacity; leading IGO on democratic governance	Limited relevance beyond member states; no explicit security agenda
ECOWAS	Strong norm-setting capacity; as SSR-recipient IGO, no apparent local ownership problem	Lacks its own resources; unevenness in members' resource profile; still democratising region with deficits in civil and political liberties
WB	Strong resource basis; technical expertise of relevance to SSR, especially as concerns public sector budgeting and management	Constraints on possibilities to intervene in political affairs of borrowing countries, leading to reticence to engage in security-related issues
IMF	Strong resource basis; technical expertise of relevance to SSR; especially as concerns fiscal issues	Constraints on possibilities to intervene in the political affairs of borrowing countries

Next Steps[4]

SSR has its work cut out for it. This section offers an overview of the various recommendations made by contributors to this volume.

Continuing the Conceptual Work

This study has shown that the underdeveloped and uneven conceptualisation of SSR has had an adverse effect on both the individual SSR efforts of IGO

actors and the way that they work with one another. Only two of the IGOs in this study have their own SSR concepts; only one has developed guidelines on implementation. Having a SSR concept is not a panacea, but it may well be a precondition for ensuring that an IGO can effectively mobilise and focus its SSR resources, and can in turn work together effectively with other SSR actors.

Another conceptual issue that has arisen in this study is the lack of a system of SSR norms accepted by all key IGO actors. There will likely never be a unified system of SSR norms for all IGOs, but this does not mean that is impossible to develop a core group of norms that are complemented by those particular to specific organisations. Box 13.1 contains elements that might constitute the bases of a generic, SSR-normative system. It will need, of course, to be further developed.

Box 13.1 Decalogue of Key SSR Norms

1. The security forces are capable of delivering security professionally, at a reasonable cost, and in a way that helps to ensure that justice for all individuals and groups in society is served.
2. The security sector is representative of the population as a whole. It is inclusive, adequately reflecting a country's various communities and fairly providing opportunities to both genders.
3. The security forces operate transparently. Information about their activities is accessible to the public, save where legitimate national security concerns justify keeping information classified.
4. A country's security objectives and policies are set out in a national security strategy and supporting documents that define the respective tasks and responsibilities of the various components of the security sector.
5. The executive and civil management authorities in charge of the security forces are capable of giving the security forces proper direction and management.
6. The security forces are overseen by, and accountable to, democratically-constituted civilian authorities**.** In particular, the legislature is empowered and able to oversee the policies and activities of the security forces as well as the executive and civil management authorities in charge of their activities.
7. The security sector is subject to a robust judicial and legal framework.
8. Civil society and non-governmental actors with a role in monitoring the governance of the security sector are active and can operate independently.
9. Domestic security sector actors are capable of interfacing smoothly with one another.
10. Domestic security sector actors are well-integrated into regional and international security frameworks.

Contributors to this study have noted a number of issues where additional normative work is in order. One is the need for a unified set of norms for the rule of law sector that sets out the executive, legislative and judicial aspects. Another is the need to deconstruct the issue of local ownership and enhance our understanding of its implementation in the various contexts where SSR is carried out.[5] The relationship between human security and SSR is relatively unresearched, notwithstanding the potential usefulness of human security in orienting SSR programming as well as evaluating SSR implementation.[6]

A further issue concerns the need to translate norms into systems of benchmarks that help practitioners to monitor and assess how they are being implemented, both in the rare situation where a single IGO or actor is involved and, more typically, where a multiplicity of actors are engaged. For example, what indicators can be assessed to evaluate whether security forces are performing professionally, as well as on behalf of the population as a whole and at a reasonable cost? Are there standards that are comparable from one country to another? Is it possible to conceive of a regionally or even an internationally accepted system of benchmarks?[7]

Benchmarks are important for several reasons. Take, for example, the case of Turkey and its accession to the EU. Benchmarks introduce a more objective measurement system into a political process and reduce its arbitrariness, assuming they are formalised and integrated into overall assessment systems, in this case that of suitability of membership. A head of state or government should not be able to block the handling of a process as important as EU enlargement on the basis of a domestic political calculation. Benchmarks allow as well for a certain comparability of different countries' performances, whether for EU membership or more general purposes. Benchmarks can also help guide countries with their budgeting decisions and prioritise measures in their overall planning for the security sector.

Building Capacity

The most promising recent initiative as concerns capacity-building is the development of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* and the ongoing effort to integrate the *Handbook* into the work of practitioners. This will help address the fact that there remains a decided lack of both SSR generalists and SSR sector experts who can connect their sectorial efforts to the wider SSR framework. The training modules being developed by the OECD DAC can be of decisive importance here. It will use an approach similar to that developed by the Harvard MBA programme, whose case-

study approach has been extremely successful, simulating working environments for thousands of businessmen and women, preparing them for real-world activity and in the process enhancing the pedagogical capacity of Harvard's educators. While the idea of the DAC Handbook has originated with development donors, it is hoped that practitioners from across the SSR community will profit from this initiative, associating themselves with it wherever practicable and adapting the DAC guidelines to the contexts where they are active as necessary.[8]

Enhancing Cooperation

There are a number of other possible initiatives that directly address the issue of cooperation that can be undertaken. One is for IGOs to develop their own general guidelines on inter-IGO cooperation. Another is for an IGO's member states to insist that its CEO pursue an active policy of cooperation with other organisations and for the CEO to make the ability to work together with other bodies, whether at headquarters or in the field, a criterion in decisions about staff remuneration and promotion. Cooperating IGOs should also consider drawing up statements outlining the principles of their cooperation and the techniques that they intend to use to this end. A further requirement, which become abundantly clear during the research phase of this project, is that much more work needs to be done to develop our theoretical understanding of cooperation, of what cooperative patterns work best under which circumstances and of the incentives that can be used to foster cooperation. Finally, there is a need to bring together the IGOs active in SSR in an informal policy network to increase their awareness of one another's approaches and activities, establish a dialogue on the way they work together and develop cooperative links. A modest start was made in this direction in 2004 when the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) brought together representatives of several IGOs interested in security and development for an exchange on their SSR-relevant activities.[9] The time has probably come to take this process forward.

Summoning the Necessary Political Will

Finally, this study, as many others before it, has also made clear that SSR cannot be successful unless IGOs and their member states summon the necessary political will to ensure that a comprehensive and cooperative approach is taken to reform and reconstruction efforts, which includes ensuring that the necessary resources are forthcoming to implement SSR in an effective and sustainable manner.

Notes

1   Judy Dempsey, 'Deal Reached on Afghan Police Training', *International Herald Tribune*, 27 August 2007.
2   See World Bank, ARTF Management Committee Meeting Minutes, available at http://www.worldbank.org.af/.
3   The Provincial Reconstruction Teams are relatively uncoordinated, operating by their own standards and pursuing different objectives. See Micheal McNerney, 'Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?', *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06): 32-46.
4   On 31 May 2007, DCAF invited members of the DCAF International Advisory Board to a Writers' Workshop to aid in the preparation of the 2007 Yearly Book. As part of the programme, participants were asked to brainstorm ideas on the key challenges in security sector governance over the short- to medium term. This exercise generated some 25 ideas. Some of these echoed the recommendations formulated in the case studies, while others went even further. The results of this brainstorming exercise can be found on the DCAF website.
5   For recent work on local ownership see Laurie Nathan, *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: a Guide for Donors*, paper commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool (January 2007), available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SSRReformNathan.pdf.
6   For a discussion of this issue, see David M. Law, 'Human Security and Security Sector Reform', *Sicherheit und Frieden* no. 1 (2005).
7   DCAF is presently supporting a project to identify a system of benchmarks for assessing SSR implementation in a national theatre. If this work proves successful, it will likely be extended, at first regionally and then perhaps more broadly. The project, run jointly with the Centre for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) in Belgrade, is called *Mapping Security Sector Reform in Serbia*.
8   DCAF has a number of programmes to help increase capacity. Fro example, it runs training programmes for various security sector actors, from parliamentary staffer to border guards. DCAF is also working on a concept called *co-learning* that seems to be particularly useful for security sector training. Co-learning exercises combine the generic knowledge of an issue that DCAF has gained from its experience in different countries and research with the insights of national practitioners into their own security sectors. They normally result in teaching the facilitators of such exercises as much or more as those who

are being facilitated. Another initiative is the DCAF Backgrounder Series on Security Sector Reform and Governance that was launched in 2004. This publication aims to map out various issues of relevance to SSR – with topics as varied as intelligence reform, multi-ethnic armed forces and child soldiers – in a way that identifies the central dimensions of the issue for practitioners, explores different country approaches and evaluates their pros and cons. The Backgrounders are modular, compact (around 3000 words) and comparative. As such, they fill an important gap in tool set generally available to security sector decisionmakers and researchers.

9 This workshop was held on 6 July 2004. The results can be accessed on the DCAF website at http://www.dcaf.ch.

ANNEXES

Annex 1

IGO SSR/G and Related Documents Referred to in Chapter 2

Ed. – As demonstrated by this list, IGOs have produced an abundance of SSR-related documents. Due to space constraints, the analysis and comparison in this chapter is based solely on documents appearing in bold.

Council of Europe (CoE)

CoE Parliamentary Assembly, *Resolution 690 (1979) on the Declaration on the Police* (1979).

CoE, *Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector* (1987).

CoE, *Recommendation No. R (87) 19 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Organisation of Crime Prevention* (1987).

CoE, *Resolution (97) 24 of the Committee of Ministers on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption* (1997).

CoE, *Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States* (1999).

CoE, *Criminal Law Convention on Corruption*, European Treaty Series No. 173 (Strasbourg, 1999).

CoE, *Recommendation No. R (2000) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials* (2000).

CoE, *Recommendation Rec(2001) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics* (2001).

CoE Parliamentary Assembly, *Recommendation 1572 on the Right of Association for Members of the Professional Staff of the Armed Forces* (2002).

CoE, *Recommendation Rec(2003) 21 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Partnership in Crime Prevention* (2003).

CoE, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), *The CPT Standards: 'Substantive' Sections of the CPT's General Reports* (2004).

CoE, *Recommendation Rec(2005) 9 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Witnesses and Collaborators of Justice* (2005).

CoE, *Recommendation Rec(2005) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 'Special Investigation Techniques' in Relation to Serious Crimes including Acts of Terrorism* (2005).

CoE, *Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism – The Council of Europe Guidelines* (2005).

CoE, *Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States* (2005).

CoE, *Recommendation Rec(2006) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Assistance to Crime Victims* (2006).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS, *Declaration of Political Principles* (1991).

ECOWAS, *ECOWAS Treaty* (1993).

ECOWAS, *The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* (1999).

ECOWAS, *On Democracy and Good Governance (Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security)*, Protocol A/SP1/12/01 (2001).

ECOWAS, *Declaration on a Sub-Regional Approach to Peace and Security* (2003).

ECOWAS, *Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa* (2006).

Cotonou Agreement, Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the Other Part (2000).

EU, *The European Community Communication on Conflict Prevention* (2001).

EU, *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World* (ESS) (2003).

EU, *The Commission Communication on Governance and Development* (2003).

EU, *EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict* (2003).

European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*, Strategy Paper (2004).

European Council, *EC Regulation establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union*, No 2007/2004 (2004).

EU, *The European Consensus on Development* (2005).

EU, *The EU and Africa: Towards a strategic partnership*, Doc. 15702/1/05 REV 1 (2005).

Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)* (2005).

European Commission, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (2006).

EU, *Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform*, Meeting of the General Affairs Council, Luxembourg (2006).

Communication from the European Commission to the European Council, June 2006, *Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility* (2006).

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

NATO, ***The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (1991).**

NATO, *Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document* **(1994).**

NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement* **(1995).**

NATO, *Membership Action Plan* **(1999).**

NATO, *Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001* **(1999).**

NATO, *Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)* **(2004).**

NATO, *Comprehensive Political Guidance endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government* **(2006).**

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

OECD, 'Security Issues and Development Cooperation: A Conceptual Framework For Enhancing Policy Coherence', *Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation Papers*, *The DAC Journal* 2, no.3 (2001).

OECD, *Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (2001).

OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance* – **DAC Guidelines and Reference Series** *(*2005).

OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice* **(2007).**

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly CSCE

CSCE, *Final Act* (Helsinki, 1975).

CSCE, *Vienna Concluding Document* (Vienna, 1989).

CSCE, ***Charter of Paris for a New Europe*** **(Paris, 1990).**

CSCE, *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Copenhagen, 1990).

CSCE, *Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Moscow, 1991).

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Annex 2

General Principles of SSR/G

Ed. – The following pages feature tables containing the general principles of security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) as reflected in statements, agreements and other documents of the IGOs examined in this volume. The organisation names appear in the left-hand column while general principles are listed across the top; the documents in which these principles feature are in bold. In cases where the general principle does not fully summarise the content of the documents, additional information has been included; these ideas are listed directly above the document(s) in which they appear.

	Holistic approach to security (security-development nexus, comprehensive security)	Local (national) ownership of the security sector
UN	Connection between security and development **Human Development Report (2002)** **Concept paper prepared for the Security Council open debate (2007)**	**Concept paper prepared for the Security Council open debate (2007)**
OSCE	Connection between peace and security and the advancement of democracy, respect for and effective exercise of human rights **Charter of Paris (1990)** Comprehensive and indivisible security **CoC (1995)**	
OECD	Whole of government approach, multi-sectoral strategies **DAC Guidelines (2005)**	**DAC Guidelines (2005)**
NATO	Broad approach to security **The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1991)** Interconnection between peace, security and development **Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006)**	
EU	Connection between security and development **Cotonou Agreement (2000)** **European Security Strategy (2003)** **ESDP SSR Concept (2005)** **Community SSR Concept (2006)**	**ESDP SSR Concept (2005)** **Community SSR Concept (2006)**

	Democratic control/ civilian oversight	Accountability of the security sector
UN	**Human Development Report (2002)**	
OSCE	**CoC (1995)**	No toleration or support for forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities **CoC (1995)**
OECD	**CoC (1995)** Independence of oversight institutions; Mechanisms of internal oversight within security and justice institutions; Capacity of parliaments to conduct oversight; Role of civil society and independent watchdogs in the democratic oversight of security and justice providers **OECD Handbook on SSR (2007)**	Principles of accountability and transparency: *i)* the availability of information required by policy makers; transparent and accountable decision-making *ii)* a comprehensive approach to public expenditure management *iii)* a capacity and willingness to shift priorities and reallocate resources to achieve strategic objectives. **DAC Guidelines (2005)**
NATO	**PfP (1994)** **Study on Enlargement (1995)** **Membership Action Plan (MAP) (1999)** **PAP-DIB (2004)**	**Membership Action Plan (MAP) (1999)**
EU	**ESDP SSR Concept (2005)**	**Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union (2000)** **ESDP SSR concept (2005)**
ECOWAS	Democratic civil-military relations; Effective governance of the armed forces and security services; Democratic control of the armed forces and security services by state institutions (executive, judiciary and parliament) as well as ECOWAS institutions (executive, secretariat, parliament and courts) **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**	
CoE	**Recommendation 1713 (2005)**	**Recommendation 1713 (2005)**

	Transparency of the security sector	Professionalism/ efficiency of the security sector
OSCE	Transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces **CoC (1995)** Stability, transparency and predictability in the military field **Charter for European Security (1999)**	
OECD		Institutional mechanisms for implementation and capacity throughout the security system; Professional security forces accountable to the civil authorities and capable of carrying out the operational tasks; Strengthening of professional security system must be balanced and include building the capacity of civil control and supervision bodies **DAC Guidelines (2005)**
NATO	Transparency in defence planning and military budgets **PfP (1994)** **Study on Enlargement (1995)** Effective and transparent financial planning and resource allocation; Procedures in the defence area **PAP-DIB (2004)**	**PAP-DIB (2004)**
EU	**ESDP SSR concept (2005)**	
ECOWAS	Transparency and accountability in defence planning, budgeting and procurement; Informing and educating the public about unclassified programmes and operations **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**	
CoE	**Recommendation 1402 (1999)** **Recommendation 1713 (2005)**	**Recommendation 1713 (2005)**

	Resources for the security sector	The duties of security sector actors
OSCE	Restraint in military expenditure; Determination of military capabilities on the basis of democratic procedures **CoC (1995)**	Political neutrality of armed forces; Measures to guard against accidental or unauthorised use of military means; Maintenance of military capabilities commensurate with individual or collective security needs; Non-imposition of military domination over other OSCE states; Stationing of armed forces on the territory of another state in accordance with freely negotiated agreements and international law **CoC (1995)**
NATO	Need for aspirant countries to commit sufficient resources to defence to meet the commitments of future membership **Membership Action Plan (MAP) (1999)** Affordable and inter-operable capabilities corresponding to the set requirements and international commitments; Effective, transparent and economically viable management of defence spending, taking into account macro-economic affordability and sustainability **PAP-DIB (2004)**	Military must be politically neutral **NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001**
ECOWAS	Adequate finances and logistics, ensured by the political authority **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**	No political interference, maintain political neutrality; Individual responsibility to refrain from murder, torture, corporal punishment, rape, mutilation, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, hostage taking and collective punishment; Use of firearms as last resort, with maximum restraint **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**
CoE		Functioning of security sector actors should be based on clear and appropriate legislation supervised by the courts; Security sector actors must remain neutral, not subject to any political influence **Recommendation 1713 (2005)**

	The rights of security sector actors	Compliance of security sector actors with internationally recognised values and standards
OSCE	Protection of the rights of personnel serving in the armed forces; Recruitment or call-up to be consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms; Reflection in laws or other relevant documents of the rights and duties of armed forces personnel **CoC (1995)**	Respect for Helsinki Final Act; Armed forces' compliance with the provisions of international humanitarian law; Individual accountability under national and international law for armed forces personnel **CoC (1995)**
OECD		**DAC Guidelines (2005)**
NATO	Participation of the military in political life **NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001**	**Membership Action Plan (MAP) (1999)** Effective and transparent arrangements and practices to ensure compliance with internationally accepted norms and practices established in the defence sector **PAP-DIB (2004)**
EU		**ESDP SSR concept**
ECOWAS	No discrimination in recruitment; Respect basic human rights at all times; Enjoyment of human rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the constitution **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**	Compliance with international humanitarian law, human rights and national laws; Education in constitutional law, international humanitarian law and human rights for all personnel **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**
CoE	Reasonable presence of women in security sector institutions **Recommendation 1713 (2005)** **Recommendation 1572 on the Right of association for members of the professional staff of the armed forces (2002)**	Training of the security sector actors in international humanitarian law and in legal norms and principles **Recommendation 1713 (2005)**

	Cooperation
OSCE	Cooperative approach to security; Cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes; Cooperation in the event of armed conflict; Solidarity principle (if OSCE norms and principles are violated) **CoC (1995)**
OECD	Political dialogue with each partner country; Whole-of-government approach; Donor coordination; Cooperation with regional organisations **DAC Guidelines (2005)** Strengthening of regional arrangements for military co-operation, confidence building, arms control and disarmament **OECD Handbook on SSR (2007)**
NATO	Development of cooperative military relations with NATO **PfP (1994)** Fostering cooperation, consultation and consensus building among new members of the Alliance; Promotion of good neighbourly relations; Integration and cooperation in Europe; Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic partnership **Study on Enlargement (1995)**
EU	**ESDP SSR concept**
ECOWAS	Cooperation among armed forces and security services in carrying out their responsibilities; Regular interactions of civilian, political and administrative authority, armed forces and security services personnel, civil society, including non-governmental organisations and the media at different levels through public fora **ECOWAS CoC (2006)**
CoE	**Recommendation 1713 (2005)**

Annex 3

IGO Documents Creating
Norms for Specific Security Sector Actors

Council of Europe	
Civil society	Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
PMCs/PSCs	Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
Borderguards	Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
Intelligence services	Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States (1999) Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
Police and law enforcement bodies	Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005) Recommendation Rec(2001) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Code of Police Ethics (2001)
Armed forces	Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
Judiciary	Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States (1999)
Legislature	Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States (1999) Recommendation 1572 on the Right of Association for Members of the Professional Staff of the Armed Forces (2002) Recommendation 1713 on Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States (2005)
Executive	Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States (1999)

	ECOWAS
Civil society	Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa (2006)
PMCs/PSCs	
Border guards	
Intelligence services	
Police and law enforcement bodies	Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa (2006)
Armed forces	On Democracy and Good Governance (Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security), Protocol A/SP1/12/01 (2001) Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces in West Africa (2006)
Judiciary	
Legislature	On Democracy and Good Governance (Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security), Protocol A/SP1/12/01 (2001)
Executive	Recommendation 1402 on Control of Internal Security Services in Council of Europe Member States (1999)

	European Union
Civil society	
PMCs/PSCs	
Borderguards	
Intelligence services	Agenda 2000
Police and law enforcement bodies	Agenda 2000 Council Joint Action of 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission, 2002/210/CFSP, Preamble
Armed forces	Agenda 2000
Judiciary	
Legislature	
Executive	

	NATO
Civil society	NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) (2004)
PMCs/PSCs	
Borderguards	
Intelligence services	
Police and law enforcement bodies	
Armed forces	Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document (1994) NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) (2004)
Judiciary	Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) (2004)
Legislature	NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) (2004)
Executive	NATO Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) (2004)

OECD	
Civil society	Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005) OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
PMCs/PSCs	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Borderguards	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Intelligence services	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Police and law enforcement bodies	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Armed forces	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Judiciary	OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Legislature	Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005) OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice (2007)
Executive	Security System Reform and Governance – DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (2005)

	OSCE
Civil society	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994)
PMCs/PSCs	
Borderguards	Border Security and Management Concept (2005)
Intelligence services	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994)
Police and law enforcement bodies	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994) Charter for European Security (Istanbul, 1999) Key Principles of Democratic Policing (2006)
Armed forces	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994)
Judiciary	Charter for European Security (Istanbul, 1999)
Legislature	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994)
Executive	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Bucharest, 1994)

	UN
Civil society	
PMCs/PSCs	
Borderguards	
Intelligence services	
Police and law enforcement bodies	Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, General Assembly Res. A/Res/34/169 (1979) Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (2002)
Armed forces	Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (2002)
Judiciary	
Legislature	
Executive	

Annex 4

IGO Documents and Sources Consulted for Chapter 3

1. Unilateral Statements

<u>European Union (EU)</u>

EU, *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* (2001).

EU, *European Security Strategy* (2003).

EU, *A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform* (2006).

<u>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)</u>

NATO, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Security*, Summit Declaration (1991).

NATO, *Foreign Ministers' Final Communiqué* (1992).

NATO, *Defence Planning Committee's Final Communiqué* (1992).

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<u>formerly the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)</u>

CSCE, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (1990).

CSCE, *The Challenges of Change (Helsinki Summit Declaration)* (1992).

OSCE, *Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century* (1996).

OSCE, *Charter for European Security* and its operational document, the *Platform for Security Cooperation* (1999).

OSCE, *The Bucharest Plan of Action for combating terrorism* (2003)

OSCE, *Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century* (2003)

OSCE, *Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension* (2003)

OSCE, *Border Security and Management Concept* (2005)

<u>United Nations (UN)</u>

UN, *Charter of the United Nations* (1945).

2. Statements and Resources on Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

<u>CoE-EU</u>

Joint Declaration on cooperation and partnership between the Council of Europe and the European Commission (2001), available at http://www.jp.coe.int/programmes/general/JointDeclaration_EF.asp.

<u>EU-NATO</u>

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (2002), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm.

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EU-OSCE

European Council, *Draft Council Conclusions on EU-OSCE Co-operation in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation*, 14527/1/03 REV 1 (2003).

EU-UN

Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management (2003), available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2768_en.htm.

NATO-UN

NATO, 'Chapter 15: The Wider Institutional Framework for Security', *NATO Handbook* (2002), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1501.htm.

OSCE-CoE

OSCE, Secretariat – External Co-operation – The Council of Europe, accessed 12 September 2007, available at http://www.osce.org/ec/13064.html.

OSCE-EU

OSCE, *Secretariat – External Co-operation – The European Union*, accessed 12 September 2007, available at http://www.osce.org/ec/13066.html.

<u>OSCE-NATO</u>

OSCE, *Secretariat – External Co-operation – NATO*, accessed 12 September 2007, available at http://www.osce.org/ec/13065.html.

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OSCE, *Secretariat – External Co-operation – The United Nations*, accessed 12 September 2007, available at http://www.osce.org/ec/13063.html.

<u>World Bank-EU</u>

World Bank, *The World Bank and the European Union – European* Commission, available at http://web.worldbank.org

Annex 5

Unilateral IGO SSR-relevant Declarations on Cooperation Consulted for Chapter 3

Year	Lead IGO	Name of Document	Other IGOs Mentioned	Subject of Cooperation	Geographi-cal Focus of Cooperation
1945	UN	Charter	Unnamed regional organisations	Regional or-ganisations' contribution to the UN	Global
1990	CSCE	Charter of Paris for a New Europe	CoE, Bretton Woods Institutions (IMF and WB), OECD, the UN	The new post-Cold War order in Europe	Greater Europe
1991	NATO	Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (Summit Declaration)	European Community, WEU, CoE, CSCE	Interlocking institutions (later referred to as mutually reinforcing institutions)	Post-Communist Europe
1992	CSCE	The Challenges of Change (Helsinki Summit Declaration)	The UN and 'appropriate' international organisation, including those from outside the CSCE area	Improved contact and practical cooperation with IGOs, NGOs, states, groups and individuals	Inside and outside OSCE area

1992	NATO	Foreign Ministers' Communiqué	CSCE (as well as the WEU, and reiterated general support for UN and CSCE)	NATO contribution of assets to CSCE peacekeeping operations	Europe
1992	NATO	Defence Planning Committee Communiqué	UN	NATO contribution of assets to UN-mandated operations for UN (and reiterated similar support for OSCE)	Not defined
1996	OSCE	Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century	European and transatlantic security organisation, the UN	OSCE as providing a forum for cooperation and coordination among organisations	OSCE area
1999	OSCE	Charter for European Security and its operational document, the Platform for Cooperative Security	Other organisations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security, particularly the CoE	Strengthening mutually reinforcing nature of organisations concerned with comprehensive security	OSCE area

2001	EU	EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts	UN, OSCE, NATO, CoE and other international and regional organisations such as the WB and the IMF	Conflict prevention and crisis management	Mainly Europe, but the EU also commits itself to helping strengthen capacity of organisations outside Europe
2003	EU	European Security Strategy	UN, the WB, and IMF, NATO, OSCE, CoE and others such as the WTO and AU, not included in this study	Conflict management and prevention; crisis management; terrorism; proliferation of WMD; regional conflicts; nuclear weapons	Global
2003	OSCE	The Bucharest Plan of Action for combating terrorism	UN and EU and other relevant actors	Preventing violent conflict and promoting peaceful settlement of disputes; combating terrorism through the enhancement of information exchange, analysis and early warning	Inside and outside OSCE area

2003	OSCE	Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension	UN, OECD, IMF	Combating corruption; prevention and resolution of financial crisis; addressing environmental threats	OSCE area
2003	OSCE	Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century	UN, EU, NATO, CoE, OECD, IFIs, sub-regional organisations	Cooperation in addressing 'new threats' such as SALW, trafficking and terrorism	OSCE area
2005	OSCE	Border Security and Management Concept	International, regional and sub-regional organisations	Border-related issues	OSCE area
2006	EU	A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform	European Community cooperation with the UN, CoE, OSCE and OECD DAC	Strengthening cooperation with regional and multilateral organisations in SSR planning and implementation	Global

Annex 6

Bilateral Arrangements among IGOs
With a Role in the Euro-Atlantic Area
Consulted for Chapter 3

IGOs	Date	Issue Areas	Region
OSCE-EU	Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 but became more concrete with CFSP and ESDP	Judicial and police reform; public administration; anti-corruption measures; democratisation, institution-building and human rights; media development; border management and combating human trafficking; elections	Mainly Balkans, South, Caucasus and Eastern Europe
CoE-EU	1987	Governance issues, especially those involving democracy, human rights and rule of law; joint programmes launched as of 2001 with the Joint Declaration on Cooperation and Partnership.	Countries which have joined the CoE since 1989 or applied for membership

World Bank-EU	Since early 1990s in NIS states and in Africa through PRSPs since 2001; WB-EU Framework Agreement in 2001	Joint financing; EC contribution to WB projects; dialogue on trade, debt relief, education, health and migration; sharing of information and research	CEE, CIS, MENA and Africa
NATO-UN	1992	Peacekeeping; peace support operations; stabilisation missions	In principle, no geographical limitations
CSCE-UN Framework for Cooperation and Coordination between the UN Secretariat and the CSCE	1993, updated after 2001	Terrorism; conflict settlement and peace-building; early warning and conflict prevention; SALW; border management; environmental and economic aspects of security; anti-trafficking; democratisation and human rights; freedom of the media	OSCE area

OSCE-NATO	1996[1]	Conflict prevention; crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation; combating terrorism; border management and security; disarmament; small arms and light weapons; confidence- and security-building measures; regional issues; exchange of experience on respective Mediterranean outreach programmes; election monitoring	OSCE area (to date, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan)
NATO-EU	2002	NATO-EU cooperation on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), specifically in crisis management and conflict prevention	In principle, no geographical limitations; includes notion of EU engagement in areas where NATO is not active
NATO-EU Berlin Plus Arrangements	2003	Crisis management; peace support operations; stabilisation	In principle, anywhere NATO has operations but mainly the Western Balkans so far (NATO-EU cooperation in Darfur and Iraq is outside Berlin Plus)

EU-UN	2003	Crisis management	In principle geographically unlimited (until 2007, only in Bosnia and the Congo)
EU-OSCE	2003	Conflict prevention; crisis management; post-conflict rehabilitation	The OSCE area
OSCE-CoE	OSCE/CoE Coordination Group established in 2004,[2] on the basis of Common Catalogue of Cooperation (2000)	Terrorism; combating trafficking in human beings; tolerance and non-discrimination; national minorities; election observation; legislation reform; Roma and Sinti; human rights; democratisation; local government; media freedom	Europe

Notes

1   The OSCE website states that, as of this date, the '…OSCE and NATO have been engaged in an expanding process of political interaction and co-operation'. See http://www.osce.org/ec/13065.html.

2   On the establishment of the Coordination Group, see OSCE Decision No. 637, 'Enhanced Cooperation Between the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE)', 2 December 2004. On the *Common Catalogue of Co-operation,* see OSCE, 'Secretariat – External Cooperation – The Council of Europe', available at http://www. osce.org/ec/13064.html. At the 2005 Warsaw Summit, the OSCE and the CoE issued a joint statement declaring their intention to enhance co-operation. See OSCE Decision No. 670, 'Co-operation between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe', PC.DEC/670, 28 April 2005.

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Andrew SHERRIFF is an independent consultant who has implemented programmes, researched and published on issues of conflict, security and development. He has undertaken work for DFID, UK Global Conflict Prevention Pools, ECDPM and UNIDIR amongst others. He previously worked for International Alert, managing their engagement on EU and conflict sensitive development.

About DCAF

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector.

To this end, the Centre develops and promotes appropriate norms at the international and national levels, determines good practices and relevant policy recommendations for effective governance of the security sector, and provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes to all interested actors.

Detailed information is available at www.dcaf.ch.

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